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ABSTRACT 
In part one, chapter one, the meaning of education is looked at. It is 
argued that 'education' is an essentially contestable concept and that 
philosophers of education can only hope to define it themselves by putting 
forward their own contestable definitions. I then define the concept as: 
learning which promotes the development of the person qua person, but 
I recognise that this is contestable. With the ultimate aim of being able 
to defend this definition, chapter two is devoted to examining the concept 
of learning and chapters three to six to the concept of the person. More 
specifically with reference to the latter, in chapter three, a short 
exposition is given of how what it is to be a person has been explained 
in the past, in chapter four, that it is essentially characteristic of the 
person that he is a centre of human experience, and in chapters five and 
six, respectively, that he is also a rational and moral agent. In part 
two, chapter seven, the concept of development is analysed and, in 
chapter eight, the definition of education given above is explained and 
defended against other definitions. 
In part three, the concept of physical education is examined and justified. 
In the first two chapters the subject matter is defined. Chapter nine 
being concerned with the concept of sport and the value of physical skill 
and chapter ten with physical education, dance and aesthetic values. 
Then, in chapter eleven physical education is justified in that it can 
legitimately be said to fulfil two roles. Namely, it gives a conceptual 
group of activities a name and at the same time it correctly asserts these 
activities are of educational value. By taking a formalist theory usually 
to be found in the philosophy of art and by applying it to P. E. activities, 
physical education can be seen to have a coherent rationale and recognisable 
'KI values which are unique and which are appreciated disinterestedly by 
the participant; and, by taking the definition of education which has 
already been put forward and defended in parts one and two, physical 
education is justified because of the considerable contribution it- makes to 
the development of the person qua person. 
Firstly, as a centre of experience a person can gain intrinsic satisfaction: 
generally through experiencing the interplay of different powers; and 
more specifically through learning to move skilfully and in some activities 
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aesthetically as well. Secondly, as an evaluator, a person, by learning 
to perform in sport and dance, will have the range of intrinsically 
worthwhile activities open to him increased. Thirdly, but incidentally, 
physical education may, to a limited extent, make a contribution to the 
development of the person as a moral agent. Fourthly, and also 
incidentally, engagement in many P. E. activities is likely to make a 
person physically fit and could therefore help in an indirect way towards 
the development of the person and the subsequent quality of his life. 
Finally, however, it is concluded that it is only because there are values 
in physical education which are not to be found anywhere else, namely 
unique I KI qualities, and the appreciation of which requires initiation 
as a participant into different physical activities, that the educational 
value of P. E. activities can be most strongly justified and the subsequent 
place of physical education on the school curriculum. 
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CHAPTER ONE : THE MEANING OF EDUCATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The meaning of education has been defined in a 
'variety of highly contest- 
able ways to the extent that there seems to be difficulty in laying down 
what might even be considered as the criteria that could serve to distin- 
guish education from other things. Considering philosophy of education 
has been on the map now for a good number of years, the student teacher 
could be forgiven, if, when looking to philosophy as a means of clarifying 
his ideas, formulating and justifying his educational values, he becomes 
somewhat dismayed in finding that philosophers who have been engaged in 
the activity for much longer than he has, or is ever likely to be, cannot 
even agree on what the term ' education' actually means. He could, indeed, 
come to the conclusion that if this in itself is a controversial area there 
will be little chance of him making sense of the rest of it, and at this point 
he may as well throw in the towel. 
Now, one of the obvious causes of difficulty is due to. the fact that the 
word ' education' is used in so many different ways, so that it could be 
argued there are really several distinct but related concepts which have 
the same verbal marker. For example, it can refer to any kind of human 
upbringing or process of socialization, which may, or may not, include 
reference to an educational system; it can also be used where there is 
no intentional process of formal initiation but where we refer to those y, a 
experiences that are significant to us' from just 'being in the world' . 
These kinds of definitions show that education' can be used in a very 
loose sense. But it can also be used in a very tight and precise way: for 
example, when education is contrasted to training or indoctrination, 
er 
when it is used to refer to those qualities which are constitutive 
of the 
educated man. Often, the distinction between the different uses is made 
clear because of the way the word ' education' is qualified. We talk, for 
example, of liberal education, primary education, physical education and 
remedial education. 
However, while it may be-somewhat, unfortunate that there are so many 
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different uses of the öne"term all carrying the same label, there is no 
reason why this in itself shouldlead to endless disagreement. A point 
which 'is fully appreciated by J. Wilson in his article ' Concepts, Contest- 
ability and The Philosopher of Education' (1), where he says: 'It is 
nothing new that different people mean different things by the same word 
but what " we 'should say here is that the word marks different concepts 
not that one and the same concept is being contested' (2). 
In"this same article Wilson criticises W. B'. ' Gallie' in'his account of essen- 
tially contested concepts (3) for' failing to distinguish between the use of 
words and the use of concepts and of trading on this ambiguity. He sug- 
gests that Gällie' s account fails once this distinction is understood and 
acknowledged. In order to illustrate his point, Wilson gives the example 
of the word r' chat' , 
which has a different meaning' depending on whether 
you' are French or English'speaking. ' In so doing, ' he exposes one of the 
main weaknesses of his argument, for while, there is no relationship 
between the different meanings' in this, and other examples he gives (4) , 
with the word' education' , . while: 
it may also refer to different' concepts, 
they are rarely, if ever, unrelated ones. This means, providing we are 
sympathetic to Wittgenstein' s use of a family analogy and are prepared 
to look for a' family resemblance' when analysing concepts, we may have 
good grounds for talking generally about the concept of education in a 
collectively overlapping sense. 
Of course, for this to be the case we would have to show that different 
uses of the term shared"at least some of the same underlying criteria. 
Certainly where this did not occur the differences between them would 
then be'-sufficiently fundamental for us to say here are totally different 
concepts which just happen to have been given the same verbal marker. 
For example, sometimes what is in effect a training programme is given 
the label ' education' but analysis of the concept of training shows not 
only that it is' a quite different concept, but that the criteria which define 
it can actually be contrasted to those of education in order to make the 
meaning of the latter clearer (5) 
But where the uses of-the term do share the same basic criteria, - even 
though they differ in others, surely we are justified in talking about the 
concept of education which would encompass different individual meanings 
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of the term, that is providing there are a sufficient number of common 
criteria that are basic to any one meaning. And if these criteria are 
applied in different contexts and in so doing generate further criteria, 
then have we not also got grounds for talking about the use of the 
concept as well? The use of the concept, in effect. to make new but' 
related concepts? 
However, even if a broad definition of the' concept of education can be 
justified, and even if the notion of using a concept can be saved, this 
still leaves us with the more basic issue: why should the concept of '' 
education or different, but related concepts of education, however one 
prefers to put it, be contestable? 
It is a- question which Wilson raises in the article already referred to and 
to which he gives, the answer that there is nothing to contest. He says: 
' If controversy over meaning of concepts does exist, this is simply 
because we have not taken the trouble to analyse adequately, to 
observe and note differences and similarities between the different 
uses of the one term' . (6) 
All that. is. needed,, therefore, for the bewildered student teacher wishing 
to understand the concept and concepts of education better is to become 
skilful in the technique of careful descriptive analysis, and to learn to 
apply them to anything labelled ' education' . 
But even if the task could be described as simply as that we would still 
need to acknowledge that the validity of such a task must rest on our 
prior understanding of a theory of -meaning. Analysing a concept 
like 
education, is dependent on us knowing the rules that govern the use., of 
the term but this rests -. on the -question 
of how the general nature of 
those rules is to be explained., In contemporary philosophy.. two main 
explanations could be given, namely one supplied- by communication,. - 
intention theory andhthe, other by formal , semantic--theory. -. 
The former, is 
concerned with what -is done. when an, utterance is made, the 
latter with 
the utterance itself. H. Grice, for example,., as one of. the best known 
exponents of communication-intention theory would analyse ,1 meaning that 
X' as: 'A must intend to induce by Xa belief in an audience and he 
must also intend his utterance to be recognised as so intended' (7). 
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While, in contrast, D. Davidson gives a recursive explanation (8) . 
He 
argues that in looking for a theory of meaning we are looking for a 
theory of truth which would conform to Tarski' s Convention T: where 
X is true i and only if Pby substituting the structural description of 
S for X and our English translation of S for p. (9) On this analysis of 
meaning the function that language has of communication is inessential . 
In giving a semantic analysis of meaning the idea of truth, remains 
entirely formal. It is for this reason that many have found the theory 
as a complete theory of meaning to be inadequate. For example, Strawson 
says to define truth only recursively amounts to a refusal to face the 
general philosophical question altogether. He argues: 
! Having agreed to the general point that the meanings of the 
sentence of a language are determined or largely determined by 
rules which determine truth conditions, we then raise the general 
question what sort of thing truth conditions are, or what truth 
conditions are conditions of and we are told that the concept of 
truth for a given language is defined (my italics) by the rules 
which determine the truth conditions for sentences of that 
language. 
Evidently we cannot be satisfied with this' (10). 
It is for this reason that in formulating a theory of meaning we cannot 
just rely on an extensionalist account, for we cannot deny the import- 
ance of communication - intention to our understanding of language and 
this is because it is only by recourse to such a notion that we can 
explain the idea of truth which is not simply a, recursive one. 
{.., _ea 
Speech - Act Theorists have recognised that language is natural and 
that it is only if it was artificial that Taski' s theory of truth would, _ 
work (11). The nature of language-, can only be fully understood if we 
recognise its purpose and, that is, communication between persons who 
hold beliefs and act intentionally towards one another.. It is only.  within 
this context that we can give an explanation, of the meaning of a sen- 
tence where we need to know under what conditions one who. utters it 
says something which is true. For we cannot explain in general what 
it is to say something true by giving only semantic criteria we have 
also to refer to the role of belief and the expression of belief (12). 
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Now in- giving criteria of a particular concept in order to analyse its` 
meaning are we giving truth conditions? Clearly we are not giving' truth 
conditions in a semantic sense. In fact Scruton has argued that : the 
concept of truth developed in semantics is something quite separate 
from the question of individual analysis and tha1'it can be neither set 
aside, Y'nor amended in the light of considerations that arise only in'r, - 
analysis of individual terms' (13) ;I would argue, , however, in. the Witt- 
gensteinian sense that criteria are rules of language operating in, differ- 
ent language games. Moreover, they are not just conventional rules for 
making unimportant classifications which have value only because they-, 
tell us when it is correct to say something; rather it is because they°- 
reflect ' shared beliefs' . -'agreement 
in judgments' - held because of our 
common purposes and because the world is as it is and as we have- made 
it, that criteria governing the use of-a term can be said to have truth 
value. 
If, we now return to the task of analysing the concept of education it 
becomes immediately relevant that' , we are not dealing with an, empirical 
but an evaluative concept, - so -that if -the criteria of " the concept of 
education can be said to have truth value it is to the extent, that- they 
reflect agreement in judgments which are essentially evaluative ones. ' 
Indeed, it is because of its evaluative, nature that 'it has been of so I 
much interest to philosophers. - For.. this interest, I would suggest; has 
not been due so much to the demand just-for conceptual. analysis, 
although obviously that existed. but because of . the - moral' Issues' that 
analysis has brought to light, - either ý because moral issues were actually 
found to be embedded in the meaning of education or because it was 
found to be, impossible to analyse. the {concept without , presupposing or 
making certain value judgments oneself. 
ax. w1ýS 
Now,, Wilson!, sz account does not do justice to this. By trying to, restrict 
the. kind of permitted. usage of, the' term 'education' to a purely descrip- 
tive one, he denies the starting point of the whole enterprise: education 
as a morally-evaluative concept.; " "` 
..,. ýýt.... ý, .ý,.. ._,. 
ýý, -_ ,_ 
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ii TWO USES OF ' EDUCATION' 
The distinction between these two uses is well brought out by 
W. F. Frankena in his article, 'The Concept of Education Today' (14) 
where he defines the descriptive, sociological use as: 
' the transmission to the young of the dispositions or states of 
mind that are regarded as desirable by their elders' 
and the evaluative use as: 
' the fostering in the young of the dispositions or states of mind 
that are desirable' 
Both definitions Frankena suggests, can be generated from the same 
basic matrix or formula in which: 
'X is fostering or seeking to foster Y in some disposition D by 
method M, and where there is an underlying assumption that 
the disposition is a desirable one that is worth fostering' (15) 
Clearly both uses do exist, even if we were acting as sociologists and 
wished to analyse the education of a society in an externally descriptive 
way, there would still be those within that society who, because they 
were committed to it, would talk of the same education in an internal 
evaluative sense. 
However, Wilson, I think, would have a reply to this, he would argue 
that, while the prescriptive use does indeed exist, it needs to be re- 
interpreted. He says, for example, that, ' when people who are not 
sociologists ask, "what is education? ", they really mean, or ought to 
mean, "what should our education system consist of? ". This would at 
least be the right way to put it' (16). 
But as education clearly is used in an evaluative sense, that is people 
do write particular values into the actual meaning of education, Wilson 
is being stipulative in suggesting that we should keep the descriptive 
use, but rule the normative one out. 
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Now there are philosophers who would try' to show that Wilson cannot 
do this on strictly logical grounds by arguing that the normative use 
is logically prior' tö the sociological one. T. F. Daveney, for example, 
argues that because both uses of , education presuppose either an ideal 
person or ideal society for which the education fits the individual mem- 
ber, then, when we talk of education, in whatever sense, values are 
necessarily, that is, I logical ly, implied (17). P. Walsh 'in an unpublished 
paper also argues in this way. He uses the analogy of project planning, 
in which language can be involved in two ways, one in conceiving and 
planning the project, the other in describing it as planned or executed. 
He then suggests the purely,, descriptive, function of language has to be 
secondary-to the planning use because, until the project is planned, 
there is nothing to describe. (18). The analogy is supposed to hold 
because, education -is the name ' of ,a human project. 
However, it is difficult to see how those kinds of arguments can be sus- 
tained. Certainly, without dispositions regarded as desirable, or beliefs 
and attitudes thought worth passing on, or worthwhile activities that 
persons should be initiated into, education would not exist, but this 
does not mean that values, as a. matter of logical necessity have to be 
written into the meaning of education. (Similarly, while without the plan- 
ning of the project there will be nothing to describe and while the pro- 
ject will depend on, and reflect the values of the planners, there is 
still no reason why these have to be written into the meaning of the 
project. ) Wilson is therefore quite at liberty to suggest that while it 
does happen - i. e. values are. written into the meaning, of education, 
there is no logical reason, why they should and that it would be much 
better,, at least philosophically speaking, if they did not. 
One of the reasons why the kind of argument that, Daveney gives seems 
to carry weight, is because the term. ' evaluative concept' can be under- 
stood in different ways. For example: 
(1) where the concept in question presupposes certain values or 
value judgments, but where these are not written into the 
concept and are not therefore logically -implied (e. g. this is 
true with the concept of reform) ; 
(2) where certain values have become written into the meaning of 
the concept (for example this is often said of both democracy 
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and education) but where the concept is actually used in only 
an external, descriptive sense (for 
. 
example by sociologists);. 
(3) , where certain values have become . written into the , concept and 
-where it is being used 
because there is, a commitment, , to those values, in other words, to use the concept is to justify and 
prescribe. k' 
But only, -on 'the- last" two : uses of -what could be meant by an, evaluative 
concept would. it be true to sYsay- that the: normative 
use was logically 
prior to the descriptive use. And, while the use of education Aas a con- 
cept must always presuppose certain value` judgments, (for example, as 
Daveney suggests, to do with an ideal person or society) it does not 
have 'to be used in - the, last, two -senses, although, as I, shall argue later, 
these can be- justified in other ways. ' 
We could, -, however, criticise Wilson on- the grounds of, inconsistency, as 
P. ý Snelders - has done. (19),. -For if Wilson -believes in the? importance of 
the non-evaluative descriptive, analysis of 'concepts, then, he can : neither 
deny the ; normative use exists nor 'pass .a death, sentence in, order. sto 
rule ite out, « and still uphold that concepts 'should be subject only to, 
descriptive analytical- treatment. But, it- may -at, least The --wiser, 'to waive 
this ý criticism and to allow the force of-his argument, to Ibe i considered, 
namely,, -,, that' at 
least as philosophers, we need. to consider ý matters -of 
value in their, own right as substantive issues separate . 
from conceptual 
ones., Is- Wilson! s fear, justified; then, that if the two are f combined there 
will always, be' a- danger- that ' people. will attempt to force or smuggle 
their 'preferred idealogies into certain categories under some disguise 
or other? ' (20) 
Presumably, Frankena would not think so, for in the article I have 
already referred to, having made the initial distinction between the two 
uses of, education, -he then goes on to recommend the adoption.. ofAheý- 
evaluative : one, at least, when -we care engaged-An, educational activity. aand 
to-leave-the other for use' in: the social, - sciences: - In other.., words. -he, f 
proposes that, we should' accept_by definition that education -is essen-. --- 
tially a , normative concept, (in the third {sense given= `above) @% Frankena 
argues-that-if the, meaning of education is restricted ý-to, the sociological 
sense, then ' it limits education by- definition-, to ' the, cultivation of 
dispositions already regarded by society as desirable by methods already 
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regarded., as- satisfactory' (21) .ý Ina similar way that it is always possible 
with regard to = the moral-code of =a particular society to raise the over- 
riding, question, of its moral. justification -according to criteria that are-- 
universal in their application, and cannot be dismissed, as, socially, rela- 
tive, so with education, whatever', dispositions; may as a matter of °a 
sociological fact' be, fostered by a- particular, society, we can still, ques- 
tion their educational value and we can -talk of, -educating society itself. 
It, is only by recourse to ; the normative use, Frankena maintains, that 
we will have a- concept of-. education that, can guide us- (my italics) as a 
pillar of cloud by day x and a ¬pillar of, fire by night' ' (22). " 
However, in practical terms;., the difference ' between -these two may not 
be as great as it first -appears. For -thereis, no reason -why Frankena 
should not agree with Wilson that private preference should not be 
sneaked in, under the guise . of 
definition, or why-Wilson should disagree 
with. Frankena that what --actuallyü does go on under the . name of educa- 
tion should not be' open to assessment and change. The =criteria used-for 
the, assessment would then- turn outtAo be-the crucial difference between 
them. For Wilson the criteria would, in the first instance, define educa- 
tion in strictly logical terms, to do with learning and being above the 
level of nature and- so'on'- (23) , 'and` then `the - question of its moral 
value would be a further one and not a question of meaning. But for 
Frankena the two could not. be'separated. The question, for example, of 
what., dispositions ý should be =fostered would also be" a. question to do with 
the 'meaning of ; education. ` In-, short, while on both accounts educational, 
questions -give rise to moral issues and consequently 'to controversy, dis- 
agreement, and ' the need for their' justification; - on Wilson's account this 
would not-be, « a conceptual disagreement on Frankena' s account . it would 
be .. ý. , .. _ 
This-brings us tothe'nub". of the: problem. of whether education should 
be 'accepted. as an: ' essentially , contested concept `'as some have suggested 
it- should. If we take Frankena', s' suggestion `of adopting the evaluative 
use of education, then, because it is open-ended and actually has writ- 
ten'into 'it, 'values that: are usually- various' and conflicting-ones, "then 
education, has -to -be , seen as -an, essentially contestable concept (see--, 
below) - while if we 'accept Wilson's stipulation, it°does not. " 
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How do we resolve a difference as fundamental as this and one crucial 
for the purpose, of my thesis? For in setting out to explain in parts one 
and two the concept of education and, more specifically, in part three, 
the concept of physical education, I am already assuming that educational 
values have been written into their meaning. Whether, with regard to 
physical education, historically speaking, this was for reasons of con- 
venience or prestige does not really matter. What matters now is 
whether they can be justified. In order to answer this I need to know 
in advance whether or not education should be accepted as an evaluative 
concept in the third sense given above, because if this cannot be demon- 
strated I am clearly wasting my time, for the overall intention behind my 
thesis will be judged to be misconceived from the outset. So I have to 
be sure philosophers like Frankena as opposed to Wilson are right. 
But beforeweconsider whether the use of the concept of education as an 
essentially contestable one can be justified, it would be useful to look at 
Gallie' s article which prompted discussion in the first place on whether 
education should be counted as such a concept. 
bi GALLIE' S CRITERIA OF AN ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT 
Gallie at the beginning of his article (already referred to, see p. 6 ') 
suggests that when philosophical clarification is called for on the use of 
a term which is causing disagreement or confusion this could lead philo- 
sophers making one of three claims - either the philosopher might claim 
to discover and persuade others he had discovered a new meaning on 
which everyone could henceforth agree; or he might stipulate a new 
meaning for the contested term which, if accepted, would enable dis- 
agreement to be avoided in the future (clearly Wilson comes under this 
category) ; o; lastly, he might claim to prove or explain the necessity of 
the contested character of the concept in question (24). What Gallie has 
to say in the text of his article falls into this last category. 
Gallie argues that there are certain concepts which are essentially con- 
testable in nature; these have certain common characteristics. Firstly, 
the term given to the concept (e. g. a work of art) is used in a variety 
of ways, but where there is no one clearly defined defensible general 
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use which can be set up as the correct or standard use. Secondly, 
those who use the term in a particular way see that as the primary or 
only important function which the term in question fulfils. And thirdly, 
when those different uses are disclosed to everyone 'who uses the term, 
the dispute does not as one might expect (and as Wilson certainly does) 
come to an end, rather each party defends its particular use against all 
the other ones. The reason for this, Gallie argues, is not a psychologi- 
cal, but a logical one in that there are some concepts where there is no 
one proper use, but where the disputes which different uses give rise 
to are perfectly genuine and inevitable. In short, this means that these 
concepts are necessarily and essentially contestable ones (25). 
Gallie, to . illustrate 
his argument, uses an analogy of a game. In the 
game, while all the contestants are playing to the same rules, i each 
team specialises in a distinctive method and style of play and it is in 
virtue of this, and not because of the number of points scored, that the 
championship is decided (where 'champion' means to have played the 
game best). Furthermore, there is no one set of criteria by which it 
can be decided what style of play is best and hence who the champions 
are. Instead there are different groups of supporters who have different 
ideas of what counts as skilful play and, while each group acknowledges 
the criteria that other teams are using, they do not accept them as the 
basis on which the championship should be decided. On the contrary, 
they try and convert other supporters to their own way of thinking. 
'There is therefore' , says Gallie, 'continuous competition 
between the 
contestants not only for acknowledgment as champions but for accept- 
ance of the proper criteria of championship' . (26) 
From this example Gallie postulates eight criteria of essential contested- 
ness: 
(1) it is appraisive and it signifies an achievement; 
(2) this achievement is of an internally complex character, but its 
worth is attributed to it as 'a whole; 
(3) therefore, any explanation to its worth must include reference 
to the respective contribution of its various parts and there 
would be any number of rival descriptions of its total worth; 
(4) the achievement is open in character in that it admits of 
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modification in the light of changing circumstances which cannot 
be prescribed in advance; 
(5) to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against 
other uses both aggressively and defensively (27). 
If Gallie had finished his analysis at this point it would be difficult not 
to agree with Wilson that it is impossible to make a distinction between 
where a concept or family of concepts is just confused and in need of 
clarification, and where there is disagreement over different interpreta- 
tions because the concept is an essentially contestable one. But Gallie 
goes on to give two further criteria, because he himself recognises that, 
while the ones listed above provide the formally defining conditions of 
essential contestedness, they fail to distinguish the essentially contested 
concept from the kind of concept which can be shown as a result of 
analysis or experiment to be just radically confused (28). 
The two further criteria given to make this distinction are: - 
(6) an essentially contested concept is derived from an original 
exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all contestants; 
(7) the continuous contest of the concept enables the original 
exemplar's achievement to be sustained and developed. (29). 
The -importance of agreement here is paramount, because it gives us 
grounds to talk of the dispute being over the same concept as opposed 
to just the same term. Also, because the exemplar is universally 
recognised as an achievement, values can be said to be written into the 
concept and agreed upon at the very beginning of its history. If this 
was not the case, the contestants could consider that those who were 
operating with different values held different concepts to themselves. 
Wilson's point would then hold; the dispute would no longer be a con- 
ceptual one. But recognition of a given concept as essentially contested 
implies recognition of rival uses as being ' logically possible and humanly 
likely' . (30) It is also on the strength of the exemplar that Gallie draws 
his last criterion that :- 
(B) the continuous competition for acknowledgment enables the original 
exemplar's achievement to be sustained or developed in an optimum 
fashion (31). 
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But if it is the same exemplar that gives rise to the development of 
different qualities, all of which contribute to the sustaining of its initial 
achievement, one cannot help but wonder why they have to be in com- 
petition with each other, particularly as the contestants have to recog- 
nise and appreciate each other' s values as legitimate. Obviously the 
contest does not follow simply from the concept being an evaluative one; 
rather it follows from two main reasons: firstly, from the nature of the 
exemplar, which is ' internally complex' ,' variously describable' and 
'peculiarly open' , so it can give rise to almost countless lines of 
descent (32). Secondly, from the fact that the contest is largely over 
the weighting different values are to be given and, where each claimant 
believes the values they uphold are of primary importance and because 
they are thought to pin point the essential nature of the exemplar. It 
is for this reason it can be said that the criteria each contestant 
championsare all trying to occupy the same conceptual space. 
Here again, it is because the values however divergent are rooted back 
in the same exemplar that Gallie is able to declare the contest is a 
logically proper one, and not simply a question of 'emotional conversion 
the appropriate engineering from one point of view to another or of 
causal explanation' . (33) This means that even if a competitor fails to 
win anyone over to his side, nevertheless the logical justification of 
what he says will still be recognised. It is for this reason that Gallie 
maintains that even apparently endless disputes can be recognised to 
have a definite logical force and that the contest is acknowledged to 
have permanent potential critical value. 
Without the authority of the exemplar, then, the contest would no 
longer be a conceptual one. But there are those who would question 
whether the exemplar can do the job required of it, the, answer to 
which is crucial and is discussed below. At the same time having now 
looked at all seven of Gallie' s criteria we are also in a position to see 
if these criteria can, in any case, be applied to the subject of education. 
In this context it would be useful to refer to A. Hartnett' s and 
M. Naish' s publication, ' Theory and Practice of Education' , Volume I, 
64, ),, because in this book this is exactly what is attempted. 
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iv IS EDUCATION AN ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT? 
The authors have no difficulty with the first five criteria. Education, 
they say, does fulfil them in that it is essentially an achievement, open 
in character and internally complex, and in that it does give rise to 
different values and attitudes of which different parties differ in the 
order of importance to be given to them, and which are contested under 
the name of education in educational debates about what should go on in 
schools, colleges and universities. (35) 
But when they come to the sixth and seventh criteria, because educa- 
tion does not have an exemplar similar, say, to the Christian life, they 
admit it is much harder to show whether it fulfils these two criteria as 
well. Nevertheless, they suggest providing a certain latitude is given 
to the notion of an exemplar and because it is possible to identify cer- 
tain educational traditions, then education can be said to fulfil these two 
criteria. 
But it seems to me they are only able to do this because they do not 
consider in any detail what would constitute an exemplar of education 
on which there could be common agreement. Considering how crucial the 
sixth condition is, to the whole justification of essentially contested 
concepts, it is rather surprising they' deal with it so briefly and uncriti- 
cally. If they had taken the trouble to examine it more thoroughly I 
think they would have found it cannot do the job required of it. This 
is because the idea of an exemplar which provides a historical landmark 
and from which various traditions can be traced does not seem to hold 
with education, rather the opposite is the case. We have different tra- 
ditions (e. g. Greek liberal education, classical humanism and child- 
centred education) which are not at all sufficiently similar 'to enable us 
to talk -ý about one common exemplar. Indeed some of the most Important 
educational values which are championed today, for example, those to do 
with equality, do not enjoy a tradition at all, or certainly not a very 
long one. 
The question can also be raised whether the exemplar may be inadequate 
for its purpose in other contexts as well. This is certainly the belief of 
E. Gellner. In his article ' The Concept-of Story' (36), in which he 
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reviews Gallie' s book, ' Philosophy and the Historical Understanding' 
(37), while he accepts the notion of an essentially contested concept as 
legitimate, he actually considers the last two criteria do an injustice to 
the very idea of essential contestability, and by applying them to the 
examples that Gallie himself gives, he concludes the exemplar cannot do 
the job required of it (38). His main objection to the fact that the 
derivation of an essentially contestable concept must come from an 
original exemplar, whose authority is acknowledged by all the contest- 
ants' uses of the concept, is in effect, an, application of the ' genetic 
fallacy' argument. For Gellner maintains : 
' the present functioning of a concept is logically independent of 
its history and that recognition of an essentially contestable 
concept must be possible on the present (my italics) working 
of a concept, irrespective of its real history' (39). 
However, in spite of the criticisms GeAner makes and there are others 
(40), he still recognises in principle the value of what Gallie is saying. 
He acknowledges that often when philosophers were engaged in concep- 
tual analysis, in order to get clearer on meaning, their analyses were 
in fact saturated with particular values, and that Gallia' s account 
reflects accurately what is often a moral debate. But Gellner floes not 
seem to think it is possible to distinguish essentially contestable con- 
cepts from those which are just radically confused and neither does he 
think it matters. (41). 
But surely it does matter, for how otherwise are we to distinguish be- 
tween a dispute over the use of a term as opposed to the. meaning of 
the same concept? As Gallie himself recognised the importance of the 
exemplar lay in the need for agreement at least to a certain level, or, 
up to a certain point. The exemplar provided an achievement that was 
universally recognised by all the contestants; without that agreement 
some could argue (as Wilson undoubtedly would) that because all the 
contestants are advocating different values they are not competing over 
the same concept - indeed they are not competing over a concept at all. 
In order, then, for essentially contested concepts, to. be justified as 
logically proper we need to find some way of doing this without having 
to rely on historically justifying conditions. 
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Now, what I wish to suggest is that we can do this if we can find in 
certain concepts a basic level of agreement operating at the present 
time (which may or may not be due to historical reasons) in the under- 
lying criteria of the concepts in question, providing these criteria are 
evaluative as well as descriptive in nature. For example, with regard 
to education, I would argue it is possible to identify pre-conditions 
which give rise to contestable definitions (see below) which because 
they are evaluative but also necessarily agreed upon, could be used to 
replace the role of the exemplar. Furthermore, this pattern depends 
on normative conditions being internal to the concept and, therefore, 
escapes Gellner' s main criticism of the exemplar that it assumes 
agreement from a kind of divine external view point. (42). 
However, it may not be sufficient to fulfil Gallie' s last criterion that 
the use of the concept enables the values on which there is agreement 
to be sustained or developed in optimum fashion, for it is difficult to 
see how this can be decided without there being an overall and over- 
riding judgment and how could this, as a judgment, have conceptual 
and therefore necessarily internal validity? But this is not crucial, for 
the other six criteria can stand without it, so that enough has been 
said to show that the idea of an essentially contested concept can be 
taken as a logically proper one and that education can be counted as 
one of them. It is therefore now possible to return, finally to the 
question of whether this use is justified or, whether, as Wilson claims, 
evaluative disputes in education should, nevertheless, come after and 
not be part of conceptual ones. 
v CAN THE USE OF 'EDUCATION' AS AN ESSENTIALLY 
CONTESTED CONCEPT BE JUSTIFIED? 
In an answer to this I would like to make five main points: - 
(1) Frankena' s defence of the evaluative use of education seems to me 
to be a sound one in that if the meaning of education is restricted 
to descriptive criteria, it encourages the continuation of the status 
quo and makes it difficult to ask the overriding questions of 
justification. 
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(2) Wilson is being stipulative not only in suggesting education should 
be limited to its descriptive use, but in suggesting what that 
description should entail. To accept his stipulation, to restrict the 
defining characteristics to only the very basic preconditions to do 
with learning and being a person would be to cut the meaning of 
education short; for while it is not incorrect to give only basic 
criteria as a definition, it is also true to say that it will be a very 
limited one (see below). Just as if someone gave a definition of art 
in the way Wilson does as, ' it isn't supposed to be of any use, it's 
just meant to look pretty/sound exciting/give you a special kind of 
pleasure/be an interesting story and somebody's created it, prob- 
ably for that reason' (43), we might wonder if he has any real 
understanding of the concept of art at all; so with education if 
only preconditions were stated one could say with some justifica- 
tion, but you haven't begun to define education. ' 
(3) It is difficult to see, in any. case, how Wilson can stop education 
being an evaluative concept when values are already presupposed 
in the preconditions (for example to do with being a person) that 
have to be given if we are to define education at all and when it 
is these values which give rise to further values that later become 
contestable. The last criterion which Wilson gives is that: 
' education is directed at, or for the benefit of (my italics). 
people as such taking all or most of the important aspects of 
a person into consideration, ' (44) 
Presumably, values presupposed here, would have to be described 
in an external descriptive fashion and not in a committed or prescrip- 
tive one. But if there is no commitment and no interested parties why 
is there any interest in analysing the meaning of education in the 
first place? If, for example, it does not matter what goes on in 
schools under the name of education, if our only interest is in con- 
ceptual analysis for its own sake, then why have we picked out 
education as being particularly worthy of analysis? 
(4) Wilson expresses the fear that if value judgments are allowed to be 
written into the meaning of education, then what education means 
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just becomes a matter of ideological preference even prejudice. But 
this does not do justice to the fact that concepts, even evaluative 
ones, if they are to be meaningful and to become common currency 
amongst language users, must command interpersonal agreement. If 
values are written into a concept which is essentially common pro- 
perty then there is also the need for justification before it can 
secure general and universal agreement. For this reason one can 
often find that evaluative concepts provide evidence for very secure 
or permanently held values (hence the plausibility of Gallie' s idea of 
the exemplar providing historically justifying conditions). 
(5) Following on from (4), it can be said that a lot of the force of 
Wilson's argument disappears once the exact criteria of essential 
contestability are recognised, because, as Gallie himself forcible 
argues, not any kind of ideological dispute is a conceptual one. A 
point, it would seem to me, was not brought out sufficiently by 
Hartnett and Naish, who tend to take just any disagreement in edu- 
cation to provide evidence for its essential contestability (45). They 
therefore fail to distinguish between those that do and those that do 
not fulfil the necessary criteria for essential contestability. It is 
not sufficient, for example, that a particular interested party wishes 
to uphold certain values as being the most important in education. 
For these values to become definitive, certainly wholesale agreement 
is not necessary, but there must at least be recognition of this use 
as 'proper' and 'correct' as against their opponent's uses, whose 
validity they must also recognise. This means that completely arbit- 
rary definitions, for example, are just ruled out as logically improper. 
It is only because of the opponent's acknowledgment of the validity 
of what other persons are contesting that their argument can be 
said to have logical, as opposed to just ' contingently persuasive 
force' . This acknowledgment is only possible because there is a 
basis of agreement from which values can be launched and justified. 
This also makes the fulfilment of Gallie' s last criterion, if not logic- 
ally necessary, at least humanly likely, in that it may make it pos- 
sible for there to be mutual agreement on the benefit of the contest 
in that it enables the whole enterprise to go forward. But many of 
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the disputes in education are not of this nature. For example, when 
persons put forward particular aims or ideologies of education but 
are not remotely aware of other positions, or certainly not all of 
them, which stand in opposition to their own, let alone that they 
should be contesting against them if what they have to say is to 
carry conceptual weight. Alternatively, while they may be aware of 
other opposing view points they may not see their purpose to argue 
against them by rational argument but rather to knock them out of 
the contest all together. 
Bearing this distinction in mind, i. e. between those disputes that 
fulfil the criteria of essential contestability and those that do not, 
it is quite possible` to uphold the essentially contestable nature of 
education and still, with Wilson, to deplore and rule out as improper 
those people in general who try to smuggle in their preferred ideo- 
logies into certain categories under some disguise or other, and 
those philosophers in particular who profess to analysing concepts 
but are only expressing a line (46), and we can agree on the need 
for logical argument in any attempt to analyse and to justify 
education. 
vi ESSENTIALLY CONTESTING PHILOSOPHERS OF EDUCATION 
While it is no doubt fairly easy to forgive those engaged in educational 
discourse who are not philosophers for trying to get their values 
accepted by making them definitional, but without due regard to the 
criteria an essentially contestable concept demands, it is much more 
difficult to forgive the philosopher, who, because part of his business 
is as a conceptual analyst, should know an essentially contestable con- 
cept when he sees one and be sensitive to this when it comes to its 
analysis and justification. Unfortunately, philosophers have been as 
guilty as anyone else and this has led to two characteristic mistakes. 
Either, the philosopher has tried to get what are evaluative and, there- 
fore, highly contestable judgments on the nature of education, accepted 
only on the grounds that they are tight logical incontestable truths, and 
because of this they have been criticised for trying to fabricate a concept; 
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or, the philosopher anxious only to be a pure analyst has failed to say 
anything substantive or practically helpful. In so doing they have real- 
ised Frankena' s worst fears in encouraging conservatism and the accept- 
ance of the status quo. 
Of course, it would be possible for this latter kind of philosopher to 
recognise that education is essentially contestable but not to enter the 
contest himself. He could sit on, the side lines and discern accurately 
what was going on. He could detect and report on shifts of meaning, he 
could even act as referee and rule improper uses out of court. But in 
fact this kind of philosopher of education (fortunately one might say if 
the arguments given so far have carried any weight) is fairly scarce. On 
the whole the philosophers who have committed the first kind of mistake 
have been much more plentiful. This philosopher, who is concerned with 
giving judgments and their justification as well as with the analysis of 
concepts, has, on the other hand, no choice I would argue, but to 
recognise that he is a contestant himself. One of the main mistakes philo- 
sophers of education have made previously was in thinking that they 
could give normative definitions, which,. because they were supported by 
logical argument and necessary truth, were not essentially contestable. 
One reason why this happened was because philosophers did not appreci- 
ate the definitional level at which they were operating (see below). 
Fearful of being stipulative or prescriptive and seeing their task of pro- 
viding a logical basis from which aims could be launched and justified, 
they saw themselves as operating at the most basic of levels, one that 
provided a definition of education which was, in some sense, fundament- 
ally true and of practical value because it was not contestable. Hence 
the considerable use of transcendental arguments to justify education. 
Although it was always expected that other philosophers would be critical 
of their accounts, and would, for example, expose any fallacies or incon- 
sistencies, they were still put forward as non-contestable, then either 
they stood the test of criticism and could then be deemed ' correct' , and 
that the philosopher had got it 'right' or it. failed the test and was then 
rejected out of hand. 
Unfortunately, most accounts of this nature because they were put 
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forward as definitions at a very basic level, did fail. They came under 
all the criticism that philosophers like W. Dray (47) and G. Reddiford 
(48) have made, not to mention those that numerous sociologists have 
been only too keen to give, and as a consequence have generally been 
discredited. At worst; they have _ been rejected wholesale; at 
best, they 
have been taken up by non-philosophers engaged in education to play 
a different game according to less stringent, rules. As a reaction to all 
this there is now a danger that philosophers will become obsessed with 
stating only the existing usage of the concept, or with only examining 
the preconditions of education, that as a matter of logical necessity must 
be incontestable (for example in finding out what mileage can be gained 
from the concept of learning). If this does happen it seems to me they 
can then be rightly criticised for not going far enough in not, beginning 
to define education. There is a difference after all, between stating and 
examining concepts on which the meaning of education depends and 
actually giving that meaning. Also, as I have already argued, there is 
good reason to suggest that it is only possible to give that meaning if 
one also presupposes or makes explicit an evaluative point of view, and 
because of the many viewpoints the preconditions can generate, meanings 
of education are essentially contestable ones, even for the philosopher. 
The upshot of this being that If the philosopher of education wishes to 
persist in giving definitions of education (rather than becoming a pure 
observer), then he has no choice but to accept that he is making value 
judgments rather than just analyses, and that what he has to say will 
have to be justified under the description of ' essential contestability' . 
In the past, what philosophers of education have perhaps paid insuffi- 
cient attention to is that definitions admit of degrees. The idea, gener- 
ally that meaning itself admits to degrees is not often argued for, 
rather what is acknowledged is that understanding a particular meaning 
or set of meanings 'admits of degrees. But the fact it is possible to 
describe understanding in this way is only because there are, in the 
first instance, degrees of meaning. The notion of degrees of meaning Is 
logically prior to the ideas of there being degrees of understanding 
something. 
This can be explained in the following way: 
I 
26 
First of all, to talk of degrees of understanding presupposes the idea 
of progression, one is coming to understand X. This implies there are 
constitutive parts of X, and depending on the nature of X these can be 
hierarchical. To say one is learning more about X is to say one is 
getting nearer to understanding X itself. 
Secondly, it is only because stages of understanding are actually con- 
stitutive of X that one can say one has, at a particular moment in time, 
a partial understanding of X, rather than an understanding of something 
else, say Y, which may be necessary for an understanding of X but is 
not a part of X. Sometimes although what is understood is a constitutive 
part one may consider that this understanding is not sufficiently great 
for us to say he has even a partial understanding of X. It is only as a 
person's understanding develops and he gets nearer to a complete under- 
standing that we feel justified in saying now he is beginning to under- 
stand, for example, the quantum theory. This is not a clear cut matter, 
deciding when the time has come may be debatable, it will certainly be 
a matter of judgment by those who already have a complete understand- 
ing of the concept. 
Clearly, not all concepts are like this, but the concept of education is. 
Furthermore, not only does its meaning admit of degrees (therefore one 
cannot understand the concept of education until one has an understand- 
ing of what constitutes learning) it is as I have just argued, contest- 
able. Furthermore, and this is what it makes it so interesting, it is not 
until the stage is reached of understanding those criteria that are 
contestable that we feel justified in saying now the person has begun to 
understand the concept. 
Now, philosophers of education cannot be accused of not reaching that 
stage but what they can be accused of is not recognising that they have 
reached this stage and that what they are putting forward as an analysis 
and justification of education is contestable even if it is supported by 
logical argument, and which can occur long before the level of being 
highly stipulative and stating aims. However, because this happens it 
does not necessarily diminish its worth as a definition, providing it is 
seen for what it is - essentially contestable, owing its logically persuasive 
force, firstly to the logical connection it has with the first stage where 
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there is agreement, secondly, to its open-ended and non-stipulative 
nature and, thirdly to recognition of the definitions of other contest- 
ants, the legitimacy of which is acknowledged and without which the 
value of this particular definition could not be recognised. 
What I am suggesting here, is that given education is evaluatively norma- 
tive (values are written into its meaning) and given that the definition 
of education admits of degrees, then, on this basis it would be possible 
to postulate three levels of normative definitions: - 
(1) the underlying conditions which are incontestable (although they 
cause disagreement this is, in principle, resolvable) and which pre- 
suppose certain value judgments which could however just be stated 
in an external descriptive sense, 
(2) an evaluative and logical model - arising from stage one and justi- 
fied by it, now evaluatively prescriptive, but open-ended and non- 
arbitrary 
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(3) aims of education, justified on the basis of the second level of defi- 
nition used prescriptively and substantively. 
If these levels were accepted, and providing philosophers still wished to 
jtistify and prescribe and not simply describe and analyse, I can see no 
reason why they should not take part in defining education beyond the 
first stage and become essentially contesting philosophers. In fact, with 
the peculiar skill of the philosopher, his capacity for rational thought 
and logical argument he should be a particularly strong contestant and 
one that can be no longer accused of conceptual manipulation whether as 
the result of self deception or honest endeavour. (As a consequence in 
the field of practical education someone may even listen I) Following on 
from this, there is no reason why definitions of education, already 
rejected because they were offered as definitions operative at an incon- 
testable stage, could not be reinstated as logical, but essentially con- 
testable models at a higher level. They could then provide a half way 
house between the preconditions from which they would be derived and 
the substantive aims which would arise from them. At the second level, 
therefore, they would have to remain open-ended. One very practical 
consequencq if this suggestion was taken up, would be that philosophers 
of education would no longer be able to see their justifications as self- 
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contained separate from the efforts of other philosophers. They would 
have to become aware of other models they were contesting against and 
emphasise their own values in contrast to those predominant in another 
model. This, far from undermining a justification would strengthen it. 
There is always a danger in giving a justification that it is done in iso- 
lation, at best, showing the shortcomings of another in order to show the 
need for one' s own. Of course, this is not to say that even with this 
latitude that certain accounts cannot be ruled out as logically improper. 
Clearly this would happen if a model failed to fulfil any of the criteria 
of essential contestedness, or, if a philosopher still insisted his defini- 
tion was incontestable, for example, if G. Langford continued to insist 
that education was in its most fundamental sense to become a person. 
It is not difficult to think of several definitions, some of which have 
been offered in the past at a very fundamental level, which would escape 
the kind of criticism Wilson makes if put forward at a higher level. For 
example J. Dewey' s idea that education' is growth (49), A .N. Whitehead' s 
contention that. education is the acquisition of the art of the utilization 
of knowledge (50), P. Hirst' s justification of liberal education (51), 
R. S. Downie' s and E. Telfer' s narrow conception of intellectual educa- 
tion (52), R. Dearden' s suggestion that education is to do with the 
development of autonomy (53) or M. Warnock's ideal of education as the 
cultivation of the imagination (54). These, I suggest could be accepted 
as contestable models at a second level, providing: (1) they can be 
shown to arise out of the preconditions of education, (2) they are put 
forward as a justification for particular educational values supported by 
logical and rational argument, (3) that they have a certain openness so 
they can escape the charge of arbitrariness or stipulation (for example, 
that one can talk of developing autonomy without stipulating how a per- 
son should exercise it, or of knowledge and understanding without say- 
ing what a person should know), (4) they are forward looking serving 
a prescriptive purpose, so that given other considerations (for example, 
the nature of knowledge, the human condition, the nature of a particu- 
lar society) , certain aims can be said to arise from them. 
It might be wondered, if these models are taken from underlying condi- 
tions where there is agreement, why these models have to be in 
competition with each other, obviously this does not follow just 
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from the fact that each one is different. It will be remembered that in 
a contest over the meaning of a concept, because each contestant has 
to recognise the values of other contestants, the competition is 
largely over a question of the priority to be given to different values. 
It is only for this reason that contesting definitions can be said to be 
trying to occupy the same conceptual space. With regard to the con- 
cept of education, therefore, each definition would have to be put for- 
ward as encompassing those values which are believed to be at the heart 
or essential nature of education. 
However, if certain practical questions had to be answered it might be 
conceded that certain models would serve the purpose better than 
others. This would mean that while only the intrinsic worth of each 
model was at stake, then, definitions at a second level would remain 
essentially contestable, but when considered in terms of practical use- 
fulness in a particular situation, it may be accepted that one model may 
show advantages or do the job better over another. This might be the 
case if we were only interested in justifying a part of education, for 
example, liberal education, primary education, art education, physical 
education. 
Following on from this, it would now be appropriate for me to indicate 
my own intentions in putting . 
forward a justification for physical educa- 
tion. Having defended education as an evaluative notion, where its 
definition admits of degrees and which because of this it becomes an 
essentially contestable concept at. a certain level of definition, I now 
wish to use the arguments and suggestions I have already given for 
the purpose of my own thesis. 
First of all, in Parts One and Two, I shall build up a logical and evalu- 
ative model of education i. e. one that has value judgments written Into 
it, but which is still based on logical and rational argument .I shall 
argue that this model is valid and of value even though contestable, 
because it can be shown that: -, (a) it is open-ended, (b) it can be 
defended against other models or 'uses' of education, (c) its legitimacy 
and justification is derived from the basic level of giving preconditions 
on which there is already agreement. Then in Part Three on the basis 
of the meaning of education I have put forward and defended I shall 
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after having defined the subject matter of physical education, go on to 
justify it. However, it will be beyond the scope of what I have to 
say in this thesis to go on to the third level of specifically prescribing 
aims of education or of physical education for I would see this as 
requiring further research in its own right . 
What I need to do now, then, is to examine what the preconditions of 
education might be, for it is only from this basis that I can launch any 
kind of credible, even though contestable, definition of education into 
the second stage. It is an examination of these preconditions which 
will provide the subject matter of the next chapter. 
vii SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have argued that : - 
(1) there has been endless disagreement over the meaning of education; 
(2) this disagreement will not simply come to an end as Wilson hopes 
by stipulating that conceptual questions should be kept separate 
from evaluative ones, and this is because education is a morally 
evaluative concept, which means that analysing it necessarily in- 
volves making or' presupposing value judgments; 
(3) because education is open. ended and presupposes, or actually 
has written in, values that are usually various and conflicting 
ones, and because defining education admits of degrees, then it 
can be correctly described as an essentially contestable concept, 
that is, providing it is accepted that the basic preconditions on 
which there is agreement can replace the role of the exemplar; 
(4) to use education as an essentially contestable concept has certain 
advantages: - 
(a) if the meaning of education is restricted to non-evaluative 
crtieria it encourages the continuation of the status quo 
and makes it difficult to ask the overriding question of 
justification, 
31 
(b) it does justice to education as a concept where its analysis 
admits of degrees; to stop short of evaluative questions is 
to lay oneself open to the charge that one has not begun to 
define education, particularly as values are presupposed 
even in the underlying conditions of meaning (e. g. to do 
with being a person), 
(c) there is no reason why just because values are written into 
the meaning of education, they have to be idiosyncratic or 
a matter of prejudice, rather it demands justification and 
universal agreement if values are to be accepted as conceptual, 
(d) not any kind of contestable definition of education will count; 
some can be ruled out if they fail to fulfil the criteria of 
essential contestability; 
(5) Philosophers in the past did not give enough attention to the definitional 
level at which they were operating, so that what were in fact contestable 
definitions, were put forward as being necessarily and fundamentally 
true - at the most basic of levels. As a consequence many accounts have 
been discredited. 
(6) There is no reason, now, however, why philosophers should not put for- 
ward contestable definitions, providing they recognise them for what they 
are, and are prepared to work at three distinct levels of definition: - 
(a) giving underlying conditions which are incontestable (although there 
may be disagreement, in principle it is resolvable) and which presuppose 
certain values (but which could just be given in an external descript- 
ive sense), 
(b) justifying an evaluative and logical model arising from stage one, 
but open-ended and non-arbitrary providing a half way house 
but which is essentially contestable, 
(c) giving aims of education, justified on the basis of the second 
level of definition used prescriptively and substantively. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PRE-CONDITIONS OF THE CONCEPT 
OF EDUCATION 
Recently, philosophers, in trying to say something about education on 
which we might all agree, have been keen to point out that at the very 
least education denotes learning! However, it is realized that education 
does not just denote any kind of learning. R. S. Peters, for example, 
says that it must be learning which would rule out changes in behaviour 
due to some causal process, and which would imply 'mastering something 
or coming up to some standard as the result of experience'. (1, ) He describes 
the impact which this learning has on the person: 
'Education surely develops a person's awareness by enlarging, deepening 
and extending it. Its impact is cognitive, but it also transforms and 
regulates a person's attitudes, emotions, wants and actions because all 
of these presuppose awareness and are impregnated with beliefs' .( 2) . 
It is a transformation which is over and above the development of those 
features necessary to become a person but falls short of the transformation 
of the whole personality. This is because Peters argues, the major feature 
of ä person's personality is his temperament which is singularly resistant 
to learning. Now, this looks very hopeful as a means of providing the 
underlying conditions that we are looking for, for if education is not 
centrally concerned with learning it is difficult to think what it could be 
concerned with. But as, clearly, not all kinds of learning constitute 
education this stands in need of closer examination. We need to know: 
(i), what might be understood by the concept of learning; and 
(ii) what conditions have to be fulfilled before it can be said to be of 
educational value. 
i THE CONCEPT OF LEARNING 
Firstly, learning as a concept is normative, our ability to describe a 
process of learning or what has actually been learnt presupposes an 
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understanding of what counts, as reaching a certain standard, giving a 
correct answer, performing successfully at whatever it might be (although 
it may be as basic as pressing a level to release a food pellet). Learning, 
as an activity is therefore rule-governed, being able to see it has taken 
place presupposes knowledge of what those rules are. This seems to me, 
to be true even in those cases where learning is defined in terms of 
permanent changes in behaviour, which may be due to a process of strict 
conditioning, for not any permanent change in behaviour would count as 
learning, at the very least it would have to be shown that the animal is 
able to do what previously it was not able to do. It is at least this, which 
provides the norm or standard by which a change in behaviour could be 
assessed as learning. What counts as a standard, an ' achievement' , 
mastery, a 'successful' performance or simply normative behaviour, depends 
on agreement which is only possible in a public and social world. The 
concept of learning, regardless of what, or to whom it is being applied, 
therefore presupposes such a world and is unintelligible without it. This 
means education, because it involves learning, can only be understood in 
a social context, but as this is true of all learning at least in some sense, 
then this does not in itself enable us to distinguish learning which has 
educational value from learning which has not. Indeed, it does not even 
enable us to say that learning of any kind is of value. The words 
' achievement' and ' success' which are used above, being only used in 
the weak sense to mean no more than ' coming up to a mark' or to imply 
that certain criteria have been fulfilled. It is therefore always a further 
question whether what is learnt, is an achievement in the strong sense 
of the word, whether it has, for example, truth value or moral worth, 
or any kind of value for that matter. When we say, then, that learning 
is necessarily an 'achievement' this does not, therefore, give us any 
reason to deny that sometimes people learn bad habits, information that 
is false and to perform actions that are essentially trivial. 
It is, however, possible to argue on the lines that John White has argued, 
that to be able to talk of learning what is false or incorrect, still pre- 
supposes norms of correctness and truth in assessing what has been 
learnt and being able to show anything has been learnt at all (3). White says, 
it could not be the case that all informational learning were of what is false 
for if that was so social life would be impossible; that there must be some 
learning of true information in any human society, is therefore also a 
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necessary truth and 'that learning true information is conceptually 
prior to learning false information' (4). 
This kind of argument like Peter Winch' s social justification of truth 
telling (5) seems to me to be fundameptally correct. And subsequently 
one could argue that because education must necessarily involve initiation 
into a social world, learning which has educational value must presuppose 
certain social values on which the existence and continuation of any human 
society depends. Learning to count as education will, therefore, at least 
to a degree, be concerned with what is true and rationally defensible; and 
it can also be said that it will presuppose other kinds of value which are 
socially relative to do with what is regarded by a particular society as 
instrumentally and intrinsically worthwhile, and these will rule out the 
trivial, and in an interpersonal context, the immoral. 
Educational learning, once it is put in a social context will also be seen 
to fulfil criteria that will give it a progressive form and coherence. 
Learning to have educational value cannot be disjointed pieces of information 
or isolated skills, rather it will necessarily fall into a pattern or structure 
in relation to a whole way of life. 
Secondly, to know that learning has taken place, it is not enough to 
have ascertained that someone has come up to a particular mark or standard, 
(for example that he can perform a particular task successfully), for this 
capacity may have been innate and its acquisition the result of physio- 
logical maturation, rather we also need to know how the learning took 
place. Now there are several ways of looking at this: 
For example, there are those who would emphasize the logical tie up of 
the process of learning with the content of what is to be learnt. For 
example, P. Hirst emphasizes that where the subject matter has a logical 
structure, then, it is only by understanding this structure that one can 
know what must be done for learning to come about and to progr ess (6). 
It is, therefore, up to the experts to determine how the learning in a 
particular field will take place. 
On the other hand, there are those who would define the learning process 
not in logical, but in behavioural terms. The psychologist, for example, 
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often describes it as any more or less permanent change in behaviour 
which is the result of experience (7). However, he does usually 
acknowledge that the learner has to play some kind of active part in 
bringing the learnt behaviour about, that the 'achievement' of the animal 
or person cannot just be the result of maturation or some causal process 
e. g. the effects of a drug. But the part the learner plays may be a 
very minimal one; for some psychologists it may involve no more than a 
reflex action or at most a perceptual response to a particular situation 
(for example as in operant conditioning) . The arguments against defining 
learning in these terms and in support of a definition that at least acknow- 
ledges that learning must involve the use of experience and not just be 
the result of it are already well rehearsed. But it depends on which 
definition of learning one supports whether these arguments carry any 
weight or not. 
For some, where the ' correct' behaviour is all important, providing it 
is the result of experience, as opposed to, say, maturation, then it is 
not even necessary that the learner should be aware of what he has learnt 
or is about to learn. Certainnly, if only living organisms can be subjects of 
learning then there must be some kind of awareness when learning takes 
place, but this may be very limited to the reward they receive at the end 
of the activity or performance; or they may have some idea of what they 
have just 'learnt' , but not the whole, or even the right idea (certainly 
they will not have the awareness the experimenter has). 
But here again a different view can be taken. that this is only possible 
in certain situations, for example, where learning is the result of condition- 
ing, but that where learning demands understanding then at least an 
awareness of the principles behind what is being done is required by the 
learner, as Hamlyn has suggested (8). Clearly there is a crucial distinction 
between what the animal or person has 'learnt' in terms of correct behavioural 
response, and what the animal or person conceives himself as doing, but 
whether these would have to coincide would depend. not only on what was 
being learnt, but also on the concept of learning with which one was 
operating. 
If a very extreme position was taken, it may be thought that all that was 
needed for something to be a case of learning would be the successful 
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performance or correct reply where it had not previously existed. This may 
seem very dubious as a case of learning because the learner is no more 
than a passive recipient, and yet it is a view which is quite compatible 
with a neurological definition. B. R. Bugelski, for example, defines the 
learning process as : 
' the formation of associations between neural events 
(consequence of stimulation) ..... The exact physiological 
nature need not concern us as long as there is a 
functional relationship formed so that one neural event 
is followed by another' (9). 
And on a mechanistic definition of learning it might be thought legitimate. 
to say that learning can occur by programming directly into the brain. 
The person would, in this case, simply find he knows how to do something, 
or has acquired new beliefs or knowledge he did not have before. 
Now these are concepts of learning which contrast sharply with the concept 
of learning which is operative in common usage where the idea of personal 
agency is all important, and this is true whether learning is construed 
in terms of the acquisition of knowledge or in terms of acquiring certain 
capacities or both. 
The idea of learning being essentially connected with knowledge where 
knowledge is understood as propositional knowledge has been well argued 
for by philosophers. For example, D. Hamlyn, in his article 'Human 
Learning' puts forward the thesis that, 'learning must at least involve 
the acquisition of knowledge through experience and that changes in 
behaviour due to learning must be the result of new knowledge' (10). 
While, J. White argues that learning must imply knowing and this is 
because of the logical connections between the concept and certain institutions 
and practices (11). And Langford emphasizes the link between the concepts 
of learning and true belief (12). 
In fact some philosophers go so far as to suggest that propositional 
knowledge is the common thread running through all cases of learning (13), 
and this would make it difficult to talk of anything other than human 
learning. However, this seems to me to be unduly restrictive, for while 
a lot of human learning is centrally concerned with the acquisition of 
knowledge of this kind, learning can also involve learning 'how' or 
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learning ' to' , as well as learning ' that', and where the achievement is 
signified by what one is able to do rather than by the propositions that 
one knows. 
It is interesting that while we can describe the acquisition of ' knowledge 
that' as a case of learning, even where no deliberate or intentional act 
on our part is involved. For example, when we just receive a piece 
of information -'I learnt that my neighbour' s children had whooping 
cough, but I do not know where, how or when I learnt it - for all I 
know the information may have been programmed directly into my brain' . 
It is just when what is learnt is not solely concerned with propositional 
knowledge that the idea of personal agency becomes so crucial. If, for 
instance, a person can be described as learning to master an activity, 
skill or habit ( cases of learning Ito') then learning is often a question 
of practice, of trying to get it right, of applying oneself diligently to 
the task in hand. If this kind of effort was found to be missing but the 
ability was still acquired, we are likely to question whether or not it was 
learnt, and we are likely to wonder if it was not simply the result of 
physical maturation, or that it just happened. For example, learning to 
sprint, to appreciate music, to love someone, we describe these as instances 
of learning, not just because of what we have come to know, but because 
of what we have learnt to accomplish, which cannot be reduced to knowing 
that. But this is not to say that learning to do certain things has always 
to be found to be difficult. It is not impossible for someone to learn how 
for instance, to , sprint, the 
first time he tries, (although the nature of 
most human activities makes this unlikely). What remains crucial is that 
we can be sure the ability was not just due to some causal process and 
that it was the result of intentional action on the part of the performer. 
However, there are those like White and Hamlyn who would wish to rule 
these out as central cases of learning, unless it can be shown that 
propositional knowledge is, after all, the distinguishing mark. Hamlyn 
argues, for example, that we can only talk of learning to love someone 
if this kind of knowledge is involved indirectly. He says, if I have learned 
to love someone rather than merely come to love them, my love follows 
upon and exists in virtue of what I have come to know. But this kind of 
argument fails to fill the gap between having the knowledge and having the 
capacity. One that if it is filled by the idea of personal agency surely 
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entitles us to say that capacity is a learnt one and not one that we have 
just found ourselves possessing. The alternative would be, through stipu- 
lation, to rule out certain habits, dispositions and attitudes as possible 
objects of learning, and I cannot see how this can be justified when the 
idea of learning how to do certain things is just as crucial to our under- 
standing of learning as learning that certain things are true. However, 
it may be possible to argue that knowledge is the common thread running 
through all cases of learning if one is prepared to accept that knowledge 
can be practical as well as propositional . See chapter eleven for a 
discussion on the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge.. 
ii LEARNING AND THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON 
The concept of learning, then, may have different interpretations and this 
in itself can be a source of confusion and controversy. It is therefore 
essential to be able to state what kinds of learning would be presupposed 
by the notion of education. If, for example, a person's behavioural 
response showed an extensive amount of knowledge, an ability to solve 
problems, a wide range of physical skills all of which came up to agreed 
public standards, why would it matter that it had been acquired as a 
result of conditioning, hypnosis, programming the brain or some other 
causal process? 
What is important here, is that the reason it does matter, does not hinge 
simply on our concept of learning but on-our concept of the person. For 
any meaning of education that might be put forward presupposes the 
latter as well as the former concept, 'education is only achieved by 
persons' , is not a contingent truth but a logically necessary one. 
Learning to have educational value must take into account what is implied 
in being a person, that is, as a self-determining agent and a centre of 
experience. This is why learning which is better described in terms of 
what happens to a person, because of some causal process is ruled out, 
and learning which is a result of what a person does and can be said to 
have experienced (as well as being seen to come up to a certain standard) 
is central to the meaning of education. 
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But even the phrase ' what a person does' needs further consideration. 
If learning as an educational achievement has to be measured in personal 
as well as social terms then the actions and activities a person carries 
out must mean more than the ability to give behavioural responses. If 
it could be shown that what a person had learnt meant no more than the 
ability to give the correct answer, perform the required task, act in the 
appropriate way to a given stimulus, rather as we might condition an 
animal, programme a computer, or simply put a coin in the slot of a 
machine, and hear a pre-recorded message', then, what has been 'achieved' 
is either not learning or is only learning (depending on the concept of 
learning being adhered to) and either way has not begun to count as 
education. Clearly those who would discountuausalmethods as forms of 
learning already presuppose an understanding of the person in the concept 
with which they are operating. If learning is to be seen as education, 
not only has it to fufil the relevant public standards, but to realise those 
basic human capacities which define the person; his ability for thought, 
to initiate action, to have intentions, purposes, feelings and so on. It 
will necessarily follow from this that if what a person is learning demands 
understanding he will have to be fully aware of his own actions including 
knowledge however limited it may be (particularly in the early stages) of 
what he is learning and when he has learnt it. 
This also explains why learning mist be seen to have a transforming effect. 
If what a person can be said to have learnt made no difference to him in 
his beliefs, attitudes and general awareness of the world, then although 
learning may have resulted in behavioural changes that can be detected, 
recorded and assessed, it still does not necessarily count as education, 
because it has yet to be shown that the person has changed qua person. 
It is for this reason that I would like to suggest that in ... d " most fundamental 
sense education is concerned with learning which promotes the development 
of the person qua person (14). 
In saying this I would recognise, however, that I am now stating more 
than the underlying conditions of education and that what I am suggesting 
as a definition has already become contestable; furthermore, that what I 
have to say from now on will become increasingly so. 
The reasons why learning fails to make any lasting impact on the person 
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and, therefore, does not have any educational significance may be 
difficult to assess. J. Dewey in 'Experience and Education' (15) 
suggests that, everyone looks back and wonders what happened to all 
their knowledge which they acquired in the past. He says the reason 
for this lies not in what was learnt but how it was learnt, because. at 
the time knowledge was compartmentalised and taught in isolation from 
other things it failed to make any connection with the rest of our 
experiences. Although Dewey' s concept of education as growth was 
for many reasons inadequate he at least recognised certain conceptual 
truths about the nature of education, not only because he conceived 
of the learner as an active agents but because he put experience at the 
centre of his account (experience that the person shared with others 
because of common concerns and purposes). Although experience was 
too narrowly defined in only pragmatic terms, at least the learning 
process was assessed not only in the short term but also by the extent 
to which it presented future experiences (for example, arousing curiosity, 
making later understanding possible, determining attitudes including the 
desire to go on learning). Dewey' s conception of education could, there- 
fore, be said to depend not only on what was learnt but also on the 
transforming effect it had on the learner as a person. So that while 
we may not agree with the particular rather narrow pragmatic view of ed- 
ucation that Dewey advocates, it still illustrates the basic point I am 
making that learning to have educational value must be seen to change 
the person qua person. 
Now this does not mean that the content of what he learns is in itself 
unimportant. The person's consciousness is dependent on the social 
world in which he lives. What he comes to learn and what is available 
to him will always be relevant and important issues in education. But 
they are questions to do with aims of education. . 
iii EDUCATION AS UPBRINGING 
In holding the above view I am not suggesting that only persons can be 
educated. In fact it would seem to me that Professor Peters' latest 
account (16) stops too short in suggesting that education has to be over 
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and above what is necessary to become a person. For surely an essential 
part, if only a part, of our understanding of education is that it is 
concerned with the upbringing of the young and the very young. As 
the human baby is not born a person and as he does not become one 
simply through a process of maturation or natural development but by 
learning, education must also be concerned as G. Langford believes 
during that stage of becoming a person (17). But G. Langford goes 
too far in suggesting that education is to become a person for clearly 
learning can go on for long after someone can fulfil the criteria of what 
it is to be a person (hence we have higher and adult education). The 
reason why it is so appropriate to talk of the child's education is 
because. on the basis of the definition of education I have just put forward, 
it can be said: firstly, the learning he achieves from the very beginning 
has a transforming effect on him, and secondly, that this is achieved through 
the realisation of those capacities which may be said to define the person. 
Although it may be argued that until the child gains a degree of conceptual 
understanding and begins to formulate attitudes and relationships to others 
he cannot even begin to have the consciousness that is distinctive of 
being a person, let alone an educated one, still. the learning he achieves 
in becoming a person can be said to be changing his awareness of the 
world, the beliefs and values he holds, the expectations he has; indeed 
the process is more marked in the child growing up than in the maturing 
adult. The impact of learning is far greater when our knowledge is 
slight, our beliefs unformed, our attitudes changeable and our own values 
as yet unknown. Furthermore, while the learning which the child gains 
may be different in kind from that of the older person it still involves 
the realization of the same human capacities. The child cannot begin to 
formulate concepts, think logically, solve problems if he has no potential 
capacity for rational thought, or to have aesthetic or moral values if he 
is unable to appreciate beauty or to care for others. 
It is for these reason then that learning as one becomes a person is also, 
like learning when one is a person a prima facie case of education. In 
saying this I am not suggesting that children are not as yet in some 
sense already persons or that there comes a time when the learning a 
child achieves enables us to say, 'now he fulfils the criteria of what it 
is to be a person' , clearly the process is not like this. Infants become 
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persons because they are treated as such. In any case it is impossible 
to draw a hard and fast line between becoming a person and being a 
person, and no doubt we consider even in the case of adults that some 
fulfil the criteria better than others (and indeed for that matter that 
some children fulfil them better than some adults) (18). 
Finally, it may help to consider why we do in general usage make a 
distinction between the person and the 'educated' person, where being 
educated is very much a question of having those characteristics that, 
for example, Peters has described in his analysis of the ' educated man' 
To answer this we have to take into account that the distinction only 
occurs in a society which has reached a certain level of sophistication 
in terms of its industry, technology, scientific knowledge and culture. 
As a society becomes more industrially and scientifically developed the 
knowledge that is available becomes extensive, highly complex, and 
increasingly differentiated into numerous separate branches of inquiry. 
These are often identified by their own conceptual framework which may 
have little bearing on the concepts employed in man' s everyday under- 
standing of the world. The child born into such a society is presented 
with a world which is potentially a lot more complicated than it would 
have been for the average man in the past or for those living now in 
a so called primitive society. Even if he is extremely talented he will 
find it impossible to gain a complete conceptual understanding of the 
world and extremely difficult to gain an understanding that could even 
be considered at all significant. However, there will clearly be some 
persons who are more successful than others. Those who we consider 
to be successful will have come up to a certain recognised standard in 
the level, extent and differentiation of their knowledge and in their 
mastery of various forms of inquiry and understanding. In these forms 
of achievement we will recognise the so called 'educated' man so that 
what we mean here when we describe someone as 'educated' is that he 
is highly educated and where the difference between him and 'uneducated' 
persons may not simply be one of degree. But the fact that the educated 
person, as used in this sense, comes up to a certain standard does not 
mean that other persons do not come up to any standard at all or that 
it is inappropriate to talk of what they, are learning as education. If we 
start to legislate on what, can, and what, cannot count as education in 
terms of content of learning or the quality of its subject matter we have 
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entered the area of debating and justifying educational aims. 
1v SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have argued that: 
(1) before trying to put forward my own contestable definition of 
education, I must first be clear on what constitutes the underlying 
conditions of education, on which there must necessarily be 
universal agreement; 
(2) to suggest education must at least denote learning is fundamentally 
right, although this will depend on the concept of learning being 
adhered to; 
(3) to say that learning is an ' achievement' or a' successful' performance 
only implies that it comes up to a mark or is correct, it does not in 
itself show that it is of educational value or any value at all for that 
matter; 
(4) learning to count as education must be given a social content, only 
then will it be possible to eliminate what is trivial, immoral and 
incoherent. This means the question of whether learning has 
educational value or not, must largely be a socially relative one. 
But not entirely, for it is possible to argue that there are certain 
social values which are universally recognised, at least to a degree, 
for example, to do with knowledge and truth and what is rationally 
defensible. In support of this, it may be possible to argue as 
J. White has done that generally, learning in itself logically pre- 
supposes values to do with knowledge, truth and correctness; 
(5) but learning is a process as well as an achievement and how the 
t achievement' is arrived at also helps to determine whether in fact 
it was the result of learning. The answer to this will depend on 
one' s viewpoint as a psychologist, neurologist, philosopher or 
layman; 
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(6) but if learning can be said to have educational value only the concept 
of learning which presupposes the agency of the person can be 
applicable. This is because underlying the concept of education is 
the concept of the person and this also means that once again, 
judging whether learning is of educational value will not only be 
based on socially relative criteria, at least to the extent that the 
characteristics of the person hold universally; rather if learning 
is to be appropriate, being a person it must : - 
(a) be the result of the person's conscious experience; 
(b) be characterised as a human activity and not simply a 
causal process; 
(c) have -a transforming effect: in that it changes the person qua 
person; , by the difference- it makes to him in terms of 
his 
conceptual awareness, the evaluation he makes, the attitudes 
he holds and so on; 
(7) it follows from the last criterion that learning to count as education 
must on logical, and not simply on empirical grounds, necessitate 
the realisation of those capacities that define the person, i. e. as a 
self-determining agent and as a centre of experience. On this 
basis I would suggest that education is concerned with: learning 
which promotes the development of the person qua person. 
(8) As the learning achieved by those who may be better described 
as becoming persons also fulfils the above criteria, education can 
also be to do with the upbringing of children as well as with 
what adults learn. 
(9) The fact that we distinguish between the educated and the non- 
educated person does not mean it is inapproriate to refer to the 
education of the latter, for the meaning of the educated person in 
this sense is highly stipulative. 
At this stage, even if it is accepted that education must be concerned 
with learning which is appropriate to being a person (in the ways that 
were briefly suggested) objections will still be raised to the overall idea 
of education being concerned with learning which promotes the development 
of the person qua person. This is because it has now become a contestable 
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definition, which, in the first instance, presupposes that there is agree- 
ment on what it is to be a person, the concept of development and the 
actual notion of the development of the person., When the first raises 
considerable and controversial questions, not only of a conceptual but 
also of a metaphysical kind, and when the last two have been much 
criticised by philosophers as being vacuous, inappropriate and even 
positively misleading when used in relation to education. Clearly it is 
now time to justify the definition I have given by :- 
(1) analysing the concept of the person; 
(2) analysing the concept of development and showing it can be 
used informatively and usefully in relation to education; 
(3) examining the meaning of education as-' learning which promotes the 
development of the person qua person; 
(4) defending it as a necessary truth of education and the values 
it champions against those advocated by other contestable 
definitions. 
I shall therefore devote the rest of part one to an analysis of the concept 
of the person, then in part two, after an examination of the concept of 
development, I shall explain and defend the definition of education that 
I have given as_' learning which promotes the development of the person 
qua person' . 
FOOTNOTES 
1 R. S. Peters, 'Democratic Values and Educational Aims' , in 
Teachers 
College Record (Feb. 1979) Vol. 80 no. 3, p. 465. 
2 Ibid., p. 465. 
3 J. White, ' Learning' , in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 
Vol. XLVI (1972). 
4 Ibid., p. 45. 
51 
5 P. Winch, ' Nature and Convention' , in Ethics and Action, (London; 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972). 
6 See P. Hirst, ' What is Teaching? ' , in The -Philosophy of Education, 
ed. R. S. Peters, (Oxford University Press 1973). 
7 R. Borger and E. N. Seabourne, The Psychology of Learning. 
(Penguin Books Ltd. 1966) p. 14. 
8D. W. Hamlyn, Experience ar. c1 the Growth of Understanding, (London; 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1978) Chapter 6. 
9 B. R. Bugelski, The Pyschology of Learning Applied to Teaching, (The 
Bobbs, Merrill Colne New York 1971) p. 280. 
10 D. W. Hamlyn, ' Human Learning' , in The Concept of Education, 
ed. R. S. Peters, (London: Oxford University Press 1973) p. 180. 
11 J. White, op. cit., p. 48. 
12 G. Langford, Philosophy and Education, (Macmillan Education Ltd. 
1968) Chapter 6. 
13 J. White, op. cit., p. 43. 
14 This should be seen separately from changes which are due to 
personality factors rather than to a process of learning. 
15 J. Dewey, Experience and Education, (Collier 1963), Chapter 3. 
16 See article by Peters already referred to above. 
17 G. Langford, Philosophy and Education., (Macmillan 1968), Chapter 5. 
18 What these criteria are will become apparent in the next four chapters. 

53 
CHAPTER THREE : THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON 
It seems somewhat presumptuous to try and analyse the concept of the 
person when philosophers have been wrestling with the problem since 
the time of Plato and especially when it is being done en route to 
something else. But of course it is just because philosophers have 
been bothered by the nature of the person that I am able to attempt 
the task at all; for although philosophers have been at variance with 
each other in what they have said, I would still hold they have succeeded 
in enriching and illuminating our understanding of what it is to be a 
person. 
i DUALISM 
Considering that philosophers are themselves persons it is not surprising 
that they initially looked inward on themselves in trying to discover the 
true ultimate human self. Descartes, following in the tradition of Plato, 
and using a particular philosophical method of systematic doubts is able 
to arrive at his ' cogito ergo sum' (1) as the one truth he could be sure 
of (for even his doubting proved his existence). From this maxim 
Descartes is able to conclude that the mind can exist separately from 
the body and is therefore essentially a thinking substance. It distinguishes 
us from animals and machines and guarantees us immortality; and in spite 
of all that philosophers have said since, it is a belief that people still 
hold today and which conditions their attitude to each other, gives 
evidence for the existence of ghosts, and confirms their belief in the 
mind being able to leave the body whether temporarily or finally at death, 
in extra sensory perception and in reincarnation. 
It is not necessary to examine in any detail Descartes theory of inter- 
actionism and its attendant problems to show that the dualist' s position 
is untenable, we have only to ask as P. Geach does. (2), to what does the 
' I' refer, in ' cogito ergo sum' to see that for Descartes the answer lies 
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in the use of a private language. As Descartes doubted the existence 
of everything else, except his own thinking (whether other things, 
persons, even his own body) then he could only conceive of the ' I' 
as being exclusively mental; because his doubting made all knowledge 
suspect, except his own existence, he thought it impossible that he 
could be mistaken and that when consciousness was present what he 
asserted must be true. But as Wittgenstein so successfully argued a 
private language is logically impossible, (3) because language implies 
rules, which in turn implies public checks (memory being private will 
not suffice). The way in which Descartes used the ' I' in ' cogito 
ergo sum' can not be publicly checked and therefore the self to which 
it refers is meaningless. 
if HUME' S' BUNDLE' THEORY 
The mistake in starting from subjective experience was dimly appreciated 
by Hume, who, when looking inwardly was able to conclude that he 
could not perceive the self at all, hence, that frequently quoted passage: 
' for my part when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself I. always stumble on some particular perception or 
other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, 
pain or pleasure, I never catch myself at any time with- 
out a perception and can never observe anything but 
the perception' (4). 
But although Hume refuted Descartes' idea of the immaterial self he was 
still left with the problem of deciding what the self did actually refer to. 
Instead of looking elsewhere for a solution he made the same mistake as 
Descartes and continued to rely on introspection, consequently as an 
empiricist he could only conclude that the self was no more than a series 
of successive states of consciousness or bundle of perceptions. This 
inevitably left him with the problem of explaining what gave unity to 
each bundle and how one could be distinguished from another. Hume 
knew these questions had to be answered but failed to do so satisfactorily 
even to himself. What Hume suggested was that the idea we have of the 
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self is based on the way we actually experience our perceptions as a 
successive chain, related through memory and causation. But, as an 
explanation this falls down on several counts: - 
(1) the idea of self is already presupposed in being able to relate 
a series of perceptions, otherwise how do I know the perceptions 
are mine? 
(2) if a person is no more than a bundle of perceptions then criteria 
have still to be given which would distinguish one bundle from 
another; 
(3) memory cannot provide the answer to (1) or (2) because : - 
(a) it evokes a circular argument (remembering an experience 
implies thinking of it as one' s own), 
(b) if certain experiences could not be remembered the person 
could not be said to have had them 
(c) it involves an infinite regress because each and every 
experience has to be remembered. 
Although Hume may have dispensed with the idea of the self as an 
immaterial substance, he is as guilty as Descartes in relying on a private 
explanation, and in failing to take into account physical and behavioural 
criteria and the relation a person has to others. It turns out to be just 
as impossible to identify the self as a bundle of perceptions as it is to 
identify a consciousness that has no physical reference. 
bi LOGICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
It was not until recently that philosophers realised that our understanding 
of what it is to be a person cannot be ascertained through introspection 
or by giving priority to one' s own case for this must always lead to a 
dualistic conception of the person and to what Ryle termed the ' ghost 
in the machine' . Following in Wittgenstein' s footsteps Ryle was able to 
explode the myth, by showing the distinction drawn between mind and 
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body to be a false one; and that the difficulties of explaining the privacy 
and intimacy of our mental life and how thinking which is essentially a 
mental phenomenon can bring about physical changes, can all be 11made 
to disappear once it is appreciated that mental terms and physical terms 
constitute different logical types. He argued that the concepts tradition- 
ally associated with qualities of mind: - will, beliefs, self knowledge, 
feeling etc., need not pose any special difficulties for us, because in 
using them we are not referring to some inner private mental occurrence 
which results in overt actions, but to the overt actions themselves: 
' The boxer, the surgeon, the poet and the salesman apply 
their special criteria in the performance of their special 
tasks, for they are trying to get things right, and they are 
appraised as clever, skilful, inspired or shrewd not for the 
ways in which they consider, if they consider at all pre- 
sumptions for conducting their special performances but for 
the way in which they conduct the performance themselves' (5). 
On Ryle' s account, then, behavioural criteria are sufficient for the use 
of mental concepts. We judge a person's character not by trying to read 
his mind, but by assessing his behaviour or dispositions to behave. 
Whether or not a person thinks intelligently, accurately, imaginatively, 
intuitively or whatever, does not depend on whether he is thinking 
silently to himself or out loud but whether it comes up to agreed public 
standards. 
Clearly Ryle is largely right, in so far as the meaning of many of our 
so called mental concepts do depend on behavioural criteria. But in 
exploding the myth of the ghost in the machine, while Ryle made a 
considerable contribution to the search for an understanding of the 
person, he stopped short of completing that understanding. For the 
mystery remains, however much a person's life can be explained in terms 
of his behaviour or dispositions to behave- this does not explain con- 
sciousness: the experience the person has of the private world of his 
own, comprising his own thoughts, feelings, and intentions, a world 
which does not disappear simply because it is parasitic and secondary 
to a public world of meaning and action. 
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iv IDENTITY THEORY /MATERIALISM 
There have been several attempts to explain the belief in our own 
consciousness, for example psychoparallelism, epiphenomenalism and 
the identity theory. Each theory has problems of its own, the first 
two because they presuppose a dualistic conception of man which has 
already been shown to be untenable and the last because it reduces 
consciousness to little more than a series of electro-chemical impulses 
and self awareness to a form of one part of the brain scanning another. 
It therefore fails to do justice to the concept of the person we already 
have. However, the identity theory does have the advantage of being 
compatible with logical behaviourism and therefore needs considering 
further. 
Philosophers like Armstrong (6) have argued that while Ryle is correct 
in the way he explains the meaning of mental concepts, this still leaves 
it quite open as to what the mind actually is. Armstrong says, the 
weakness of behaviourism lies in its inability to show what is happening 
when there is no outward behaviour but the mind is active (thinking, 
dreaming, feeling or whatever) and to explain, why, when outward 
behaviour is present, it is often seen as the effect or result of the 
mental state and not simply as a logical expression of it. He says, 
the problem is only partly solved by the notion of a disposition to 
behave because this fails to show what actually causes a person to 
behave or not to behave in the way he does. It is with the logical 
possibilities of giving a causal explanation of behaviour and therefore 
of the mind that the identity theory is concerned. 
But while the identity theory may be compatible with logical behaviourism, 
one can still accept the main arguments behind the latter without being 
committed to the former. This is because Ryle' s thesis is a logical one, 
he is not saying the mind is behaviour (as the materialist might say 
mental states are brain states) that is, he is not identifying the mind 
in any substantive sense with behaviour, rather he is showing that in 
common discourse behavioural criteria are logically sufficient for the use 
of mental concepts and if a private language is logically impossible he 
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must in some sense be fundamentally right. But with regard to any 
causal description which would explain what enables us to have a 
mind, logical behaviourism can remain quite neutral and indeed for 
that matter quite disinterested. 
The identity theorist of course accepts that the logic of mental concepts 
will be different from that of physical ones but what he is anxious to 
show is that while the logic of 'a' statements may differ from those of 
' b' this does not entail that ' a' s' are anything over and above ' b' s' 
But this means he has to find a way of explaining the identity of mental 
states and brain states without confusing the two different types of 
logical predicate, so that when Armstrong suggests that 'logical 
behaviourism' 'leaves it quite open as to what the mind actually "is" ' 
he must be using the "is" in a compositional and not a definitional sense. 
But at this point all the problems begin, for the idea of contingent 
identity may get round the problems of Leibniz law but only it seems 
to me if restricted to physical phenomena. It makes perfectly good 
sense to say this table is an old packing case and nothing else or the 
evening star is the morning star or fleecy textured clouds are in fact 
water particles, or lightning is an electrical discharge, because, in each 
case these are different expressions which can be seen to refer to the 
same thing, and this is because each one has a physical existence which 
stands independently of the ways in which it is described (7). But this 
is the only way the identity theory makes any sense, for when it is 
applied to persons we find that mental statements and brain statements 
are not referring to the same thing at all, because there is nothing 
which stands independently of the two classes of statement, but to which 
they both refer. For example, to describe my dream is not to describe 
a brain state as describing something as an old packing case is to 
describe a table. In the case of brain states and mental states all that 
we could identify in the way required would be the physical process of 
the brain. But we do not have two different logical descriptions of 
this, but only one, for while brain statements may be said to refer to 
it, mental statements (concerning thoughts, feelings, intentions and so 
on) do not, rather they refer to away of life characterised by human 
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actions and purposes. It is because the logic of the respective 
statements differs in the way it does, it never could apply to 
the same thing, regardless of what empirical discoveries were 
made, any more than the aesthetic properties of a poem could 
ever be said to refer to the ink in which it was written. 
The only way a materialist's conception of the mind could be 
preserved would therefore be by radically altering the logic 
of mental concepts. Some materialists do see this as a possibility 
and suggest that once certain empirical discoveries are made 
those concepts which imply consciousness will necessarily change. 
Instead of talking about thoughts, intentions, emotions and purposes 
we will be talking about brain processes, dispositions to behave, 
stimulus-response behaviour and so on. The identity theory will 
then be perfectly meaningful - mental states will be brain states. 
The need for education would disappear, for while human beings 
could still be said to have a 'mental life' - to make calculations, 
to have a memory, to respond behaviourally at least to the extent 
certain animals and machines do, any alterations needed on the 
human organisnis behavioural patterns could be achieved through 
a process of programming or conditioning on the lines B. F. Skinner 
(8) has suggested. But the materialist would be wrong if he thought 
he had succeeded in explaining our concept of the person; 
for 
clearly in a world of only biological machines, persons would 
simply not exist and the world that they once inhabited would 
not exist either; because it is a world, which at least so far, 
has 
been based on inter-personal achievement, common purposes and 
shared experiences. This journey into the future does not 
illuminate our concept of the person it destroys it. 
v STRAWSON' S CONCEPT OF THE PERSON 
We have at this stage reached something of an impasse, if dualism 
is logically absurd and if materialism fails to do justice to the 
picture we already have of what it is to be a person, how can we 
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explain the concept? Is there a way of at least analysing it, 
making use of contemporary methods of philosophy without 
commitment to either side? P. F. Strawson (9) has attempted just 
such a task and although it has come in for a lot of criticism, 
it does have the merit of explaining our understanding of the 
person as it is presupposed in our language without recourse 
to dualism or materialism. But it is not simply an analysis for 
it also serves to solve some metaphysical problems, notably the 
existence of other minds. 
Strawson defends the view that the concept of the person is 
logically primitive and therefore unanalysable into other concepts 
(like the mind and body). The idea of dualism therefore pre- 
supposes a prior understanding of what it is to be a person and 
so this means that the idea of individual consciousness can not 
exist as a primary concept. But this does not leave Strawson to 
defend a materialistic position, for, he say4. it is characteristic 
of our concept of the person, that not only are ' m' predicates, 
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics applicable to it, 
but also 1p' predicates that is, predicates ascribing states of 
consciousness. He says the reason why we want to distinguish 
between statements to do with physical characteristics on the 
one hand, and those to do with mental attributes on the other, 
(in that one can never be logically equivalent to another) and why 
at the same time we wish to apply both kinds of statements not 
to two subjects but to one, can only be explained when we realise 
the logical primitiveness of the concept of a person. 
Once we have reached this stage other problems which existed 
for us simply disappear. For example, on Strawson' s account 
the argument from analogy should never get started, for the person 
who uses it relies on the notion of consciousness as a primary one 
and on this basis he defines and identifies himself, (if he does 
not do it on this basis, if he uses behavioural criteria then he 
has no need for the argument from analogy). But according to 
Strawson the very idea of my own consciousness already presupposes 
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the concept of the person. It therefore only makes sense for me 
to talk of y experiences in contradistinction to those of other 
people. If the experiences were only mine, then, they would be 
no ones. 
But if we do not identify the person on the basis of introspection 
and then by the argument from analogy, how do we identify those 
subjects to which both ' m' and ' p' predicates are applicable? 
Now Strawson' s thesis is a logical one: individuals of a particular type 
must be described in the same way. He says it is therefore 'a 
necessary condition of one' s ascribing states of consciousness in 
the way one does, that one should also ascribe them or be prepared 
to ascribe them to others who are not oneself (10). This means 
we must be able to identify other subjects of experience. The 
question of identification is therefore a crucial one, and is the one 
that has led to most controversy. Strawson holds that when we 
ascribe states of consciousness to others, that is, when we identify 
others as persons, we do so on the strength of their behaviour, 
not because it is seen as a sign but because behavioural criteria 
must in some sense be of a 'logically adequate kind' (11) ; but 
when we ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves we do so on 
the basis other than that of behaviour. Now, when individual 
consciousness was seen as a primary concept it was exactly this 
distinction which was the source of all the problems concerning the 
existence of other minds, but on Strawson' s account this is no 
longer the case; rather it shows the special nature of ' p' predicates, 
that they have both first and third ascriptive uses. It is not that 
these predicates have two kinds of meaning (one public and the 
other private) rather there is a single meaning, but two ways of 
ascribing them. But, according to other philosophers, it is 
precisely these two ways of ascribing ' p' predicates (that does not 
rely on the argument from analogy) which puts Strawson' s account 
into serious difficulty. 
A. J. Ayer, (12) argues that although human behaviour can in 
itself be seen as expressive of consciousness this does not 
necessarily imply that behaviour provides a logically adequate 
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criterion. He says however intimate the relationship is, there 
is still a difference between the sign and what it signifies. For 
example there would be no contradiction in identifying a man' s 
grimace as one that was characteristic of a man in pain and at 
the same denying he was in pain. He therefore considers 
Strawson' s analogy of a game of cards to be inappropriate: ' the 
grimace and the feeling are logically separable in a way that, 
given the appropriate conventions the appearance and function 
of a token in a game, are not' (13). Although Ayer accepts 
Alston' s point, that there must be a logical connection between 
the inner state and its outward expression which generally holds, 
he still concludes that once the understanding of mental concepts 
has been acquired, they can still be divorced from their original 
association with behaviour. Indeed, Ayer takes this a stage further 
and suggests that in the case of identifying the person, once we 
have the concept, there is no reason why we should continue to 
successfully ascribe experiences to others for it could be, unknown 
to us, that no other persons actually exist (e. g. they have all 
been replaced by human looking automata). This would mean that 
Strawson would be wrong in maintaining that before I could ascribe 
experiences to myself I must first ascribe them to others. It 
would be quite possible for me to be mistaken in ascribing them 
to others but not apparently in my own case (although how would I 
know I hadn't become a human looking automaton). Ayer says 
there is a difference between my believing that I am justified in 
accepting a given proposition and my really being so. Strawson 
has therefore to show not only that we are prepared to ascribe 
states of consciousness to others but that we are actually -successful 
in doing so. 
But this is surely to go too far; certainly we can not be said to 
have a concept of a person unless we can identify him, in ascribing 
any kind of predicate we have to know what we are talking about, 
but this does not mean we have to know whether what we are 
talking about is true. Although for Ayer meaning does seem to 
rest on verification, the relationship is surely the other way round. 
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We can only verify (whether a person exists) what we already 
understand (what it is to be a person). There may be no empirical 
contradiction in saying a man looked as if he was in pain, but he 
was not, (just as there is no empirical contradiction in saying 
that in a particular card game the Queen of Hearts was used as 
a card without honours), but there would certainly be a logical 
one. Pain behaviour (and other forms of behaviour) do not only 
act as signs they also provide logical criteria. Confusion arises 
when the two become muddled. A doctor may well use pain 
behaviour as a symptom in diagnosing a complaint or given other 
information he may well discount pain behaviour as being indicative 
of it. But in order to do this at all he must already have a con- 
cept of pain where behaviour provides 'logically adequate criteria' 
and is not simply understood as a sign. If it was, then in order 
to have a concept of pain he would have to know what the sign 
was signifying, what it was referring to, but how could this be 
identified on its own when it has no public check? 
I would conclude that to have a concept of a person, we only have 
to know how to apply both aspects of ' p' predicates correctly 
and on this basis we can identify the person. We do not have 
to know if what we say is true or not. Indeed we could be 
mistaken in our own case as well as in that of others. We can 
believe ourselves to be in severe pain and later realise we are 
suffering no more than a dull ache, and some persons believe 
they possess some other kind of identity to that of personhood, like 
Nina in Tchekov' s Seagull. 
However, further objections have to be faced for Strawson himself 
has been criticised for confusing questions of meaning with those 
of verification. Hamlyn, for example, suggests that Strawson 
explains the meaning of pi predicates in terms of ways of 
ascribing those predicates. And Don Locke (14) argues that 
Strawson hopes to show that we can not ascribe conscious states 
to anything unless we have some logically adequate way of telling 
that our ascriptions of conscious states to others are correct. 
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But that, because he fails to distinguish telling in the sense 
of identifying and telling in the sense of verifying, his argument 
is a complete muddle (15). 
However, I cannot, for myself, see that these criticisms of Strawson 
are justified. Certainly, having a concept of the person (under- 
standing what it means) entails an ascriptive use, and therefore to 
have a concept of a person we have to be both other ascriber (on 
the basis of behaviour) and self ascriber (on a basis other than 
that of behaviour) ; but this ascriptive use is part of the logic of 
' p' predicates and does not necessarily imply a process of veri- 
fication. We can use ' p' predicates correctly without wondering 
how we could verify them, although if we were to wonder, on 
logical grounds an argument from analogy would certainly be ruled 
out. Although Strawson makes a distinction between meaning and 
ascriptive use, both are still within the business of conceptual 
analysis; for in this case, understanding a concept implies knowing 
how to use it (in these two distinctive modes), in the same way 
that having a concept of the Queen of Hearts implies more than 
recognising its markings for one has to also appreciate how it 
functions within a game. But the fact that we ascribe the concept 
on different grounds, depending on whether we are talking about 
ourselves or others is not because ' p' predicates have two separate 
meanings (e. g. criteria applicable to private consciousness and 
behavioural criteria), but rather as Strawson argues, 'because it 
is essential to the single (my italics) kind of meaning that they 
do have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly 
in order' (16). 
But it is perhaps because we have these two ascriptive uses that 
it has been thought appropriate to speak of two distinctive meanings. 
Strawson gives the example of depression where describing someone 
behaving in a depressed way is thought to mean something different 
than describing ourselves as feeling depressed, ' One is inclined 
to argue that feelings can be felt but not observed and behaviour 
can be observed but not felt and that therefore there must be 
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room to drive a logical wedge. But the concept of depression 
spans the place where one wants to drive it' (17). This must 
surely mean that in order to have a concept of consciousness 
(thoughts, feeling states intentions) , one has to be a subject 
of consciousness as well as an observer of others; but this does not 
mean (for the reasons Strawson has given) that we come to under- 
stand consciousness from our own case. To understand ' p' 
predicates, or many of them, we have to' already possess a 
concept of a person, but this also entails being a subject of 
consciousness and sharing a common human nature. 
This very last point is perhaps not developed sufficiently in 
Strawson's analysis of 'P' predicates. B. A. O. Williams (18) 
with some justification, remarks that as Strawson has defined 
them, ' p' as well as ' m' predicates are ascribable to animals. 
He argues that Strawson did not see this because, like Descartes, 
he fails to relate persons to other living things and therefore main- 
tains an artificial dichotomy between persons and everything else. 
Unless Strawson is going to widen his concept of the person to 
include animals, then, according to Williams we will have to accept 
that the concept is not after all unique in admitting the joint 
ascription of the two kinds of predicate. Although obviously 
it still is unique in the way predicates are actually ascribed, if 
William's point is a valid one then there must be other concepts 
(or at least one), which is primitive in the same kind of way. 
However, while Strawson' s analysis takes insufficient account that 
the concept at least of human being, falls under a class of living 
things in general, it is surely right in its specification of the 
distinctive nature of the human being as a person. If it fails, it 
fails because it makes too few distinctions. For in showing the 
nature of ' p' predicates- it is not enough to show how they differ 
from ' m' predicates, what is also required is that they are distin- 
guished from the description of other living things, but which would 
not be classed as persons. It is not enough to say that predicates 
imply consciousness, for clearly in a straight forward sense animals 
are conscious too. However, if I have understood Strawson 
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correctly the special nature of I p' predicates is not simply that 
they imply consciousness, but that they imply a particular kind 
of consciousness, namely that which is intentional and the 
content of which is publicly shared. Consciousness as a notion 
is only intelligible if there is some understanding of what stands 
as its object (to be conscious we have to be conscious of something) 
it is surely what persons are conscious of and not consciousness 
per se, that makes ' p' predicates identifiable and uniquely 
applicable to persons. It is therefore only to the extent that 
animals are conscious, in the same way as persons and therefore 
could be said, to share the same world, that ' p' predicates can 
be said to be applicable to them. Both dogs and persons can be 
described as having their dinner, enjoying the sun, going for 
a walk, getting upset, but to show dogs were engaged in the same 
activities there would have to be some evidence that they were 
conscious of what they were doing in a similar way. Clearly what 
makes it unlikely is that the person is a language user, he has a 
different conceptual understanding to animals and is therefore 
conscious of the simplest activities (including the situations and 
feelings which give rise to them) in a totally different way. 
The distinctive nature of ' p' predicates is clearly crucial to our 
understanding of the person and this needs to be considered 
further. It is therefore perhaps time to part company with 
Strawson, for while his analysis has enabled us to understand the 
logic of the concept it does not tell us what the person is actually 
like - what characterises him, in what ways does his consciousness 
differ from that of animals? What is peculiar to the human nature 
that he shares with others? In short what can be said about the 
actual content of ' p' predicates, that will explain not only the 
character of the person but why he is valued so highly, to the 
extent of being held worthy of respect and the belief for some, 
that if he lives his life aright that he will be blessed at the end 
with immortality . 
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vi THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ' P' PREDICATES 
In answer to this, it is not difficult to empty out a rag bag of 
attributes that provide the subject matter of ' p' predicates. 
Above all, they would indicate that a person can initiate action, 
that he has intentions and purposes, based on his capacity. for 
thought, memory and the evaluation of his desires. Furthermore, 
that the quality of these capacities, the degree to which these 
are exercised, are a result of the life he shares with others, 
through his ability to communicate and to use language. But 
they are also due to his curiosity about the world he lives in 
and his constructiveness in the world he creates; for these have 
led to the search for knowledge and to the continual striving to 
create and preserve a civilisation he could be proud of. The 
achievements of human civilisation show that the person is not 
simply characterised as a rational being, but that he is also a 
creature of feeling, capable of caring for others, of appreciating 
goodness and beauty, of enjoying a mental and emotional life, 
which is both imaginative and sensitive. The person can be res- 
pected, regardless of whether he possesses all these attributes, 
simply on the strength of being a self-initiating agent living in 
a human world. But this also carries with it a burden of res- 
ponsibility for it means he is accountable for his actions not 
only as a rational agent but also as a social one and therefore 
as a moral being. 
The person, then, could be described as having a whole range of 
capacities, without which education as a concept would simply be 
unintelligible to us. But while they may provide the subject 
matter of ' p' predicates, they do not all define the person. It 
would no doubt be argued that some persons are characterised by 
their destructiveness, lack of imagination, their irrationality, 
cruelty to others, and so on. It is clearly important to distinguish 
between those characteristics which do, and those which do not, 
define the life of anyone deemed to be a' person' . There is a 
difference between what a person could or should be, and what 
a person necessarily is. 
i 
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What then are these characteristics which enable us to identify 
the person, to distinguish him, for example, from a machine. 
A machine can be credited with a certain ' mental life' :' holding' 
concepts, making calculations, acquiring knowledge, upholding 
values of accuracy, truth and consistency, but it cannot be said 
to be experiencing what it is doing, or if we think it can, we are 
starting to identify it as a person. We distinguish the person 
from the machine by virtue of his self awareness or self conscious- 
ness, and this includes consciousness of the world he lives in as 
well as consciousness of himself. But it is the idea of self 
awareness which is crucial, because the notion of consciousness 
could not get along without it. Consciousness suggests not only 
an objective world that the person can be conscious of, but an 
awareness of that objective world, which implies a subjective point 
of view and a personal experience of that point of view. This is 
why, the concept of the person is dependent on us being both 
self ascriber and other ascriber, and why it entails understanding 
the concept from the inside and not simply from the position of 
an observer. 
But the person is also distinguishable from the machine because 
he is self motivating or determining. The person behaves and 
acts without having to be ' switched on' . This is why we attribute 
wants and desires to a person, in a way we would not consider 
doing if we were explaining the behaviour of a machine. It is 
only because the person is self determining, that it can make any 
sense to refer to the person being an agent, capable of initiating 
actions, making evaluations and having reasons for what he does 
that are in an important sense his own. 
The ideas of consciousness and self motivation have also biological 
meanings and some philosophers like Paul Ziff (19) have argued that 
consciousness could never be attributed to a machine for the very 
obvious reason that it is not a living thing. Although this does 
not take us very far, for consciousness is only definitive of the 
person, if defined in social and not simply in natural terms, 
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nonetheless, the relationship between being conscious and being 
alive does seem to be more than a contingent one. 
To say that the person is characterised in these ways may serve 
to distinguish the person from the machine, but the account 
given, so far, is still open to the objection that Williams makes, 
that if ' p' predicates only suggest consciousness, which is not 
qualified in any way, they can apply equally well to animals as 
they do to human beings. To answer this one I would now like 
to put forward and defend the following criteria as being crucial 
to our understanding of ' p' predicates :- 
(1) the person is a centre of human experience, where ' human' 
gives a social rather than a physiological explanation; 
(2) the person is a rational agent where 'rationality' pre- 
supposes the capacity for evaluation and linguistic under- 
standing and not only purposeful behaviour; 
(3) the person is a moral agent where the meaning of moral 
may have different interpretations some of which are 
dependent on more than formal criteria. 
These will now be looked at in turn and will provide the subject 
matter for the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PERSON AS A CENTRE 
OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
The person is identified qua person, not simply on the grounds 
that he can be said to be conscious or a centre of experience, 
but because of what is characteristic of that experience, in being 
conceptually structured and affectively sensitized. But even this, 
it may be argued, is not sufficient to distinguish the person from 
the animal, because both may be said to hold concepts and to have 
feelings. What turns out to be crucial, is the nature of a person's 
conceptual understanding and emotional experiences. It is only 
when these reflect a way of life, characterised by human beliefs, 
values and interpersonal agreement of meaning, that consciousness 
can be said to identify the person. As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, consciousness or experience of the animal differs from 
that of the person, because of what it experiences and because 
of what it is conscious of. Only by the extent to which the animal 
could be said to share the same world as human beings, that is, a 
world characterised by human activities, values and purposes, 
could its consciousness be said to be comparable or similar to that 
of persons. Attempts have been made to initiate animals into 
human society, not only peripherally in the way domestic pets 
are encouraged to 'join in' family life, but in the real sense of 
trying to get them to understand human activities under the same 
description that human beings would use. This of course is only 
possible through the use of language which at the present time 
would make it empirically impossible. Although some remarkable 
work has been done in getting apes to communicate symbolically 
through sign language, this still remains at a very limited level. (1) . 
However, there are certainly no logical reasons why an animal 
should not learn to become a person. For as M. Midgley forcibly 
argues we are animals too (2). 
The person, then, can only be identified as a centre of experience 
because of the nature of that experience which can be said to be 
both (i. ) conceptually structured and (H) affectively sensitized. 
These will now be looked at in turn. 
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iA PERSON'S EXPERIENCES ARE 
CONCEPTUALLY STRUCTURED 
As a biological organism the experience available to the person 
is dependent on sense perception; without the possession of sensory 
organs the outside world would simply be inaccessible to him, but 
as a social being they are dependent on the conceptual understanding 
that enables him to actually make sense of his perceptions. No one 
realised this more than Immanual Kant whose famous maxim ' thoughts 
without content are empty intuitions without concepts are blind' , 
is particularly appropriate here. Although Kant' s main concern was 
with the nature of a priori judgments what he says still has 
implications for synthetic concepts, because, like a priori concepts, 
they are also principles of unity, which provide a rule or rules, 
for the unification of a particular set of sensible data. 'All know- 
ledge' he says, ' demands a concept, though the concept may indeed 
be quite imperfect or insecure. But a concept is always as regards 
its form something universal, which serves as a rule' (3). The 
distinction between intuition and conception is a crucial one. 
Conceptual knowledge may come through experience but can not be 
derived from it. Furthermore, the conceptual understanding we 
gain is not a series of unrelated facts or ideas. Concepts at one 
level for example will logically presuppose concepts at a lower level. 
Conceptual learning is therefore structured and so in learning any 
new concept, we can only make sense of it if we can place it 
within an existing conceptual framework. In this way with the help 
of the imagination our experiences become synthesised. 
Unfortunately, psychologists engaged in empirical research into 
cognitive development have not always appreciated the logical nature 
of man's conceptual understanding. Associationists, (4) for example, 
in identifying thinking as a series of thoughts, where one experience 
triggers off the next by a process of association (due to contiguity, 
continuity of attention, frequency and similarity, related ideas 
occurring together etc. ) failed to realise, that thinking based on an 
association of ideas, already depends on a prior understanding of 
concepts, which are general and not particular in nature, and that 
therefore their theory failed to explain learning. Associationism has 
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now been rejected, but abstractionism which is still widely accepted 
by psychologists, faces just as many logical difficulties because it 
is based on the erroneous assumption that concepts can be derived 
from sense experiences (5). But there are exceptions, G. F. Stout, 
for example criticised associationism on the grounds that it failed 
to recognise the 'form' of thinking as distinct from the 'psychical' 
element. In A Manual of Psychology, he says, 'the presented whole 
is for the associationists simply the sum of its presented components'; 
but he maintained that mental elements will change in entering into 
new combinations (6). There is a clear similarity here between 
his work and gestalt psychology. 
More recently J. Piaget' s work has fallen very much within the Kantian 
tradition. In his explanation of cognitive development he recognises 
that the child has to pass through certain logical stages, (7) that one 
stage logically presupposes earlier stages (for example thinking 
autonomously presupposes conforming to rules) and that in this way 
the child' s ability to think develops. He therefore recognises that 
experience does not depend simply on sense perception, but is 
determined by pre-existing knowledge which has its own logical 
structure and is characterised by public norms. 
But Piaget' s account is not without its problems, because while he 
accepts the social nature of learning, he also conceives of the 
child' s cognitive development (particularly in the early stages) 
in biological terms, and it is because of this that philosophers 
like T. Nischel and R. S. Peters, while recognising the immense 
contribution Piaget has made to child psychology, have still found 
good cause to criticise his work (8). For, 
while both natural and other forms of development are all normative, 
the kind of norms involved are essentially different (q). It may be that 
biological or physiological development is causally necessary for 
development which involves learning to go on, but the two 
descriptions must be kept distinct. To describe the latter in terms 
of the former can only cause confusion, for example the notion of 
'accommodation' will have a different meaning if applied to physiological 
development rather than development through learning; but to 
muddle the two can only lead to conceptual error and so to empirical 
misunderstanding as well. 
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It could be, that the tendency for psychologists (Piaget is not 
alone in this) to confuse natural development, with development which 
is the result of learning, is due to the fact, that both go on at the 
same time, and because one kind of development enables the other 
kind to take place. For example, a child learns to talk (end of 
sensori motor stage) but this is only possible because a certain 
physiological stage has already been reached (hence the notion of 
readiness for learning). The capacity to learn can therefore be 
seen as a result of the physiological development, hence most 
children learn to talk at roughly the same time. The picture can 
be potentially even more confusing, when development is not only 
the result of learning and physiological change, but where the 
learning is in itself, determined by the logical nature of what the 
development is in. For while these two can be described in the 
same terms, because the experience of learning must be logically 
related to what is being learnt, this can not be the case with a 
physiological explanation. And it becomes even more important 
not to confuse the story of natural development with development 
which is conceptual and achieved through learning. (For further 
comment on this see chapter seven especially pp. 180-182. ) 
Whatever the difficulties of empirically explaining how a person 
learns to think and to understand the world he lives in, (and 
they are considerable (10) ).. the philosophical point remains, that 
it is distinctive of a person that his experiences are conceptually 
structured and this is only possible through the acquisition of 
language. It is because of the child' s growing conceptual aware- 
ness that he begins to formulate beliefs and attitudes and to 
arrive at a position in which he can both know and understand the 
world he lives in. It is a position which is an essentially social 
one, the concepts available to the person being dependent on the 
society of which he is a member. 'But this does not commit us to 
saying that all the beliefs and knowledge which his conceptual 
understanding allows him to have, are socially relative. Far from 
it, if education is concerned with the development of persons it 
must respect the rationality of the person and this means upholding 
standards of truth and objectivity (see below). To a large extent 
the common knowledge which the person comes to enjoy as a member 
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of a social group is 'picked up' rather than being formally and 
intentionally learnt, but providing it comes up to standards that 
are publicly recognised, the continuous growth of a person' s 
conceptual experience can still count as learning. In a society, 
however, in which knowledge is highly advanced and differentiated 
this would be inadequate, learning would have to be brought about 
systematically and intentionally through formal teaching. . 
No doubt, the conceptual distinctions a society makes depend on 
the unique wants and interests of the members of that particular 
society. But this is not to say that they can construct a world of 
meaning in any way they like. It is interesting that in spite of 
the fact that societies are, and have been1 so different, that it is 
not usually too difficult to translate exact meanings from one 
language to another. A. Quinton remarks on the comparative ease 
with which we can translate ancient languages, (ii) and if we con- 
sider, at the present time, the extent and complexity of what is 
claimed to be true, there still exists a tremendous body of know- 
ledge which is universally recognised and which does not depend 
for its validity on where we happen to live (consider for example 
the universal appeal of an encyclopedia translated into one common 
language). But having said this it would be wrong to suggest 
that the development of reason on which the pursuit of knowledge 
depends can be found to the same extent universally. Our own 
culture for example is rooted in a critical tradition where there is 
a concern for truth and a desire to push the frontiers of our 
knowledge forward. But this is not the case in all societies. 
Indeed, some societies actually discourage the development of 
rational inquiry and critical thought (12). Nonetheless, because 
the extent of our knowledge is now so much greater and the 
communicable world can be seen to be considerably bigger, 
agreement that has been reached, is now on a far greater scale 
than it ever has been in the past. And so it would not seem too 
outrageous to suggest, that we may at least have got some of our 
conceptual understanding right, that our cognitive apparatus may 
be doing a reasonable job in enabling us to get clearer on the 
nature of reality. Furthermore, this body of universal knowledge 
is not simply an agglomeration of facts, for it to be meaningful it 
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must be structured, and it must be seen in terms of its subject 
matterC133, This means that if a person is to acquire knowledge to 
any degree, he must be initiated into different subject areas and 
he must achieve certain standards of competence and understanding 
that the subject areas demand. 
The ability to learn and to gain knowledge and understanding is 
not only based on what is objectively ' there' available to us. 
Knowledge depends on the notion of truth and this as Wittgenstein 
pointed out is a social concept: it implies agreement. Furthermore 
language itself, which presupposes the value of truth telling, is a 
social achievement and is only possible against a background of 
common interest, wants and purposes in short it depends on under- 
standing and sharing in the same way of life. It is on this basis 
that agreement can be reached. But the actual possibility of sharing 
our human predicament, this, in its turn presupposes the potentiality 
of human beings to communicate and to form relationships with each 
other and this is also part of our understanding of what it is to be a 
person. 
I have argued that a person's experiences are only meaningful to 
him because they are conceptually structured. They enable him, 
on the strength of this, to form beliefs and attitudes and to have 
certain expectations of the world he lives in. But these will not 
only be concerned with what a person finds to be true, they will 
also involve other types of experience, for example, of an aesthetic, 
religious or moral sort; although the nature of these experiences 
will depend on a particular social environment they are derived from 
sources of value common to all societies. But it could not be 
claimed that there is the same agreement that has been found in the 
pursuit for knowledge. Different societies and indeed different 
persons, hold varying aesthetic, religious and moral beliefs. No 
doubt in each case it is possible to lay down what would count as 
minimum criteria, otherwise we could not identify the belief or 
attitude in question, but it would be impossible to give stipulative 
criteria, that would define content and be recognised as universally 
valid. However, with the rapid increase in communication between 
different societies it could be argued that different beliefs are now 
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more commonly known about and this has led to an appreciation 
of other cultures and to a gradual emergence of common values, 
at least of an aesthetic and moral kind if not of a religious kind. 
As evidence, we have only to consider how much more liberal 
we have become in our appreciation of the arts or the extent to 
which the human rights campaign has taken on most of the world. 
Although there is not the same universality of agreement over 
aesthetic, religious and moral values as those concerned with 
knowledge, there must be agreement for the forms of life or modes 
of experience to be at all meaningful or creditable. Furthermore, 
an appreciation of these values will also involve initiation, this 
time, into what could be called distinctive modes of experience, 
and these too, will have certain standards concerning their mastery 
and understanding. 
To summarise, it can be said that a person is identified because 
his experiences have been conceptually structured through the 
acquisition of language and this enables him to have: firstly, a 
certain knowledge and understanding of the world; and secondly, 
to hold particular values concerned not only with the pursuit of 
knowledge but also with the appreciation of aesthetic, religious and 
moral experiences. 
üA PERSON'S EXPERIENCES ARE 
AFFECTIVELY SENSITIZED 
(a) The Concept of Emotion 
So. far, a person's experiences have been explained largely in 
conceptual terms because the experiences which are available to 
him are dependent on the concepts he holds. Even an experience 
which is largely a matter of sensory perception, (for example an 
awareness of a bright light), only has the meaning it does because 
of the description under which it is seen. But, I now wish to 
suggest, that experience is characterised by being affectively 
sensitized, as well as conceptually structured, that life is experienced 
emotionally, and that it is feeling and sensitivity which are as much 
the mark of the person as his rationality. 
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The arguments against this kind of distinction are, of course, 
well known. It can easily be shown that emotions are basically 
forms of rational appraisal, that distinctions between different 
emotions can only be made on conceptual grounds and not simply 
by an appeal to the strength of feeling being experienced. 
The attempt to identify emotion with feeling states that can be 
ascertained physiologically was, for example, the mistake lying 
behind the James-Lange theory of emotion. This explained emotion 
as a mass of sensations, defining it as, 'the way the body feels 
when in a disturbed organic state and when going through expressive 
and overt movements characteristic of emotions' (14). But the very 
fact that it was able to show a relationship between the two, meant 
that it was already dependent on a concept of emotion which could 
be understood independently from any bodily reference. It has 
since been argued by psychologists and philosophers alike that 
the emotions can never be identified simply on the grounds of 
describing an organic state., R. S. Woodworth, as a psychologist, 
for example, argues that emotions are only distinguished by con- 
text and depend on the person's cognition of a situation and his 
behavioural response being appropriate to it (15). 
And R. S. Peters, as a philosopher, has been especially concerned 
in showing that emotions are basically forms of cognition, that 
some kind of appraisal is a logically necessary condition in dis- 
tinguishing between them (16). For example, a man feels sympathy 
because he knows and understands the situation another person 
finds himself in; contempt because of what counts as worthy 
behaviour and what it means to fall short of it; resentment because 
of what is recognised as unfair treatment by others and so on. 
There is therefore plenty of scope for educating the emotions. 
Now while I would accept Peters argument that emotion has a 
cognitive core (on the basis of which different emotions can be 
distinguished) and that the experience of emotion is therefore 
dependent on acts of cognition and can not be separated from them, 
I would still wish to argue, that an appraisal in itself does not 
enable us to identify an experience as an emotional one. In 
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emphasizing the conceptual nature of emotion there is a danger 
that the person's experiences are reduced to acts of cognition. 
To say that emotions are conceptual, that they are dependent 
on how we assess a situation, does not commit us to saying that 
they are only a form of cognitive appraisal. To feel fear is 
not only to see a situation as harmful, for it is possible to assess 
a situation in this way without having any feeling of fear at all; 
furthermore, a man can consider that someone possesses what is 
rightfully his without feeling jealous; or two persons could be un- 
justly treated but only one may feel resentment. In these examples 
the difference lies not so much in the appraisal, but in the feeling 
being experienced and the question which then immediately poses 
itself, is how is this to be identified? 
By way of providing an answer we could consider that as we are 
subject to emotion, as it is something that comes over us rather than 
something that we decide to do, it might be possible to identify 
feelings either introspectively or by using physiological tests. But 
there are problems with both of these methods. Firstly, the 
problem of introspection (which I shall return again to shortly), 
is that it relies on a method which is essentially private. We can 
ascertain that people are making the same assessment in a way we 
can not be sure that they are having the same feeling. There are 
therefore difficulties of both an epistemological and metaphysical kind 
in using introspection as a method of identification. Secondly, 
with physiological tests, here certainly, the evidence is clearly 
public, so there would be no problem if all that was required was 
the identification of particular physiological states but this is not 
all that is required. The psychologist, for example, also needs 
to have a prior understand' of whether, what he is identifying, is 
in fact an emotional, as well as a physiological state. It could be 
thought that this would be provided by the appraisal being made. 
When it is correlated with a certain condition of the autonomic 
nervous system the person could be said to be undergoing some 
emotion. But as all appraisals will correlate with some physiological 
state or other on what grounds could one be described as emotional 
but not another? 
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(b) Behaviour as a Criterion of Emotion 
In fact, as I pointed out above, psychologists, like Woodworth, 
do operate with another criterion. They are able to identify an 
emotional state not only because it has a cognitive element but also 
because there is a correlation between a physiological state and a 
particular pattern of behaviour or disposition to behave that the 
physiological state gives rise to. On this basis it can be decided 
whether the organism is in a high state of arousal and of course 
once the correlation has been made, an emotional state can be 
identified separately from descriptions of behaviour. R. Melzack 
and K. L. Casey, for example, claim, -'that while a high level of 
arousal or activation cannot be equated with emotion, nonetheless, 
it is the most characteristic feature of emotion' (17) (other 
physiological states are also correlated with emotional behaviour, 
for example, hormonal and visceral changes (18) ). Furthermore, 
it can be shown that high levels of arousal will correlate with 
particular forms of behaviour and on this basis different emotions 
can be distinguished. 
Behaviour then, as well as cognition, is crucial in Identifying 
emotion in affective as well as conceptual terms. But both are 
needed. If emotion cannot be identified only by the appraisal being 
made, it cannot be identified simply by the behavioural response 
either. Clearly, the meaning of some emotions will be more 
dependent on the appraisal, like jealousy, vanity, envy; and others 
like anxiety, fear, anger, will rely more heavily on forms of 
behaviour. But even the latter are still dependent on an under- 
standing of the object of emotion. But while there is a conceptual 
link between emotion and behaviour the connection is not a tight 
one. Firstly, because the same emotion can exhibit itself in 
different forms of behaviour; for example, two men can see a situation 
as threatening and feel equally afraid, but while one faces the 
danger, the other runs away. Secondly, and conversely, because 
different emotions can be exhibited in the same pattern of behaviour, 
for example, two women at a party could start a fight but for 
completely different reasons, one because she is angry, the other 
for reasons of pride. This shows behaviour can be unreliable; 
we can be mistaken if all we have to go on is his outward behaviour 
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and it also shows the strength and necessity of the person' s 
assessment of a situation in identifying emotion. 
Flut still the point remains that if emotion is more than a question 
of appraisal, the conceptual connection between particular emotions 
and certain forms of behaviour must also hold, if only loosely; 
and hold, if not for the whole of the time, at least for most of 
it. If persons who perceived a situation as dangerous always 
behaved differently we would not have the concept of fear we do 
in fact have. It is because generally speaking human beings try 
to avoid what is dangerous, we can still believe that the person 
who faces danger is afraid, because we can show physiologically 
he had the tendency to run away. Indeed, it is on this basis 
that we would assess a person as brave, because he had overcome 
the natural inclination to run away. In other words, if various 
persons after appraising a situation similarly, all behaved in 
differing and conflicting ways then there would be no justification 
for saying they were experiencing the same emotion. 
Often the relationship is conceptually loose in a different sense, 
in that there is simply no one appropriate form of behaviour which 
can be associated with a particular emotional experience, (for 
example despair, grief, frustration, anxiety). Hence the connection 
with R. S. Peters refers to between emotion and wishing (19). But 
while no specific form of behaviour may be appropriate, and while 
also there may be different ways a person will react in behavioural 
terms to the same situation, nonetheless, certain forms of behaviour 
are characteristic of those emotions, like compassion, remorse, despair, 
sympathy and so on. Certainly the connection still holds, if only 
negatively; if for example, in experiencing grief, people generally 
spent their time enjoying themselves our understanding of this 
emotion would be totally different. It does seem then that even 
in these cases the conceptual link between emotion and behaviour 
still holds, in that there are limits to what would be thought appro- 
priate and because at the very least certain forms of behaviour are 
ruled out. I would conclude that there is a conceptual connection 
not only between emotion and various types of cognition but also 
between emotion and appropriate forms of behaviour or dispositions 
to behave. 
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(c) The Importance of Feeling States to an Understanding of Emotion 
Finally, I would wish to argue that our understanding of emotion 
does not only depend on these two criteria outlined above. For 
just as it can be argued that an appraisal in itself does not entail 
a person being emotionally affected, so the same can be said of a 
particular pattern of behaviour. Neither can this understanding 
of the feeling side of emotion be provided by identifying a 
physiological state, because this already presupposes such an 
understanding in identifying emotional behaviour. If emotion could 
be explained in only conceptual and behavioural terms, then robots 
could be described as being as capable of experiencing emotion as 
human beings. An understanding of emotion therefore also depends 
on our personal experience of actually having feelings. This is 
why we are capable of sympathy as well as rational understanding. 
It is only because we are creatures of feeling, that we can under- 
stand what it is to be in pain, to feel sorrow, joy, grief, remorse 
and so on, for either we have experienced them ourselves or can 
imaginatively identify with those who have. In defending this 
view, however, I am not suggesting that feeling states can be 
experienced or identified separately from the appraisal being made 
or the tendencies one has to behave in particular ways. Clearly, 
this would be impossible, but what I am saying is that feeling 
states cannot be reduced to what these might happen to be, and I 
suppose the upshot of this must be that introspection will after 
all, play a part in our understanding of emotion, why then has 
it been discredited? 
C. A. Mace in his article Introspection and Analysis (20) argues that 
psychologists like Titchener who worked out elaborate techniques 
to train observers to introspect were largely ineffective because 
they failed to see the nature of their difficulties, that they were 
not due so much to observing the facts but in knowing how to 
describe them. He says the idea of describing personal experiences 
is intelligible enough: ' the facts are there for all to see but we do 
not know how to say what we see' .' There is accordingly a prima 
facie case for the hypothesis, the problems of introspection are in 
part at least problems of analysis' (21). In reply to this we can 
say it is clearly impossible to describe what is only a private event. 
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We can only communicate and share our feelings with others 
because they are public property and therefore depend for their 
meaning on an understanding of the situation a person is in, the 
appraisal he makes and this disposition he has to behave in a 
particular way, but the feeling state is still there, only as Strawson 
says you cannot drive a logical wedge between them (22). 
(d) Value Judgments and Affective Experience 
It is often thought that the values a person holds will depend on 
his conceptual understanding and his ability to make and universalize 
value judgment, (23) but equally important Is how he experiences 
life affectively. Increased conceptual understanding and the ability 
to make rational appraisals may lead to initiation into the different 
sources of value mentioned earlier but not necessarily to the personal 
acceptance of these values. 
Knowledge is not simply acquired, it has to be sought after and 
therefore depends on a person's desire for it. Knowledge in 
itself is inert. What counts is how a man experiences it. Does it 
appeal to him? Does it make any difference to the extent, depth 
and variety of ways he experiences life? In short does it make 
any difference to the person that he knows and understands 
more than he did before? 
Similarly, to appreciate aesthetic values whether generally or in the 
specific context of an art form depends on personal experience. 
Certainly aesthetic understanding, particularly in the arts is 
dependent on a great deal of knowing, sensitive awareness and fine 
judgment, but aesthetic value is something over and above rational 
appraisal. The critic may help us to understand a particular work 
of art by pointing out certain objective features and by trying 
to convey through metaphor, its emotional meaning or import, but 
in the last analysis what counts is whether we come to ' see' its 
value for ourselves. Clearly the teacher of art appreciation is 
often disappointed. (See also pp, 238-240. ) 
Lastly, it could also be argued that the religious and moral values 
a person comes to believe in are not simply the result of rational 
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belief or the initiation into a particular moral code or religious 
way of life, the person is an agent and will, to some extent, make 
up his own mind and this will depend on how he is affected by 
the issues, situations and predicaments that he encounters. Two 
persons with similar social backgrounds and with equal ability in 
making their own judgments, can, when faced with the same 
situation, react very differently. The Salvation Army calls for 
converts, one person goes forward the other stays back. A 
mutual friend gets the sack for serious misconduct, one person 
feels sympathy for him, the other feels nothing but contempt. 
These, could no doubt be explained as a difference in the values 
the two men hold but it could be argued that they are just 
affected differently and it is because of this that they come to 
hold the values they do. 
Of course no one realised more the important part that feeling or 
passion played in the making of our value judgments in general, 
and our moral judgments in particular, than David Hume, because 
for him it was the main motivation behind his moral philosophy 
in opposing rationalist thinking of the time. Reason, he argued, 
is impotent in the sphere of morals. It is the passionate side of 
our nature which is at work when we make moral discriminations 
which are more properly felt than judged. In analysing our moral 
judgments, he says: 
' the vice entirely escapes you so long as you consider 
only the object. You will not find the vice until you turn 
your attention to the sentiment or disapprobation in your 
own breast towards the object' (24). 
Consequently, on Hume' s account it would be quite possible for 
different persons to witness the same events but to pass different 
moral judgments and this could not be explained by reason but by 
the difference of moral sentiment that each person possessed and 
whether it caused them pain or pleasure. But this did not mean 
that Hume was a pure hedonist, for he distinguished between 
pleasures which determine moral conduct from other kinds of 
pleasures, in that the former arise from the contemplation of 
some lasting quality in the personal character of a person which 
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may be revealed in action or sentiment, and because it would be 
viewed disinterestedly and not from the position of self interest 
for example, in admiring bravery in one's enemy. Moral judgment, 
for Hume, was therefore dependent on objective qualities that are 
perceived as well as the feeling they give rise to (25). But in 
spite of Hume' s obvious insight into human nature, his moral 
philosophy is strongly attacked because of the distinction he makes 
between reason and passion. In his eagerness to give an alter- 
native to rationalism he fails to see that the two are intimately 
connected, that we cannot separate feelings from the assessment 
that we make in a moral situation or the reasons we have for acting 
in a particular way. 
Hume' s concern was with what moves us to action and to pass judg- 
ment. The answer, he believed was to be found in an understand- 
ing of human nature rather than rational belief. In this connection 
his concept of sympathy (which was not a passion, but the means 
by which we can identify the feelings of others in ourselves) was 
particularly important. For Hume believed that it was because of 
this human capacity, that man is sufficiently motivated to care for 
his fellow man (with the help of certain artificial conventions) and 
to be united with other members of society for the pursuit of the 
common good. It seems a pity, if in criticising Hume for being unable 
to recognise that reasoning is a practical matter, (26) that in 
failing to realise that it Is not reason but knowledge which is inert 
and that passion and reason cannot be conceptually separated, if 
attention is diverted from the importance he attached to feeling 
and our natural inclination as a motivating force in our moral 
behaviour. Because, as I have consistently argued throughout 
this chapter, while feelings cannot be separated from rational 
belief, they cannot be reduced to them either. Kant may have 
been right in emphasizing that man is only moral in so far as he 
is rational, but could a person be moral who is incapable of moral 
feeling, like Christian love? Would man ever be sufficiently moved 
to act on the universal judgments he had made if he had no feeling 
of concern or of caring for his fellow men? In short would duty 
be enough?, For further discussion on this see, chapter six pp. 129-133. 
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To say that our values and attitudes are dependent on our 
capacity for feeling is not to deny that value judgments involve 
formal, rational considerations or that feelings are not conceptual. 
Neither is it being claimed that when a value judgment is made a 
person has to be in a highly emotive state, nor that he is necess- 
arily trying to arouse the same feelings in others. If a person 
is concerned that another should come to share in the same values 
of a situation, activity or way of life, he will do so by pointing 
out the objective features on which the values he hold depend, and 
not necessarily by describing his subjective state. The enthusiast 
or devotee can in this way enable another to understand all the 
considerations on which his own values are based, but ultimately 
he may still be unsuccessful. The newly initiated can say ' this 
may excite you, but frankly it leaves me cold' , or ' obviously 
you' ve seen the light but I am still not convinced' , or 'I 
understand and admire your reasons but I am unable to join you' . 
Experiencing life is, in one sense, then, a private affair dependent 
on a personal view point but it is also dependent on what we know 
and this is only possible if there is common agreement. It is 
equally true that it is because we have common experiences, that 
we are able to speak and understand the same language, share the 
same values and participate in the same activities, in short to 
share in the same way of life. (The enthusiast or devotee may 
sometimes be unsuccessful in winning a new convert but this will 
not always be the case). 
So far I have talked at some length about the person as a centre 
of human experience and in so doing I have already presupposed 
the capacity a person necessarily has for human agency, that is, 
his ability to initiate and carry out action. An examination of 
this is therefore somewhat overdue. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: HUMAN AGENCY 
In the last chapter I explained how the person is characterised as 
a centre of experience. which can be described as being both conceptu- 
ally structured and affectively sensitized, but he is also an agent 
characterised by his capacity to initiate and carry out human actions, 
where 'action' means more than simply effecting a certain result. 
It has been suggested for example that a person's actions are 
occurrences which it makes sense to qualify in certain ways, for ex- 
ample, as voluntary, purposive, conscious, intentional etc. and that 
it is these qualifications which provide the criteria for distinguishing 
human actions from non-actions or actions of other kinds. But they 
do not tell us what the difference actually is and philosophers vary 
in their attempts to explain (1). 
i TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF AGENCY 
There are those like E. E. M. Anscombe, C. Taylor and A. I. Melden who 
give a teleological explanation of human actions. G. Anscombe, suggests 
that intentional actions are distinguished from those which are not, 
because they are actions to which a certain sense of the question 'why? ' 
is given application. In other words there must be reasons for acting 
which give the action point. But as reasons obviously can be given 
for actions that are not intentional what becomes crucial is the kind 
of reason given. A totally causal explanation, for example, would not 
do (2). Charles Taylor, argues that a human action is necessarily 
directed towards a goal, which can be identified independently of 
antecedent conditions or a causal description and it is the desire for this 
goal which provides the agent's reason for acting (3). Similarly, 
A. Melden draws attention to the distinction between action and mere 
bodily movement by showing that in the case of an action the person 
has a reason for acting (as opposed to there just being one) which is 
based on his evaluation of some envisaged goal- (4). He further holds, 
that because value judgments must inevitably lie behind the actions we 
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take, the concept of human action can only be fully understood in a 
social context. This means, he says, that the description of any action 
must take into account, ' that we are concerned with the actions of 
human beings who are social and moral beings and who are guided 
in their conduct by social and moral considerations in their dealings 
with one another' (5). 
A similar point is made by R. S. Peters in his book ' The Concept of 
Motivation' , where he maintains that actions are logically irreducible 
to movement terms. He speaks of a logical gulf between nature and 
convention and gives as an example the logical impossibility of trans- 
lating the statement, ' he signed the contract' , into movement terms 
like, ' he moved the pen in such and such a way' (6). C. Taylor, 
however, has argued that in this particular example R. S. Peters does 
not succeed in showing the logical distinction between movement and 
action, but rather the irreducibility of signing a contract to other 
action terms (7). But this criticism does not seem to me to be valid, 
for surely action can only be explained in relation to other action 
terms, particularly if the action is described more specifically than 
' he signed the contract' , if, for example, the exact nature of the 
contract was specified. But no amount of description just referring 
to bodily movement would explain the action taking place. C. Taylor 
seems to think that even the phrase ' he moved the pen in such and such 
a way' could constitute an action, but in fact it depends how it is 
interpreted, if it was understood to mean simply that ' the pen was 
moved in such and such a way' with no implication of intention, then 
Peters' argument still stands. If, in this context, Taylor' s distinction 
between movement and action differs from the one Peters makes I 
cannot see where the difference lies. 
By defining agency in terms of the agent' s purpose or goal-directed 
behaviour it is possible to describe an action in the long or short 
term, depending on whether the intended result is far away or close 
at hand. Often an action can be analysed into a series of simpler 
acts, or, it may, in itself, be seen only as a part of a larger enterprise 
and be assessed simply as a means to it. Obviously some actions are 
carried out for their own sake and at times an activity can serve both 
as a means and as an end, (indeed it may not always be possible to 
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distinguish between the two (8) ). As an action must come under 
either one or both of these descriptions, then clearly the idea of 
undertaking something for its own sake must be essential to our under- 
standing of intentional action. As Aristotle pointed out the chain has 
to stop somewhere, if our actions are only ever assessed as means they 
cease to be means and therefore cease to have any point; instrumental 
activities only make sense if ultimately what is reached is worthwhile 
in itself. But this does not- mean that we always act with some final 
end in view, or that we have to believe as Aristotle did that all chains 
of man' s actions must finally stop at the same place. 
Whether a particular action is understood in terms of immediate or 
distant goals, human action can only be identified by reference to some 
kind of intended outcome which provides the agent' s reason for acting 
and indeed defines the action itself. It is on this basis that Melden 
argues that: 
' while in a causal sequence cause and effect are logically 
distinct, in an action there is a definite logical connection 
between the action and the reason for the action and so 
reasons cannot be considered as causes' (9). 
While it is often possible to distinguish a difference between what we 
actually do and what we had hoped to achieve, the former can only be 
understood in terms of the latter. We cannot therefore identify a 
person's actions unless we at least know what he is trying to do. 
Those like R. Chisholm are therefore right in suggesting that essential 
to a theory of intentional action, is the concept of 'a completely success- 
ful intentional action' (10), and I think we can agree with this without 
necessarily accepting his account of causal agency. 
However, this kind of logical connection between the action and the 
agent' s reason for acting is often argued against on the grounds that 
because a person does not always act in the way that he intends, an 
action can often be described independently of, and even contrary to, 
a person's intentions. Philosophers have argued that it is just not true 
to say that X cannot be the action of A unless A knew or intended it 
under that description (11) . There are several ways of looking at 
this problem. 
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In many situations while the agent's intention is still crucial, different 
descriptions can be given, regarding what the agent Is actually doing. 
For example: a hiker may consider he Is going on a trek but a farmer 
may see the same action as trespassing; a child may believe he Is 
trying to learn Algebra, while as far as the teacher is concerned, he 
is only copying off the blackboard. Clearly, in both cases the descrip- 
tions given are not incompatible and therefore present no problem. 
They could in fact be used to illustrate the first two distinctions the 
jurisprudonts have made between throe classes of act: the actual 
physical movement, acts and circumstances, acts and consequences (12). 
But there Is a difficulty where the descriptions of an action do-conflict. 
Often this can be resolved by taking the person's avowal of intention 
as decisive, for example, passers by seeing a child climbing a tree may 
consider he is playing, when in fact he is trying to rescue his friend. 
But not always; there are situations whore not only is the account 
given by the agent different, but whore the agent is actually wrong 
in what he thinks he is doing: a holiday maker may think he is 
travelling through Germany when in fact he Is touring Franco; a life 
savor may believe he Is rescuing a drowning man, when he is already 
too late, a doctor may consider he Is curing his patient, after he has 
prescribed the wrong medicine. But I would wish to argue that oven 
these examples do not destroy the general logical connection between 
action and reason, rather they show that intentions are dependent on 
beliefs and these can sometimes be wrong, but they cannot always be 
wrong or we would not have the concept of human action wo do In fact 
have. 
The other kind of situation, which is usually cited in an attempt to 
show that causal factors rather than just intention is crucial to explain- 
Ing human action, occurs when a person is no longer responsible for what 
he is doing. For example in the actions of a psychopath, where only 
a causal explanation would be sufficient. But drawing attention to this 
kind of example would not help to break the logical connection between 
action and a person's reason for acting; rather it would simply serve 
to illustrate those cases where human agency breaks down and a person 
acts because of what he suffers or undergoes, rather than because of 
what he does. In those cases the word 'action' therefore ceases to 
be appropriate. 
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But it would be wrong to claim that identifying and defining a human 
action is always dependent on a person's intention, for there are times 
where a person is responsible for actions which he did not intend and 
where in fact no reference to intention may be relevant. For example 
a man, while cleaning his gun, which he knows to be loaded, inadvert- 
ently fires it, killing his wife. In this kind of situation a causal 
description may be thought to be appropriate, for a person may be 
seen as a causal agent but not an agent of an intentional act. Although 
the same example could be re-described in which the action only refers 
to the intentional part (cleaning the gun), and where the act of 
killing is then seen as the unintended consequence of the agent' s action, 
the fact remains that on either account, this is something the agent did 
and consequently he may be found morally as well as causally responsible 
for it. I shall return to this kind of difficulty later (13). In the mean- 
time, as the notion of responsibility now also looks fairly crucial to 
our understanding of human agency this needs closer examination. 
ii THE NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In so far as a person's actions can only be explained in terms of his 
purposes, intentions and values, then, to that extent, the person can 
be said to be responsible for what he does (although as already suggested, 
he may be held responsible for other reasons as well). H. Hart, for 
example, has held that an action is not to describe anything that has 
happened but to ascribe responsibility for it (14) ; while C. Taylor 
argues, that the idea of an action being directed towards some goal does 
not simply depend on bringing about certain results or being accounted 
for by certain laws, but rather he says, it hangs on 'it' s being true 
of some locus of responsibility or agent that it directed behaviour 
towards this goal' (15) . 
The idea of attributing responsibility to an agent for his own action has, 
however, been criticised on several counts: - 
For example, J. Feinberg comments on the fact that when we say that 
Smith is responsible for X we can simply mean that X is the result of 
what Smith did. In a similar way we can hold the low pressure responsible 
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for the oncoming storms (16). Obviously in ascribing responsibility 
to the person qua agent more than this is implied. I would wish to 
argue that in this latter sense, responsibility suggests that a person 
is accountable for what he does, this is because the person's actions 
can only be understood in terms of his reasons for acting, which in 
turn are based on the beliefs and attitudes he holds and on the 
judgments he has made. It can be said therefore, that a person is 
responsible for his actions, to the extent to which it is the result of 
what he intended. It should be added that this will not necessarily 
mean that there is any implication of fault imputability or credit- 
ability; although as it happens, it is precisely when a person's 
behaviour is considered under these descriptions that questions of 
responsibility arise, for there may be moral or legal reasons why it 
becomes important to know whether responsibility is correctly ascribed 
to a particular person. 
But there are those who would argue that the person is responsible 
for his action, regardless of what he might have intended (for example 
causing a road accident) and that therefore we can judge a person to 
be responsible for an action without first having to ascertain the 
reasons or purposes behind his behaviour. This brings us to the 
second main criticism of those like Hart and Taylor who consider 
'responsibility' to be being definitive of action, and that is, that 
they fail to distinguish between the action we take and the deeds 
that we do... ". Once this distinction is borne in mind it is thought 
to be apparent that the latter may be due to causal factors rather 
than intention. This is usually argued for in two different ways. 
Firstly, that while we can be held responsible for our actions in the 
sense that they can be ascribed to us, we are not necessarily 
responsible for the consequences of our actions, it may depend for 
example on how important a causal contribution our actions make to 
the upshot and the extent to which other factors play a part (17). 
Secondly, it is argued that it is only in respect to the consequences 
of our action that we are responsible, which may, or may not be, 
what we intended. G. Pitcher, for example, argues that it is not 
the action that a person can be held responsible for, because he simply 
does this, but what his action 'causes' to happen (18). 
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It is interesting that the above arguments do not actually question 
whether it is appropriate to ascribe responsibility to an agent, but 
rather the grounds on which responsibility is ascribed. If one holds 
a teleological view then intention is crucial. If a person's actions 
were only described in causal terms then it would be either impossible 
to know whether to ascribe responsibility to an agent or it would actually 
rule it out. But if the position of a causal theorist is taken, it is 
precisely on these grounds that responsibility can be attributed, 
because he understands agency as what an agent causally brings about. 
This may be understood in terms of the person's movements or in terms 
of the causal contribution that he makes to the events that follow his 
action; in either case the intention of the person is not necessarily 
crucial. 
Who then is right? The answer to this clearly depends on the more 
fundamental question :- can a sufficient explanation of human action 
be provided teleologically or is a causal explanation also required? 
iii CAUSAL AGENCY 
There are many who do consider that the notion of causal agency is 
essential to any explanation of human action. D. Davidson, for example, 
argues strongly against Melden' s account (19). Initially h e accepts that human 
action can only be identified and explained with reference to a person' s 
reasons for acting, which place it within a social context. He says, 
' to learn through learning, the reason that the agent 
conceived his action as a lie, a repayment of a debt, 
an insult ..... is to grasp the point of the action in its setting of rules, practices, convention and 
expectations' (20). 
But this, he argues, is not enough to explain that the person acted 
because of these reasons. It is the force of ' because' which is to be 
found wanting. He says, a person can have a reason for acting and 
perform it but this may not be the reason why he did it (a man may 
be making ten carbon copies as he writes and this may be intentional 
yet he may not know that he is, all he knows is that he is trying (21) ). 
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It is only when a causal explanation is also given that the reasons 
for an action taking place are fully explained. For example, it is not 
sufficient that I have the intention of jumping off the top board I 
have to actually jump, and so a causal explanation in the end is both 
appropriate and necessary. 
But while Davidson explains human action in terms of causal agency 
not any kind of causal explanation will do. In his view, it is not 
enough to show the causal contribution a particular person makes to 
a series of events because this may be due only to outside causal 
factors. For example, if I spilled my coffee because someone jiggled 
my hand, then this is a question of what happens to me not a question 
of what I do, (the actions of the psychopath would also come into 
this category) . What is crucial is intention. If I causally effect what 
I intend, then responsibility for my action car' be attributed to me. 
But Davidson still accepts that agents can be causally responsible for 
actions they did not intend: to continue the above example, I would be 
causally responsible if I spilled the coffee unintentionally, thinking it 
was tea. Davidson explains these cases by trying to show that the 
same act can be described in different ways, and that providing what . 
a person in fact does is identical with what he does intentionally, 
but mistakenly, he is still the agent of the act. This would be the 
case in the current example, because my intentionally spilling what 
I think is tea is identical to me mistakenly spilling the coffee. 
Davidson says, 'A man is the agent of an act if what he does can be 
described under an aspect that makes it intentional' (22) . But what 
is it that the agent can be said to 'do' ? In many accounts of causal 
agency what matters are the physical changes a person brings about which 
can be narrowly or broadly described. J. Feinberg, refers to 'the 
accordion effect where the meaning of an action includes the outcome 
which can be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched out', and 
where responsibility depends on causal contribution to the outcome 
regardless of intention (23). Davidson criticises Feinberg' s description 
of human action, partly because it fails to take intention into account, 
but more strongly because it includes the outcome in the meaning of 
an action. For, according to Davidson, while a person is causally 
responsible for the upshot of his action, this is not classed as a part 
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of the action, because the action is something we just do and not 
something we can be said to cause; its description is therefore 
limited to the primitive action of bodily movement, the rest, he says, 
is up to nature. 
' We may indeed extend responsibility for an action to the 
responsibility for its consequences, but this we do, not 
by saddling the agent with a new action, but by pointing 
out his original action had those results' (24). 
But at this point Davidson' s account no longer seems to me to be 
coherent; for as he limits action to bodily movement, then intention 
can only be said to define the action to the extent that I can intend 
to move my body. But in most of the actions we perform our intent- 
ions are concerned with what our bodily movements will bring about, 
not with the movements themselves. Davidson' s argument is, that 
these are different descriptions of the same event; but while this 
can be the case, as in his example of causing the death of the 
king, it does not have to be. In giving orders to have an animal 
destroyed, the description of my bodily movement is irrelevant to 
the action, I indirectly but intentionally perform. By defining action 
in terms of primitive movement and by distinguishing it from its 
consequences, a person becomes in effect a causal agent, and 
intention which should have been logically tied to the action, becomes 
redundant. 
J. Corman' s example illustrates this well (25), he describes the 
action of a technician who wires a switch intentionally but incorrectly 
because he is given an incorrect wiring diagram, as a result a 
rocket explodes on take off, killing its crew. What the technician does 
intentionally, but mistakenly, is identical to the event which caused the 
deaths of the members of the crew, are we then to say the agent is 
responsible for their deaths? On Davidson' s account we would have 
to, for although agency depends on the person having an intention 
it does not seem to matter what the intention is, and we can conclude 
that this intentional criterion does not necessarily serve any purpose 
in ascribing responsibility to an agent. It turns out, that to say a 
person's act has to be described under an intentional aspect is only 
helpful in making the distinction between agency and non-agency if 
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it coincides or is compatible with the description of what actually 
happens. 
In fact, the only way a causal explanation of human action seems 
to make any sense is if it is described only in causal terms. But of 
course this would not explain the action of the person qua person. 
If I initiate a sequence of events I may be said to be causally 
responsible but the same can be said of the wind. No wonder then, that 
given the area of interest is the action of human beings rather than 
human bodies, who perform actions because of what they wish to 
achieve in terms of their values and desires and who live in a social 
and not just a physical world, that so much attention is attached to 
intention, that is, a person's reason for acting, and not to what he 
just causally effects. Even those philosophers who try to assimilate 
reasons to causes recognise as much. But if intention is the hallmark 
of agency then a causal explanation is at best otiose and at worst 
extremely confusing. 
It is otiose because if two persons can be causally responsible in 
exactly the same way (for example in pressing a button which fires 
a missile), but only one is held responsible as an agent, because what 
he does can be described under an intentional aspect, then agency 
cannot be said to depend on causal responsibility. The most that 
could be said, would be that it provided a necessary condition but 
this does not mean it provides an explanation of human action. 
Similarly, it could be argued that to understand music I must be able 
to hear, but this does not make hearing definitive of appreciating 
music. And it is confusing, because the causal theorist wants to hold, 
that while intention is crucial to our understanding of human action 
it does not necessarily explain why a person acts in the way he does, 
the notion of causal agency is also required. In fact, on this view, 
intention is often seen to be irrelevant to what the person can be 
said to be doing, because this can be described independently of any 
intention: it may be argued, for example, that the person has no 
intention at all, regarding what he is doing; or he may have one, but 
it is contrary to what he is actually doing; or he may have the right 
intention but this may not be the cause of his action. But then the 
causal theorist is in a dilemma because if causality in these cases is 
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seen to be the distinguishing mark of agency, how can intention be 
said to play a part at all? 
What some try to show is that intention or reasons for acting do 
ascribe agency to a person, to the extent to which they can be 
said to cause the person to act in the way he does. But in giving 
a causal explanation they have to distinguish between the cause 
(i. e. 'the action') and its effects (i. e. the outcome). By failing 
to acknowledge that reasons for acting (i. e. the intended outcome) 
are logically tied to the meaning and description of the action, the 
action is ultimately reduced to bodily movement. It is therefore only 
this which can be said to cause the outcome not our reasons for 
acting, which cannot be understood in only these terms, and this is 
why on a causalists account, a person is still responsible for what he 
did not intend. But without some reference to intention the whole 
notion of causal responsibility as a way of ascribing agency becomes 
trivial, for there is no end to the sequence of events I might happen 
to cause, not only because of what I do, but also because of what I 
don't happen to do. 
iv ' RESPONSIBILITY' CONSIDERED FURTHER 
One of the reasons why causal agency is often considered important 
and necessary to any account of human action is that it helps to 
explain those cases where a person is held responsible, but where 
there is no question of compulsion of any kind (so agency is not 
actually ruled out) but where the person acts unintentionally or perhaps 
with no intention at all. Now while it is true that if a person did not 
effect a certain result he would not be held responsible, it is not true 
to say (and this is a point I made earlier) that it is for this reason 
that he is accountable for what he has done. But if causal theorists 
cannot explain responsibility simply in causal terms, it might be thought 
that those holding a teleological view will have just as much difficulty 
in providing an explanation, at least in those cases where intention is 
not the deciding factor. 
But in fact, these can be explained and without recourse to some causal 
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analysis, by bearing in mind that the notion of responsibility is much 
wider than that of intended action. There are many situations where 
we are responsible for what we do regardless of the reasons we may 
or may not have had at the time. This is because we are social beings 
as well as individual agents and are therefore subject to various rules 
and obligations that are necessary for the functioning and well being 
of our society. As members of a society we inevitably belong to 
different classes or. groups of persons held together by mutual interests 
and purposes; because the existence of these groups is dependent on 
there being rules which are adhered to we will inevitably be held to 
account if we break the rules. When a motorist is found responsible 
for causing a road accident he is found to be responsible not simply 
because he caused it to happen, but because his behaviour as a motorist 
is found to be faulty, that is as a member of a particular category of 
persons which demands its own standards of behaviour and where the 
person's reasons for acting may be irrelevant. Similarly, a pro- 
fessional musician will be judged according to his performance, if he 
plays badly it will not help if he protests that this was due to him 
losing his place on the manuscript. 
But interestingly, some excuses or reasons for a person's action do 
count and do overrule the judgment made on other criteria. This is 
because most classes or groups we belong to we also belong to as 
persons and so the nature of personal agency is presupposed in the 
activities and conduct of the group. If it can be shown that a default 
in a person's behaviour is due to certain personal incapabilities (e. g. 
severe mental illness) then responsibility for what a person had 
causally brought about would not be attributed to him qua person. 
The social character of many of our actions is also a relevant factor 
in explaining why we are held responsible for the action of others 
rather than just our own actions. This may be ascribed to us on one 
of two counts: either, (1) because we belong to a particular group and 
because what is done, is done under the name of that group so 
responsibility is collective; or, (2) because we are personally in overall 
charge of a group of persons, responsibility for what happens rests 
with us, regardless of whether or not we personally brought it about. 
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It is sometimes thought to be a problem that someone may be carrying 
out an activity but not know that he is, or he may have the right 
intention, but it is not because of this intention that he is successful. 
But here again, this can often be explained by taking account of the 
fact, that because the actions and activities we perform are social in 
nature, we have to learn what to do before we can perform them. 
The child learning to play tennis, and with that intention, may have 
started to master it, but he may not know that he has, because to 
begin with he will have to rely on the knowledge of someone else to 
tell him when he is playing correctly (i. e. in accordance with the rules 
and techniques of tennis) (26). 
In conclusion, it can be said that the fact that the notion of respon- 
sibility is social and wider than that of intentional action does not 
alter or lead us to deny the importance of responsibility to the concept 
of personal agency (and therefore to the concept of the person). To 
ascribe responsibility to a person as an agent means that he can in 
principle give an account of what he does, because it is based on his 
reasons for acting, which in turn are based on his beliefs and value 
judgments. And to say this is consistent with the fact that the person 
lives in a society so that his actions and decisions will be based on 
what is on offer and will depend on objective considerations, the 
social rules he has to adhere to and the moral obligations he has to 
fulfil in order to carry them through. 
Furthermore, the responsibility of the agent is not limited to his 
actions, for the same reason which is used in ascribing responsibility 
to the agent underlies his purely mental as well as his physical under- 
takings, namely, the belief that the person has aims and purposes 
which arise from his ability as an evaluator. 
v THE AGENT AS EVALUATOR 
Personal agency is dependent on our capacity to make value judgments. 
Acting intentionally presupposes having reasons for acting based on the 
goals or ends men wish to achieve. It might therefore be argued that 
human beings are not alone in being agents because animals are also 
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capable of initiating action and directing their behaviour towards 
particular ends. They too can be said to have desires and even to 
make choices between them. How then can human agency be distinguished 
from the action of animals? 
H. Frankfurt in ' Freedom and the Will and the Concept of the 
Person' (27) suggests the answer lies in the fact that persons are 
capable of second order desires. He says, human beings are not alone 
in having desires, but they are alone in having second order ones, 
that is, desires whose object lies in having a certain first order desire. 
In other words persons can evaluate their desires and this means they 
are capable of self evaluation, to the extent that they identify themselves 
with those desires. It is only because of this that a person can assess 
his action and give an account of it and therefore be deemed responsible. 
(It would not be enough to show that a person just had certain first 
order desires because these are in a sense ' given' they are not 
something he has any choice over). 
C. Taylor takes this point further in his article ' What is Human Agency? ' 
(28). He says what is distinctive of the human agent is the qualitative 
nature of the assessment he makes. ' Good' in this instance does not 
simply depend on whether or not the object is desired but on how we 
judge our desires and this involves being able to give reasons, being 
able to justify our choices in a way that the pursuit of a desired goal 
does not. It is therefore possible for the agent to see that the 
stronger desire is not necessarily the better one. 
The possibility of making qualitative evaluations is dependent on being 
in a world where richness of experience is available in different 
activities and forms of life, characterised by their own rules and 
purposes. To become an agent is therefore dependent on initiation 
into what is considered to be worthwhile by the society in which he 
lives. It could be argued further that as this happens from the earliest 
of days that even first order desires are dependent on the social values 
children are taught to accept and these will not only be restricted to 
hedonistic ones (29). In fact, so called human needs and wants are 
often more dependent on a society's underlying ethical system than on 
physiological deficiences. Indeed, it is only because of the activities 
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and social conventions we come to understand that we are able to 
make second order evaluations or qualitative assessments at all. 
But it could be argued that these are then just as much ' given' 
as natural desires. For example, we may desire to be honest and 
believe this to be better than cheating in order to fulfil some hedon- 
istic pleasure, but we may not know why. We could give reasons, 
but they would be limited to such things as from fear of punishment 
or out of respect for some authority (30). Clearly, what is missing 
is not the knowledge of different kinds of values but the capacity 
of the person to reflect on them and to decide his own course of 
action because he sees the value of it , for. himself. 
It is not surprising therefore, that at the end of Taylor's article 
emphasis is put on the importance of self evaluation, where the 
assessments and reassessments the agent makes affect his identity; 
an identity which Taylor defines in terms of certain essential evalu- 
ations which provide the horizon or foundations for the other evaluations 
he makes (31). But it is not necessarily an unchanging horizon 
because it is always open to the person that he can make radical 
evaluations; for without necessarily having the viewpoint of an 
existentialist, it is still possible to believe in the agent's capacity 
to rethink his whole life style which could then influence the numerous 
and various decisions and assessments he makes in his daily life. 
But this capacity of reflection, and indeed of the will presupposes 
that the agent is, in at least a negative sense, a' free' agent; that 
his 'choices' are not simply determined by natural inclination or social 
convention (this is not to say that choosing and being free are the 
same, only that the former in some sense presupposes the latter) . 
It is therefore important to consider what these conditions of freedom 
might be. 
S. Benn, in his article ' Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a 
Person' , (32) suggests that for a person to be in a position of choice 
four criteria have to be fulfilled: ' 
(1) there are determinate sets of resources at the person's disposal, 
(2) he is confronted with a set of opportunity costs, if he pursues 
X he must forego Y, 
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(3) he has goals forming an ordered preference set in the light 
of which he makes choices, 
(4) . he has a set of beliefs about 1-3 about relation of resources 
as means to goals. 
The first two conditions are objective the second two are subjective. 
Clearly, for a person to be in a position of choice alternatives have 
to be open to him, but his ability to decide between them is dependent 
on subjective rather than just objective criteria. For example, Benn 
draws attention to the person's capacity to change his mind in the 
light of new information, of formulating projects where decisions are 
taken now and for the future. In a similar vein R. S. Peters in his 
article, ' Freedom and the Development of the Free Man', emphasizes 
the importance of the agent being able to: weigh up alternatives 
think in terms of means-end, appreciate the causal property of 
things; and distinguish consequences brought-. about by. his' own 
agency from those that come about independently of his will (33). 
Sometimes, the importance and necessity of these conditions are often 
best realised when they are not seen to be fulfilled. S. Benn describes 
those cases where a person is disqualified as a chooser because of a 
tendency to behave compulsively, where he is more attracted to goals 
of immediate gratification and when these become the only relevant 
considerations. (34) 
But, while S. Benn maintains that to be an agent a person must be able 
to make choices, he also argues that this does not mean his decisions 
are made independently of what is socially expected of him. Indeed, 
he can be said to be both author of his own action and a slave to 
convention. This is because a person can choose by using standards 
he has accepted quite uncritically and can still be said to be self - 
governing. To illustrate this, Benn makes a useful distinction between 
autarchy, that is being self-governing, being the author of one' s 
actions ; and autonomy, where only the former is a condition of agency, 
the latter being an ideal which transcends it. On Benn' s account, the 
autonomous person sounds very much like Taylor's human agent, for 
he too is characterised, by having reasons for acting and being capable 
of second thoughts in the light of further reasons. He is also conscious 
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of himself as an author, of being capable of effecting changes in the 
world, of appraising critically the traditions and conventions into 
which he has been initiated; and he is self reflecting, he too can re- 
consider his personal values and change them in the light of experience 
(35). 
Has Taylor then, made the conditions of being a human agent too 
rigorous? For clearly, while we would wish to argue that, by definition, 
a person is an agent it would simply be wrong to deny the personhood 
of those who are not autonomous. But if Taylor is fundamentally 
correct in stating that human agency is dependent on the person' s 
capacity for evaluation (which implies self-evaluation) then it is not 
enough to show that the person qua agent acts on the basis of social 
norms. For in one sense (as I have already argued) the fact that a 
person's desires are dependent on the qualitative values of a partic- 
ular society does not stop them being any the less ' given' . Until the 
agent can be said to act on the basis of his own assessment (although 
clearly this does not have to be in any sense original., for a person 
can be both self-governing and conventional) then human agency may 
be thought to differ very little from the agency of animals. 
However, I think we can have it both ways, we can accept Taylor' s 
criteria in principle and at the same time acknowledge that not everyone 
fulfils the criteria to the full. We can do this by appreciating that 
human agency admits of degrees; for while a person must to some 
extent be an evaluater not everyone will aspire to the kind of autonomy 
that S. Benn describes, or fulfil entirely the ideal which Taylor 
envisages. But the fact remains, that some degree of self evaluation 
is necessarily a distinguishing mark of human agency and when this 
is entirely missing we hesitate to attribute personhood to a human 
being. This can be illustrated not only by remembering those whose 
mental functioning is impaired through brain damage but also by con- 
sidering those persons who are suffering some kind of temporary mental 
or personal illness, and where, as a result, their ability to act 
intentionally is reduced. 
G. A. Foulds, in his book"The Hierarchical Structure of Personal Illness' (36), 
argues that being able to even describe and diagnose mental illness 
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presupposes having a concept of a person as an agent and not just 
that of an organism, the latter only being derived from the meaning 
of the former. Evidence for this, Foulds argues, lies in the fact 
that the severity of mental illness is always seen as relative to the 
agent' s loss of responsibility for his own action. He says, 
' the more severe the illness the less the individual is able 
to intend his own actions and thoughts, the more he is 
driven by motives outside his awareness, the less he is able 
to choose, the more his behaviour is determined the more he 
ceases to be a person, and the more he becomes merely an 
organism' (37). 
vi THE PERSON AS A RATIONAL AGENT 
In trying to map out the criteria of human agency it becomes increas- 
ingly apparent that responsibility for action, because it is dependent 
on the notion of self-evaluation (having reasons for acting based on 
the agent' s choice) , that the person must of 
logical necessity be a 
rational agent. To talk of agency which is intentional rather than 
causal, means the person has the ability not only to take the approp- 
riate means to achieve the desired endbut to conceive of ends as ends 
and to choose between them as alternatives. As these ends or goals 
(unlike those of animals) tend to involve relatively complicated rule- 
governing activities (consider for example what is involved in the most 
routine of human activities like catching a bus) then even being able 
to just identify them demands conceptual understanding and some 
capacity for rational thinking. To distinguish between different human 
activities the person has to see each under a certain description, to 
understand the rules that govern them and to be able to pick out 
the relevant differences between them. This ability to discriminate 
presupposes that the person has a grasp of certain general rules or 
considerations, that he can at least see, ' here is the same again' . 
Consequently as those like Peters have argued, the development of 
rationality must allow the individual to transcend the present, to 
look beyond immediate impulses and desires and to be guided by norms 
to do with consistency, impartiality, relevance and truth. (38) But 
these norms only make sense if they are given content and must there- 
fore be seen in relation to the human culture to which a person belongs, 
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of shared experiences, of law-governed activities, which are made 
meaningful to him through a common. language, and the more extensive 
this is, the greater degree of choice as well as conceptual under- 
standing which is open to the person. 
The importance of language to the existence of persons as rational 
agents cannot be over estimated. Although certain animals can, in spite 
of being non-language users, be seen to conceive of ends and to take 
appropriate means to achieve them, . while we maybe prepared to 
describe them as intelligent, we would hesitate to call them rational, 
at least in any full sense. C. Taylor points out (in the same book 
referred to earlier) that only language users can become aware of 
the ends they wish to pursue through self avowal. However, he goes 
on to suggest that this does not necessarily mean that non-language 
users are incapable of intentional action or rational thinking, although 
it does make it more difficult to decide whether what the animal ' does' 
is simply law governed or purposeful. For it may well be that to 
describe the action of an animal is simply to state the antecedent 
conditions for its behaviour. (39) 
The importance and obvious difficulty in making a distinction between 
rule-guided and law-governed or 'regular' behaviour is particularly 
well illustrated by Jonathan Bennett in his book ' Rationality', where 
he describes and analyses the behaviour of bees (which. is regular 
rather than rule-guided) and where he considers what would have to 
happen if the bees could ever be said to have a language. (40) , The 
state that turns out to be crucial, is when the dances of the imaginary 
bees can be said to be intentionally performed because of what they 
communicate to other bees. 
This 
, 
ability of the bees to communicate presupposes -ät common understanding 
based on those criteria which concern the relationship between what 
is said in their language and what is the case about the world in which 
they live; it is therefore an understanding dependent on conditions 
of truth, on the bees capacity for knowledge as well as their ability 
to make universal judgments. The two former conditions would mean 
that these remarkable bees were able to give evidence for what they 
claimed to know and to test and challenge the evidence given by the 
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other bees; and the latter would presuppose that the language of the 
bees was not restricted to what was happening in the present, but 
would enable them to make past and predictive statements. Further- 
more, this understanding would have to show itself in action, the 
bees would have to be able, for example, to act on new information 
appropriately. In order for an outsider to make sense of this language 
he would also have to know the needs, wants and purposes of the bees, 
because the meaning of their language will depend not only on truth 
conditions but also on the uses to which their language is put in 
talking about the world in which they live. But while this use of 
language would entitle us to say the bees are rational it turns out 
not to be any kind of language which would suffice. Purely descrip- 
tive language of the here and now, for example, would not do, it is 
explanatory language that J. Bennett shows to be essential to our 
understanding of rationality. 
Can we then conclude that non-language users cannot be rational? 
I do not think so, for the fact that Bennett is so successful in showing 
what is distinctive of human rationality does not necessarily mean that 
only language users can be counted as rational agents; rather, in the 
case of non-language users what would have to be shown, would be 
that their behaviour unlike the activity of ordinary bees, was not 
simply law governed, but that they had a reason or reasons for their 
actions. And, as C. Taylor argues, this could not be done simply by 
ascertaining the end product of the animal's behaviour. What would 
count is whether it is given this direction by the animal itself. 
In the case of the higher primates while much of their behaviour is 
law governed it may at times be seen to fulfil the above criterion. 
This may be true of learning situations which involve the understanding 
of some general principle (e. g. when the dog learns to open a door 
by pulling it towards itself and then applies the principle to other 
doors) and where a teacher is involved, the learner taking corrections, 
as correction (41). 
But even if it is the case that animals are capable of action what those 
actions will consist of will always remain extremely limited, animals 
being non-language users do not share except minimally in human 
activities. It is only possible to describe an action under a particular 
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description, and many descriptions of human actions presuppose an 
understanding of complicated rule-governing activities and forms of 
life which can only be understood through explanatory and symbolic 
language. 
What is distinctive of persons is not that their behaviour is goal- 
directed, but the nature of the goals themselves, which will vary between 
different generations and different cultures. But, as Taylor argues, 
the goals of animals are always limited to what is immediately relevant 
to their behaviour; they could never, for example, see the same thing 
under different descriptions. Conceptual understanding based on 
language, on the other hand, is rich, so that one action may presuppose 
a tremendous amount of background knowledge and understanding which 
the animal could never have. Indeed, Taylor goes further and argues 
that while it could be wrong to deny non-language users have some 
kind of capacity for intentional action, there is still the vital distinction 
that only persons can be conscious of their action, in the sense that 
they can describe it to themselves and to each other (42). But this 
ability to communicate, this in itself, is dependent on shared meanings 
and presupposes norms of rationality such as those concerning 
universality of judgment, relevance and truth. 
Interestingly, while the above norms enable the person to act as a 
rational agent they also have a limiting effect on what he can decide 
and choose to do as an agent. For although the agent is essentially 
an evaluator, capable of deciding what is both instrumentally and 
intrinsically w orthwhile and living his life accordingly, it is because 
he has to attend to rational considerations, he cannot, in effect, choose 
in any way he likes. He has, for example, as M. Warnock has argued, 
to accept the force of an argument, to change his mind in the light of 
new evidence, to accept the facts if he finds they are well supported, 
to disregard beliefs that are based on prejudice or falsehoods, and so 
on (43).. 
As a rational agent then, he has to accept that truth and inter-subjective 
agreement make their own demands so that he cannot be said to have 
free choice in everything he does. But his potential as an evaluator 
is not in consequence diminished, for there is still room for the agent' s 
own freedom of action, deliberations and decisions. For it can also be 
argued that the agent in conjunction with other agents make their joint 
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activity or pursuit what it is, for example, through their insight, skill, 
imagination and inventiveness (and this is as true in something like 
the sciences as it is in the arts) . It is for this reason we hold those 
agents who engage in a particular activity as being responsible for it, 
not only in the changing of its rules or nature but also in the en- 
forcing of existing ones. This is surely partly what R. K. Elliott draws 
our attention to in his article, ' Education, Love of One' s Subject and 
the Love of Truth' , when he says, that ' if we love our subject we 
shall ensure it is going in the right direction' (44). 
There is also a very valid sense in talking about the agents own assess- 
ment, even when the nature of the assessment will be decided by pre- 
existing objective, or even tight logical criteria. For example, in a 
learning situation even though the learner may be a beginner and the 
path of knowledge to be followed well trodden, it will still be necessary 
(at least in many situations) for the person to ' see something for 
himself' ,' to make up 
his own mind' ,' to assess the evidence before 
him' , 'to appreciate the value of what 
he is engaged in' , and so on, 
even though there is no question on his part of him being either 
original or an innovator of any kind. In fact these kinds of subjective 
criteria are as necessary to our concept of understanding as objective 
ones which determine the nature of what the understanding is in. 
Knowledge and understanding can therefore, be said to depend as much 
on our capacity of making our own evaluations as on rational or 
epistemological considerations. The validity of this argument is further 
strengthened by considering, in contrast, those persons who do not 
fully understand, who accept what they are told only on someone else' s 
authority, who are unable to question, to change their beliefs in the 
light of new evidence, to accommodate exceptions to some general rule, 
and so on. 
Furthermore, our nature as evaluators is not restricted to the under- 
standing and development of specific activities, (or to our own personal 
cognitive development). As agents, our responsibility also lies (as we 
have seen) in more general evaluative judgments that determine our 
overall goals and purposes. Even when a person is engaged in an 
activity like pure mathematics we still consider him as a responsible 
person and not simply as a responsible mathematician. Even though 
what he is doing is determined by tight logical conditions -there is still 
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room for the notion of personal effort, choice and moral accountability. 
For these are over and above what the subject itself demands and his 
degree of understanding within it and are concerned with how the agent 
as a person conducts himself and evaluates what he is doing in relation 
to a whole way of life. So we come to the importance of a person as a 
moral being in relation to those beliefs and values on which the pattern 
and style of a person's life ultimately depend. In other words, the 
fact that the person is held responsible as an agent, depends on moral 
as well as rational criteria. These must now be looked at. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MORAL AGENCY 
We have seen that the person is necessarily capable of action and 
having reasons for his action. This makes the person in a very 
obvious sense responsible for what he does, at least to the extent 
to which his actions or consequences of his actions are the outcome 
of his intentions. In short, it can be said that a person is, by 
definition, a rational agent. 
i CONFUSIONS OVER THE TERM ' MORAL' 
Novi clearlX with regard to many of the person's actions it will be 
appropriate for him to give reasons which are of a moral kind. On 
this basis it might be held that the person, at least for some of the 
time, is necessarily a moral agent as well. But this kind of claim is 
not easily justified. On commonsense grounds alone it could be argued 
that it is not difficult to identify those persons who are essentially 
amoral. They would, for example, be identified by their lack of moral 
thinking or action. It may be, that certain persons have never thought 
it necessary, or it simply never occurred to them, to formulate their 
own moral principles; or they may have engaged in moral discourse 
arrived at moral decisions, but never acted on them due to some 
personal weakness on their part. But we would not, for these 
reasons, discount them as persons, rather we would probably lament 
the fact that they lacked a morality, or that it had become for them 
no more than a theoretical exercise. Yet, interestingly, at the same 
time, the fact remains (which was pointed out earlier) that if they 
are members of a society and more particularly members of different 
social groups, they would still be held morally responsible regardless 
of whether or not they could be said to have moral intentions in either 
their actions or practical thinking. If their actions transgressed 
against the moral rules or norms of their society, for example, certain 
sanctions would be brought against them to bring them back into line. 
And so it might be argued that in a rather different sense, they could 
still, be described as ' agents' of a moral kind. 
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To complicate the matter further we could consider the possibility 
of persons transgressing the moral code of a society, not because 
they lacked their own morality, but because their values conflicted 
with those of the society to which they belonged. In this situation 
the persons concerned could give moral reasons for their actions 
based on their own evaluations, and so in an important sense, could 
be described as moral agents; but they may not see why they should 
be accountable to others who hold different moral values to themselves. 
Alternatively, there may be those persons who may be described as 
'moral' because the acts which they perform do come up to social 
expectations or reflect values which are held by the society at large; 
although as far as the persons themselves are concerned they may be 
totally unaware that their behaviour is construed in this way and may 
see themselves as authors of their actions under completely different 
descriptions. 
Now all this begins to look very odd, for there appear to be in these 
situations different and conflicting criteria which are operative in 
defining the words ' moral' and ' moral agent' . Until these different 
meanings are sorted out it will just be confusing to consider in what 
sense a person is a moral being; for it could be, that while it may 
be impossible to talk of a person necessarily being a moral agent in 
one sense, this may not be the case in another. 
In examining the meaning of morality it will be useful to refer to 
N. Cooper' s article ' Two Concepts of Morality' (1). In this article 
Cooper distinguishes between positive or social morality on the one 
hand and autonomous or individual morality on the other. These can 
be viewed from an external or internal point of view. Social morality 
can be described anthropologically (i. e. externally) and can also be 
described and prescribed by someone who is committed to the morality 
he is describing (i. e. internally). When this commitment comes from 
an individual's own moral assessment and personal beliefs rather than 
from fear or habit, it is appropriate to talk of the individual having 
a morality of his own and the autonomous concept comes into play. 
Clearly it is this latter concept which philosophers, like Hare, have 
been concerned with in trying to identify moral judgments in terms 
of their universality and prescriptivity. Now the point Cooper is 
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making, is that in trying to explain the nature of moral judgments 
and actions both concepts are necessary, for if we only employ the 
concept of social morality then there is no room for showing how moral 
beliefs can be justified or how moral conflicts between different 
societies can be resolved. (If, for example, an action is valued by 
one society but not by another, how can it be decided which society 
is right? ). But if, on the other hand, only the autonomous concept 
is used, then moral judgments lack both content and authority; to show 
that an individual's values are both universalisable and prescriptive 
does not show them to be moral, for the same could be said of other 
values (e. g. hedonistic,, aesthetic and idiosyncratic ones). To evoke 
the criterion of overridingness does not in itself, meet the charge of 
potential egoism, eccentricity and the lack of moral authority gained 
only from interpersonal agreement. The answer, then, is to use both 
concepts, but the question remains how is this to be done, while at 
the same time preserving the objectivity and action guiding function 
of an agent's moral judgments, which are crucial to any understanding 
of morality. 
ii RATIONAL CRITERIA OF MORALITY 
We could start off by arguing that as a moral agent is necessarily 
aI rational! agent, his actions including those delineated 'moral' must 
(at least in general) fulfil conditions of rationality. Alan Gewirth, 
for example, has argued on these lines (2). His theory focuses on 
the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) from which he attempts 
to show that rationality is a crucial criterion in identifying a moral 
agent. This has been summarised in the following way (3) : 
(1) All actions have two generic features in common: 
(a) voluntariness 
(b) purposiveness 
These necessarily imply the condition of freedom, i. e. 
the agent's actions are uncoerced and he has control over 
them (this would rule out animals and infants as moral 
agents). 
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(2) To act according to some purpose is a rational activity, 
for example, in taking the appropriate means to reach the 
required end, but more importantly, because acting 
voluntarily ar, d purposively means there must be a practical 
commitment to the reasons of logic. 
(3) To be successful in the above is to, be a rational agent. 
(4) A normative element is actually present in - the ' is' involved 
in action, because according to Gewirth, having a purpose 
involves him understanding that purpose as some kind of 
good. Furthermore, the agent in deliberating between different 
courses of action and in deciding which is the best way of 
achieving his purposes, will necessarily use the concept of 
' ought' .'I ought to do x because I want y' . 
(5) The agent, in viewing the purpose of his action as being in 
some way worthwhile, and in recognising his action is dependent 
on him being free to act in order that he might achieve his 
purpose, claims that: ' he has a right to perform his actions 
and to have freedom and basic well being' (4). In so doing 
he also claims that others ought not to interfere with its 
exercise. 
(6) As the agent is essentially rational he is logically committed 
to generalising or universalising the above with respect to 
all prospective agents; for he must apply the same reason to 
them, as he applied to himself. He must accept that they too 
have a right to freedom and well being they think their 
purposes will achieve and therefore should not be interfered 
with, and so the rational agent is committed to the PGC: - 
' apply to your recipients the same generic features of action 
that you apply to yourself' (5). 
Our understanding of what it is to be a moral agent, then, is 
dependent on our understanding of rational agency. But it cannot 
just be dependent on this. Gewirth only starts to get warm when 
he argues that the rational agent must recognise the same right, 
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which he claims for himself, belongs to all other rational agents. 
In a similar way philosophers like Walton have argued that the basis 
of a moral 'ought' rests on a consideration of the purposes of others 
and not only of one' s own. ' It is the intentions of others, he says, 
'that set a moral limit' (6). But Walton, unlike Gewirth, does not 
consider that being rational entails the agent adopting the intention 
of being moral. In fact Gewirth' s claim that he has given a complete 
rational justification of moral behaviour is quite a remarkable one, 
and one which is not entirely successful, largely because it does not 
do justice to the autonomy of morality. As H. B. Veatch points out 
in his review of ' Reason and Morality' '(7), one cannot infer from the 
fact that human beings acting as agents must necessarily value both 
freedom and well-being, that every human being has a right to them. 
Gewirth' s attempt at finding a rational justification of morality is all 
very reminiscent of Kant' s categorical imperative. But Kant not only 
argued that morality was essentially rational and autonomous, but 
also, that if persons were to act morally they had to respect not 
only the freedom of other agents, but the moral law itself. In other 
words, Kant recognised that objectivity was also a crucial criterion of 
morality. And the validity of this argument still holds, for if moral 
behaviour depended only on individual evaluations plus the recognition 
that all agents have the same right to exercise their freedom, moral 
action would never get off the ground; for as soon as my action, 
fulfilling my purposes, prevents some other person fulfilling his, we 
have on the kinds of argument Gewirth has given, both grounds for 
saying, 'I ought to do x' and 'I ought not to do x' . 
Clearly the question of whether I ought to consider my own interests 
or the interests of others is in itself a question of a higher order. 
Moral judgments can therefore be described as overriding as well as 
rational. But even this is not enough; for the individual may hold 
overriding principles which fulfil the conditions of rationality, but which 
are based on no more than some personal whim. Objectivity, as a 
criterion can only be understood if the meaning of morality is given 
content. The very idea of an individual exercising his own moral 
autonomy is parasitic on there being choices available to him. He has 
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therefore to understand what these choices are and the reasons for mak- 
ing them. This presupposes, if not Kant' s moral law, at least a social 
background where there is public agreement on what constitutes worth- 
while action and activities. In short the second concept of morality is 
also required. 
iii SOCIAL CRITERIA OF MORALITY 
It has been argued that rationality is a necessary criterion of being a 
moral agent, but equally necessary is the agent' s membership of a 
human society and this is hardly surprising when rational thinking is 
itself a social enterprise. It is a point well illustrated by Richard 
Norman, in his book 'Reasons for Actions' (8ý where he argues that 
while it is always possible for an individual to reject the social values 
into which he is initiated he cannot reject them all, or there would be 
nothing on the basis of which he could reject them. However personal an 
individual's morality may become, the moral principles he holds still 
rest on public standards of evaluation. 
Now, Norman maintains that the individual agent, in coming to under- 
stand the meaning of ethical concepts, will have to learn how they are 
interrelated and how often they underlie not just a moral belief, but 
a whole way of life. It may therefore not always be possible for him 
to accept or reject one particular moral value, like honesty, which is 
connected to so many others, like fairness and respect for persons. 
But the understanding which an individual gains is not just conceptual, 
for he must also come to see that moral principles provide reasons for 
action. It has sometimes been held by other philosophers that this is 
only possible if reasons are ultimately grounded in wants, for only then 
are they necessarily connected to action. But, Norman (and R. S. Peters 
takes a similar position. (9)) argues wants in themselves presuppose 
rational appraisal, for wanting cannot be identified separately from the 
reasons for wanting, which point to the objective features of what is 
wanted and not to a person's psychological disposition. It is therefore 
true to say that just as a word cannot have a logically private meaning, 
so a want or action cannot have a logically private meaning. Reasons, 
Norman claims, ensure rationality not logical certainty and this is all 
we should hope for' . (10) 
126 
But Norman's account does not in itself explain what gives moral 
decisions or judgments their authority; and the point which must be 
made here is that social morality, because it is dependent on inter- 
personal agreement, has a prescriptive force which would be lacking 
if it was only based on individual judgments. Kant' s maxim draws 
our attention not only to the respect that each moral agent must 
give to another person's freedom, but to agreement on what con- 
stitutes the moral law itself. As rational beings we are all subject 
to the same moral law, because we are all law-making members in a 
universal kingdom of ends. But, we might question this degree of 
universality. For Kant it was a necessary requirement of a moral 
rule that it should be regarded as applying to all rational beings. 
However this is clearly unacceptable; for different societies are 
held together by different moral codes, which, while fulfilling the 
criterion of overridingness, do not make the same demands on its 
members and all of whom may not necessarily be joint legislators, but 
we might still wish to call their codes ' moral' ones. Clearly we still 
need further criteria to explain what gives a social code its moral 
authority. 
In this connection it will be helpful to look at Strawson' s article 
' Social Morality and the Individual Ideal' (11). Here, Strawson 
initially suggests the following as a minimal social interpretation of 
morality :- 
' the fundamental idea is that of a socially sanctioned demand 
made on an individual in virtue merely of his membership of 
the society in question or in virtue of a particular position 
which he occupies within it or a particular relation in which 
he stands towards members of it' (12). 
On this interpretation the universality of moral rules can be maintained 
by limiting it to a particular social framework. But, Strawson says 
this is not enough to explain their authority, for there is no reason 
why members of a society should be joint legislators of its moral law, 
and if this is the case, why should it hold any moral authority for 
them? If the only requirement for being a moral agent is social 
membership, then, those subject to the moral law may not agree with 
it and indeed be socially exploited because of It. Clearly some other 
criterion is also required. Strawson suggests that to be subject to 
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a moral code one must at least have an interest in it. He argues 
that as the individual can only pursue his aims within a society he 
must adhere to the socially sanctioned demands made on its members, 
providing these do protect his interests as well as placing obligations 
upon him. In other words, as a member of a society pursuing his 
own goals, he must acknowledge the reciprocal nature of rights and 
duties. Strawson argues: 
' it is not a tautology that anyone subject to moral demands 
who recognises his interest in the system of demands must 
also genuinely acknowledge some obligations under the system. 
But we can argue that it is a tautology that the generality 
of those subject to moral demands must genuinely recognise 
some obligations under the system of demands' (13). 
Similar arguments have been advanced which also explain the universal 
in morality in terms of reciprocity of rights and duties. within a 
particular society. K. Baier, for example, argues that being moral 
is, 'following rules designed to overrule self-interest whenever it is 
in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should set aside his 
interest' (14). And D. P. Gauthier takes this a stage further by suggest- 
ing that morality is, 'a system of principles such that it is advantageous 
for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the 
system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous 
acts' (15). 
But the problem with these kinds of theories is that morality is viewed, 
at least in part, instrumentally; but it must not be viewed in only 
this way, because even an instrumental account presupposes some 
notion of the common good which in itself has to be defined and when 
this is done, when it is established what does constitute the common 
good, it is still a further question as to whether it has moral worth or 
not. The whole nature of moral judgments demands, that whatever 
conventionally might be the case, there must still be room for the 
question of justification. Morality need not only be seen as a means 
to an end. Questions concerning what the good life should consist 
of and what activities men should pursue, while they can only be 
asked against a particular social background cannot be reduced to it, 
otherwise there would be no room for talk of moral change, develop- 
ment and criticism. 
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iv THE POINT OF MORALITY 
Now, certain attempts have been made by those, like P. Foot, to 
show that in spite of cultural differences there are certain facts 
of human existence which are so basic they are bound to determine 
at least part of what constitutes a idea of human well-being (16). 
These would include, for example, freedom from injury and the 
fulfilment of physiological needs. But while certain universal 
biological and psychological facts must have a bearing on what counts 
as human harm and benefit they cannot9 as philosophers like Norman 
and Peters have argued, be the basis of morality in any reductionist 
sense (17). The question of moral justification cannot be reduced to 
what men happen to want. 
Attempts at actually justifying moral values as being universally 
valid have also been made by using transcedental arguments. It has 
been argued that values like justice, respect for persons, truth 
telling can be found in any society of rational agents because of what 
is involved in persons living together in a social community. Justice, 
for example, is based on the rational principle that no distinctions 
can be made without relevant differences and the need in a society for 
a common action (18) ; respect for persons on what it is to be a 
person and the logical connection between this and the appropriate 
attitude of one person to another (19) ; and truth telling, because 
without it the use of language, particularly of an explanatory nature, 
would be impossible (20). 
Although space does not allow discussion of these issues here, what 
must be said is that whatever the basic moral requirements that might 
be necessary for the existence of a human society, there is still 
room for enormous diversity in different social ways of living. It is 
because the concept of morality is autonomous as well as social that 
we can talk of individual moral choice. In a society where the good 
life consists only of maintaining a mere level of survival, scope for 
individual morality will be limited, while in a society where there is 
a plurality of moral values, moral choice will be at its maximum. In 
such a situation, moral decisions, while fulfilling conditions of rationality 
and social criteria, will also depend, if they are to influence action and 
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not remain at a theoretical level, on personal and affective consider- 
ations (21). While we cannot agree with Hume, for reasons already 
given (22) that morality is more properly felt than judged, we can 
agree with him that making moral evaluations is a passionate business. 
As I argued in the last section, while feeling cannot be separated from 
rational appraisal it cannot be reduced to it either. This must surely 
be at least an important factor in explaining diversity in moral 
attitudes and the seriousness we attach to them, and why moral reasons 
if not logically impelling are at least psychologically forceful in disposing 
us to act. 
But equally important as moral choice is the idea of consideration for 
others, not only in a formal sense demanded by us as rational agents, 
but in a caring emotional sense. An act of kindness carried out for 
its own sake, rather than from obligation or long term advantage, may 
be said to have arisen from a truly moral motive as opposed to a 
prudential or self interested one. Even a society geared to its own 
survival will be held together by fraternal relationships, kinship and 
emotional ties which cannot simply be explained in terms of rights and 
duties. The importance of caring as a criterion of morality is well 
illustrated by Turnbull' s Mountain People, for it is because these people no 
longer care for each other that we would hesitate to say they had a 
morality (23). (I shall return to this example presently). 
Why we are capable of caring cannot be explained only in terms of our 
rationality. It might be prudent if we look after each other and 
rational to respect other persons for having a point of view, but this 
does not explain human sympathy which Hume recognised as the common 
experience of humanity. Men are no doubt capable of immense cruelty 
but it is not just due to rational self interest that they are able to 
live together and pursue common ends. Certainly morality can be 
understood in functional terms, as a system of principles and rules 
which make social co-operation possible, but this cannot provide the 
whole story, for social activity is always dependent on man' s ability 
to form personal relationships, and these are based on emotional 
attitudes, and not only on contracts of convenience or unthinking 
acceptance of roles sanctioned by a society. 
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v IS THE PERSON NECESSARILY A MORAL AGENT? 
Having considered, if briefly, the many different ways in which the 
concept of morality might be defined, we can now return to the 
question of whether a person is necessarily a moral agent, and if so, 
in what sense. 
As an agent, the person must be an evaluator, capable of purposeful 
and voluntary behaviour even if the choices available to him are 
limited (for both rational and social reasons). As a rational agent 
he will be logically committed to universalising or generalising his 
principles although the principles themselves may have a very specific 
application. But while some of the values he holds will have over- 
riding importance it is debatable if by this criterion alone they could 
be described as moral values; if the arguments already given have 
been at all persuasive they must at least exclude the egoist and the 
eccentric as being moral agents. 
If it is accepted that the social concept is also necessary in defining 
morality then other criteria must be seen to be fulfilled namely: - 
(1) that those values which are of overriding importance to the 
agent or agents are also other-regarding; 
(2) that they are in some way dependent on a moral code on 
which there is public agreement and some form of public 
sanction; 
(3) they are based, at least in part, on reciprocity of claim 
(in other words the agent must have an interest safe- 
guarded in the moral code) ; 
(4) that generally (i. e. this may not be true of individual agents) 
the morality of a society may be seen to uphold certain values: - 
(a) because of what is involved, by rational agents living 
together in a social community (e. g. justice and truth 
telling) . 
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4. (cont. ) 
(b) because of what is involved in human beings, living 
together (as sentient as well as rational. beings) bound 
together by emotional ties, capable of caring for one 
another (e. g. generosity and self denial). 
But in giving these criteria and remembering the last one can only be 
applied in general terms, we can still remain flexible in our compre- 
hension, of who, and who does not, come under the moral net. There 
would still be room, for example, for the rebel whose behaviour cannot 
only be judged against the moral code of the society of which he is a 
member; the man who acts out of prudence and the man whose 
behaviour is the result of self denial; the person whose autonomy is 
limited in that he simply accepts, or has to accept, what is on offer; 
and for the person who belongs to a society like our own, where it 
would be a mistake to talk of one moral code and where the opportunity 
for full moral autonomy is at its greatest; and it must rule out the 
psychotic, the eccentric and the thorough going egoist. Clearly, given 
this kind of flexibility most persons, who can be described as rational 
agents and members of a society, can also be described as moral agents. 
But this is not necessarily the case; for while the majority of persons 
must recognise certain moral obligations if a society is to survive it is 
still possible for particular persons to act solely frort personal profit. 
However, there is still one sense in which it can be said that a person 
is necessarily a moral agent. Leaving to one side how a person 
actually does behave, if he can be described as a rational agent and a 
member of a society, then, to the extent that his behaviour has an 
effect on others, and to the extent he has an interest in a society's 
moral system, he will be held morally responsible for the actions he 
performs. In this rather narrow sense, all persons including egoists, 
are necessarily moral agents and their behaviour will be judged against 
the moral code, sanctioned by the society of which he is a member. 
But even this kind of claim might be questioned because it assumes 
that a society will necessarily have a moral code. I would wish to 
argue that on the very broad conception of morality I have suggested 
this is, in fact, the case. For a human society is dependent on social 
co-operation (even if it is also highly competitive) and is bound to 
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possess moral concepts to do with rights, obligations, freedom and 
consideration for others. It is not just that social co-operation is 
necessary if a society is to survive, rather it actually defines what 
we mean by ' society' . 
However, in a claim of this kind the validity of the second part of 
the final criterion I gave (4b) may be questioned, because clearly 
societies can exist which do not possess virtues like compassion, 
generosity, affection etc. which are associated with the idea of caring 
for others. Indeed I could no doubt be accused, in suggesting this 
criterion, of defining morality prescriptively, of giving content to it 
from the standpoint of certain values which operate only in particular 
societies. This criticism may to some extent be justified, but it does 
not alter the more basic and underlying fact that in a society there 
must be some values which are at least connected with consideration 
for others even if they are more of a prudential than a self-sacrificial 
nature. It cannot be a social virtue to be a thorough going egoist. 
What then of those persons like the IK? How am I to account for 
them? For if Turnbull is right in his description of them, he has 
apparently found a society without a morality. First of all, let us 
recognise that there are those who would dispute this. C. Battersby 
for example, believes Turnbull's assessment is incorrect (24). She 
argues that it is only because the IK' s morality does not match up to 
Turnbull' s own moral values, which recognise human beings as ends 
in themselves, that he wrongly concludes the IK do not have a 
morality. She suggests that if the meaning of morality is defined non- 
prescriptively in terms of formal criteria to do with universalizability, 
overridingness etc. the IK can be said to have a morality after all. 
While Battersby admits that Turnbull' s criteria ' do provide some 
pragmatically useful guidelines for dividing between the moral and the 
non-moral' (25), she still considers his criteria to be too restrictive. 
But to me, her arguments far from showing that the IK have a morality 
only show the absurdity of using only formal criteria. For if only 
formal criteria are used everything gets let in; not only does it become 
difficult to distinguish between different kinds of values (legal, 
aesthetic, hedonistic) but now, it seems, what most of us would find 
the complete antipathy of a morality must also be included. And so 
the term 'moral' ceases to do any work. It seems essential, therefore, 
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that we retain consideration for others as a criterion of morality. 
But to believe this still leaves us with the problem that if it is possible 
for men to live like the IK, then it looks now as if a society can exist, 
after all, without a moral code. However, I do not consider this to 
be the case, for if we examine Turnbull' s Mountain People carefully 
it is a very odd kind of society which he describes. The IR are 
held together by a common language, the mutual aim of their own 
personal survival and the vestiges of a common culture, but the same 
could be said of men on opposite sides in a civil war. In other words 
even where persons live in close proximity to one another and even 
where there is social interaction between them, if: social : ]co-operation 
is missing to the degree it is missing with the IX it is simply in- 
appropriate to describe them as a society. 
In conclusion, therefore, I would still hold that persons as rational 
agents and members of a society are morally accountable for their 
behaviour and because of this, can, in one particular sense, be 
described as moral agents. But this is not to say it is the most 
important sense, for it fails to make the distinction between the person 
who has through reflection arrived at his own moral principles, which 
may go beyond what is socially required of him, and the one who 
unthinkingly accepts the moral norms of his time; the man who acts 
'morally' but prudentially, and the one who is motivated by selfless 
ideals (and who may not wish to universalise his principles), and 
lastly between the person who always acts on his moral beliefs, and the 
one who never gets passed the stage of deliberating. For all these 
persons,, might for importantly different reasons, be described as moral 
agents. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT 
Having in part one examined the concept of the person and the essential 
nature of I P' predicates, I have now reached the stage where I am in a 
position to be able to explain and defend the definition of education I put 
forward in chapter one. To this end I shall now: 
(1) in this chapter analyse the concept of development; 
and then: 
(2) in the following chapter (chapter eight) explain and defend the meaning 
of education as:, learning which promotes the development of the 
person qua person. 
i INTRODUCTION 
The concept of development is still used frequently in education, particu- 
larly in relation to personal development and this is perhaps surprising when 
it is remembered that the notion has, in the last ten years, come under 
considerable criticism; for example P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters in 'The 
Logic of Education' (1) , draw attention to the 
dangers of taking the 
meaning of development out of its biological context and using it to refer to 
human development, where it makes no sense to talk of a pre-existing 
structure or culminating end state. More recently, G. Langford, in his 
reply to R. K. Elliott's paper 'Education and Human Being' (2), asserts 
that it is completely inappropriate to talk of the development of mind unless 
it is to mean no more than that a person has changed for the better. This, 
G. Langford argues, is because changes in a person do not occur according 
to a fixed pattern and in the direction of a pre-determined end, but as a 
result of a person's ability to learn which is essentially an open-ended 
affair. The same opinion is shared by P. H. Hirst who agrees that 
education is better seen as a matter of learning rather than development, 
if only because the criteria that make understanding understanding are 
external demands of logic not implicit natural norms (3). Still further 
support for this position is given by D. Hamlyn, who, in his paper 'The 
Concept of Development' (4), analyses the difficulties of applying the 
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concept outside a biological context and from this is able to conclude that 
'education has little to do with development except as something which might 
provide the right conditions, just as physical education provides the right 
conditions for physical development' (5). 
Yet in spite of so much agreement that the concept Is singularly unhelpful, 
and at times positively misleading, it is interesting that philosophers of 
education are still unable to give it up. For it is not only R. Elliott who 
refers to education in terms of development, that is, development of the 
mental powers, (see his article already referred to above), but there are many 
others who also rely on the concept quite heavily, and at times it is difficult 
to think of another term in a particular place which would do just as well. 
We have only to consider that R. Dearden talks of 'the development of 
autonomy' , P. Hirst continues to speak of the 
' development of the mind' 
and that R. S. Peters has described education as the development of 
persons ' growing awareness' , to illustrate this point. No 
doubt it will be 
argued by these philosophers, that unlike, for example, the use of the 
phrase in child-centred literature where there is also frequent reference to 
' growth' and ' self-realization' , these are not vacuous statements; 
that 
they are used meaningfully because, in each case, an account could be given 
as to what the development would consist of. Nevertheless, they are only 
meaningful if it is accepted that the concept of development can be applied 
outside a biological context, and I am not sure, that as yet, an adequate 
definition has been found to do the job required of it. For it needs to be 
one that does justice to the fact that our understanding of development 
extends beyond the world of plants and animals, that its meaning is to 
some extent universal and does not always change according to the situation 
in which it is found. 
In general discourse the word development is used in many different ways, 
as the following will illustrate: 
(1) Where development is used simply to refer to a series of changes, for 
example, the stages of a train journey. 
(2) When the concept is used only additively and refers to an increase of 
some kind, for example, developing queues, leaks and housing 
estates. 
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(3) When development is used transitively, for example, he developed in 
his children a love of the countryside, the photographs are being 
developed, he is developing his powers of reasoning. 
(4) Where there are a series of stages leading to an end state, which are 
assessed as developmental by the extent to which they come up to the 
end state or fulfil the criteria it demands, for example, the realization 
of a plan, becoming a proficient traffic warden. 
(5) Where development means changes for the better, where, because the 
end state is valued the movement towards it is also valued by the extent 
to which it comes up to it, for example, to tell someone he is developing 
as a teacher is to congratulate him. 
(6) Where there are a series of generative changes, that is the changes 
arise from the nature of the subject of development, and which are 
dependent on human intention to enable the development to take place, 
for example, the development of linguistic philosophy, electronic 
technology, fauvism in art. 
(7) A series of generative changes dependent on a pre-determined process, 
for example, the development of the fruit fly. 
(1) and (2) show us that at the very least development refers to a series of 
changes and that there is a need for a principle of unity, we need to know 
what is developing. But these are only extenuated meanings because in each 
case another word implying a great deal less would have done just as well. 
In the examples under (3), development is y someone and is not simply 
development per se. They do not illustrate the meaning of the concept, 
unless they can be reinterpreted in terms of enabling the development to 
take place. Strictly speaking what is developing must in some sense develop 
itself . 
(4) and (5) are dependent on the notion of the end state and are often 
thought for this reason to be the only legitimate uses outside a biological 
context. However, I hope to show why this meaning fails to do justice to 
the generative nature of development, which only becomes evident in (6) 
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and (7). I would argue that the last two are closer to a central and 
universal meaning of development. However, there are those who would go 
further and argue that development is only correctly understood under (7), 
that is, as a biological concept, instances of which will be causal in nature, 
predetermined and will involve a sequential set of permanent changes 
leading to a culminating end state. 
ü NATURAL DEVELOPMENT 
The best known account of natural development at least in educational 
discourse is provided by E. Nagel (6). He analyses the concept in terms 
of what is potential becoming actual, and in support of this he puts 
forward 
the following criteria: 
(1) there is a pre-existing structure; 
(2) the processes of development are sequential and irreversible, but may 
be assisted by outside agencies; 
(3) there is an end state which is the culmination of the process. 
P. Hirst and R. S. Peters have examined these criteria and have shown the 
difficulties of applying them in any literal way outside a physical environment. 
It is because of these difficulties that the notion of development has been so 
discredited when applied to other areas like education. Of course, one 
could argue (and this has been done) that the meaning of development is 
different outside a biological content and why should this matter as long as 
we recognise what those differences are? But unfortunately it does matter, 
because what tends to happen is that either the meaning of development 
becomes very loose, so it comes to mean no more than a series of necessary 
changes, or changes for the better, and the word is no longer doing any 
special, work; or the meaning remains tighter by retaining its connotations 
with biological development to do with inevitable and predictable causal 
processes, and then it is likely to mislead us into committing all kinds of 
naturalistic sins. However, what no-one seems to have bothered to question 
is whether Nagel' s original analysis of biological development was correct in 
the first place. And I think it can be shown that it was not (at least in 
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the form that it has been represented in educational literature) and that it 
is open to objections even when restricted to the context Nagel intended. 
(a) E. Nagel' s Account and Its Attendent Problems 
First of all, the whole notion of what is potential becoming actual can be 
questioned as an explanation of development, for it is not difficult to 
envisage situations where it does not mean development. Words written in 
temporarily invisible ink, the negative of a photograph, the character of 
Mr. Hyde, the ' dematerialised' space traveller, can all potentially exist and 
in the right conditions become actualised or energised, but can hardly be 
said to develop, at least, not in the way the biological organism develops. 
Much more it seems needs to be said on the nature of the developmental 
process through which the realization takes place. To describe this process 
as a series of irreversible and sequential changes may provide us with a 
necessary criterion, but it is not in itself sufficient to explain development. 
An ancient tree, for example, also goes through a series of reversible 
changes as it decays and dies. 
Secondly, I have difficulty with the end state, as a criterion of development. 
It is identified as the culmination of the process, which indeed it is, but 
this means it is the result of what has already developed and therefore 
cannot provide a condition for it. It may be that certain sequential stages 
always do lead to the same end state, but as I shall argue later, it is not 
for this reason that the changes constitute development. 
Thirdly, while a very crucial part of our understanding of biological 
development is its predetermined nature, I think the role attached to 
external factors can be greater than Nagel allows for. He suggests 
external factors only assist the development, they do not play a part in 
determining the development itself. But surely it is conceivable that outside 
agencies can do more than allow the nature of the phenomenon to unfold, and 
that they can actually change the nature of what is developing. While it is 
undoubtedly predetermined that a biological development takes place it may 
not be predetermined what the development will be like. Consider, for 
example, the importance of climatic conditions on the developing landscape 
or the effects of a drug on a developing embryo. Changes which are 
determined by outside agencies could even be quite dramatic, but it would 
still make sense to talk of development providing this phenomenon remains 
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self generating. In other words subsequent change must still arise from the 
nature of the organism itself, even if the organism is now somewhat different, 
otherwise the word development does cease to be inappropriate, if for 
example the nature of the thing changed only because of what was externally 
altering it, like a series of continual transplants. 
Lastly, I think if development is to be given a general rather than a 
specifically biological definition, it would be safer to say that the fact 
the organism's development is predetermined is not in itself a criterion of 
development, but rather it enables us to assess what is a necessary criterion, 
namely that the changes arise in some sense from the nature of whatever is 
developing (see below). 
On Nagel' s account of biological development the only criterion that seems 
crucial is the second one, but of course growth is genetically determined 
but does not in itself constitute development, much more it would seem is 
required before predetermined changes could be assessed as developmental 
ones, which, as I shall show, cannot be provided for by the end state 
(rather we have to give a functional explanation but one where the end 
state does not provide the means of assessment, rather it is no different 
from any other stage of a development, in that it can only be understood in 
terms of the entire biological process) . 
(b) The End State as a Criterion of Biological Development 
A more recent and even tighter analysis is given by D. Hamlyn in his article 
'The Concept of Development' . He too restricts his analysis to cases of 
natural development, taking a biological paradigm to explain the concept (8) 
and he shows the implications this must have for our understanding of 
development in an educational context. 
Hamlyn argues that development cannot simply mean a sequence of changes, 
not even if one stage is a logically necessary condition for the next. Neither, 
can it simply be equated with growth, for the development of an organism 
implies more than mere increase in size; rather, what is required is that 
its original state must, in some sense, be generative of subsequent ones 
even if the generation still depends on the satisfaction of other conditions (9). 
Development is dependent on an organism having the potential for its own 
development, but actualization only occurs because of an underlying process 
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which generates the changes and final end state. Hamlyn says: 
' it is the inter relationships between pre-existing conditions, necessary 
sequence and end state within a pattern which we see as natural to a 
given kind of thing that is important to an understanding of the 
notion of development. ' (10) 
Now, the idea of a generative process, of one stage arising out of the one 
before does seem crucial to our understanding of development and is a 
different kind of criterion from just saying development is predetermined. 
However, I would have thought a further distinction needs to be made here, 
which Hamlyn does not make, between what causes a development and how we 
recognise development as a development; for the two are not necessarily the 
same and failure to make this distinction can only lead to confusion. Hamlyn 
talks of the intial stage being generative of subsequent ones, but in strictly 
causal terms it would be more accurate to say that it is in the nature of the 
organism to change in the way it does, that it is a causal process which 
generates all the stages the organism goes through, including the first. 
But while biological development is dependent on a causal process, we come 
to recognise development not by observing or even understanding this 
process but by watching the changes or effects of that process. It is by 
observing one stage coming out of the one before that we judge development 
is both generative and dependent on the internal nature of the organism. 
But the confusion arises because we also want to hold that each stage in 
fact alters the nature of the organism, even to the extent where one might 
wish to say that what was developing has developed into something else. 
But if we keep to the causal story, we would have to maintain that its nature 
had not changed, rather it was in the nature of the organism to change in 
the way it did. In other words 'nature' is ambiguous and can be defined 
by internal or external norms. But once this is recognised we can have it 
both ways: development can be said to both be the result of the organism's 
nature (internal/genetic) and to change that nature (external/physical) . 
Development, then, suggests a generative process, but as Hamlyn argues 
this is not enough, something else is required to distinguish development 
from mere change in size, brought about by natural growth. He suggests 
that changes of development have to be seen in functional terms, where 
each stage of development is recognised as a pattern because of the 
145 
contribution it makes to the end state, which in some way must be the 
rationale of the thing itself (11). This presumably means that development 
can only be finally explained in terms of the end state and in this way 
stages of development are recognised in their movement towards it. 
If development is to be assessed in terms of the end state, it is easy to see 
how and why the subject of development could become identified with it. On 
the kind of functional account Hamlyn suggests, it would surely be correct 
to say that it is only because of our knowledge of the end state that we 
know what is developing. While the end state of the organism may not be 
recognisable until the end, nevertheless this is what can be said to have 
been developing all along, even though we could not actually see it. If we 
are able to identify what is developing before the last stage is reached this 
is only because the stages of its development are familiar to us, not because 
there is necessarily a similarity between the stages leading up to the end 
state and the end state itself. In other words, it is not like some human 
enterprise, for example, the building of a bridge, where each stage in its 
construction does take us nearer to seeing the finished product, and where 
the stages of building can be described as functional to this end, and 
constitutive of it. It is difficult to see, for example, how, in a similar way, 
it would be possible to say the acorn resembles the oak tree or that the 
caterpillar can be likened to the butterfly. If, in biological development 
we hold on to the idea that it is the end state which is developing, then we 
can only conclude that for most of the time the whole process is hidden from 
us until the end state is reached or the organism begins to show some 
resemblance to it. This perhaps explains why the notion of an unfolding or 
emerging process is often used in the context of development. 
But development has a different meaning to emerging or becoming. In these 
cases, on strictly logical grounds, one does have to know the end state 
before one can know what is emerging or is in a state of becoming; 
furthermore, this is all one has to know. Now the same might be thought 
to apply to development, but while we do talk of developing 'into' we also 
talk of developing ' as' , and the same criteria which are operative 
in the 
former are also operative in the latter. 
In both instances knowing the subject of ' development' does not enable us 
to assess whether or not, it is developing. We can identify a subject of 
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development on the basis of recognising a familiar series of predetermined 
changes or by knowing what the organism has changed into or became, in 
terms of gaining new characteristics and therefore a new conceptual identity, 
but this kind of information is not enough to establish whether what we can 
identify is the result of development rather than, say, a process of 
actualization. As we shall see other criteria are necessary before a natural 
process can be assessed as a development. 
Clearly, the subject of development develops through all the different stages 
of development including the last one, but this does not mean it cannot be 
seen until the end, rather it suggests there is no reason to identify what 
is developing with the last stage rather than any other. In fact the identity 
of what is developing must be over and above the changes it goes through, 
or at least it cannot be reduced to any particular stage. If the name of the 
end state is used as a title for the subject of development, this does not 
mean we have reason to equate the two, but rather, we need to notice that 
the name refers to two distinct things: it refers not only to the end state, 
but to the organism itself which goes through all stages of its development 
including the last one. 
In order finally to throw off the myth of the end state, we have only to 
consider an animal developing for the first time, perhaps as the result of 
abnormal mutation or experimental breeding. Without a prior understanding 
of the sequence of changes and end state, biologists could still ascertain a 
development was taking place. Now, it might be argued, yes, but only when 
the development was finished, that they could only assess whether the 
organism was developing by knowing what it eventually became, so that 
once more the end state is still crucial. But suppose the development did 
not stop like a creature out of science fiction, it just went on ' developing' , 
at what stage would they look back? Clearly, there would have to be a 
retrospective judgment at every stage, in that one stage must be seen to be 
dependent on the one before, and to give rise to subsequent ones, but they 
would not have to wait until the end to make these judgments, they could 
make them as the changes occurred. 
But, it might still be argued this is not enough, that without recourse to 
an end state we will have no way of distinguishing development from 
degeneration. But this is not true. The criteria by which we distinguish 
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development from degeneration has nothing to do with the end state. In 
fact if we judge the development against the end state, we are already 
assuming it is a developed state, and how do we know this, that it is not 
for example, the first stage in a degenerative process? 
The answer to the above will be considered later, in the meantime if we still 
wish to persist in using the end state as a criterion of development, then we 
will have to admit to having theistic or anthropomorphic tendencies of thought, 
that we believe, for example, that nature wanted elephants, cabbages, 
earthworms and tortoises and then found the way of bringing these about, 
that until they reach their final stages of development they have not become 
what nature intended. Alternatively, one may believe in a kind of 
essentialism: that the organism is not fully itself until the end stage is 
reached, it is only then that it has become what it is really supposed to be. 
Without such teleological beliefs as these, it is difficult to see what other 
reasons there could be which could explain why stages of development should 
be dependent for their occurrence on that final end state. 
However, Hamlyn would argue that one can give a quasi-teleological account. 
In the article already referred to, he agrees with Charles Taylor' s 
explanation of natural behaviour, where it can be accounted for 'by laws in 
terms of which an event occurring is held to be dependent on that events 
being required for some end' (12). In other words if it was not required 
for that end, it would not occur. Moreover Hamlyn says: 
'there is no necessity that what is so explained should be explained 
more fundamentally perhaps, in terms of pre-existent causes also 
though nothing logically rules out that possibility either' . ('13) 
But there is every necessity why what is to be explained (that is 
development) must rest on a more fundamental explanation. Strong arguments 
have been put forward to show that a functional explanation cannot be 
fundamental in the way that is supposed by those holding on to a quasi- 
teleological account of development. 
For example Susan Khin Zaw, in her reply to Dr. Boden' s paper, ' The 
Case for a Cognitive Biology' (14) argues that the series of physical events, 
which is the production of a particular creature can be given a causal 
explanation, which can stand independently of any kind of functional 
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analysis. If a functional explanation is given, it is at best a possible 
explanation and is dependent on what is causally the case if it is to be 
scientifically true. The causal story is therefore explanatorily fundamental 
Presumably in the case of living organisms, they are as they are because 
of an evolutionary process, dependent on such considerations as, natural 
selection, chance factors of the environment and random mutations. Genetic 
coding being the result not only of change but the functional viability of 
the physical realization of any particular coding. 
(c) The Use of Cognitive Concepts in Biological Development 
In view of all this we might wonder why biologists talk in functional terms 
at all, and indeed attempts have been made to show that while this may have 
been legitimate before Darwin's theory of evolution when the idea of a Grand 
Design was acceptable, now, the language of causation and evolution eliminates 
the need for functional statements (15). But, notwithstanding, biologists 
continue to defend functional explanation as being essential to biology, and 
it is not difficult to see why, because, without such explanation, biology is 
reduced to physics and chemistry. For example it has been said: 
'A sequence of events within the organism is not understood merely 
when that sequence has been fully described in terms of biochemistry 
or physical chemistry. ' Understanding that sequence may require as 
well knowing what function it serves (16). 
And: 
' If we omit the functional description of what goes on in the organism 
and confine ourselves to the physical description, we have failed to 
understand the organism (we may have achieved biochemical or physical 
understanding) but we have not achieved biological understanding. '(17) 
But while the need for functional language is still recognised, if biology is 
to survive as an explanatory science, it is now generally accepted that a 
meaning of ' function' has to be found which is free from any reference to 
the purposes of a creator or designer. This means a functional explanation 
cannot just be in terms of or for the sake of the end state. If it was 
confined to the latter it would remain teleological in the strict sense and be 
open to those criticisms I have already made. In fact,. functional analysis 
looks at every stage, not least at those stages in embryological development. 
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Dr. Boden in the article already referred to, says: 
'the main theoretical aim in developmental biology is to find ways of 
expressing the overall integration that characterises the developmental 
process. How is it possible for the different organs to arise from a 
single cell or homogeneous mass of cells? How can they be placed in 
the correct positions relative to one another? and how can they be 
induced to develop in parallel so that they do not get out of step with 
one another? ' (18) 
The answers to these kinds of question Boden says will only come from 
biological understanding, achieved through the use of cognitive concepts 
but without mentalistic implications. She talks of 'pattern regulations' , 
' control systems' ,' negative and positive feed back' ,' choice sets' , 
' generative rules' . She even goes so far as to say that something is 
significant for a given system if it has both ' specific meaning for the 
system and that it has a potential for contributing to the systems' goals or 
interests. ' (1 9) 
She quotes Goodwin who sees the natural world as full of meaning. For 
example, he describes: 
' evolution as an intelligent system that tests hypotheses and provides 
evidence of learning; the embryo he likens to a mind and the 
organism he describes as a cognitive system, adapting and evolving 
on the basis of knowledge about itself and its environment. The 
dynamical modes of the organism's behaviour are represented as 
manifestations of co-operative or collective activity among cognitive 
units, development being seen as the orderly unfolding of these 
modes within a structurally stable, knowledge using system. '(20) 
Apparently, there is no danger in these kinds of descriptions given above 
of taking them literally, of thinking that organisms could possess knowledge, 
or evolution can test hypotheses like human minds are capable of doing. 
This way of talking is just a useful metaphor, less likely to mislead than 
cognitive concepts used in psychological discourse. It is, after all to be 
based on what is physically the case; it is a causal process which makes 
the functioning of the organism possible, even if different functions can be 
realized in physically different ways. 
But, as Zaw effectively argues there is a danger if the functional 
explanation is thought to be of a fundamental kind, if descriptions like the 
above are thought to provide the reasons why biochemical processes occur, 
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for the sake of bringing these ends about. The organism then becomes 
essentially a knowledge user, 'an intelligent system' ,a creative idea' , 
rather than a series of physical events. And there must be the tendency 
for biologists to do this, because they cannot accept a physical or causal 
description as being fundamental, which would reduce the organism to 
being no more than a series of physical changes and biology to physics 
and chemistry. This, then is the crux of the problem. How can the 
organism be defined without reducing it to physical matter, and by drawing 
on a notion of function which is not so dependent on metaphor as to be 
misleading, which is not based, for example, on the artifact model which 
has already been shown to be inadequate and misleading? 
Khin Zaw suggests that most analyses of natural function in the end 
depend on the function of survival and reproduction (21), these are the 
defining characteristics of a living organism. How these functions are 
fulfilled will vary from one organism to another and will enable us to 
identify a particular organism or species. Without this knowledge we 
could not identify the subject of development. To recognise a series of 
changes in physical or biochemical terms does not, itself, enable us to 
identify an organism or the development of a particular organism. It is 
not sufficient that we know a series of changes is genetically determined 
to enable us to describe a development, for changes are assessed as 
developmental ones on other grounds than their origin. 
What is also required is that they are seen to fulfil normative criteria 
as well. 
First of all, it has to be accepted that the overall purpose of the organism 
is survival and the continuation of the species and that how this is 
achieved will depend on the intricate and unique system of a particular 
organism. Secondly, under this description changes will have to show 
evidence of the organism as a developing system, to the extent that 
the changes can be seen to form a pattern. And thirdly this pattern 
must be susceptible to assessment in cognitive terms, for example as an 
'integrating system' , as 'the realization of generative rules' , dependent 
on ' choice sets' and ' developmental constraints' . Dr. 
Boden suggests: 
' developmental choices guiding cell differentiation and organ growth 
have to be made continually, and while each of these leave some 
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options open for later discussion within the developmental process, 
other potential options are progressively outlawed. ' (22) 
(d) Summary 
To summarize, I have tried to argue that an understanding of development, 
even within a biological context, is normative and dependent on cognitive 
concepts for its assessment. It is the overal integration of a given 
system for the purpose of its survival that characterises the developmental 
process. It is not enough to ascertain that a series of changes the 
organism undergoes are predetermined; if an organism is able to change 
colour or shape, although these have internal causes, they are not 
necessarily a part of the developmental process. Growth only counts as 
development if it can be seen in relation to an overall pattern of 
synchronised change. Stages of development are recognised as such 
because they bring about the creation and maintenance of a network of 
related functions, to enable the organism to do certain things necessary 
for its identity as well as for its survival and reproduction. 
In abnormal development, while the above condition has been achieved in 
that the organism is able to function, it does not do it very well and is 
therefore unlikely to communicate the information, that makes its existence 
possible, to the next generation. A biological monster can develop, but 
it is unlikely to reoccur. If it does, a new development is established 
for its way of functioning has been tested and has been found, after all, 
to be adequate. 
The functionalist account, but freed from reference to a final end state 
as an end state, is, then, necessary for an understanding of development. 
It is this which provides the rationale that enables the organism to be 
identified (as an organism and as a particular one) and enables its 
development to be assessed. But one might wish to argue that the 
empirical usefulness of this analysis, is dependent on taking a functional 
description as fundamental, and has it not been successfully argued that 
it is at best only a op ssible explanation? and dependent on the causal 
story which remains explanatorily fundamental. Fortunately for me, for 
the purpose of my thesis, I do not have to answer this kind of question. 
It remains a problem for the biologist to solve. All I wish to show is 
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that development as a concept (regardless of the scientific mileage that 
can or cannot be gained from it) is, contrary to what is usually thought, 
dependent not only on criteria taken from the natural world, but on 
criteria which are taken from the world of human activities, artifacts 
and symbolic meaning. According to Goodwin one might put it, that 
'the embryo is more a sculptor, the brain more a composer of music, 
both being very fine artists. ' (23) 
iii NON-NATURAL DEVELOPMENT 
It is often thought outside a biological context, because development is 
no longer causally predetermined, but is the result of human intention, 
its meaning can only be metaphorical, and that it is therefore likely to 
be misleading or limited in its significance. But as we have already 
discovered, even in biological development changes are actually assessed 
as developmental ones, not on grounds of their origin, but on the basis 
of external norms. These presuppose a functional explanation which is 
only meaningful because of our prior understanding of a social world of 
human activitiy, purpose and intention. In other words a functional 
explanation presupposes a conception of development which is more at home 
in a non-natural context. We have therefore just as good reason to say 
biological development is being used metaphorically, as the other way 
around. As both criteria are necessary (but not jointly sufficient) one 
could conclude that in biological development, while the criterion which 
states the changes must arise from the nature of the subject of development 
belongs naturally to it, the criterion which refers to the means of assessing 
it does not, and, that this is conversely true in non-natural development. 
(a) The Use of The End State as a Criterion of Non-Biological Development 
Previous analyses tended to work from the assumption that biological 
development provided the paradigm and that the most that could be hoped 
for in other contexts was a much looser meaning, to do with a series of 
changes leading to an end state. The end state was seen to be crucial. 
Stages could be assessed as part of the development by the extent to 
which they fulfilled or came up to the criteria it demanded. 
I have already argued that in a biological context development is not 
dependent on the idea of an end state, and to think it does presupposes 
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teleological or essentialist assumptions. But in non-natural development, 
which is initiated by human intention, it might be argued that stages of 
development could be correctly said to occur for a purpose and this could 
be legitimately construed in terms of the end state. One could argue that 
now it is a sufficient explanation of their occurrence that they are 
required for a further end. Furthermore, stages of development could, in 
some cases, be said to become constitutive of this end. For example, 
stages in the construction of a town could be described in this way. On 
this account, then, it could be argued with some justification that in non- 
biological development the means of identifying and assessing what is 
developing could lie with the end state. 
But the problem with this account is that as it stands the idea of a 
generative process is entirely missing. A series of stages could after 
all contribute directly to some final state of affairs without us wishing to 
say there had been a development. The stages of putting on a theatrical 
production or executing a plan could have been described in this manner 
without us wishing to say either the production or the plan had developed, 
we may only wish they had. There is a significant difference between 
describing the construction of a new town and the development of an old 
one. Where changes are simply the realization of a pre-conceived project 
or are logically necessary in a strict sense as in a deductive argument, 
there is simply no room to talk of development. Moreover, we do talk 
about development even when no end state exists, or is likely to, when 
the process is still ongoing and there is no sign of an end being reached. 
This might be the case for example, in diplomatic negotiations, space 
technology, women' s fashions, hang gliding and philosophy, unless, that 
is, the end state is defined as loosely as where they all happen to be now, 
and in some cases it is difficult to imagine how even this could be 
delineated. 
While human intention does not, as some have thought, rule development 
out, it cannot provide the only story. While non-natural development 
depends on personal or social action, nevertheless what is developing 
must in some sense be described as developing itself, even if an agent 
or agents are responsible for that development. 
This is only another way of saying that the idea of a generative process 
is crucial to any understanding of development. Development which is 
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the result of human intention is therefore only possible because the nature 
of its subject matter. allows for the possibility of its own development. It 
is this which makes a series of changes possible, where one stage arises 
out of the one before and gives rise to subsequent change. These can 
then be seen as a part of an overall order or pattern, the relationships 
between the changes which take place being an intrinsic one. It is this 
pattern which enables us to identify the nature of the development, which 
could not have been known beforehand by knowing what a person intended. 
The end state therefore cannot dictate what the stages of development are 
going to be; if, as an intended outcome it does, then it would be better 
to describe the series of changes as realization, progression, construction 
or improvement, rather than development. 
This also means that where we can talk of development, intention cannot 
be linked to bringing about a specific state of affairs. For example, 
without human curiosity and man' s capacity for purposeful action, science 
would never have developed, but human intentions did not specify what 
science was or is to become, because these lie in the nature of science 
itself. The present stage of any specific field within science is the result 
of what has gone before it, it is the outcome of what has already developed 
and this includes the criteria for testing its truth value. 
(b) How Non-Natural Development is Assessed 
The only way the end state might be rescued as a criterion of development 
would be if it could be shown that it provides the means of assessing the 
development. It could be argued that we can only assess if a development 
has taken place after it has finished. 
But if we hold on to the idea of development being generative, then it 
is difficult to see why the end state, which has been thrown up by what 
has gone before should have the final authority, rather than being in 
the same position as any other stage subject to assessment. The same 
point could be made that was made with regard to biological development, 
how do we know that what we consider to be the end state of a development 
is not the first stage of a degenerative process? 
A similar point, I feel, is made by Ray Elliott in his reply to Hamlyn' s 
paper, which has already been referred to (see p1)) for Elliott also 
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believes that one can talk of development where there is intention, 
providing the subject of development can be said to develop itself. He 
suggests with regard to the development of the mental powers that the 
structure of developed understanding reflects that of primitive under- 
standing, as the structure of a mature human body reflects that of the 
embryo (24). In other words, to put this in more general terms earlier 
stages of development must be reflected in later ones. In relation to the 
end state, Elliott argues that in development of this kind it would be 
more appropriate to use the notion of 'possibility' rather than 
' potentiality' because in the latter we will be tempted to provide 'a full 
specification of the relevant actuality' ; he says: 
' there is therefore the danger that attention will be drawn almost 
exclusively to the end state which then provides the criteria for 
assessment and in so doing stands above evaluation and criticism. ' (25) 
On the end state account it is therefore difficult to see how a distinction 
can be made between development and degeneration, we can say that we 
disapprove of what has developed, but this is not the same as describing 
it as degeneration, rather we are saying that we wish whatever has 
developed had not done so. Because on the end state account, one can 
only identify the subject of development because of what it becomes , 
(and as we can therefore only do this at the end of the development) we 
cannot describe it as degeneration simply because we dislike its face. All 
we can do is to hope it might start to degenerate. 
The only other possibility of holding on to the end state would be to give 
up the idea of a generative process, so that where the end state was 
approved of, stages leading up to it would be called a development, and 
where it was disapproved of, stages leading up to it would be called 
degeneration. But if this is all that is meant why talk of development 
at all? If a neighbour kept building a wall in front of our living room 
window would we, when he eventually finished, call this a development if 
we approved of it and a degeneration if we did not? 
It is difficult to think of any good reason for deciding in favour of the 
end state especially as it has already been found wanting in biological 
development. In fact it will be helpful at this point to remind ourselves 
of the basis on which the distinction was made in biological development. 
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It will be recalled that in order to assess the development of the living 
organism we needed to understand how it functioned as a system that 
was capable of survival and reproduction, it was this which provided 
the underlying rationale. Now, in a similar way what I wish to suggest 
is that in non-biological development we also need to know the underlying 
rationale, only this time it will be provided by purpose or point of the 
action or activity, the principles that govern it and the methods it 
employs. But (as with biological development) while the rationale enables 
the development to be assessed, it does not tell us what the end state is 
going to be, in fact it does not tell us what any stage is going to be. 
It would be quite possible for the different developments to have the same 
rationale. Consider the different ways methods of agriculture have 
developed or the different forms and character democratic governments 
have taken. But the rationale does provide the means of assessment, it 
is this which enables us to see that the changes contribute to, rather than 
destroy what is developing, by the extent to which the rationale is fulfilled 
rather than undermined. This point is best illustrated by examples: 
(1) The rationale behind state schools is to educate the young. This 
being the case some would argue that comprehensive schools, 
being instruments of education, could be rightly described as a 
development from the previously existing grammar and secondary 
modern and technical schools. But it could also be held that the 
rationale behind comprehensive schools is not simply to provide 
education but to provide equal education, this being the case they 
would be better described as a reaction against rather than a 
development from the older system. 
(2) In recent times there has been a tremendous proliferation of different 
denominations of the Christian Church in the U. S. A.. These, in 
spite of their differences, could still be described as developments 
of the one religion, providing the same Christian beliefs and ethics 
(that is, the rationale) are essentially the same and if the work of 
any one denomination can be said to uphold and promote them in a 
way that contributes to the life of Christianity. Clearly Roman 
Catholics may well not wish to describe any branch of protestantism 
as developments but rather simply as different forms of Christianity. 
a 
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(3) The techniques used in olympic gymnastics can rightly be said to 
have developed if each change of technique can be seen to be an 
adaptation or to have arisen from what has gone before and if they 
are increasingly successful in achieving their objective, that is, if 
the movements become more skilful and more graceful. 
(4) Any area of knowledge or of understanding which can be said to 
have an underlying rationale, characterised by a complex and 
articulated network of concepts which sets up criteria of meaning and 
justification, can be said to have the possibility of its own development. 
In this instance we would need to know the principles and methods 
employed and not just the purpose behind the area of knowledge to 
understand its rationale (faith healing and modern medicine may have 
the same purpose but not the same rationale). Development of this 
kind will depend on the logical structure of the form of thought or 
mode of experience in question. In most cases it is a structure 
which is not simply hierarchical. This is because while the meaning 
of concepts is inter-related it does not normally involve a strict 
logical order. Our experiences are certainly structured conceptually 
and in a variety of ways, but conceptual structures are better 
envisaged as rambling old buildings than narrow apartment blocks 
with no lifts. It is simply not possible within any given area to map 
out a fixed route of development. Forms of thought and modes of 
experience develop and continue to develop multifariously, as this 
happens their structures become increasingly differentiated. 
Furthermore it need never be appropriate to talk of a final end 
point in their development. Certainly there are significant turning 
points and points of arrival but they are not necessarily culminating 
or final. It is in the nature of different subject areas that they 
endlessly open up new possibilities in developing man' s awareness 
and understanding of the world he lives in. To some extent it is 
only by looking back at the history of some area of knowledge that 
we can see how knowledge itself has developed. Not only do changes 
gradually alter the nature of our understanding (changes in scientific 
thought alter scientific method, changes in the style of art alter our 
concept of art), but in some cases the raison d' etre actually changes 
altogether, for example, when psychology developed from philosophy. 
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Now, in the above, although in each case the rationale enables us to 
identify the development and makes its assessment possible, it does not in 
itself tell us what the development would be like. For example, it would 
have been impossible to have predicted the form that any one Christian 
denomination would have taken or what a Ludmila Turischeva or Nelli Kim 
would come to achieve on the beam and asymmetric bars or where the path 
of knowledge might have led. Often in development of this kind it is just 
when the outcome is unknown and unpredictable that it seems appropriate 
to talk of development. When something is not totally in our control, where 
we talk of something making its own demands, or where we have to be 
sensitive to what we are creating we may say ' we shall have to wait and 
see how it develops' . In other words there has to be the possibility of 
development even though it is the result of human intention. Putting a 
plan into operation or following a recipe cannot be said to develop if it 
simply involves following specifications or instructions to the letter (like 
painting by numbers). But we can talk of the development of a story, 
of a town or of a relationship ; of developments in diplomatic negotiations 
or in writing a poem. In these kind of instances it can make sense to talk 
of development. From the outset it may at least be possible to ascertain a 
principle of unity provided by the intention behind an activity or situation, 
although this may not be sufficient to provide an underlying rationale. 
For example, although it might have been enough to know diplomats in 
negotiation wanted reconciliation, it would not have helped to know that 
the poet intended to write a poem. 
Now in all these examples, although the development is seen in retrospect, 
this does not have to mean the development is only recognised after the 
development is finished, but rather (as with biological development) a 
pattern emerges, as the changes occur, the nature of what is developing 
is recognised, and changing stages are seen as constitutive of that 
development. We might notice for example that a story ' unfolds' , that what 
used to be a few shops has become a town centre, that the stages of getting 
to know someone have taken on 'a life of their own' , that in diplomatic 
negotiations a solution is 'emerging' and that in the writing of a poem one 
part of it 'suggests' the next and the poem starts to write itself. 
Although outside a biological context development is invariably unpredictable, 
this does not have to be the case. Where a development has already taken 
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place, for example developing an understanding in mathematics, there it 
is possible to recognise and assess another instance of the same development 
and of course the stages then will be predictable, just as they are in 
familiar cases of natural development. But these stages must already have 
been judged as a pattern of development rather than simply as a set of 
sequential stages leading to an end state. 
In each of the above the changes can be said to contribute to, rather than 
to destroy the nature of what is developing, because the rationale is 
fulfilled or upheld. But when it is undermined the opposite takes place, 
for example, art degenerates when it no longer uplifts the soul but is 
used merely for sensual gratification; diplomatic negotiations start to 
deteriorate when the underlying purpose of appeasement and reconciliation 
are replaced by provocation and division; democracy degenerates if the 
criteria it demands are no longer fulfilled (for example, if changes prevented 
freedom of speech) ;a marriage carries the seed of its own destruction 
when loving care and companionship are eroded by indifference and contempt; 
history degenerates if the use of propaganda destroys its truth value. 
Sometimes a development is described even when the rationale is altered, 
when what is developing can rightly be said to have developed into 
something else. In this case, it is not that the rationale has been under- 
mined or destroyed, but that it is superseded by a new rationale which, 
while to some extent fulfilling the old criteria also sets up new ones. This 
means that although the new development gains a different identity and & 
different means of assessment, it will still be compatible with what it has 
developed from. On this basis, although in each case the rationale has 
indeed changed, nevertheless psychology could be said to have developed 
from philosophy, lawn tennis from royal tennis, electronics from our 
knowledge of electricity. But if the criteria changed entirely even at the 
most general level they could not be correctly described as developments. 
The theory of evolution, Paul's conversion, the age of the Renaissance, 
the French revolution - we could not describe these as developments 
because they were a reaction against or in opposition to existing beliefs 
or the recognised order of things. 
In assessing development it has to be made clear what the development is 
in and this will sometimes depend on whether the rationale is given a wide 
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or narrow base. A development in chemistry counts as a development in 
science but not necessarily the other way round; we may wish to say 
someone is developing as a portrait artist but only as that kind of artist; 
or as a classroom teacher, but not simply as a teacher; or as a prima 
minister but not necessarily as a statesman and so on. It is easy to sen 
that the rationale could become too broad so that it would become impossible 
to describe the subject of development in any precise way; and that also 
it could become too narrow so what is developing is always in effect 
developing into something else. 
(c) Is Development an Evaluative Notion? 
It is often thought that because development is normative it is also 
evaluative. In other words when we say something is developing we are 
commending it. But this is not necessarily the case; we can say something 
is developing well without approving or disapproving of it. We can assess 
developments in modern architecture without passing judgment on its value. 
If we do question the worth of a development we are not questioning that 
it is a development. Indeed if we assess it negatively we may wish that a 
degenerative process would set in (no doubt people felt like this at the 
time of the German occupation). 
However, it is only if we value what the development is in that we will 
necessarily value its development. This would only have a bearing on 
actually assessing the development, that is in deciding whether what is 
happening is a development if we are talking about something prefixed 
by the word I good' or where it is already an evaluative notion, i. e. value 
judgments are already written into its meaning (for example, education may 
be thought of in this way). This is because, in order to decide whether 
the changes are fulfilling the criteria demanded by the rationale and 
contributing to the nature of the development, we would have to pass 
evaluative judgments that could be controversial. But it is not the notion 
of development that would be problematic but what the development is in. 
If, for example, it is, difficult to assess whether something counts as a 
good piece of music or a good novel if opinions differ, the problems lie 
with the criteria of good music or novel, not with the criteria of development. 
It may therefore be easy to show that punk rock is a development of 
popular music, but it may be much more difficult to show it as a development 
of good popular music. 
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(d) Conclusion 
The rationale must allow for the possibility of development. The purpose 
of dealing cards, whisking an egg, reciting mathematical tables, sewing 
on a button does not allow or create the demand for development, unlike 
the rationale of playing bridge, the art of cooking, mathematics and 
furniture design. 
It is because of the rationale that it can be said to be in the nature of a 
given activity to develop. But this does not mean it is pre-existing or 
causally determined, rather its nature is created as the development 
takes place. By fulfilling the criteria the rationale demands, each stage 
contributes to the development and makes it what it iss but is also a result 
of what has already been created and therefore new changes can be said 
to be generated from previous ones (that is from the nature of the 
development itself) . 
It is not enough to show that in a development one passes through a 
series of necessary stages but rather these stages must be seen to be 
constitutive of what the development is in. It is logically necessary in 
learning to create. poetry that one learns linguistic concepts but the 
latter is not a stage of poetry development. It is empirically impossible 
to ice skate before one can walk but walking is not a stage in developing 
as an ice skater. Similarly according to psychological research carried 
out by J. Piaget, B. Inhelder and others (26), in order to think formally 
one has to first think concretely but this does not mean concrete thinking 
constitutes a developmental stage of formal thinking (Hamlyn makes a 
similar point in the article already referred to, see p. -St ). But it 
might be claimed and indeed it has been claimed that both are a part of 
cognitive development. It must therefore be shown that the nature of 
cognitive development is something over and above concrete and formal 
thought of which they were both a constitutive part. As far as I can 
see this could only be provided by an area of knowledge, the nature of 
which could provide the means of identifying what the development was in 
and of assessing it as a development as opposed to a series of necessary 
stages. 
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iv SUMMARY 
I have argued: 
(1) that biological development is dependent on a functional description, 
where a developmental process is characterised in terms of the overall 
integration of a given system for the purposes of reproduction and 
survival; and that this is true even if the functional description 
does not provide an explanation of a scientifically fundamental kind; 
(2) that the end state is not a necessary criterion of development in 
either a natural or non-natural context; 
(3) that the difference between biological and non-biological is not as 
great as is commonly supposed; that while the criterion concerning 
its origin belongs naturally to the world of plants and animals, the 
one concerning its assessment comes from the world of human activity 
and symbolic meaning; 
(4) that it is quite possible to put forward a universal meaning of 
development which does justice to both contexts. This I have 
suggested would have to fulfil the following criteria: 
(a) there is a principle of unity; 
(b) there is a series of intrinsically related changes, where one 
stage arises from previous stages and gives rise to subsequent 
change, because of the internal nature of what the development 
is in; 
(c) that there is an underlying rationale which enables the developmont 
to be assessed as a development; 
(5) that if the changes in a development changed its nature entirely, a 
new set of criteria would come into play and it would gain a now 
identity (it would therefore be a different development) ; 
(6) that development is a normative but not necessarily an evaluative 
notion . 
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is to be a person, that is, as; 
(1) a centre of human experience, where ' human' gives a social rather 
than physiological explanation and which is characterised by being 
both: (a) conceptually structured, and (b) affectively sensitized. 
(2) a rational agent, where ' rationality' presupposes the capacity for 
evaluation and linguistic understanding and not only purposeful 
behaviour. 
(3) a moral agent, where the meaning of moral as a defining characteristic 
of the person may have to be limited to 'being morally responsible' or 
'morally accountable to others' and will depend on the assumption 
that persons are necessarily social beings. 
We must now, therefore, consider what would constitute the development 
of the person under these descriptive terms. Descriptions, which I have 
already argued, underline the essential nature of ' p' predicates, and 
which have, therefore, universal application. 
A 
ü THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
AS A CENTRE OF EXPERIENCE 
As a person's experiences are characterised by being conceptually 
structured and affectively sensitized it may be thought that the development 
of the person as a centre of experience must involve him in one long series 
of passing through different logical or mental states during which his 
understanding of the world would increase. But this would fall down on 
two counts. Firstly, development as already defined, involves more than 
a series of dependent stages, there must also be an underlying rationale 
responsible for these stages. Secondly, - man's conceptual and affective 
awareness is not global, it is highly articulated. Man has made sense of 
his environment in a variety of ways and this is reflected in different forms 
of thought and modes of experience. It is these which provide the rationalo 
that is needed to make the changes in a person's conceptual understanding 
and affective experience count as development. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EDUCATION AS LEARNING WHICH PROMOTES 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON QUA PERSON 
Having in the previous chapter examined the concept of development, it 
is now possible to: 
(1) explain what might be meant by the development of the person _qua 
person; 
(2) defend the meaning of education I have given as learning which 
contributes to the development of the person qua person. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON QUA PERSON 
i INTRODUCTION 
In terms of the criteria of development that have been given, there is no 
problem in talking about the physical development of the person, this can 
be explained straightforwardly enough in causal terms, as a predetermined 
and generative process assessed by the use of functional criteria of the 
kind applicable to the development of any living organism. But the 
development of the person gua person can only be explained in terms of 
intention and not in those of causal necessity; to believe this is to hold 
a particular view of man as a free agent as opposed to one whose actions 
and beliefs are unalterably determined. 
What the development of a person might consist of can only be understood 
in a public world, but because the development of the person is not simply 
dependent on what is potential becoming actualized, but is a result of 
learning, the directions in which a person could develop will therefore 
necessarily be social ones and the nature of any direction will vary 
enormously depending on the particular 'world' he has experienced. 
But his development 
_qua 
person will be assessed, as with any development, 
because of an underlying rationale, but, which this time does not depend 
on functional or social criteria (which could be applicable to an organism 
or an activity respectively) but on the defining characteristics of what it 
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It only makes sense to refer to a person's conceptual development in 
terms of different conceptual schemes and not by referring to a general 
process of increasing understanding. A person learns to discriminate, 
think critically, make assessments only within a particular context. A 
person could, for example, go through a series of mental changes in 
mastering an order of historical facts. It could be appreciated that the 
meaning of one fact was necessary for the understanding of subsequent 
ones, but these changes would not in themselves constitute development, 
unless it could also be shown that they reflected an increasing understanding 
in the nature and logic of actually doing history. 
In any case, it could be argued that a person's thinking only changes 
significantly when a certain level of understanding occurs and not 
necessarily because he has mastered a large body of facts. Changes that 
reflect an increasing mastery in a given area will give us grounds for 
describing them as development. There may be no one logical order in 
stages of development but given that an area becomes more complicated, 
there must be an order and it must make sense to talk of its development. 
This is not only true of what could be described as areas of knowledge, but 
also of what has been referred to as modes of experience, concerning 
aesthetic, religious and moral values. These, too, involve initiation and 
the need for mastery. It may not be appropriate to talk here of a logical 
order, but given that each mode of experience has an underlying rationale 
and is characterised by the person gaining an increased and differentiated 
understanding as initiation goes on, one can talk legitimately of stages of 
development (indeed in the case of moral experience, psychologists have 
done just this). 
It may be objected at this stage that what is now being referred to is not 
the development of the person. Pe: t se, but only his development in, for 
example, geography, current affairs or music. But to say this would be 
to miss the point. A person's conceptual awareness is dependent on what 
he knows and what he has come to experience and this by its very nature 
is structured in different ways. But this does not mean that a person 
cannot bring to bear on a particular situation , understanding based on 
many different modes of thought or experience. More importantly, it must 
not be forgotten that the principle of unity is provided by the person 
himself. What is decisive in assessing development is not only dependent 
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on specific criteria of the form of thought or mode of experience in question, 
but the degree to which a person is changed by it. In the last analysis, 
development depends not only on the nature of conceptual understanding 
but on the nature of the person himself. Certainly, the understanding and 
expertise the person gains must come up to certain standards demanded by 
a particular subject area, but to count as development this understanding 
must actually change the person's conceptual nature or outlook. In other 
words it affects his expectations and general awareness of the world. It 
also makes subsequent change possible to the extent that it leads to new 
knowledge and to new experiences, although this is not to say that these 
will not also involve further learning. 
But even to leave the matter there would be to operate with an entirely 
passive model of education, it would be to forget the person is an agent 
as well as a centre of experience. One can have knowledge without it 
providing a disposition to act, it therefore does not necessarily lead to 
development in terms of our a enc . If we remember the person is also 
characterised by being an evaluator, it must be just as important to consider 
what a person comes to value as well as what he comes to know. What his 
values might be will obviously depend on the society of which he is a 
member, as well as on the objective assessments he is able to make, but 
they will also depend on how a person affectively experiences the knowledge 
and understanding he gains. 
In the previous section I argued that feeling and sensitivity are as 
characteristic of the person as his rationality (1). Yet the two cannot 
be divorced, the experience of emotion is dependent on acts of cognition 
and cannot be separated from them. Education of the emotions can, 
therefore, be said to depend to a 
"large 
extent on enabling children to 
make the right appraisal based on true beliefs according to the situation 
they find themselves in (2). But at the same time, I also argued the 
meaning of emotion cannot be reduced to acts of cognition. To say that 
emotions are conceptually based, that they are dependent for their identity 
on how we assess a situation, does not commit us to saying they are only a 
form of rational appraisal. The personal experience of having feelings must 
remain central to any understanding of emotion, even if they are logically 
inseparable from the appraisal which is made at the time. 
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The capacity for feeling and sensitivity is therefore as important to the 
person's emotional development as his ability to appraise a situation 
correctly, not least because of its motivational effect. Indeed, many of 
the activities a person may be initiated into demand an emotional response 
on his part, so that true understanding of the activity is impossible 
without this. This seems to be the case, for example, in those areas 
which reflect aesthetic, religious or moral values. But even where learning 
is concerned only with empirical truth, emotional engagement may still be 
necessary, that is, if the person is going to come to value what he is 
learning for its own sake, if he is going to do more than go through the 
motions as it were, with understanding, but without personal commitment. 
And where a society allows, there is always room for diversity and individual 
choice; development therefore depends on contingent factors as well as 
logical ones. 
But there are other considerations; a person develops as a rational agent 
as well as a centre of experience, and this may well limit what affective 
experiences are open to him, if he is to develop qua person under this 
description as well. These must now be looked at. 
ill THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
AS A RATIONAL AGENT 
A person is distinguished by his ability to: (a) think rationally. (b) to use 
reason in initiating action. 
(a) This has largely been explained already because it is dependent on 
the conceptual understanding a person has. But one can say conversely 
that this understanding is only possible because he has the capacity to 
reason. There are therefore prima facie grounds for saying that the 
development of the person's conceptual understanding must be based on 
what is thought to be true and rationally defensible. And if it is argued 
that many concepts that are understood do not fall under this category, it 
does not alter the importance of a person being able to make distinctions 
between true and false propositions, valid and invalid arguments and matters 
of fact from those of fantasy or opinion. Furthermore, if he is recognised 
as a rational agent,, then he will be respected as a source of thought and 
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argument. There is a sense in which a person must make up his own 
mind, although this is not to say he could do it in any way he wished. 
It follows from what has been said that if a person is a rational agent, 
then, it is not always open to him to develop in any form of conceptual 
or affective experience that he may encounter. A person may change because 
of what he learns to believe or because of personal experiences but this does 
not mean he has developed qua person. For this to be possible justice must 
be done to the fact that he has to fulfil conditions of rationality. This 
means, with regard to the affective side of our natures, that to the extent 
to which emotional experience is based on rational appraisal, development 
of the person will depend on his ability to correctly assess a situation, to 
remain objective, to be discriminating, realistic and free from prejudice. 
But (as I have just argued in the previous section) affective experience 
cannot be reduced to acts of cognition, it therefore still makes sense to 
talk of a rational agent developing through emotional experience and this 
does not only mean he can think rationally, make realistic assessments and 
has control over his feelings. Indeed, there is plenty of room on this 
account, for the development of the person as a centre of experience in 
different situations, areas and activities that are not distinguished by their 
degree of rationality. 
(b) As a self-determining agent, a person is able to formulate his own ends 
and take the necessary means to achieve them, he is also capable of choosing 
between different ends and giving reasons for doing so. The extent to 
which this is possible is dependent on the alternatives known and available 
to him. There will always be practical limitations in terms of the nature of 
a society., the social groups to which the person belongs and the moral 
obligations he must carry. Furthermore, his capacity to realise the ends 
he chooses will depend in some cases on his technical competence and 
physical skills, as well as his ability to reason. 
A person's actions areý not. isolated events; they are based on his ability 
to form rules and to live by them, they can therefore be seen as a pattern 
reflecting a whole way of life. It will be remembered from chapter five in 
part one, I used Taylor's argument that while the person cannot be 
distinguished from the higher primates because he has first order desires, 
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he can be distinguished by his capacity to have second order ones (3). 
In other words persons can evaluate their desires and this means they are 
capable of self-evaluation to the extent that they can identify themselves 
with those desires. It will also be recalled that a person is characterised 
by his ability to make qualitative evaluations, to justify his choice of 
action by the giving of reasons (4). It is therefore possible for the agent 
to see the stronger desire is not necessarily the better one. 
While a person is necessarily a free agent, one that is capable of choice, 
the extent of that choice may be limited. A person's decisions may never 
be made independently of what is socially expected of him, so that while 
he is author of his own action he is slave to convention. This may not 
only be because of the limitations of what is ' on offer' in the society in 
which he lives, even where choice is at its maximum a person may never 
reach a decision independently of what is socially expected of him. In 
Benn' s terms, he may have achieved autarchy without achieving autonomy (5). 
This may mean a person's development as a self-determining agent will be 
assessed by the extent to which the person can aspire towards this ideal, 
within the physical and social limitations he finds himself in. For example, 
that he can think for himself, make critical appraisals, reach his own 
decisions; formulate his own personal values and change them in the light 
of experience and that, finally, he is able to act on them. 
But there are, as we have also seen, other considerations. Whether or not 
a person exhibits his agency in his thinking or his actions, if it is to count 
towards a person's development it must be seen to fulfil criteria not only 
concerned with autonomy, but rationality as well. To develop qua rational 
agent, it is not enough to become increasingly autonomous. To have a mind 
and opinions of one' s own and even to act on them, counts for very little, 
if, at the same time, our beliefs are false, our reasons inconsistent, our 
opinions biased and our evaluations made uncritically. In fact, in some 
situations while there will always be room for individual judgment there may 
be no room for original thought, judgment or even choice. It is for these 
kinds of reasons autonomy cannot, on its own, be an educational ideal (6). 
Finally, the person's development as a rational agent, does not happen on 
its-own, but within a society held together by mutual purposes and common 
codes of conduct. This means a person's use of practical reason is very 
much a moral matter. 
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iv THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
AS A MORAL AGENT 
As a rational agent, a man is held responsible for what he believes to be 
true or valid and can therefore be asked to give an account of the evidence 
as reasons for his beliefs; as a moral agent, a person is held responsible 
for his actions in a social world where his behaviour has a direct bearing on 
others. While it may not be possible (for the reasons which have already 
been given (7)) to say the person is necessarily a moral agent in an 
autonomous or altruistic sense, nevertheless, as a rational agent living in a 
society, then, as I argued earlier (8), to the extent that his behaviour has 
an effect on others, and to the extent he has an interest in the society' s 
moral system, he will be held morally responsible for the actions he performs. 
But it might be questioned whether this gives enough scope to talk of the 
person developing morally, that is, as a necessary aspect of his development. 
In other words, it is difficult to know how far one can go without becoming 
prescriptive. Perhaps, the most one can say is that persons, as members 
of society, will at least reach what Kohlberg has referred to as the ' good 
boy' or conventional stages of morality even if he does not reach the level 
of internalising and universalising his own moral principles. 
However, if, as I argued in chapter six, our understanding of morality also 
involves some sense of caring for each other, then it is doubtful as to 
whether these stages can, on their own, be described as moral development, 
rather than as just necessary pre-conditions, to which one might add the 
ability of the person to form relationships with other persons (which is a 
necessary pre-condition having knowledge and understanding of others as 
well as moral understanding). R. S. Peters in an article 'The Place of 
Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education' (9) looks at the possibility of 
supplementing Kohlberg' s account by the work of Hoffman, Peevers and 
Secord to provide a developmental account of concern for others. Certainly 
this must be worth exploring if it is accepted that the kind of attitude we 
develop towards our fellow beings is as crucial to our understanding of, moral 
development as the more formal and rational considerations that Piaget and 
Kohlberg make so much of. 
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v CONCLUSION 
If the notion of development is to be used in the way it was earlier defined, 
then what is meant by the development of the person must mean more than 
that he has changed, even if the changes are thought to be for the better 
or that the stages he can be said. to go through contribute directly to a 
recognisable end state. What must be shown is that the criteria which have 
been given can be directly applied to what it is to be a person, these are, 
namely : 
(a) there is a principle of unity; 
(b) there is a series of intrinsincally related changes where one stage arises 
from previous stages and gives rise to subsequent change, because of the 
internal nature of what the development is in; 
(c) there is an underlying rationale which enables the development to be 
assessed as a development. 
Now the development of the person qua person can be shown to fulfil these 
criteria in the following way: 
(a) the principle of unity: this is provided by the person himself; 
(b) series of intrinsically related changes: this criterion is fulfilled in 
two main ways: 
1. As a centre of experience the person will, through learning, 
necessarily go through a series of intrinsically related changes in 
gaining conceptual and affective understanding in different areas of 
knowledge and in various modes of experience open to him. These, 
by virtue of their complex and structured nature and the standards 
they demand, enable the changes in a person to count as development 
and to make subsequent understanding possible. It is because the 
person's understanding changes, it can be said that further development 
arises from the subject of development, that is the person himself. 
2. As a rational and moral agent a person can change in terms of: 
his ability to deliberate between courses of action, to make decisions, 
to effect change in the world and how he conducts his personal life 
and his life in relation to others. As an evaluator, a person can be 
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said to develop not only because of a greater knowledge of the 
alternatives open to him, but also because of the extent to which he 
comes to value some or all of these alternatives whether for intrinsic 
or instrumental reasons (although some of them must be for intrinsic 
ones) . choose 
between them and turn them into action and where his 
motivation will depend on affective as well as rational considerations. 
To say that changes under this description arise from the nature of 
the person would be to point to certain dispositions, for example, moral 
sensitivity, personal abilities, practical know-how, his awareness of the 
situation he finds himself in and most important of all his strength of 
character to carry out what he chooses or is obliged to do. 
(c) The underlying rationale: if changes in the person are to count as 
development they must fulfil the underlying rationale of what it is to be a 
person, that is, a centre of human experience and a rational and moral agent. 
This means, in relation to the first criterion, that learning which results in no 
more than a behavioural or physiological response cannot count: as development 
qua person; and that, with regard to the second, changes in a person's 
actions and lifestyle cannot just be the result of personality or causal change 
or because of what the person undergoes-, rather, they must, at 
least in part, 
be based on personal thinking, reflection, deliberation and decision. Further- 
more, this increasing ability to evaluate, if it is to count as development, 
must fulfil criteria of rationality, for example, to do with impartiality, relevance, 
freedom from error, cogency and consistency. 
B. CAN LEARNING WHICH PROMOTES THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PERSON QUA PERSON BE DEFENDED AS A DEFINITION 
OR NECESSARY TRUTH OF EDUCATION? 
i INTRODUCTION 
It will be remembered that in part one, chapter one, I argued that giving 
a definition admits of degrees and that there can only be a guarantee of 
universal agreement at the first stage where underlying conditions are 
given, after that, it necessarily becomes contestable (10). I also suggested 
that, in the past, philosophers of education have paid insufficient attention 
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to this fact and have often put forward contestable definitions as if thoy 
were giving underlying conditions or very basic criteria of education, and 
that this is one reason why they have been accused of writing in value 
judgments, even of smuggling in their own preferred ideologies, under 
the guise of conceptual analysis. As a result of this there is now a danger 
that evaluative definitions given by philosophers will be discredited and that 
they, in their turn, will tend to only look at other, related concepts, like 
learning or concern themselves with analysing how concepts of education 
happen to operate in common usage. However, I think the validity of 
giving definitions of an evaluative kind can be rescued if it can be 
accepted that: 
(1) education as a concept admits of degrees, and at a certain level 
because of its evaluative complex and open-ended nature, it necessarily 
becomes an essentially contestable concept; 
(2) that definitions which prescribe particular values are therefore 
contestable and must prove their worth against other definitions 
put forward by other contestants, whose validity they must 
acknowledge; 
(3) these definitions, while they are prescriptive, are not arbitrary and 
can be justified by reference to the preconditions of education where 
there is agreement; 
(4) following on from (3) that definitions of this kind provide a half way 
house between the preconditions from which they are developed and 
from which they gain their validity, and the stipulation of aims for 
which they can provide a launching pad and a justification; 
(5) in order to fulfil the above role, evaluative definitions will have to 
be initially open-ended in character, in that, while they will emphasise 
certain criteria as being definitive of the 'true' nature of education, 
they must still leave room, at this half way stage, before the 
stipulation of aims, as to how these criteria might be realised in 
substantive terms. In other words we could define education as the 
realization of the person without specifying the entire nature or 
character of the person to be realised, or we could talk about education 
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as initiation into worthwhile activities but leave it open as to the content 
of these activities, or we may put forward the development of knowledge 
and understanding as a definition of education but without specifying 
what this knowledge should consist of, at least that would be a 
further question; 
(6) certain definitions which are both evaluative and prescriptive, but 
which are put forward as being incontestable, can be justifiably ruled 
out. 
would hope that the definition I have given can be seen to fulfil the 
above criteria. For I would recognise that in suggesting education is to 
do with learning which promotes the development of the person qua person, 
I am stating more than the underlying conditions, and that as a definition 
it has now reached the second stage where it must be defended as being 
essentially contestable. This means, first of all, it must be shown to be 
a valid and genuine definition, where the values it presupposes and 
champions can be both justified and applauded; and, secondly, it must 
be defended against other definitions where, while I would acknowledge 
their validity, I would question the priority they give to other educational 
values. 
üA VALID AND GENUINE DEFINITION 
I have already analysed the actual notion of the development of the person 
_q, 
uaperson and defended it as meaningful. It should, therefore, be clear 
by now what I understand by it, that I do not mean, for example, that to 
talk of the person developing is to suggest that he is just becoming more 
and more of a person or is progressing towards some predetermined end 
state. But what may still be questioned'is, why 'learning which promotes 
the development of the person cLua person' has to be accepted as an important 
necessary truth of education? And I should now like to answer this in 
the following ways: 
First of all it must logically be true that education is only concerned 
with learning which presupposes the value of the person, that is as a 
centre of experience and self-determining agent in the ways already 
170 
described. The definition I have given can, therefore, rightly be 
said to be drawn from the preconditions on which there is necessarily 
agreement. 
Secondly, given the way the concept of development has been defined, 
it will be remembered that if we value what the development is in, we 
will necessarily value its development. We are, therefore, committed 
in education, where the value of the person is presupposed, to 
valuing the development of those characteristics that are definitive 
of the person. 
Thirdly, the idea of education as I learning which promotes the 
development of the person _qua 
person' , does full justice to the way 
education has been contrasted to training, where education is no longer 
seen in relation to learning specific subject matter or as preparation 
for an occupation or the fulfilment of a particular social role, but where 
its value is seen to the extent that learning actually changes the 
person qua person, for example, in terms of his beliefs, attitudes and 
dispositions to behave. 
Fourthly, as a definition it is non-stipulative, because the conditions 
that have to be fulfilled do not prevent it from being open-ended in 
its application. In other words, while not any change in a person's 
outlook or behaviour will count as his development q Lua person, 
nevertheless, there are a multitude of ways he could develop and still 
develop as a person; what these might be will depend to a large extent 
on the social world of which he is a member as well as the person's 
idiosyncratic nature. It is difficult to see, therefore, how I can be 
accused of smuggling in my own personal prejudices about what the 
content of education ought to consist of. On the other hand, I have 
tried to show that however much social scope we allow for, if education 
presupposes the value of the person, then, there are certain criteria 
that have to be fulfilled and these must apply universally. 
Fifthly, while advocating that learning to have educational value must 
hinge on the concept of the person, I have emphasised throughout 
that the person' s existence and development qua person is dependent 
on him being a member of a human society. I would not, therefore, 
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now deny that certain social criteria have to be fulfilled as wall; for 
example, that education is concerned with initiating the young into what 
is considered to be socially worthwhile, and also with what Is necessary 
for the functioning and maintenance of a particular society, only that 
these could not stand on their own. There is always a danger with any 
account labelled 'the development of the person' , or with similar labels, 
like I self realization', I education of the whole man' , that it will be assumed 
that they are promoting values to do with individualism and are, therefore, 
open to the criticism that the values they -imply (concerning, for example, 
self fulfilment or the pursuit of personal excellence) are socially relative 
ones, operating only in particular cultures, like our own and not. for 
example, in certain communist states, and cannot be defended as necessary 
universal truths of education. 
But I do not believe my account has to meet this charge, for what I have 
said is quite compatible with a society which emphasises fraternal values, 
the importance of group activity and collective responsibility of mutual 
achievement and the sharing of personal experience, which may attach little, 
if any, importance to individual self-fulfilment, and may even deny the 
person's development as a unique individual for the sake of the common 
good. But what I do not recognise is that education can take place where 
members are only seen in functional terms, where they are 'educated' only 
to fulfil a particular role or roles, in order to uphold the functioning of a 
society, and where no, or very little, account at all is taken of members of 
society as persons, that is as unique centres of human consciousness and 
as self- determining agents. 
If education as a term is used to refer to learning which makes social member- 
ship of a depersonalized nature possible and ensures the continuation of a 
society, but not the development of the person _qua 
person, then I would say 
that this is an entirely different concept and, therefore, does not have to be 
contested against. Of course, if one was to ask the overriding question as 
to whether this kind of learning achievement is not better than the one that 
presupposes the value of the person, then the answer must be found by 
looking to the underlying purpose for the existence of any human society. For 
if society becomes something other than the human beings which make it up, 
if it is thought that the consciousness of each person does not matter, then 
the society is no longer serving the purpose for which it was created. 
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All this is not to say that persons cannot be treated as social cogs, only 
that if they become educated this will be in spite of and not because of 
this fact. For to deny the value of the person is to deny the value of 
education. 
üi A DEFENCE AGAINST OTHER CONTESTANTS 
(a) Other Accounts that rely on the Idea of Development or Similar Nations 
For Example: Self Realization 
I have already suggested that other accounts may have fallen into the trap 
of not being able to justify the values which they presupposed. At one time 
the all round development of the individual (for example, physical, 
intellectual, moral, emotional, spiritual) was very popular. By taking the 
concept of development as it is normally used in a natural context, they 
were able to describe the development of the person as the unfolding of 
inner potentialities, assigning education to the role of an outside agency 
assisting the development and playing a somewhat negative role in the process 
by I allowing' the development to take place and I nurturing' where necessary. 
By taking development to be a natural process they failed to see the need to 
justify the values they assumed in the directions they specified. The same 
problem arises for those who try and Justify education in terms of self- 
realization; because as, for example, Elizabeth Telfer has argued in her 
article, I Education and Self Realization' (11) , the self to be realized or 
fulfilled, unlike the nature of a biological organism, is always an ideal self. 
It, therefore, assumes certain values, for example the importance of a 
balanced self (all round development), a higher self (development of 
particular talents, intellectual and moral development), an autonomous self 
(the development of the ability to evaluate and to choose). These accounts 
also show their dependence on a concept of development that relies heavily 
on a culminating end state. 
It is because of this consistent belief that the concept of development belongs 
only in natural context that it is thought that it can only be used in other 
situations either inappropriately or at best metaphorically; and that it 
continues to be criticised as a way of describing and evaluating education. 
For example, in 'Philosophers Discuss Education'. G. Langford maintains 
that the use of the term I development' in relation to education is simply 
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inappropriate, for it suggests, he says: 
'that change occurs according to a fixed pattern and in the direction 
of a predetermined end. This may be true of the changes which occur 
in plant and animal bodies. People, on the other hand, possess the 
ability to learn; moreover in contrast with most other animals, their 
ability to learn is open ended; they can learn to do, and learn about 
an almost infinite variety of things. ' (12) 
And Langford is not alone in this, P. Hirst and D. Hamlyn hold similar 
views (13). 
The argument, then, still runs that education is to do with learning, not 
development. It is only by sticking to the former, so it is said, that our 
attention will not be drawn away from the fact that education presupposes 
public standards, common understanding, social content and an the rest of 
it. Apparently we can never develop through learning, but only through 
what is physically predetermined, which means the only development opon 
to us as human beings is biological development. This then has the absurd 
effect of ruling out mental I development' , as a development, which must 
in part be biologicall predetermined, because clearly, it is also the result 
of learning as well. It seems the two have to be kept separate, when it 
would be much more honest to say that usually we refer to the one and the 
same development, assessed not in physical terms in a laboratory, but in 
terms of the child' s understanding and mental abilities in a classroom or 
other places of learning, which nevertheless we believe to be brought about 
by natural causes as well as through learning. If we are not prepared to 
say this then either we have to stop talking of mental changes and talk 
instead of physical ones, which would have to be described in real and not 
just pseudo-physiological terms; or we shall have to deny that mental 
changes, like the child 'coming' to speak, are biologically predetermined; 
or we shall have to be prepared to allow the development to be a non- 
biological one, although it has natural causes. What we cannot do, however, 
is to describe mental changes as if they were only physical ones and which 
is a constant danger in psychology. 
I hope I have already effectively shown that the concept of development is 
not restricted in its application to cases of natural development and that 
it can be used just as legitimately in other contexts because the criteria 
of development apply universally. The use of development is, therefore, 
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quite valid in contexts where certain value judgments are operative either, 
explicitly or implicitly, providing, of course, they are recognised and are 
not just put forward under the guise of natural development (that is, only 
as the result of a natural process). 
It is perhaps because this distinction was not fully recognised when the 
concept of development was used in the past, that it has now become so 
discredited. Another reason, which is well illustrated by Langford in tho 
quotation given above, must be that development is often thought to refor 
to an end state and is, therefore, judged to be inappropriate to use in 
relation to education, which is open ended. As R. S. Peters once said 
to become educated is not to have arrived but to travel with a different vlow. 
But as I have argued there is no reason why development has to be under- 
stood in terms of an end state, development can be open-ended, on-going 
and still be assessed as a development (14). 1 would conclude there is, 
therefore, no reason why learning should not be assessed in developmental 
terms. 
Nový to talk of education 2LaL in terms of learning is to be open to the 
charge that what comes under education can be not only trivial and 
arbitrary, but undynamic: as well, in that it need make no difference to the 
person in terms of his attitudes, long term interests and dispositions to 
behave. In short, he could learn a tremendous amount without It changing 
the way he thinks, makes decisions, conducts his life, or even how he sees 
and experiences the world he lives in. And this is because these depend 
not only on what he learns but how he comes to value what he learns. in 
other words, it does not necessarily lead to his development _qua 
person. 
Any account of education must allow for the person as a self- determining 
agent not only in terms of his ability and willingness to learn and to 
understand but, also as an agent that lives and 6ffects change in the 
world. 
(b) The Development of Autonomy as an Alternative Model 
It might be thought that the kind of case I am trying to make has already 
been done by those who advocate the value of autonomy as an educational 
ideal. But I do not think it has. It may, depending on how autonomy is 
defined, be a part of what is involved in developing as a person, the 
reason being, as we saw earlier in chapter two, autonomy admits of degrees, 
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so while it can refer to as little as the person's ability to mako rules for 
himself, it can suggest as much as the person's developed and extensive 
capacity for authentic and independent judgment and activity. But as I 
have already argued, if autonomy is accepted as a part of what tho 
development of the person involves It must be balanced with the fact that 
we live in a social world, where there are always limitations of an intellectual 
and practical kind. This means that while it is always appropriate in tho 
definitive sense to talk of the person as a self- determinin g agent It can be 
misleading to talk of the person as a self-governing one, whether in his 
judgments or actions, that is, if the former implies he can make up his own 
mind in any way he likes, and the latter suggests he can act indepondontly, 
without restraint of any kind and without considering the effects of his 
actions on others. I shall look at these in turn. 
Firstly, given that our judgments need content and that the nature of this 
must depend on what is socially available to us, then our judgments must 
to some extent be socially determined. For example, trying to decide what 
political party to vote for is dependent on what parties exist and what thoy 
stand for; even where an individual's judgment leads him to taking a 
highly critical and original position which is independent of anything on 
offer, it is still parasitic on those values where there is already some kind 
of agreement and on which he can exercise his critical powers. Ho cannot 
just make political evaluations in a social vacuum. More specifically, there 
is the point that Telfer makes, that the person cannot, having considered 
the views of a particular case just choose what opinion to hold, for having 
reflected on the evidence he may have no alternative but to accept a certain 
conclusion (15). In short, all this must mean that while the ability to think 
and act independently is central to the meaning of autonomy, in torms of the 
development of the person 
_qua 
rational agent, there are always other critoria 
to bear in mind. (16). As Dearden says, while autonomy centrally involvos 
independent judgment what counts is 'Judgment of what and according to 
what criteria' (17). 
Secondly, there are always inner and outer restraints which put practical 
limitations on our capacity as autonomous agents (18). Those may depend 
on the fact that our wants and desires at least of a first order are more 
often given than a result of rational reflection (for example, as I argued in 
chapter two, our evaluations often depend on our affective response to a 
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situation as well as our ability to make rational appraisals although as we 
have seen the two cannot be separated (19)). Even where our wants may 
be said to be truly the result of our own but objective assessment, most 
of us (apart that is from the existensialists amongst us) believe that we just 
have to accept that there are always restraints, for example, of a cultural, 
psychological, financial or moral nature which make the idea of complete 
freedom of thought and action an impossible one and which means autonomy 
as an ideal must always be qualified. 
Finally, it can be said that those who advocate the value of autonomy in 
education usually rule out persons like slaves and true believers (20) but 
there is no reason why these persons should not develop as self- determining 
agents in terms of their capacity for thought and conceptual understanding. 
Conversely, I can see no reason why a person cannot be autonomous in both 
the authentic and intellectual senses, in that his motives are genuine and 
because he always weighs up to the alternatives before deciding what is 
the correct judgment to make or action to take, but in spite of being 
underdeveloped in what he knows, understands and has affectively. 
experienced. 
(c) Models of Education that emphasise 
_either 
the Development of Knowledge 
and Understanding or Initiation into Worthwhile Activities 
In describing education in terms of the development of knowledge and 
understanding or initiation into worthwhile activities there is a real danger 
that education is then conceived as a state of being rather than doing. On 
these accounts it could be enough to show the educated person had been 
initiated, if, when asked, he could exhibit his skill and understanding, even 
his capacity for original thought, even though he may have no personal 
inclination towards any of these things. In other words, education has 
given him understanding but not the disposition to think, it has provided 
him with, for example, intellectual capacities and physical abilities, but with 
no inclination to put them into practice. 
By defining education as learning which promotes the development of the 
person 
_qua 
person, I have drawn attention to values to do with the porson 
not only as a centre of experience but an active agent effecting chango in 
the world, and I do not therefore believe the meaning of cducation can just 
depend on criteria to do with knowledge and understanding or initiation 
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into worthwhile activities; for what the person knows and undorstands and 
Is capable of doing is one thing, and whether the person uses his knowladgo, 
values his understanding, exercises his capacities is another. What I am 
suggesting, is just as we would not call a person moral simply becauso ho 
had moral understanding but never behaved morally, so I want to champion 
the cause for only calling persons educated where it changes them qua 
persons and that means not only as centres of experience but also as 
agents who make value judgments and live in a practical world of action. 
On the account I have given, then, the man who receives an I education' 
but spends all his time lying in the sun, and that is all he does (he is not 
for example appreciating the scenery, planning next week' s events, solving 
a mathematical problem in his head or practising yoga), would be ruled out. 
At this point I would recognise that what I have said is at its most 
contestable but in its defence I would gladly continue to pit it against 
other accounts that, to me, are just as contestable. For example. wherc 
education is seen only as a second order activit);, or where knowledge and 
understanding is sufficient to characterise the educated man but where 
there is no personal commitment, or where education is seen as the 
development of certain capacities but not inclinations, where there is 
always a logical gap between being educated and letting that education 
change one' s life as a human being. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 See pp. 79-88. 
2 See, for example R. S. Peters, ' The Education of the Emotions', in 
Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R. F. Dearden, 
P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, (Routledge a Megan Paul, 1972). 
3 See pp. 106-107. 
4 See pp. 106-109. 
1nß 
5 See p'. 108. 
6 See E. Telfer' s article' Autonomy As An Educational Ideal II' , in 
Philosophers Discuss Education, ed. S. C. Brown (Unwin Brothors 
Ltd., 1975). 
7 See pp. 130-133. 
8 See p. 133. 
9 R. S. Peters, ' The Place of Kohlberg' s Theory in Moral Education' , 
Journal of Moral Education Vol. 7 No. 3. 
10 See pp. 23-27. 
11 E. Telfer, ' Education and Self Realization', in Proceedin gs of the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Vol. VI No. 2 (1972). 
12 G. Langford, ' Education and Human Being II' , in Philosophers Discuss 
Education, ed. S. C. Brown (Macmillan 1975) p. 76. 
13 See P. Hirst, I Chairman' s Remarks' , also in Philosophers Discuss 
Education, p. 94 and D. Hamlyn, I The Concept of Development' in 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society Vol. 1. (1975). 
14 See pp. 152-160. 
15 See E. Telfer, ' Autonomy As An Educational Ideal II' , also in 
Philosophers Discuss Education, p. 21. 
16 Ibid., pp. 21-24. 
17 R. F. Dearden, ' Autonomy As An Educational Ideal V, also in 
Philosophers Discuss Education, p. 18. 
18 See earlier discussion pp. 107-109. 
19 See pp. 79-85. 
187 
20 See J. P. White, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum (London: Routlodgo 
& Kegan Paul, 1973) pp. 79-82. 
188 
PART THREE 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION: THE CONCEPT AND ITS JUSTIFICATION 
189 
CHAPTER NINE: DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER (1): 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION, SPORT AND THE VALUE 
OF PHYSICAL SKILL 
Page Number 
i Introduction 190 
(a) 
. 
The common nature of physical education 194 
(b) Sport 198 
ii The Concept of Play 199 
(a) R. Dearden' s analysis 199 
(b) The distinction between play and other 
intrinsically worthwhile activities 203 
1. Those activities which require little or 
no skill to be engaged in 205 
2. Those activities which require a lot Of\. 
skill to be engaged in 206 
3. Those activities which allow for the 
realization of both a minimum and maximum 
amount of skill 206 
4. Those activities which are recognised as 
children's play but which have, the 
potential for realizing a great deal of 
skill 208 
(c) Non-Seriousness 209 
iii Sport 211 
(a) Physical skill 213 
(b) Assessing the degree of difficulty 217 
1. The standard of the opposition 217 
2. Difficult physical technique 218 
3. The limitations of our constitutional 
make-up 220 
Page Number 
(cý TI 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
ie point of sporting activities 221 
Best on purposive and non- 
purposive sports 222 
S. C. Bailey on games and winning 224 
Winning 225 
Educational implications 228 
J 
.ý 
190 
CHAPTER NINE: DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER(1) 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION, SPORT AND THE VALUE 
OF PHYSICAL SKILL 
i INTRODUCTION 
In parts one and two, I examined the concept of education as an essentially 
contestable one, and put forward and defended a particular definition of 
education, namely as: 11earning which promotes the development of the 
person 
_qua 
person' . Now, on the basis of this definition, I wish to 
look 
at the concept of physical education and to consider whether, contrary to 
what is often felt, the use of this term (as opposed to say, physical 
training, which is conceptually straightforward) is justified. 
But before considering whether physical education can justify its name, and 
this would have to be on the grounds already indicated, namely, that It 
could be shown to make a substantial contribution to learning which would 
promote the development of the person gua person, we need to be able to 
identify our subject matter. The next two chapters will therefore be devoted 
to this task. For this purpose it would be sensible to imagine we have put 
the term physical education in inverted commas or given it another name, so 
we can examine the conceptual nature of our subject without begging the 
question of whether it does or does not have educational value. 
Increasingly, it would seem that as a profession we are coming to hold the 
opinion that 'physical education' is not a unified concept. Indeed, it is 
often described as an umbrella term where the activities which are found to 
come under it are there only as the result of historical accident or 
development, having little in common with each other and certainly not 
enough to justify seeing them all as aspects of one concept. D. Best, for 
example, in his article 'Physical Education and the Aesthetic' , suggests 
that the search for the specifically physical education element in the 
respective activities is a wild goose chase (1). He says that those, like 
Carlisle, who have gone on such a search did so only because of their 
belief that where there is a single term such as I physical education' , which 
is used to refer to a variety of activities, there must be some common 
underlying essense which justifies our using the same term of each. It 
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is this kind of essential presupposition, Best suggests, which prevented 
Carlisle from seriously considering the possibility that there is no unifying 
concept (2) . 
However, there are those in the profession (presumably those without 
essentialist preconceptions) , who have not been prevented from seriously 
considering the possibility, but who have, unfortunately, come to the 
conclusion that physical education is indeed impossible to define. (They 
have even welcomed this conclusion because it lets us out of the knotty 
question of its justification. ) Harry Maudsley, for one, says that the vast 
collection of activities that come under the term are held together by little 
more than gross movements of the body. In his article 'Physical Education - 
An Obituary' , he argues that physical education is dead and one of the main 
reasons for this is that it has proved impossible to define (3). He thinks 
that the subject has still to be buried but once it is, we will have in its 
place: dance, sport and outdoor pursuits. Furthermore, Maudsley suggests 
that, ithis will be a relief for those who attempted in vain to justify a place 
in education for such a diverse and ambiguous concept' (4). 
Now, it, is of the first importance for us to see if this kind of attitude is 
justified, not least for our future on the school curriculum for one of the 
reasons why sporting activities, dance and outdoor pursuits have been a 
compulsory part of the school curriculum for so long is because, along with 
their health value, they were believed to be aspects of a child' s physical 
education. If we now dispense with the term we are still left with the 
problem of justifying those same activities, the problem will not go away just 
because we have given them different names. 
However, I have yet to be persuaded that the task of defining physical 
education as a unified concept is an impossible one, I believe there is every 
justification for seeing those activities which can be found in a programme 
of physical education as falling into one conceptual group. I believe the 
reason why this has been thought to be aI non-starter' ,Ia wild goose 
chase' , is because firstly we have lacked a theory of physical education 
and secondly because the business of defining it has got muddled with the 
question of its justification. Because of its title physical education, it was 
assumed that it must be shown even in the task of defining it that it does 
have educational value. Presumably in the same sort of way that it is 
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thought necessary to show generally that what is described as education 
does indeed have educational value. But the term 'physical education' 
unlike I education' does have a subject matter, the conceptual nature of 
which could, as I have suggested, be considered under a different title 
altogether if necessary, where the question of its educational value need 
not arise. In this way the task would be similar to looking at what we 
meant by music to find out if this was a unified concept, before considering 
how we might justify music education. 
As evidence for my observation that this kind of distinction has not been 
made between the question of definition and the question of justification, 
consider Carlisle's attempt at justifying physical education. His thesis (the 
value of which in terms of its contribution to our understanding the nature 
of physical education never seems to me to be fully appreciated) was based 
on the belief that there'had to be a link-up between what could be found to 
be peculiar to all P',.: E. activities and the way they were justified. He thought 
it was only what could be found to be common and essential to all aspects 
of physical education that would also be what would justify them. But, clearly, 
there is no reason why one P. E. activity has to be educationally valuable in 
the same way as any other, and certainly there is no reason to assume that 
this will have to be based on what could be found to be common to them an. 
U am not saying that it may not turn out that what they have in common 
may be at least in part what gives them educational value only that it does 
not have to be the case. ) 
Now, it is unquestionably true that the character of P. E. activities is 
extremely diverse and what is recognised as the most important aspect of 
one activity is not the most important aspect of another. Best, for example, 
in criticising Carlisle's attempt to justify physical education aesthetically, 
says that where Carlisle went wrong was in ignoring major differences 
between the activities and in assuming that there was one peculiar aesthetic 
element- (5). For while it may be possible to show that the aesthetic element 
could be found in all P. E. activities it could never be thought to be the 
most important element in any but a few. But the fact that Carlisle pin- 
pointed the aesthetic as the peculiar P. E. element did not show that he was 
on a wild goose chase in looking for what might be common to them all, but 
rather that he picked on the wrong thing, not just because, clearly, it is 
not the most important aspect of all P. E. activities but also because it was 
not (with the notable exception of dance and certain sporting activities like 
gymnastics) definitive of them. 
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However, Best, as we have seen, suggests that the whole idea of looking for 
the essential P. E. element is misconceived. He says: 
I it is the result of supposing that no aspect of P. E. is really an aspect 
of P. E. or is characteristic of P. E. unless it is peculiar to P. E.. This 
is as if one were to insist that a ginger cake could be fully characterised 
and only be characterised by saying it contained ginger. Yet although 
ginger is the peculiar ingredient in ginger cakes as contrasted with 
other kinds of cake, no cake can be made entirely of ginger and the 
other ingredients are also used in other kin--d-s o7-cakel (6). 
Now while this criticism may be valid if it is applied to an account like 
Carlisle' s, because he emphasised the aesthetic element in P. E. activities 
to the exclusion of everything else (although incidentally he never considered 
the aesthetic element was peculiar to physical education he did recognise it 
was to be found elsewhere) there is absolutely no reason why, in looking for 
what is common to all F. E. activities, one should consider that once it is 
found one then has a complete picture of every aspect of physical education. 
One can accept that P. E. activities like the ginger cake are not fully 
characterised simply by giving common criteria but still to acknowledge the 
importance of doing this. After all it is the ginger which enables us to 
distinguish between the ginger cake and all other kinds of cake, what is it 
that enables us to distinguish P. E. activities from all other kinds of activities? 
All right, it certainly is not the aesthetic element, but this just means we 
have to look again, and to look eventually in terms of a theory of physical 
education which would do justice to those distinctive values which are inherent 
in P. E. activities when they are actively engaged in. And we can do this 
without having to commit ourselves to saying that what, if anything, we do 
find to be distinctive of physical education will also enable us to justify it; 
although if it did it would provide us with a very strong kind of justification. 
Of course it may not be possible to do this by finding just one common element 
for it is more likely there will be several. Furthermore, if they are to be 
conceptually important, these elements must be central, although It may well 
be the case that some will be more crucial to one aspect of physical education 
than they will to another. 
Now, it is of the first importance that we do look agairý for if these common 
elements or criteria cannot be found, as some have indeed suggested, we 
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will have to conclude that what comes under the P. E. umbrella is, after all, 
no more than a loose collection of activities, which can be likened to all 
those activities that come under the banner of primary education (except 
that with physical education the more cynical amongst us might suggest 
the activities being together have little to do with their educational point 
and a lot to do with historical accident) . 
We are also, I have suggested, badly in need of a theory of physical 
education; and it will be necessary at a later stage, when we come to look 
at how physical education can be justified (see chapter eleven) to consider 
what kind of theory of physical education can be given that will explain the 
common but distinctive and unique nature of physical education. 
(a) The Common Nature of Physical Education 
It is interesting that those who have already decided we should actually 
dispense with the term physical education as a concept, usually admit that 
the activities have a little in common, even if it is no more than the fact 
that they all have something to do with the movement of the bodyl I hope 
to show that they all have a lot more in common than this and furthermore 
that it will take up a sufficiently central position to warrant their inclusion 
into one conceptual group. It is no good if the aspects which they an 
share have little bearing on the actual nature of any one activity. 
First of all let us list all the kinds of activities that are considered to be a 
part of physical education: 
Physical Games (e. g. tennis, netball, cricket, badminton). 
Athletics (e. g. hurdling, polevaulting, sprinting). 
Outdoor Pursuits (e. g. mountaineering, sailing, orienteering). 
Dance (e. g. National, Ballroom, Modern Educational Dance, Classical 
and Modern Ballet). 
Gymnastics. 
Swimming and associated water sports. 
Trampolining, Diving. 
Combat Sports. 
Physical Training Activities: Strength and fitness training - 
including such things as keep-fit, weight and circuit training, 
aerobics. 
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Now I would suggest that, with the exception of the last group, those 
activities can be said to fulfil all of the following criteria: 
(1) They are necessarily performative and not spectator activities; 
(2) They are essentially physical activities, exercise and the intentional 
movement of the human body are all important (although this is not to 
say they do not also involve to a lesser extent the use of the intellect 
and practical reasoning as well). 
(3) All P. E. activities involve the performance of movements which are 
difficult to execute and require learning and practice as well as 
natural ability if they are to be mastered. 
(4) Following on from (3) it can be said that they all have standards of 
excellence built into them. It is in the nature of all P. E. activities 
that they allow for the realization of physical skill. How skilful any 
performance is will depend on the extent to which it reaches these 
standards, and what these are will be dependent on the particular 
activity in question (for example the criteria by which we judge the 
value of a game of tennis will be quite different from those used to 
judge a game of football). 
More precisely it can be said that: (a) because they are normative in 
the way just described one has to reach a certain standard before one 
can be said to be even engaging in the activity, and that: (b) each 
activity has the potential of making it possible for participants to 
reach a certain standard of performance, even to the extent that its 
value will be universally recognised as a human achievement. In 
many activities this will be because of what might be described as the 
demonstration of physical prowess in others as the creation of aesthetic 
and sometimes artistic excellence. 
(5) The point of all P. E. activities is an intrinsic, non-instrumental one 
(even if, as we shall see, some can be described in Instrumental terms). 
They are non-productive in that the activities do not result in anything 
of material value being made, in other words, the movements are 
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significant in themselves. It is because this criterion is operative that 
we do not see in the list above, carpentry, the work of the lumberjack, 
micro-surgery or opera singing. The point of all P. E. activities lies 
in the actual performance of movement as movement, the character of 
which will be dependent on the particular activity in question. 
(6) It is because P. E. activities are non-instrumental that the most likely 
reason why they are engaged In must be because of the intrinsic 
satisfaction they can give. (They are not, as it is often said, carried 
out as a means to an end but for their own sake. ) The kinds of 
intrinsic satisfaction open to the participant will lie in the common 
nature of the activities just outlined. For example: 
M there is generally the satisfaction from experiencing the interplay 
of many different powers, for example, fitness, physical strength, skill, 
imagination creativity, practical judgment and style, and the harmony 
that comes from the release of these powers working together; 
(ii) more specifically there is the satisfaction from learning to move 
skilfully in the medium of a particular activity, for example the 
satisfaction that comes from mastering a difficult pattern of movements; 
(iii) also quite specifically there is the satisfaction from learning to move 
aesthetically or by giving a performance which has aesthetic value. 
Then incidentally there is also the satisfaction which comes from: 
(i) physically recreating, 
(ii) appreciating natural beauty and the aesthetic form of physical 
movements, 
(iii) being and feeling fit. 
To summarize the above in a sentence, it can be said that P. E. activities 
are physically performative, having standards of excellence built into them 
so that it is, (a) necessary through learning and practice to reach a certain 
standard before one can engage In them at all, (b) open to a performer in 
any one activity to reach such a high standard the value of his performance 
would have universal recognition as a human achievement; and where the 
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point of these activities does not lie in effecting an instrumental end, but 
largely in the intrinsic satisfaction gained from participating in a physical 
activity ýs a physical activity. 
However, physical training activities like circuit training, weight training, 
aerobics, keep-fit, although they fulfil the first four criteria given, they 
may not always fulfil the last two. Certainly the point of these kinds of 
physical activities is clearly not a non-instrumental one (although this is 
not to say they are not often engaged in for purely intrinsic reasons, such 
as the satisfaction the exercise itself can bring, rather than for the 
instrumental benefit of becoming, for example, fitter or stronger) - Here, 
I would argue that while these kinds of activities may be conceptually 
different from P. E. activities they are rightly included within the P. E. 
programme because they are instrumental in enabling us to engage in P. E. 
activities. For example, fitness training will help the swimmer, the sprinter 
and the games player to achieve their different ends. (Fitness or P. T. 
activities can also be said to be essentially physical ones which have 
educational value because by promoting fitness and physical strength they 
can contribute in an indirect way to the development of the person. (see 
pp. 282-283) .) 
Now I would argue, taking all the criteria that have been given, that what 
I have said constitutes a very large measure of common ground and which 
would enable us, if a new activity presented itself as a P. E. candidate, to 
assess whether or not it could be rightfully included. If, for example, 
gardening, scrabble or ear-wiggling were put forward we would know it 
would be right to reject them. (With regard to the last activity, it is 
interesting that contrary to what has often been said about physical education 
in the past (7), these activities involve an awful lot more than just having a 
knack. ) As each criterion is to do with the basic nature of each activity it 
cannot be dismissed as being conceptually unimportant, however, we must 
also recognise that the criteria put forward do not enable us to know the 
entire nature of any one activity for this will depend on the specific 
characteristics of each activity. In other words, we must accept that while 
there is this common ground, there are many important differences as. well. 
The main one which is Usually recognised is between those activities which 
are largely sporting or athletic activities, where the most important kind of 
satisfaction can be said to come from learning to move skilfully; and those 
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activities, like dance, where the chief kind of satisfaction to be gained from 
engaging in them is aesthetic in character. We can therefore gain a greater 
understanding of the conceptual nature of physical education by looking: 
firstly, at the concept of sport and the satisfaction that can be gained from 
learning to move skilfully. This will provide the subject matter for the rest 
of this chapter. Secondly, at the concept of the aesthetic and the satisfaction 
that can be gained from learning to move aesthetically which will provide the 
subject matter for the following chapter. 
SPORT AND THE VALUE OF PHYSICAL SKILL 
(b) Spor 
Although each sport has its unique character, I hope to show they are similar 
in certain important ways which can help explain the nature of sport and 
why we value it. 
It is Interesting that the many definitions of sport which have been given 
are often quite contradictory. For example, a fairly typical way of defining 
sport is one like H. Graves gives in his article, IA Philosophy of Sport' (8). 
He starts off by saying that the original meaning of sport could well have 
come from the medieval word I se disportarel and he concludes that what is 
essential to all sporting activities is that they must be undertaken for the 
sake of recreation as distinct from business. On the other hand, there are 
those like L. Collins, who, in his article, I Sport and Physical Recreation' (9), 
suggests that the prerequisite of all sports is 'the demand for preparation 
and a degree of commitment on behalf of the participants whose primary aim 
is to win' , and he concludes that sport is often I the antithesis of recreation 
and diversion' . He accepts, however, that the same activity may be sport 
to one and physical recreation to another. 
Now these two ways in which sport can be conceived means there is not 
only a problem of meaning but of their value as well. And the way In which 
sport is to be characterised is of the utmost importance when we come to 
look at physical education as physical education, because those who hold 
that sport is a form of man's play, argue a case for physical education in 
terms of educating for leisure and those who see it as the serious commitment 
to winning, argue a case for physical education in terms of the pursuit of 
excellence and the demonstration of Physical prowess. And the view which 
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wins the day will have a direct bearing on what is taught as physical 
education and how it is taught and whether it is taught at all. This is 
because, for example, if we are educating for leisure it might be thought 
that the level of skill which had to be achieved would be much lower than 
what is required if we are after the pursuit of physical excellence, and, 
because., there are many who would say if our values are only recreational 
ones we should have no place on a compulsory school curriculum. It is 
therefore now imperative that we examine the nature and meaning of sport 
to see if this contradiction is real or apparent, for if It can be shown there 
is, perhaps, confusion rather than contradiction. then clearing this up, 
should, at a later stage, throw light on the further question of its value 
and justification when considered as a part of physical education. 
First of all let us look at the play view of sport. Here, the emphasis would 
be placed on the idea of sport as self-contained, non-serious, pursued only 
for reasons of enjoyment or recreation and where the question of how wen 
one was performing would be unimportant. 
Now one of the difficulties in conceiving sport in this way (a view which I 
held myself at one stage (10)) is that it is difficult to see what sport, like 
many other intrinsically worthwhile activities*, particularly when engaged in 
at a certain level, have in common with the spontaneous play of children. 
if THE CONCEPT OF PLAY 
It is because play is often seen to have educational importance, and yet on the 
face of it education is a serious business in a way play is not, that philosophers 
like R. Dearden have considered it worthwhile to give a thorough analysis 
of the concept as a way of throwing light on this apparent paradox (11) - 
(a) R. Dearden' s Analysi 
In his article I The Concept of Play' , he argues that play 
is non-serious and 
self-contained which is engaged in just for the satisfaction involved 
in it. 
And he says all play activities are non-serious in that they have no purpose 
dictated by prudence nor do they fulfil any kind of obligation (12). 
*(for which I shall use the abbreviation 1wwa) 
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Crucial to Dearden' s analysis, then, is the emphasis he places on the non- 
seriousness of play. He recognises however that there are other activities 
mostly in the arts and sciences, which on the face of it also look non-serious, 
inasmuch that they too are pursued quite apart from having any obvious 
applications to the serious business of living, and in that we do not have 
any obligation to pursue them. However, he says though they often do 
give satisfaction to those who pursue them, the reason for pursuing them 
as worthwhile in themselves is rather to seek to establish or to create 
something of objective value, whether this is some mathematical proof, 
scientific law or object of aesthetic merit. They are to be assessed not 
primarily by the satisfactions which they give, but by impersonal criteria of 
truth and merit (13). 
Now, two things concern me here. Firstly, while it is undoubtedly true that 
iwwa are often assessed by these kinds of criteria, this does not mean that 
the value these activities have is not assessed by the ]2articipant very much 
in terms of the satisfaction he gets from engaging in them. 
Secondly, and more importantly, granted that unlike the spontaneous play 
of children, adult activities or what is produced by them, are often appraised 
by evaluative criteria why does this make them serious? If this is the 
distinguishing mark we would have to allow chess to be considered as serious 
and other kinds of games which are not nearly so demanding as chess but 
which could still be assessed by criteria of merit but which in his article 
Dearden firmly classifies as instances of play. It is not until he specifies 
thaýlthere are adult activities worthwhile in themselves which explore aspects 
of the conception of ourselves and of our situation which provide the 
background against which our objective evaluation of seriousness are made' , 
that we have the means of distinguishing those intrinsically worthwhile adult 
activities which constitute play from those which do not. But the problem 
now is that as this analysis stands very little is left out, for there are many 
adult activities which could not be described in this way although they are 
characterised by criteria of excellence and demand persistence and commitment 
for their participation and seem quite unlike the natural play of children. 
It is a problem which is tackled by N. Gayer and M. F. Burnyeat in their 
article 'Play Measure' . (14). They suggest that there is a danger in 
applying the criterion of intrinsic motivation to both children's play and 
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activities that adults engage in for their own sake (i. e. because of what Is 
involved in them). They suggest the term should only be applied to adult 
activities, because what is characteristic of children's play is that while it 
is motivated by pleasure, it is only pleasure in general; children do not 
look for 
, 
specific satisfaction, rather they flit in and out of play, as the 
mood takes them. In contrast, the adult who Is engaged in intrinsically 
enjoyable activities is not so easily distracted, because for him what is 
important is not any kind of pleasure but the specific satisfaction that comes 
from doing one thing rather than another, and which is derived from an 
appreciation of particular features of the activity in question (15). 
Consequently, Gayer eBurnyeat conclude that as iwwa form an important 
part of adult life, and as adults typically do take most of what they do 
seriously, it is hard to see how non-seriousness is compatible with the 
satisfaction they get from these kinds of activities. They suggest that as 
play is centrally and fundamentally the concern of children, the desire for 
pleasure, regardless of how it is obtained, is the hallmark of play and not 
intrinsic motivation (16). 
In his reply to Gayerl s and Burnyeat' s article, Dearden changes his original 
position. He admits that play is characteristic of children and that I while 
adults amuse themselves and enjoy their leisure, play is most evident if at 
all in their contact with their children' (17). He accepts that adults engaged 
in leisure activities can be committed to objective standards or values in a 
way a person who merely plays is not. This means he extends the range of 
iwwa which cannot be classified as play so that instead of there being very 
few that are left out, now there are very few that are left in. 
The concept of play is therefore firmly pushed back to what children 
naturally engage in without commitment or seriousness of purpose. Dearden 
says: 
I the modification of otherwise transient, moods by wider awareness and 
longer term considerations is such a feature of adult life that it 
penetrates even leisure and amusements in a way that makes genuine 
play marginal or even non-existent amongst adult activities' (18) - 
It would seem, then, taking Dearden' s analysis and Gayer' s and Burnyeat' s 
analysis all together that most adult leisure activities, although they are 
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self-contained and pursued voluntarily, can be discounted as instances of 
play on two counts: 
The satisfaction which a person gets from engaging in them is not 
just the result of searching for pleasure in general, but it is gained 
because of the intrinsic feelings which characterise engagement in 
the activity. 
(2) They are serious largely because they have standards or criteria of 
merit written into them and they are taken seriously because those 
engaged in these activities have to be committed to reaching and 
fulfilling these standards or criteria. 
Now as they stand there are problems with these. With regard to the first 
criterion, Gayer and Burnyeat consider that play is all about the pursuit 
of pleasure 
_qua 
pleasure not intrinsic satisfaction, consequently it is a 
feature of children's play that they tend to flit from one activity to another 
in search of whatever they find pleasurable. But while this may be the case, 
it is not necessarilythe case as they wish to suggest, for even very young 
children can be absorbed in one particular activity, one particular toy. 
Frequently, the reason for this is that they are attracted to the Intrinsic 
features of that toy or activity, so that the value they attach to them lies 
in their uniqueness and is irreplaceable - nothing else will do as well. If, 
for example, a favourite toy is lost or broken, it is of no comfort for the 
child if it is replaced by a similar, even near identical one. He liked the 
fact his doll was armless, his truck bright green but faded in parts, his 
plastic sword sturdy but bent at the end. They become fixated not only 
with particular toys but games as well; they can repeat them endlessly 
never apparently tiring of them and always concerned that they are always 
played in exactly the same way. It would therefore seem extremely arbitrary 
to say that the satisfaction children gain from play is not just as intrinsic 
as the satisfaction of those engaged in adult leisure pursuits, for their 
pleasure is uniquely tied to those features that amuse and fascinate them. 
(It is not just the experiencing of a particular feeling state which might come, 
for example from cuddling their teddies or sucking their dummies. ) 
Then, with regard to the second criterion, I think more needs to be said 
about the significance of an activity having objective value. For it is surely 
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the case that many play activities of children also have criteria of merit 
written into them and demand effort and concentration if they are to be 
engaged in. Furthermore it is possible to assess whether the game is a 
good one even if it is as simple as playing tiddleywinks, where I good' is 
assessed by the player's skill, and not just by how much fun everyone is 
having. In other words, one can refer to many activities and games 
pursued by children for their amusement which nevertheless fulfil the 
criteria that should discount them as instances of play. 
It is because of these kinds of difficulties that I would like to give the 
following analysis which while based on similar considerations to the ones 
already given I think it is an improvement because it takes these kinds of 
difficulties into account. 
I wish to argue initially, as Dearden has done, that what marks off the early 
and natural play of children (which must provide the paradigm case in 
any analysis) from other intrinsically worthwhile activities is that there is 
no concern for standards. It may be possible to evaluate the performance 
of a young child while he is engaged in his own activity, but if one is 
viewing it as play it would not be appropriate to do so. In play the satis- 
faction the child gets comes from pleasure, where pleasure is very much the 
result of idiosyncratic attraction an activity has for him and not because of 
any kind of achievement or the satisfaction I from getting it right' . On this 
understanding of play one cannot play badly. 
(b) The Distinction between Play and Other Intrinsically Worthwhile Activities 
It is interesting that the distinguishing mark between play and other 
intrinsically worthwhile activities cannot be made in the end by noting whether 
it is children or adults who pursue them. Adults play children's games and 
children engage in adult activities. This is no more true than it is in sport. 
It is not difficult to see when children have stopped merely playing. It is 
easy for example to see the difference between the child playing in the water 
and the child swimming breast stroke, the child kicking a ball around and 
the child playing football. What has to become characteristic of the child's 
activity is that it is appropriate to assess his performance as an iwwa 
(although this does not mean he does not have to be doing well at it). In 
sport particularly in the eastern communist countries, children are trained 
in techniques of particular sports from the earliest possible age, these 
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children are not playing. (Indeed one may question whether they are engaged 
in iwwa either if, that is, they have no choice and only gain satisfaction 
from gaining the approval of their coach rather than through the activity 
itself. ) 
When one hears of two year olds water skiing and thoroughly enjoying It one 
has to accept that even babies can engage in adult activities. Often adults 
keen for their children to excel at these activities of which they are devotees, 
try and teach them as soon as they can hold the ball, wear ice skates, blow 
on a trumpet, or put on a pair of boxing gloves. They are often disappointed; 
in the end they may well find themselves saying, they don't want to learn, 
just let them play, they will come round to it soon enough' . Once they do 
want to learn and learn how to do it properly they have stopped just playing 
and it becomes appropriate to talk of evaluating their performances. Further- 
more, how well they do will have a direct bearing on the satisfaction they get 
in participating. 
One can distinguish, then., between play and iwwa in that while both are 
pursued for the sake of intrinsic satisfaction, only the latter are characterised 
by their potential for enabling those who engage in them to show considerable 
skill, knowledge, physical prowess, intellectual ability, craftmanship, aesthetic 
understanding and so on, where the person engaging in it does so, .: 0 
(a) because he is concerned with doing well, coming up to I the mark' , getting 
it 'right'. improving his performance, and (b) where he is motivated by the 
intrinsic satisfaction he can gain from participating In the activity, where 
how well he is able to perform has some bearing on the kind of satisfaction 
gained. This means that, on the whole, knowing whether play is going on 
is decided negatively, in that there is no concern for standards, where it is 
inappropriate to assess how well a person is doing, and where his satisfaction 
has little to do with the quality of his performance. Furthermore, it can be 
seen that adult activities are designed, or more correctly speaking have 
evolved, to bring intrinsic satisfaction, so that unlike the natural play of 
children, where one has to rely on knowing their motives (I would agree 
with Dearden here contra Gayer and Burnyeat that a child who only has an 
instrumental reason for what he is doing is not playing), one can say they 
are non-instrumental by their very natures. It may be that someone plays 
tennis or backgammon for some extrinsic motive, for example for money or to 
make friends, but this does not alter the fact that the point of these activities 
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is an intrinsic one. And as we have seen they are characterised by norms 
of correctness, standards of excellence, truth criteria and so on. I have 
also argued that even if a participant is not doing very well he must still 
be concerned with trying to gain mastery if he is not to be thought to be 
just I playing at it' . 
On the basis of this analysis I would now like to look at particular examples 
some of which will illustrate the analysis in a straightforward way and others 
of which will prove to be more problematic and more interesting. I shall use 
the word I skill' at this stage in the broadest sense - it may be allowed to 
refer to physical, intellectual or artistic skill depending on the kind of skill 
a particular activity demands. 
1. Those activities which require little or no skill to be engaged in. There 
are certain structured activities and games like snap, snakes and ladders, 
parlour games, which are engaged in because they are found to be pleasurable, 
but which are limited in their scope for anything to be achieved which could 
be considered to have any kind of objective value. It is just inappropriate 
in many kinds of pursuits which are carried out for pleasure, to be assessed 
in terms of standards of excellence. One can therefore say unproblematically 
that those who engage in them at whatever age are just playing. 
There are many activities which come into this category., particularly those 
which require luck rather than judgment, or, where if it is required it is 
extremely limited in its scope, and it is true to say that adults engage in 
these just as much as children. Dearden I think is wrong in suggesting 
otherwise. Adults do play, we have only to think of the value they attach 
to such things as beetle drives and bingo to illustrate th is point (at least 
when money is not at stake! ). 
It is possible and perhaps helpful to consider play activities where skill is 
less important than just the fun of taking part on a continuum. This would 
start with play activities that require little or no skill and finish with an 
activity before the level of skill becomes sufficiently great for it to become 
appropriate to talk in terms of judging the quality of a person's performance 
rather than his mere enjoyment, in the middle would be activities where it 
would be possible to assess how well a person was doing but the extent to 
which this would be done would be extremely limited, or where little value 
would be attached to doing this. 
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2. Those activities which require a lot of skill to be engaged in. There 
are activities like chess, archaeology, diving, carpentry, home computing, 
juggling, which are characterised like play activities by being non-instrumental, 
and which can be engaged in for the sake of getting intrinsic satisfaction, 
but which unlike play activities are characterised by the demand they make 
on those who are engaged in them to show considerable skill. The nature 
of this will depend on the activity in question, it may, for example, require 
physical prowess, craftmanship, aesthetic understanding, scientific insight, 
creativity or a phenomenal memory. The person who is engaged in these 
activities does so because he is concerned with mastering the activity, 
coming up to the mark, fulfilling the standards the activity, demands, not 
only because this is necessary if he is to engage in it at all, but because of 
the satisfaction he gets from both his own achievement and in his objective 
appreciation of those intrinsic features that are either being displayed in 
the activity (for example a first class game of cricket) or being created ýy 
means of the activity (for example making an elegant pot). Again, one can 
say categorically that these are not play activities and those engaged in them 
are not playing. Furthermore, as I argued earlier, these activities are not 
only available to adults, instruction of children in these kinds of activities 
is just as common, especially in educational institutions, particularly where 
there is the belief that the future success or progress in an activity depends 
on I getting them young' . 
3. Those activities which allow for the realization of both a minimum and 
maximum amount of skill. Now this category is pertinent when considering 
the two conceptions of sport considered earlier, one which viewed sport as 
fun, amusement, recreation, the other which viewed sport as the serious 
commitment to the pursuit of physical excellence; and I hope to show at 
this stage why both views are, after all, compatible and can be appRed 
equally well, at least to a great many sports. 
First of all, it needs to be emphasised that with regard to those iwwa that 
are rule-governed (like sport) that even those which can be engaged in 
simply as play or for amusement are still characterised by normative standards 
and, because of this, to be able to ascertain whether they are being engaged 
in, it is not enough to know that the participants are playing according to 
the rules, we also need to be able to show that certain objectives, namely 
those the rules are designed to bring about, are being achieved. If, for 
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example, we saw two persons keeping to the rules of tennis but neither of 
them ever hit the ball (or very rarely) we could not justify the claim that 
they were playing tennis. The most we might be able to say would be that 
the players were trying to engage in the activity of a game of tennis. But 
until they started to achieve certain objectives like striking the ball, getting 
the ball over the net, returning the ball etc. that are characteristic of 
tennis, they could not be said to be playing the game. In other words 
there are certain standards to be reached however minimal (and the same 
principle couldbe applied to other rule-governed iwwa, certainly to all 
sporting activities) before one can be said to be engaging in the activity. 
Now, there are many activities (and not only sporting ones) characterised 
by normative standards and at a certain point by criteria of excellence which 
nonetheless it is possible to engage in with the minimum amount of learning, 
where the participant is not necessarily doing very well at it and more 
importantly, is not concerned about how well he is doing, whose main 
motivation is just the fun he can have from playing, but where in the same 
activity the potential exists for the participant to display an enormous amount 
of skill and to get the same kind of intrinsic satisfaction described under the 
last headingwhich comes from playing well, seeing the activity at its best 
and trying to improve one's performance. 
In other words, there are some activities where-, while a certain standard 
always has to be reached before one can say the activities are going on, 
nevertheless, the skill threshold is sufficiently low at the beginning for 
persons to engage in them without too much natural ability, persistence or 
hard practice. It may not necessarily be the case that the intrinsic value 
of the activity itself does not matter to him, but knowing that he will never 
be any good at it, he prefers to watch it played or being done at its best 
by others and to play or to engage in it himself for mere amusement or 
recreation. Examples of these could be table tennis, badminton, embroidery, 
photography., certain card games. 
These people, then, are playing in an activity where other participants, 
because they are concerned with improving their performance, fulfilling 
criteria of excellence to realize the activity at its best, are not. But it is 
not possible to play at all intrinsically worthwhile activities, there are some 
which because of their natures, unless one continues to be concerned about 
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reaching certain standards by fulfilling very difficult objectives one cannot 
be said to be engaging in the activity at all. This is true for example of 
figure skating, bridge, archaeology, computing, synchronised swimming 
(although one may of course be engaged in the activity of trying to master 
them) . And it can be argued that where adults or, for that matter, children 
do engage in certain iwwa (and this is true of sporting activities) but only 
in order to I play' , who, after having reached a standard that enables them 
to participate in the activity, are not concerned with improving their 
performance or realizing the activity at its best, then they have missed a 
lot of the point of the activity (see pp)-7 S -? 0 for further discussion on this) . 
4. Those activities which are recognised or are often put under the 
descrIption of children's play but which nonetheless have the potential for 
realizing a great deal of skill. On the face of it the existence of this 
category may appear to suggest the analysis given so far is wrong, for it 
might be said that there are many activities which are not natural or 
spontaneous, but are structured, defined by tight rules and more importantly 
are difficult to master without a great deal of practice or skill, but which 
nevertheless, when we watch children engage in them we would judge them 
to be playing because it is something that only children, and not adults, 
do. Examples of these kinds of activities would be hopscotch, skipping, 
playing marbles, and hoop bowling. Imagine that the children engaged in 
them are very concerned (as they often are) with doing as well as possible 
and that their satisfaction comes from their increased mastery. Now on the 
analysis given, these activities would not count as play yet this is how they 
are usually regarded by the casual observer. 
In reply to this, I would argue that what is happening in these activities 
is, in actual fact, no different from what is happening when children are 
engaged in what are recognised to be adult activities. The fact that 
skipping has the status of play and not the status of an adult activity is 
neither here nor there. Imagine that diving is not the sport we recognise 
it as today but is only engaged in by children when they have nothing 
better to do. If, by natural ability., continual practice, learning from each 
other what they were doing took on the character of a highly skilful 
activity, where the children's satisfaction came from making this activity 
possible, -improving their performance, then the children are not playing, 
whatever we might think. There are no doubt many adult sports which 
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started off as the unorganised activities of children with time on their hands. 
Again with these kinds of examples, one can see that the same activity may 
be play to one child and an intrinsically worthwhile activity to another. 
(c) Non-Seriousness 
It will be noticed that although the analysis of play which has been given 
is very much a development of what Dearden has already said, no use has 
been made of the notion of non-seriousness and yet, for Dearden, it is this 
criterion which he considers to be crucial in the demarcation of play. For 
example he says, I we have to look at play against a background of adult 
social life which is made up of activities evaluated as serious in that they 
are engaged in for some further purpose, the omission of which would 
constitute neglect' (19). He goes on to argue that the person who plays 
does not regard his activity as being serious in this objective evaluative 
sense. If it is a child who is playing this may not be the casiý but this 
does not matter, for it is the adult' s evaluation that counts, and on the 
basis of this, he teaches the child when he is playing and when he is not. 
It is not until the child has some understanding of what Ponstitutes the 
serious business of the adult world that he can fully grasp the concept of 
what he can remember doing naturally from his earliest days. 
Now, Dearden uses this criterion of non-seriousness to make the distinction 
between play and non-play as others have used it to distinguish between 
physical recreation and serious sport. But I would wish to suggest that 
adult leisure activities are usually non-serious and this is because, as with 
children'-s play, nothing depends on engaging in them as it does on earning 
a living, paying one' s debts, fulfilling moral obligations, so this criterion 
cannot be as vital as Dearden and many others have often thought. So why, 
it might be asked, is this notion so often brought forward in an analysis of 
play? I think one of the reasons for this is that I serious' is given the same 
meaning as I important' and clearly adult leisure activities are valued as 
important in a way children's play is not (although it is often considered 
instrumentally important, if it can be shown to fulfil valuable biological or 
social functions) . But the meaning of the two concepts is quite different, 
although their meanings are related. This is not, however, again as is 
often thought, because what we consider -important to us we also consider 
to be of the utmost seriousness. A man's hobby may be important to him 
and intrinsically so (in other words it is not just of value in some 
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psychological sense because it provides him with a means of relaxation). 
Furthermore, while he is engaging in it he may take it very seriously indeed. 
But because it does not come under the day' s agenda of serious business he 
can therefore enjoy it without anxiety because nothing of any greater 
importance depends on it. Indeed it is possible for a person to evaluate 
all aspects of his life in terms of their importance without having to think of 
any of them as serious, because nothing of further importance depends on 
them or they are never threatened and therefore never cause him any anxiety. 
For most of us, however, this is most unlikely; a lot of what we do, 
particularly the decisions we make are serious because they affect so many 
other important areas of our lives. We just cannot afford, for example, to 
neglect our work because what is important to us, namely our livelihood, is 
dependent upon it. We therefore have to see it as a serious matter if we 
are to see it any way at all. But in these kinds of instances, when we talk 
about what we take seriously, we are not (as we are when, for example, we 
talk about how a person might pursue a hobby) describing an attitude but 
an objective evaluation. But of course this is also true of what we consider 
to be important to us. So we need to know what makes the difference 
between the two kinds of assessment. 
Now, I would suggest that when me ask for an objective evaluation with 
regard to the seriousness of a situation or action as opposed to its importance 
we are talking about the implications it has for what is important to us and 
how great those implications are. If we ask, for example, how serious an 
illness is we want to know the effect it will have on the person's health and 
ultimately his life, or if we are concerned about a crack in the wall of our 
house we realize its seriousness only if we find it threatens the foundations 
and therefore the house itself. Although what is serious is clearly important 
it is only instrumentally important, dependent for its importance on what is 
important to us in its own right, for example, our health and our homes. 
To say, then, that something is non-serious is not to say it is unimportant 
but it may be to say anything very positive, it may just mean the question 
of seriousness does not arise and this I think is the case with adult leisure 
activities. It is misleading to say they are non-serious for this, as I have 
argued., does not mean they are unimportant, neither does it refer to some 
inherent quality, certainly it is no reason to discredit them or to consider 
them as less important than what we do evaluate as a serious matter, 
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particularly when what is serious is only instrumentally important in securing 
what is of ultimate importance to us. It is because, for example, that we 
value sport intrinsically that if our right to engage in it became threatened, 
then fighting to maintain or secure that right would become a serious matter. 
I would conclude that to describe play as non-serious is to say nothing of 
importance depends upon it, which taken as a conceptual statement says 
nothing very much and certainly does not help us to distinguish between 
play and intrinsically worthwhile adult activities, and taken as an empirical 
statement is obviously false. While adult leisure activities, like children's 
play, have much in common in that they are self-contained, non-instrumental 
and pursued voluntarily, the essential difference is not a question of their 
seriousness, but that, unlike play, they are intrinsically important, 
characterised as they are by normative criteria in a way that play is not. 
iii SPORT 
I have tried to show that to talk of adult leisure activities as play does not 
do justice to what many of them involve. Being normative, they demand, 
unlike children's play, standards to be reached, techniques to be mastered, 
a body of knowledge to be understood. Now, if all we wanted to do was to 
play, either as amusement or recreation,, we may as well choose those activities 
that are not too difficult, which give immediate pleasure without too much 
hard work and practice. If, however, we are after the intrinsic kind of 
satisfaction gained from an understanding and mastery of the 'art' of an 
activity that we appreciate for its own sake, then this means we have to 
do more than play to find this kind of fulfilment. 
If we now turn to sport, it must be said that it is possible to view some 
sporting activities as play and recreation on the one hand and as intrinsically 
worthwhile activities where there is a concern for standards, on the other. 
Sport, then, can, up to a point accommodate the two views outlined earlier. 
This is because in some sports one only has to reach a fairly low standard 
just to be able to take part which one can then play for pleasure, without 
wishing to improve or try to realize a better game because one values the 
quality of the game itself. One can be quite content to play badly, indeed, 
as one is only playing the question of how well one is playing does not arise. 
212 
However, as I argued earlier, the character of sports is such that a certain 
level of expertise has to be achieved before one can be said to be engaging 
in them at all. And it is also true that all sports have the potential for 
those engaging in them to learn how to move more and more skilfully. 
Furthermore, this is what one would expect those who valued them intrin- 
sically to want to do. This is because, as I hope to show below, the point 
of these activities for the participants (even though some chbose to ignore 
it), lies in the satisfaction that can be gained from moving skilfully. 
Consequently, the more skilful one becomes, the greater should be the 
satisfaction gained from participating. 
The reason why the point of these activities can be said to lie in the 
satisfaction to be gained from moving skilfully is because of the underlying 
nature of these activities, which can be characterised independently of a 
player's motives at any particular time. And what I wish to suggest is that 
sporting activities exist in the way that they do in order to bring about the 
realization of physical skill because it is valued as an end in itself. 
Compare for example pole vaulting to the building of a wall. Both activities 
can be described in instrumental terms. There are distinctive ends: in 
pole vaulting to have cleared the bar raised at a particular height, in the 
bricklaying to have built the wall; and in both cases there are the means 
used for achieving these ends. The difference between the two is not that 
in the bricklaying the activity achieves an end, for which the bricklaying 
is simply the means, but rather that the end is valued as an end. If this 
stopped being the case, if people started building walls where no one wanted 
them but simply because of the value attached to bricklaying itself, then it 
would, I suggest, have taken on the character of a sport. One can see in 
many kinds of sporting activities, that in some time in the past, the same 
kinds of movements were carried out for the sake of bringing about an end 
because the end itself was v4lued - consider javelin throwing, fencing and 
archery. Now the distinction, for example, between fencing as a sport and 
fencing as a duel, is not only that one can be described in instrumental 
terms and the other cannot, but rather only in the one that is not a 
sport is the end valued as an end.. But the point of sporting activities 
lies in a different place altogether. Although sporting activities can be 
described in instrumental terms and an end can often be specified, for 
example, clearing the box, scoring a goal, hitting the target, the end is 
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merely contrived and exists only for the sake of bringing about the means; 
for it is the means which are valued in their own right, because it is they 
which demand and make possible the exercise of physical skill. It is interesting 
that in the case of the duel, say as it was fought in Italy in the sixteenth 
century, while the main intention was an instrumental one, not any way of 
killing the enemy would do, it had, therefore, even at this stage, something 
of the character of a sport. 
The view, then, that I wish to defend is that I sport' can be said to refer to 
those activities which can be described in instrumental terms (and in some 
cases assessed by them) but which are instrumentally contrived to bring about 
an artificial end, because the bringing about of the end demands physical 
skill which is valued for its own sake and which at its best is recognised as 
a human achievement. The point of the activity therefore to the performer 
lies in the intrinsic satisfaction from learning to move more and more skilfully. 
(a) Physical Skill 
It can be seen that this -analysis relies heavily on the notion of physical 
skill which now therefore needs to be examined in some detail. First of all 
it must be said that not everything which can be described as skill in sport 
will be physical skill. For example, there will be the ability to make good 
tactical judgments and D. Carr has already done a lot of work in showing 
that P. E. activities involve practical reasoning (20). (See also pp. 285-296 
for a discussion of Carr' s account. ) 
However my argument is that if we are talking about sport, then by 
definition physical skill must be predominant. If, for example, intellectual 
skill became more important then we are talking about something other than 
just a sporting activity. Now the coach may in a game be said, up to a 
point, to be taking part in the activity by telling the players what to do 
from the side-line (providing that is they took some notice of what he was 
saying! *) but it would be absurd to say he was therefore playing the game 
and this is true even if his instruction, based on his ability for practical 
reasoning, enables his team to win. It is not difficult to envisage a game 
where as far as movement was concerned all that was required was the pushing 
of buttons which results in actions carried out by mechanical ' 
players. However skilfully one played this kind of game, it would not 
involve physical skill and consequently would not constitute sport, but an 
214 
intellectual activity (providing of course there was a sufficient degree of 
intellectual complexity. about the game). Indeed one could still be said to 
be playing even if one instructed someone else which buttons to press. 
The same kind of point can be made with regard to the aesthetic in sport, 
for while many sporting activities are defined by aesthetic criteria they are 
not predominant, and that is why they are regarded as sporting activities 
and not aesthetic or artistic ones. Occasionally you get an equal demand 
for physical and aesthetic skill, this I think is the case with some forms of 
ice skating, then of course they can be described either way, but the whole 
question of the aesthetic in sport can be left for the moment as it is dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
The assessment of physical skill can refer to a specific action, the arm action 
of the crawl, the handstand in gymnastics, the drop volley in tennis; a 
player's individual performance, a team's performance of a particular move 
or of a whole activity. When we say someone is moving skilfully we are 
evaluating his performance positively. We are saying he is doing well, and 
the basis on which we will make this judgment will depend on the criteria 
of excellence operative in the particular sporting activity in question. What 
counts as a skilful performance in one activity will be quite different from 
what counts as a skilful performance in another. However, as in all instances 
of sport we are, by definition, talking predominantly about physical skill, it 
will be true to say that what is being assessed must be how well a physical 
task is being carried out as a physical task. It therefore only starts to 
become appropriate to describe a person as being physically skilful if he is 
consistently successful in bringing about those physical objectives demanded 
by a particular sport. 
It might be objected that defining physical skill so loosely fails to take into 
account that very often an athlete or games player is successful in carrying 
out a physical task but only because he is very strong or has staying power. 
However, I would argue that these considerations come into a completely 
different category from the word §Ml , for they are put forward as 
factors 
which explain why he is successful. Indeeq we would put forward a whole 
range of reasons, for example his mobility., coordination and quick reflex 
action. Now all of these are measurable but we do not measure skill we 
assess it, for as Ryle tells us I skill is not an act it is a disposition' . (21) 
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Of course this is not to deny that the word , skill is often used as if it 
was a causal factor which explained a person's achievement, but it has to 
be recognised that if it is used in such a way that it is put on a par with 
other physical factors like stamina, flexibility or fitness then it has an entirely 
different meaning. Usually what is being referred to is a recognised pattern 
of movements which is commonly found to be successful in a particular sport, 
in certain situations, In other words, it is given the same meaning as 
I technique' , or more precisely good technique, where 
I good' means I known 
to be successfull . 
However, technical ability is not just decided by whether the person is in 
fact successful, it is possible to say a person has a good technique even 
though on occasion he falls to achieve a particular objective (for example 
putting the ball into the basket) conversely we may judge a person to 
have a poor technique although he is successful. Now the reason why we 
are able to make these judgments is because it has been found over a period 
of time, through trial and error and more recently through our technological 
knowledge and our knowledge of physiology, that certain ways of performing 
are more effective than others (and where this is important, more efficient) 
in carrying out the task (e. g. swimming through water as quickly as possible, 
jumping the greatest possible distance, abseiling down a rock, or hang 
gliding). We then come to recognise these patterns or sequences of movement 
even when, on a particular occasion it so happens that they are not successful, 
perhaps because the opposition is better, the performer is tired or just plain 
unlucky. It is therefore possible to assess if a person is technically good 
at an activity simply by observing the technique used and without even knowing 
if on a particular occasion it achieved the desired end. 
We can see now that it is because it can be shown that certain techniques 
enable a person to achieve physical objectives that the word technique is 
often replaced by the word I skill' . But it should be remembered that strictly 
speaking the technique is not a skill, rather if it is done well and it is 
effective then it shows skill. 
It would be apposite here to draw on the distinction that Von Wright makes 
in his book 'The Varieties of Goodness' (22). He distinguishes between 
logical or achievement tests and causal or symptomatic tests. Only the former 
are decisive in assessing a person's ability at a particular activity and this 
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is because it is logically related to it. Examples of showing oneself to be 
successful on this kind of test would be winning a football match, beating 
the world land 'speed racing record, coming first after sprinting a hundred 
metres, climbing t6 the top of the mountain or throwing the furthest distance 
in a discus throwing competition. A causal or symptomatic test on the other 
hand is not ultimately decisive rather it is indicative of ability because it 
can be shown there is a causal connection between doing well at it and 
being successful at the logical test. In other words, on the basis of a 
causal test one can say there is evidence to suggest that a person may have 
abilities in a particular activity, for example, doing well at tests which measure 
muscular strength would indicate an ability for weightlifting. 
The evaluation of technique as the accurate execution of a predetermined set 
of movements can be an achievement test. This is true for example in 
gymnastics and ice skating, but in most sports the assessment of technique 
on the basis of how it looks, will, like most assessments of strength and 
stamina be a symptomatic test, on the basis of which we can do no more than 
point out potential ability or predict how a person might do in an actual 
performance. With regard to the former, it is interesting to note that 
however good we think a technique looks we must recognise it to be inferior 
to another kind, if that technique proves to be more effective in the test 
that ultimately matters - achieving the physical objectives, logically defined 
by the game. We must accept for example that the straddle, however well 
it is performed technically, is inferior as a technique to the fosbury flop 
because the latter gets better results in the achievement test. If, as is 
sometimes argued, the best team did not win - team X showed great skill 
throughout but failed to score any goals and team Y was of a fairly average 
ability but managed to score a goal largely through luck at the last minute, 
then it is necessary to remember that, while of course this often does happen, 
it could not happen all the time. If a team keeps on winning then it must 
be more skilful than the other teams, if this is because of the techniques 
they are using, even though they may be different or even at variance to 
what has been recognised in the past as I good' technique, these must now 
have proven worth over the techniques used by the other teams. 
The decisiveness of an achievement test in assessing skill is, however, 
subject to certain considerations regarding the nature of the activity itself. 
We would not consider, for example, that there was much justification for 
talking about players showing physical skill in an activity where it is 
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possible to secure its physical objectives without too much difficulty, either 
because the technique required could be mastered quickly and executed 
easily, or because the activity could be carried out by only using movements 
we do naturally anyway, like walking at a moderate pace. So we need now 
to look at the importance of assessing the degree of difficulty to our 
understanding of physical skill. 
(b) A_ssessing the Degree of Difficult 
In order to assess physical skill we need to know not only that a person is 
consistently successful in achieving a physical objective but how difficult 
the task is to achieve. We would not begin to assess a person as physically 
skilful even though he was consistently successful, if the movements he 
performed were extremely easy, like walking to the bus stop or bending 
down and picking up an - object. The grounds on which we decide the 
degree of difficulty will be dependent on several factors, specifically, most 
of these will be understood by having detailed knowledge of each sport, 
what it takes to master it and the standards operating at the time. But 
more generally it will depend on knowing that we have certain physiological 
and anatomical limitations that make the execution of certain physical tasks 
hard for us. Given our physiological constitution it is not difficult for most 
of us to jump 20 cm. into the air, but it shows a lot of skill to reach 1.5 m. 
and of course we would not be really so impressed by man' s high jumping 
achievements if he lived on the moon. 
In describing a person as skilful, then we need to know not only how well 
a person consistently performs a physical task but how difficult that task is 
and I would suggest this can be judged in relation to three different 
factors; 
(1) the standard of the opposition 
(2) the physical technique demanded by the sport 
f3) our physical constitutional make-up. 
1. The standard of the opposition. In a game to be able to assess the 
skill of a person's or team' s performance we need to know not only who won 
but how difficult it was for them to win, beating a team in the fourth division 
is not nearly so difficult as beating a team in the first division. In judging 
the standard of the opposition it is not enough to know the score, or even 
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to have followed the game closely throughout, unless one has the means of 
assessing the game against a great deal of background knowledge. 
It is because games like football and golf are based on aI league' or 
I handicap' system that we are able to assess the level of a team' s skill by 
taking into account its position within the system as well as whether they 
win any particular game. One can also judge it technically as we shall see 
below, and this, as far as the basic value of sport goes, (which I have 
argued lies in the realization of physical skill for its own sake) may ultimately 
be the overriding consideration. 
In athletic events we need to know the age of the participants, whether they 
are men or women, the standards which are operating at the time at a local, 
national and international level. Our judgment will always be a relative one 
as records keep being broken we will change our conception of what 
constitutes a difficult objective. To give a well worn example, we considered 
thirty years ago the four minute mile to be difficult to achieve in a way we 
would not consider it to be difficult today, at least not for top athletes. 
2. Difficult physical techniq,! ýe. In some sporting activities like gymnastics 
and trampolining we need to know not only that each task or predetermined 
sequence of movement is accurately executed but how difficult the task was 
to accomplish. If we were assessing the quality of movement of a functional 
object like the cutting action of a blade in a piece of machinery we would 
not have the problem of assessing the skill of the blade but simply its 
technical goodness where this relates to the end it serves. But in a sport 
where we are concerned to assess a performer's skill we have to look not 
just to the end achieved (where this can refer to the whole sequence of 
predetermined movement) but what it takes to achieve this end. For example 
it involves knowing the amount of practice required, how much natural ability 
is needed and how exceptional or rare a person's technical ability might be. 
It is for these reasons that we cannot just rely on knowing the result of an 
achievement test in deciding whether a person is skilful or not, for we also 
need to know, at least in some sports, how technically difficult it is for a 
performer to be successful. 
Now I believe this to be true of games. Although it is possible for a person 
to find an extremely effective way of doing something that may ultimately 
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enable him or his team to win, this does not necessarily mean his movements 
can be described as skilful, for the way he has found may be technically 
very easy. But the point is, that this could not be the case for very longý 
because the nature of games as sporting activities is such that they exist to 
make it necessary for the players to perform movements that do demonstrate 
skill. Nov$ in some sports, and I believe this includes games (as well as 
ones that can be non-competitive, like ski jumping) this is ensured by making 
it necessary for players to perform movements that are technicauy very 
difficult before they can achieve the objective or objectives logically defined 
by the activity., which are in a sense artificial and contrived for this purpose. 
In the case of games the objective is to win according to the rules. Although 
the game (unlike say trampolining) is not actually defined by technically 
difficult movements, it is because of the nature of the rules, that certain 
difficult techniques come to characterise the game; and it is the fact that 
they are competitive that high standards of play are established, because in 
striving to win better ways of securing specific objectives (for example, 
passing the ball) will be found. For, even if to begin with these might be 
technically quite easy, providing they are effective this will then make it 
more difficult for the opposition, who.,, in their turn, will have to find better 
ways of playing. As the opposition gets better so it becomes harder to win 
and the standards of technical play (as well as, of course, tactical play) 
necessarily go up. If this did not occur, if, for example, the technical skill 
of a game deteriorated because it became too easy to win then we would 
change the rules in order to make it more difficult. To describe games in 
the way B. Suits has done in his article I What is a Game? ' , we would put 
more unnecessary obstacles in the way of the players- (23); or we would 
make the game fairer by making it obligatory to play within a class of players 
similar in relevant respects; and of course, this happens already, we 
distinguish according to age, sex, weight and standard of play. 
Whether we are talking about games where there is the overall objective of 
winning and difficult techniques have developed over a period of time to 
secure this objective as winning becomes more difficult, or something like 
gymnastics or diving which involve the mastery and execution from the outset 
of pre-prescribed movements that are already in themselves technically 
difficult, we value what it takes to be successful - the realization of 
physical skill. It is not therefore like the value we attach to functional 
objects, where, providing the end we want is brought about, it would not 
matter when a new functional object was involved if it was technically less 
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interesting or difficult (although the latter at least is perhaps unlikely) . 
In purely functional terms the object would be a better one than the one 
it replaced if the end it achieved fulfilled our purposes better. We therefore 
value electric or diesel trains over steam trains, electric lamps over oil 
lamps. The way we value sport is more like the way those who still value 
steam engines as steam engines do so because what they involve technically 
they find intrinsically interesting and because of what they demonstrate in 
terms of human ingenuity. 
3. The limitations of our constitutional make-up. Sometimes we assess 
physical skill where the prime consideration is not technical difficulty but 
the extent to which our physical limitations as human beings (and more 
specifically as male and female human beings) are overcome. 
In athletics, for example, in all events beating one' s own record and for top 
athletes beating world records, is extremely important. On the whole the 
technique which is used is subservient to this end. It does not matter, 
for example in long jump, if an athlete uses a technique easier to execute 
than the one used by the other athletes if he jumps further. The main 
consideration is whether an athlete's technique enables him to be successful, 
where success is measured by the achievements of ends that are difficult for 
us to reach because of our physical limitations. In this context we often 
talk about physical prowess and it can be found not only in athletics but 
in such activities as swimming, mountaineering and water sports as well, not 
to mention the remarkable physical feats undertaken by those trying to get 
into the Guiness Book of Records, like the person who tight-rope walked 
along a cable car wire several miles up a mountain. 
Sometimes in a particular athletic activity the means are written into the end. 
In other words the activity logically demands a particular method of movement, 
for example, jumping as far as possible but only while doing the action of 
the triple jump. Now here it does look as if the technique as a demonstration 
of physical skill is important in its own right. (Consider for example the 
technical difficulty in mastering the dolphin stroke or hurdling. ) But even 
though technique clearly is important and logically determined by the 
activity, it is still the case that it is subservient to achieving a further end 
which can be measured. Ultimately we assess its value only in relation to how 
well it brings about this end of the activity which is measurable in terms of 
how long, how fast or how high. 
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It is perhaps the recognition of this kind of physical prowess which is 
admired most universally and at its best takes on a moral dimension. It 
is because we have a close awareness of our own physical limitations 
including our own finiteness that we marvel at those who push themselves 
physically to the limit, like the marathon winner; defy gravity as the ski 
jumper seems to do so proficiently; undertake amazing feats of strength 
and endurance which must be the experience of most mountaineers and 
weight Ufters; for most of us can only dream of flying through the air, 
running endlessly without getting out of breath. In reality we find we are 
slow and awkward in our movements; although easy access to motor transport 
and labour saving machines means for much of the time we can forget about 
it, usually however, we are still able to respond with admiration when others 
try and succeed to conquer their physical limitations which we all experience 
as human beings. 
(c) The Point of Sporting Activities 
I have argued that sporting activities are those which can be described in 
instrumental terms but where the end is artificial and exists only because 
reaching it requires means that demand physical skill from the participant. 
But while it is appropriate to describe sporting activities in instrumental 
terms at the same time it is also true to say that sporting activities are 
engaged in for non-instrumental reasons - because of the intrinsic satisfaction 
obtained from engaging in them. Now this may at first appear to be contra- 
dictory but actually the contradiction is merely apparent for my argument is 
that sporting activities are contrived as instrumental ones and therefore exist 
not for the sake of bringing about an instrumental end, but because what is 
needed to bring about this end is intrinsically valued, namely the means 
characterised by the employment of skilful movement by the participant. 
While in some activities it is possible to specify one instrumental end - 
getting to the top of the mountain, hitting the bullseye, clearing the bar, 
in many sporting activities one can only see the end as a series of 
instrumental tasks: keeping the ball in one' s possession, passing the ball 
to another player while avoiding the opposition, getting the ball into the net 
and so on. In each situation that arises in the game or activity one has to 
be able to use the most effective means of securing the specific objective, 
which are instrumental in achieving the final objective which can often be 
described in terms of winning. 
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1. Best onpurposive and non-purposive sports. There are some sports, 
however, like trampolining and diving where it is appropriate and indeed 
logically necessary to describe them not only in instrumental terms but 
aesthetic ones as well. There is a distinction which D. Best has referred to 
as the distinction between purposive and non-purposive or aesthetic 
sports. (24). He argues that it is a mistaken assumption to think that the 
point of an activity must somehow always be identifiable as an end or purpose 
distinct from the activity, and that while in purposive sports the purpose can 
be specified independently of the manner of achieving it, as long as it 
conforms to the limits set by the rules or norms, in aesthetic sports this is 
not the case, for here their purpose cannot be considered apart from the 
manner of achieving it, (25). 
But while Best acknowledges that in aesthetic sports their point and value 
lie within the activity itself, he does not seem to acknowledge that in what 
he calls 'purposive sports' this is equally true. For while an end often can 
indeed be specified independently of the means of achieving it, their point 
and value do not lie in achieving this end as an end. It is because, I would 
argue, that their point is to be found in what is necessary to secure this end 
(which is merely a contrived one), namely skilful movement, that the 
difference between I purposive' and I aesthetic' sports is not as great as 
Best would like to suppose. 
All sports (including aesthetic ones) involve the carrying out of difficult 
physical tasks which demand a great deal of skill, the nature of which will 
depend on the activity in question. If this was not the case, if, for 
example, aesthetic presentation became more important than the display of 
physical skill (as indeed it does in dance) then we would not be talking 
about sport at all. The fact that some can be described completely in 
instrumental or 'purposive' terms and some cannot, is neither here nor 
there; the value of all sports, by definition must be predominantly about 
the realization of physical skill. in some sports this will. be achieved by 
aiming within the rules for certain independently specifiable objectives and, 
in otherýsby performing pre-prescribed movements that for different reasons 
are difficult to perform which also have to fulfil aesthetic criteria. 
Best comes nearest to recognising this when he talks about I closing the 
gap' . He says that even 
in the case of the aesthetic sports there is still 
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to a very limited extent an externally identifiable aim: for example the 
requirements set by each particular movement in gymnastics and that it is 
also possible to consider purposive sports from the aesthetic point of view; 
and he argues: 'these considerations help reduce the gap between means 
and end, which is not fundamental and cuts across any kind of aesthetic 
character a particular sport may or may not have' (26). 
But these observations, while not incorrect, still fail to show an appreciation 
of the underlying nature of sport, whether defined by aesthetic criteria or 
not. For example Best says 'from a purely purposive point of view any way 
of winning (within the rules) will do' (27). This makes it look as if the end 
is valued as an end, and providing it is achieved it does not matter what 
means are used. But of course it does matter how. If it turns out the end 
can be achieved very easily then the end is changed or different means of 
achieving the end are invented to make it more difficult to do so. Even 
though Best acknowledges that while in purposive sports the end (which can 
be specified independently of the manner of achieving it) can only be 
achieved by conforming to the limits set by the rules or norms, he fails to 
point out the importance of these rules in determining the whole character 
of the sport. ForI would arguethe rules are there solely in order to bring 
about certain means of achieving the end, namely means that will demonstrate 
skill and it is within these means that the value and point of the activity 
lie. As B. Suits argues, in the article already referred to, 'if we were playing 
a game in order to achieve an instrumental end, how absurd the activity would 
then become. If all I wanted to do, for example, was to put a ball into a 
small hole, why should I make the task so difficult for myself by putting 
unnecessary obstacles in the way' (28). We accept the rules that make the 
obstacles obligatory, Suits argues, because it makes the activity possible; 
and I would argue further that we accept the rules because of the intrinsic 
value we attach to the physical skill required in trying to overcome such 
limitations . 
It is of the utmost importance that while we can, as Best has done, talk of 
some sports in 'purposive' terms one has to always qualify this by saying 
according to the rules' . It is the rules which define the game and only 
exist to bring about what comes to characterise the activity. For example, 
its technical and tactical features. If it could be found, therefore, that 
changing the rules would increase the standard of the game, for example, by 
making the end or ends more difficult to achieve, we would not hesitate to do it. 
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In relation to aesthetic sports, Best supports his argument that how one 
performs certain movements is not incidental but central to these sports by 
citing the fact that how one performs a particular movement is actually 
written into the name we give to the movement itself. But this argument is 
just as relevant in I purposive sports' . Once certain ways of securing the 
end are mastered they are also given technical names, for example, I dribbling' , 
I hurdling' ,I cradling' , (not any way of a player getting the 
ball up the 
field would count as I dribbling' just as not any way of dropping into the 
water would count as a dive). Unlike a dive or a vault these do not imply 
aesthetic norms but they certainly imply technical ones. It is because 
certain techniques such as the above characterise a particular sport we have 
good reason, if they are found to be missing, to say that the sport in question 
is not going on, even though the rules are being adhered to and the parti- 
cipants are trying to secure an independently specifiable end. This often 
seems to be justified when novices are trying to play, for example, a game 
of hockey or tennis. 
2. C. Bailey on games and winning. A similar lack of insight can, I 
think, be found in what C. Bailey has to say on the nature of games in 
Physical Education, (29) for he too fails to consider that what can be 
demonstrated to be the logical point of games and competitive activities may 
not be the same as the point of these activities in the more fundamental 
sense of why they exist at all. 
His main concern is a very real one - namely that because games are 
essentially competitive they may be inappropriate as a compulsory part of 
general education. In particular he considers that it certainly means that 
there are strong arguments for saying that games cannot help, as has been 
commonly thought, in a child's moral education. (See chapter eleven pp. 301-315 
for a discussion on how physical education might contribute to a child' s 
moral education. ) 
His main argument is that the notion of winning lies logically and conceptually 
at the heart of that family of concepts constituting the idea of competitive 
games and is not, therefore, I so easily dispensed with or diminished in 
importance as might be imagined' (30). He says to try to pretend that winning 
is an unavoidable consideration is to deny the logic of games for not only is 
the notion of winning unavoidable but it is crucial to the point of the 
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enterprise. On this basis he concludes that I we are in games talking about 
activities where basically what is celebrated is the desire for individuals 
and groups to demonstrate their superiority over other individuals or 
groups' (31). 
Now, as others like K, Thompson '(32) and S. J. Parry (33) have argued, 
Bailey's account of games rests entirely on the notion of I the point of the 
activity' S. J. Parry, for example, says that of course it is logically true 
that in order to play one has to try to win-, but this does not mean that 
you have to have winning as your reason for playing. Parry gives 
Thompson's example of the businessman who whilst he plays must necessarily 
play to win, but where his reason for playing is relaxation and to keep 
fit (34). This is, however, an unfortunate example because it means Parry, s 
criticism is not as effective as it might have been, for there is a stronger 
meaning of the point of an activity, which does not refer to a person's 
individual motive at any particular time. Bailey could therefore well retort 
to Parry' s criticism that he would not deny that participants in a game could 
have many different motives, but that these are a contingent matter whereas 
the desire to win is a motive a person must necessarily have if he is going to 
engage in the activity. 
If we think Bailey is wrong, what we have to try to show is that what he 
puts forward as a motive does not have to be described as a motive at a. 11, 
in other words we have to show, as Parry does indeed attempt to do, that 
Bailey is wrong in describing the fact one necessarily has to try to win if 
one is to play as a necessary desire to win, and I would suggest the best 
way of doing this would be to look more closely into the notion of winning. 
3. Winniag. To say one is playing to win does not in itself explain a 
person's motive for playing, rather as Parry argues (35) it simply points 
to a necessary truth about engaging in competitive games. When someone 
says, 'I only play to win' , we have to probe further, we have to find out 
what for that person the winning is a means to. As winning is a purely 
formal notion it cannot be the winning itself which he values but it could 
either be, (1) what it gives him - money, fame, someone's hand in marriage, 
or, (2) what it demonstrates, - his superiority over the other side. If 
winning is said to be all important then it is only because of those values 
already attached to the winning. We only value winning because of what is 
won or because what. that winning demonstrates, namely our superiority, 
gives us personal satisfaction. 
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Now where the desire to win is a result of valuing what there is to be won, 
this, as a motive, cannot be described as anything but a contingent one. 
For while it is indeed possible to win prizes, money and fame from playing 
and there are plenty of people for whom playing games is a profession, 
nevertheless, in these cases what is won is extrinsic to the activity itself 
qua competitive game - it is not the necessary result of playing asfor 
example, during the course of a game of basketball gaining possession of the 
ball must be. 
In other kinds of competition which fit into the kind of analysis thaý for 
example,, R. Dearden gives, where A and B are in competition for X and 
where A gaining X must exclude B from gaining it, (36) there is a prima 
facie justification for saying that they are trying to win because they value 
what there is to be won, because this is the reason for there being the 
competition in the first place. If they could gain X without having to compete 
there would be no reason for the competition. 
But in sport we value the competitive activity itself. The point of the 
activity lies not in what there is to be won but what has to be done in order 
to win. Imagine in a situation where tribal groups are fighting over limited 
food supplies, a particular group goes to a'place where they believe food to 
be found but in the custody of another tribe. When they get there they 
find the food has been left unguarded and delighted and relieved they take 
the food home. Compare that event to where the group, whoon finding the 
food readily available are disappointed and who instead of taking it home, hang 
around hoping the other tribe will turn up so they can fight for it first; 
or consider that they do meet some opposition but that it is very weak so 
they have no difficulty in overcoming it. Now imagine that after showing 
their overwhelming superiority instead of taking the food and going home 
they decide that as the standard of fighting had not been up to much they 
would like to engage the enemy again. Perhaps they invite the other tribe 
(at least those who are left of them) to go back and get some better fighters, 
and after this both sides get together to devise certain rules to put up 
certain obstacles in order to make it more difficult to fight so that more skill 
is called for. If all this was to happen the ensuing battle would have taken 
on something of the character of a game, for in a game opposing teams have 
to cooperate. They have to voluntarily get together and agree to be bound 
by the rules if there is to be a competition at all and they do it not because 
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they value something extrinsic to the activity for which the competition is 
only the means of getting it, (this is often the case for those firms trying 
to win export orders) but because they value the competitive activity itself. 
There is a difference in games between where the desire to win refers to 
what is contingently attached to winning and where it refers to what Is 
necessarily attached to it. It is a difference, the Importance of which Parry 
does not consider sufficiently and it is because of this difference that 
Bailey's argument is stronger than Parry's allows for. For while playing 
for money like playing to feel relaxed and get fit are only based on personal 
considerations and are only contingently connected to winning, where one 
plays in order to win because by winning one can show oneself to be 
superior, there ba logical connection. For while it is not a logical conse- 
quence of playing a game that one feels relaxed and fitter or wins a prize 
of some kind, it is a logical consequence that one knows which individual 
team or player is better. 
We need then to look again at the distinction between personal motives 
(which could be quite idiosyncratic) and the point of the game which lies 
in the nature of the activity rather than in the participants' reason for 
playing at any particular time. I would argue that while there is indeed, 
by definition, a competitive point to the activity, this is dependent on there 
being a more fundamental one which explains why the activity exists at all, 
and in the way that it does. Although a game must necessarily show one 
performer to be superior to another, if this is valued and can therefore be 
seen to serve as a motive, it is only because what a performer can show 
he is superior at is valued in the first place. The value of winning does 
not lie beyond the game (as it does in other kinds of competition), rather 
it is to be found by what happened within the game. We have to know why 
we value the game intrinsically first, before we can know why we value 
being superior at it. I have already argued that we value those games 
which can be described as sport because they make possible the realization 
of physical skill, which is valued as an end in itself and because of the 
satisfaction the performer gets from learning to move skilfully. 
Now, Bailey makes it sound as if the development of physical skill could 
only be valued as a means to winning, but this is to misconceive the nature 
of sport altogether, for as I have argued what counts as winning is 
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contrivado It Is based on an artificial sot up to make the activity possible 
and enable what Is Intrinsically valued - namely physical skill to be realized 
and assessed. I have also argued that It is because of the compotitivo 
nature of some sports that standards are likely to go up, because as the 
opposition Improves so It becomes harder to win and so greater skiU 
Is 
called for, and this, I suggest, is the true point of the games being 
competitive - it means standards of play (whether understood 
In technical 
or tactical terms) are likely to go on getting better. It is also possible 
for 
the reasons given earlier to be able to recognise quality of play in a game, 
independently of knowing the score, so we can acknowledge the 
brilliance 
of a performer's physical skill even though he loses. And a person can 
see the point of playing even if he knows beforehand that he is unlikely 
to win. 
Of course there will always be those who do not actually value Intrinsically 
the physical skilful nature of a sporting activity, but who will play to win 
in that narrow sense where they simply want the psychological satisfaction 
of winning and where the activity is seen simply as a means to that end. 
They may not even like playing but they just happen to be good at it. 
But this could be true in all activities and not just competitive ones, providing 
the craft, hobby, intellectual pursuit, creative activity, performative art or 
whatever is universally valued to a high degree. If a person is good and if 
there is the opportunity for comparisons to be made, he can use this to show 
himself to be superior to others and to get satisfaction from so doing. In 
these cases there is again no reason why he necessarily values what he is 
good at in any intrinsic sense. 
4. Educational implications. Bailey is concerned that because games are 
competitive by nature that we are therefore 'essentially, centrally, teaching 
pupils to win' (37) land that this goes against a certain view of education, 
namely, that education is to do with the development of fundamental knowledge 
and understanding and has nothing at all to do with helping people to 
demonstrate their superiority over others' (38). He argues on the lines 
that Dearden has also argued (39), that a person can gain knowledge and 
understanding without loss to anybody else, but this apparently is not the 
case in competitive games. 'Here we have the difficulty of harnessing any 
genuine educational purposes to those specifically competitive activities and 
secondly there is the difficulty therefore of justifying cOmPOtitive games 
in an educational context' (40). 
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But these are problems only if one thinks that winning to the exclusion of 
others winning is the fundamental point of playing games. But as I have 
argued, unlike other kinds of competition where the reason they take place 
is dependent on something of value standing independently of the competitive 
activity which all competing parties want but only one can have to the 
exclusion of everyone else, in sport what is valued lies within the game 
itself. The opposition far from preventing one from getting what one wants, 
enables one to get it - namely a contest of physical skill. There is 
absolutely no reason why any player or team of players should prevent any 
other player from becoming as skilful as the activity and the person' a ability 
allow. In fact as I have shown the opposite is more likely to be the case. 
just because in a particular game one side loses and therefore falls to show 
its superiority does not mean it cannot show itself to be extremely good. 
And conversely, why even though a team by winning shows itself to be 
superior, its performance cannot be assessed as being extremely poor. It 
is in the nature of sporting activities that they offer the opportunity for 
us to learn to move more and more skilfully and to get satisfaction from so 
doing. It is because of this that most players who win a game but without 
having to show the level of skill they are capable of are disappointed and 
get less satisfaction from playing than those who know they played as 
skilfully as they could although in the end they lost the game. 
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CHAPTER TEN: DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER(2) 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND AESTHETIC VALUES 
A. AESTHETIC VALUES AND VALUES IN ART 
Having in the previous chapter looked at those specific values to be found in 
sport because of the satisfaction to be gained from learning to move skilfully, 
I now wish to turn to the other main kind of satisfaction that can be gained 
from participating in P. E. activities and that is satisfaction of an aesthetic 
kind. 
i AESTHETIC VALUES 
If the concept of the aesthetic could be explained simply in terms of making 
a purely sensual response, then it would be difficult to see the need for 
education in enabling a child to have aesthetic experiences. But given that 
the subjects' response is logically inseparable from the object and can only 
be identified by reference to the nature of that object (1), and given what 
might be involved in understanding and the making of it both requiring 
initiation, then it is possible to argue a case for aesthetic education. 
It is because the aesthetic experience or response is logically tied to the 
object and demands judgment, where the reasons given for one, s aesthetic 
satisfaction (or otherwise) lie in the nature of the object (2), that it is 
possible to talk of aesthetic satisfaction being non-detachable (3) and 
aesthetic appreciation being normative. As Kant said, I the judgment- of 
taste requires the agreement of everyone, and he who describes anything as 
beautiful claims that everyone ough to give his approval to the object in 
question and also describe it as beautiful' (4) ; and similarly, R. Scruton, 
echoing Kant, has written: 
Ia normative attitude seeks to found agreement in reason and not in 
some chance convergence of opinion. -A man with a normative attitude 
to X feels that others should recognise the qualities that he likes or 
admires in X and on this basis come to like X for themselves, . (5) 
The normative nature of aesthetics is only too evident when one looks at all 
the different aesthetic activities which have evolved over a period of time 
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where there are definitive rules and procedures for how they are to bo 
conducted and for judging what counts as aesthetic quality. This is not 
only true in the arts (which, in fact, it may be least true of complicated 
as they are with other values to do with uniqueness and life meanings) but 
in simpler aesthetic activities as well, like landscape gardening, fashion design, 
gymnastics, aeronautic displays, home decorating an d hairdressing. 
These kinds of activities are highly normative and because of the agreement 
that has been sought after and found in the past, aesthetic appreciation and 
aesthetic creativity are invariably only possible after initiation into the rules 
and principles that have actually come to govern these activities. Of course 
it has to be acknowledged that rules are continually changing, so that, for 
example, the dress which is prized as 'sheer elegance' one year is described 
as 'old fashioned' 'out of date' the next. But this does not alter the need 
to understand the rules operating at the time, the ones that have gone but 
from which new ones have emerged and the ones that are more everlasting. 
Although a lot of aesthetic understanding of this kind is just picked up 
generally by living in society, the school can still have a role to play in 
initiating children into different aesthetic values and activities. Even with 
something as simple as appreciating a rose it may be necessary to point out 
to a small child that its beauty lies in its fragrance and simplicity as well 
as its colour and texture and its power to inspire poets. Examples of 
material objects like perambulators and lampshades could also be given; for 
the child can be made aware that aesthetic features are not only a part of 
the natural but also of the man-made world. 
It is interesting that those who argue for the need to understand the 
aesthetic in terms of taking up a special attitude, often argue that this is 
necessary because of the tendency we have, at least for most of the time, to 
view the world purely instrumentally, for example, that we see objects simply 
as signs and as the means to fulfil our purposes(6). Yet it seems to me 
that this overstates the case, for while it may be true that our perception of 
the world is largely instrumental this does not prevent it from being aesthetic 
as well. Most man-made products, I would suggest, are viewed aesthetically 
as well as functionally by both maker and consumer. There are few people 
who buy a motor car who are only interested in its mechanical efficiency. 
Even our cutlery we can find aesthetically pleasing, distasteful or just plain. 
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In any case it is insufficient to define. the aesthetic in terms of taking up 
a special attitude (7) although this has often been dQne in the literature 
written on aesthetic values in Physical Education and Sport (8) (this has 
been variously expressed in terms of: attending to the object disinterestedly 
quite apart from any instrumental* use (9); perceiving in a contemplative 
way (10), seeing and appreciating the object for its own sake (11)) for 
these do not specify, except perhaps negatively, the kind of judgment on 
which the aesthetic experience is based. And there are many 
things which, 
for example, are viewed disinterestedly and for their own sake, which we 
would not wish to describe as aesthetic (like an intrinsic interest someone 
might have in the working mechanism of clocks). In order that we can 
understand the content of our aesthetic experiences we have to refer 
to the 
value necessarily attached to the sensible qualities in the aesthetic object - 
to the way the object looks, the way it sounds, tastes or feels. 
It Is because aesthetic considerations enter into a great deal of what we see, 
hear, feel, etc., that Duchampl s submission of a urinal as a work of art is 
thought by some to be plausible. Indeed the success of a lot of so called 
minimal art is due to the fact that we take a lot of what we perceive 
aesthetically for granted. Minimal art reminds us of these values by 
abstracting objects from the everyday world and placing them under the 
aesthetic spot light. 
Education also has a part to play, not only in making children aware of those 
aesthetic considerations operating in their everyday world, but in getting 
them to actually participate in the making of aesthetic objects. This aspect 
of a child's aesthetic education is often undermined and classified as 
recreation rather than education. However, I would suggest that when this 
happens it is largely because the distinction has not been made sufficiently 
clear between aesthetic values on the one hand and those to do with art on 
the other. Aesthetic education has all too often been equated with art 
education, where the main focus must be on getting children to understand 
and appreciate works of art. When practical activities like painting and craft 
work are also referred to as 'art education' this term is thought to be 
something of a misnomer because, clearly, apart from the very rare exceptions 
most children's work does not aspire to the condition of art. As a consequence 
these practical activities then become educationally discredited. 
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But if the distinction between the two concepts I aesthetic' and I art' is 
accepted then we can justify these activities on quite different grounds from 
our appreciation of works of art; that is, we can justify them because of 
their aesthetic value, where aesthetic enjoyment can qome from doing, making 
and creating and not simply contemplating, but where we are not trying to 
pretend that children are actually producing works of art, G. Dickiel s 
classificatory definition of art being apposite here(12). For Dickie defines 
art in a descriptive and non-evaluative sense as: (1) an artefact, (2) a set 
of aspects which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for 
appreciation, by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain 
institution - the art world. It is an advance on many other definitions of art, 
because, although it does not enable us to determine the grounds on which 
a work of art is evaluated as a work of art and therefore provides no insight 
into the nature of art (and it has been criticised for this (13)), it does do 
justice to art as an open concept and the idea of art as a creative on-going 
enterprise, where what counts as art is open to change and criticism. And 
although as a definition it is non-stipulative and value free, nevertheless, as 
a formula it does preserve the need for what is put forward as art to be 
subjected to evaluative tests by those who are socially recognised as experts. 
Now, there are many activities which are rightly described as aesthetic ones 
(even if they are instrumental ones as well) which do not involve making 
works of art but where being able to appreciate and participate in them 
involves learning and initiation. Furthermore, these activities will vary in 
the degree to which they demand creative and original work from the 
participant. Some, like vaulting and ski jumping, will depend only on learning 
and carrying out aesthetic rules agreed upon and already laid down. Others, 
like educational gymnastics, will necessitate, if they are to be engaged in at 
all, originality from the performer. 
Looking at education as I have done, as learning which promotes the develop- 
ment of the person _qua 
person, then it can be said that as aesthetic experience 
and understanding can help in the development of the person as both an agent 
and as a centre of experience (14), then, on this account, aesthetic activities 
can be legitimately regarded as being of educational value. (See chapter 
eleven. ) 
However, this is not to say that art may not be of greater educational value, 
because it is not only concerned with aesthetic values, but social values as 
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well and the value we attach to experiencing human emotions', and it may 
therefore have more significance for us in our development as persons. 
ji VALUES IN ART 
Beardsmore in an interesting article, I Two Trends in Contemporary 
Aesthetics' (15), suggests that the most obvious way in which the appreciation 
of a novel differs from that of a sunset is that it makes sense to talk of 
learning from a novel in a way that it makes no sense to talk of learning 
from a sunset. 
Beardsmore says the man who sees a sunset may wonder at what he sees, at 
the kaleidoscope of colours, the lines and shapes but he will never have to 
wonder what to make of it (16). But in art we do just this - we look for 
meaning and significance, because art demands from us much more than the 
ability to perceive and enjoy aesthetic features. Indeed, it is because of the 
'human' dimension in art that it is possible to find works of art worthwhile 
without finding them enjoyable, perhaps because they are too disturbing or 
depressing in their message. Part of the reason why we value works of 
art, then, is not because of any kind of aesthetic satisfaction but because of 
what we can learn from them. Although this is not to deny the importance 
of valuing the work of art as a work of art on its own terms and as an end 
in itself: if a work of art cannot be reduced to aesthetic values this is not 
to say it can be reduced to human or social ones either. A point that perhaps 
needs to be borne in mind when reading Beardsmorel s article. 
In the same article, Beardsmore describes Orwell's example of the experience 
of a journalist who on seeing a dead German soldier has the meaning of war 
finally brought home to him. Beardsmore argues that what he has learnt is 
not a piece of information - that men die in wars, but what war is like. It 
is this kind of learning - insight into human experience that can be gained 
from art. Often this experience can only be understood in terms of human 
emotion and it is presumably for this reason that art is often described as 
being expressive of emotion where this includes all the arts - music, dance 
and drama as well as the narrative. While as an account of art it has largely 
been discredited, it is still true to say that it is because of the strong 
connection between art and human emotion which may be a necessary rather 
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than just a contingent one, that art often demands a different kind of 
response from us than an object that only has formal aesthetic appeal 
(although I am not denying that obviously many works of art come under 
only this latter description). This means where someone correctly appraises 
a work of art but has no emotional response to it, we would question 
whether he had adequately experienced it as a work of art. 
The need for an emotional response where we commit and identify ourselves 
with the work of art is well argued for by R. KE]liott in his article, 'Aesthetic 
Theory and the Experience of Art' , where he talks of experiencing- the work 
from within for which no exquisiteness of taste can compensate' (17). And 
he also argues that if a work of art is not experienced at an emotional level 
it is possible that the perceptual features, for example of a painting, will 
not all emerge. He describes I Roualt' s flight into Egypt, and says: 
I It would be quite insignificant if it did not have the power suddenly 
to make it seem that we are actually there, in an unbounded landscape, 
with the sky extending over us in a chill dawn ....... If we value a 
work because it offers us such an experience we may be inclined, for 
want of a better word, to call it "vivid" or "realistic" but the relevant 
aesthetic properly cannot be adequately described except by reference 
to the shift in the subject's point of view 1 (18). 
There are, then, dimensions of art education which are missing in other 
aesthetic activities. Clearly, to appreciate and to respond appropriately to 
a particular work of art it is necessary to acquire the relevant knowledge and 
understanding. Nevertheless, in the end, as with simpler aesthetic activities, 
it is the first hand experience which counts. The value of art is caught as 
well as taught, the subjective response being all important. For example, as 
Reid argues, knowledge about music is necessary for musical understanding 
but knowing abou music, if that means knowledge which is centrally focussed 
in statements, is never equivalent to knowing music (19). It is, however, 
questionable whether Reid is right to talk of aesthetic experience as knowledge, 
however, I would maintain that it is still of educational value even if Reid is 
wrong on this because, as I argued previously, the development of the 
person depends on what he comes to value where this is not only the result 
of what he comes to know. 
Furthermore, the fact that as persons we come to hold aesthetic and artistic 
values, not just because of what we are taught but in the final analysis 
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only because of how we are able to respond, whether to the natural or man- 
made world around us, does not mean that these values are not of legitimate 
concern for educators, or that we have to accept that there are limitations on 
how far education can contribute to a child' s aesthetic development. For 
I would argue aesthetic education is not only about teaching aesthetic 
principles apparent in a particular activity or giving those criteria relevant 
to judging an aesthetic object or work of art. It should also be about putting 
children in the way of experiences of giving them the right opportunities so 
they can I respond' I catch' ,I delight in', - aesthetic objects, activities and 
works of art. And with particular reference to art, I would say the importance 
of its appreciation in education is not, simply to be found in the I act of 
contemplation and that it is possible to get children to understand and 
experience works of art by taking a much more active role. In many art 
forms there is the opportunity for appreciation to come by the children 
actually performing, however badly, rather than from being mere spectators. 
To teach children to recite poetry, act parts in a play, perform dances, to 
sing and play musical works can help children to respond to and to appreciate 
art from the inside, as well as giving children, at the same time, the chance 
to exercise their own creative and imaginative powers, through both inter- 
pretation and in producing their own original work. 
Finally, it should be said that the distinction between art and aesthetic 
activities is rarely as clear cut as I have suggested. Aesthetic aspects are 
important in our appreciation of art and aesthetic activities are not always 
just concerned with formal qualities. Dance, painting, music, creative 
writing, for example, can be taught to children so that they can try themselves 
to find and convey to others through an artistic medium what Martha Graham 
once referred to as the great matters Of the heart. 
B. PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND AESTHETIC VALUES 
In recent years a considerable amount of literature has been written on 
physical education and the aesthetic. Mostly, philosophers who have considered 
the connection between the two, while being critical of Carlisle's account, 
(which has already been referred to in the previous chapter, see PP-190-193) 
have agreed that aesthetic values are to be found in P. E. activities, either 
from the point of view of the spectator, or the participant, or both, sometimes 
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contingently, at other times because, like dance, they actually define the 
activities. On this basis it has been concluded by some that physical 
education could have a part to play in a child' s aesthetic education. The 
degree to which this is argued for varies depending on the position a 
philosopher has taken. 
Carlisle, for one, would clearly see aesthetic education as the main role of 
physical education because he argues that the aesthetic provides a unifying 
concept of physical education and that, not only dance, but all P. E. activities 
performed at their best constitute art. Then there are those like 
D. C. Meakin, D. Aspin and L. A. Reid who would not go so far as Carlisle, 
but nevertheless would argue the contribution P. E. might make to a child's 
aesthetic education could be considerable, because in some P. E. activities 
the aesthetic is necessarily characteristic of them and because it can be 
experienced in all of them, if only incidentally. And thep finally, there are 
those like Best who emphasise that, with the exception of dance, P. E. activities 
are not artistic ones that in most of them the aesthetic element is incidental, 
but who, nonetheless, would not deny that aesthetic satisfaction can be 
gained by both participating and spectating. but who do not attempt to use 
this connection as a way of justifying physical education. 
Unfortunately, where the aesthetic has been looked at in relation to physical 
education (and this has often been in connection with its justification) there 
have been some serious weaknesses, the main ones, I would suggest, being 
as follows: 
(a) It is often assumed that to show an activity has aesthetic value is 
sufficient to show it also has educational value, but clearly whether aesthetic 
values can also be considered to be educational ones is a prior question 
which has to be answered first, and this can only be done on the basis of 
the meaning of education one is defending. Very often this question remains 
unanswered because no definition of education is put forward and defended 
in the first place. 
(b) Because the aesthetic has been defined in terms of attitude or 
disinterested mode of perception, this has necessarily meant that all P. E. 
activities (and not only dance), are potentially of aesthetic value, providing 
the correct attitude is taken up. Certainly philosophers, like Reid, do 
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make a distinction between an object which has negative and an object which 
has positive value for the perceiver, so that while in one sense anything 
whatever can be held as an aesthetic object, only sometimes is the object 
aesthetic, in the sense of having positiv aesthetic value for the perceiver. 
However, as it is also argued that P. E. activities tend to have this positive 
aesthetic value wherever they come up to a particular standard and the 
performers exhibit a certain level of skill, this tends to make it impossible 
for P. E. activities (and this includes all sporting activities) not to have at 
least potential aesthetic value. - 
(c) The distinction between art and the aesthetic Is not always made, with 
the consequence it is often argued that because sport can be shown to be 
of aesthetic value and because sporting activities are intentionally carried 
out by an agent, then sporting activities are forms of art. Sometimes the 
line taken is slightly less strong, although equally indefensible, that it is 
only in those activities where the performers' intentions are actually aesthetic 
ones is it right to call them forms of art and to refer to the performers as 
artists. 
(d) The assumption is usually made that even if sporting activities do not 
come up to the mark, at least dance is an art form and can be justified as 
a part of art education. It is usually acknowledged that there are different 
forms of dance, which are not all defined by artistic criteriabut that at 
least modern educational dance is an art form. But even this may be to 
claim too much, it is certainly a creative and aesthetic activity but it Is 
questionable to say the least whether it can be classified as art. 
(e) There is insufficient attention paid to the importance of whether the 
aesthetic value to be found in physical education is from the point of view 
of the spectator or the participant. Very often, for example, it is thought 
to be enough that aesthetic value can be found, particularly in sport, by 
watching it, but this does not establish that there is aesthetic value in it 
for those who are participating as performers and this must matter when one 
is considering a justification for physical education, because the term we 
are interested in refers to active participation in physical activities. 
In the account I shall give below of how the aesthetic and artistic values 
characterise P. E. activities I hope to try and avoid these kinds of weaknesses. 
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Firstly, I have already established that aesthetic values can be also seen 
as educational ones and I have done this on the basis of the meaning of 
education I have put forward and defended as: learning which promotes 
the development of the person cLuaperson. However, I shall leave the 
question of how this helps in the justification of physical education until 
the next chapter. 
Secondly, at the beginning of this section I have also spent time defining 
terms, and at least I cannot be accused of conflating the aesthetic with art 
and I shall continue to keep the two quite separate. Furthermore, in 
defining the aesthetic very specifically in terms of the non-detachable 
satisfaction gained which can only be explained in terms of the perceptual 
qualities of an I object' ,I have given definite criteria which can be applied 
to P. E. activities. At this stage it remains an open question as to whether 
they can fulfil these criteria or not. 
Thirdly, I shall not, when considering dance and the aesthetic assume that 
modem educational dance is an art form, but shall consider its actual nature 
as it is taught under the name of physical education and in the light of what 
has been said earlier in this chapter on the concept of art. 
And lastly, as my interest with justifying physical education is in those 
physical activities which are participant ones, I shall concentrate throughout 
on the positive aesthetic value that dance or sport might have for the 
performer rather than the spectator. I shall try and avoid the mistake of 
assuming that because it can be shown that sport or dance gives aesthetic 
satisfaction to the one it therefore follows it gives aesthetic satisfaction to 
the other. 
I shall now consider the aesthetic in physical education under the following 
headings: 
Sport and The Aesthetic 
(a) where aesthetic criteria define at least in part the nature of 
sporting activities. 
(b) where aesthetic values are found incidentally in sport. 
1. the kinaesthetic sense. 
2. the enjoyment of natural beauty. 
ii Dance and The Aesthetic 
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i SPORT AND THE AESTHETIC 
(a) Where Aesthetic Criteria Define At Least In Part The Nature of. 
P. E. Activities 
The strongest case for trying to show that physical education activities 
have aesthetic value is usually made by reference to those activities where 
aesthetic criteria actually define their nature and how they are to be judged. 
D. C. Meakin, for example, in his article 'Aesthetic Appraisal and Human 
Movement' (20) argues that unlike other P. E. activities where the aesthetic 
is purely incidental, so they can be learnt and engaged in without any 
appreciation of their aesthetic value, in those activities which are defined 
by aesthetic criteria (for example diving, trampolining and ice skating) it 
is logically impossible to learn to engage in them without gaining aesthetic 
understanding at the same time. This is because in all these activities the 
intrinsic aim is to execute a set of movements in a manner which satisfies 
aesthetic standards. It is therefore imperative for the performer to know 
what these standards are and to be able to appraise his own performance 
according to these standards. It is then largely from this basis (i. e. that 
participating in physical education necessarily involves the aesthetic) that 
he concludes, 'it would seem that physical education has a significant part 
to play in aesthetic education' . (21). 
But there are problems with Meakin' s account, this is partly because he 
rests a great deal on the performer's ability to appraise his performance 
during its course. This, according to Meakin, is necessary if the 
performer is to fulfil his intrinsic aim - performing according to aesthetic 
standards. But I would wish to argue that as the criteria are visual ones 
and as he cannot see his own performance, at least while he is performing, 
he must be dependent on a coach and/or a video tape machine to be able 
to do it, this means, normally and at least while he is learning, any 
appraisal the performer makes must be done retrospectively. The only 
possible way that he might be able to appraise his performance while it is 
taking place would be, if through a lot of training and experience, he has 
already achieved success and has come to know kinaesthetically, that is 
through the sensations of his own movements, how well he has performed 
these movements, according to the aesthetic criteria operative in that 
activity. But what has to be accepted here is that it would be quite 
possible for someone else who has not learnt how to do this, still to have 
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gained knowledge of the aesthetic principles that govern the activity he is 
trying to engage in. It may be, for example, that he is still at the stage 
where, although he knows the movement he is supposed to be doing, he does 
not know if he has got it right or not and he does not know what it would 
feel like to get it right (for example, the thief vault in gymnastics) and 
therefore he is unable to appraise his performance while he is moving. 
In any case, I cannot see why it is important to Meakin' s account whether 
or not a performer is able to appraise his performance during its course. 
For, -At 
is not, as I have just acknowledged, that it is impossible for the 
performer to do this, but rather I can see no logical necessity why he has 
to do this simply because he is engaging in activities defined by aesthetic 
criteria and which are necessarily aesthetic in character. There is no 
reason why he cannot engage in these activities but leave the appraisal, 
while he is actually moving to others, especially when in the end it is the 
observer's appraisal that counts. As Best has argued, that it feels right 
is no guarantee that it is right(22)1. While kinaesthetic feelings enable us 
to know through experience and constant correction what we are doing and 
how well we are doing it, it never acts as a criterion of aesthetic quality. 
(See below. ) 
Meakin could quite easily have made his point that a person necessarily 
gains knowledge of aesthetic principles by engaging in certain sporting 
activities without having to make this rest on the performer's ability to 
appraise his performance during its course. The only reason why drawing 
attention to this ability might be important would be if one wanted to argue 
that sporting activities could provide the opportunity, not only for gaining 
knowledge of the aesthetic principles that govern them, but also for some 
kind of kinaesthetic satisfaction which might, as certainly the name suggests, 
be an aesthetic experience in its own right. We shall return to considering 
the validity of this kind of claim later in the chapter. 
Other philosophers attempting to justify physical education, like Carlisle, 
have gone even further and suggested that as certain P. E. activities are 
defined by aesthetic criteria they can be described as forms of art. As 
we saw earlier, this kind of extreme position is just one of the consequences 
of conflating the meaning of the aesthetic with that of art. Because the 
word 'aesthetic' is applied both outside art and specifically to art it 
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becomes as easy step to start describing anything that can be classified 
as an aesthetic activity as an artistic one as well. 
The relationship between the aesthetic and art, and whether either or both 
are to be found in P. E. activities has long been of interest to L. A. Reid. 
In his article, 'Aesthetic and Education' (23), he acknowledges that while 
it would be wrong to classify sport as art simply because it can be 
incidentally of aesthetic value, there may be a case for saying an element 
of art can be found in sport and that the performer may be something 
- 
of 
an artist, but only in those activities where aesthetic criteria are intrinsic 
to them and where the intention of the performer is, partly at least, 
aesthetic if he is going to engage in the activity at all. 
I The gymnast or ice skater may be like a working artist inasmuch as 
the aim which controls his whole practical enterprise is an aesthetically 
contemplative one, he is out to produce forrr4gwhich when perceived 
contemplatively in a certain way are aesthetically meaningful' (24). 
However, even in these activities, Reid says, we must be careful not to 
assume without examination that the qualities of which a judge has to take 
account are I artistic' qualities. I Could it beV he ask5 I that the concern 
of the judges for smoothness, rhythm, grace, etc., is a concern for strictly 
speaking functional perfections and not for genuine artistic qualities' (25). 
He goes on to suggest that the performer may simply learn prescribed 
movements with great functional skill (presumably in a way that would not 
be very different from the swimmer learning to put a stroke together to 
make his swimming as effective as possible) and he argues that it is only 
if the performer starts to make his own expressive creation that it would 
be right to describe him as an artist. 
Now while I would not wish to disagree with Reid that just because a 
performer is technically excellent and his performance is defined and 
judged by aesthetic criteria this does not make him into an artist or his 
performance into a work of art, I think it is worth emphasising that he is 
still engaged in an aesthetic activity. Just because the aesthetic rules 
are clear cut and the proper way of judging aesthetic merit, in say, 
something like gymnastics, commands considerable, if not unanimous 
agreement, and just because the performer can learn to carry out his 
movements that come up to agreed aesthetic standards without having to be 
creative or original, does not make his performance any less aesthetic or 
reduce it to achieving only functional perfection. 
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What I am trying to argue for here is a middle area where an activity can 
be aesthetic without being artistic but where even if It Is only aesthetic 
in nature, the performer cannot just be concerned with functional perfection. 
This is because 'functional perfection' suggests that the criteria which 
will be used for assessment will be to do with the efficiency and skill shown 
in the movements that are used and not by criteria determining whether the 
movements are pleasing to look at. Aesthetic activities are,. at least in part, 
and the part that matters, if we are going to call them aesthetic, concerned 
with how the object looks (and for that matter sounds, tastes or smells) 
as qualities in their own right, it is these which provide the means by which 
the performance is assessed. 
But this does not necessarily also imply that the performance has to be 
an original one. In those sporting activities which are also aesthetic ones, 
the aesthetic criteria that are operating do not necessarily allow for creativity 
but they are no less aesthetic for that. Even where they do, this is not 
necessarily taken up by the performer, for he can simply carry out the 
creative ideas of his coach; just because the performer is unoriginal does 
not mean that what he is doing is not intentionally aesthetic although it may 
be one reason for not describing him as an artist. 
We can therefore confidently assert that certain P. E. activities are by their 
nature aesthetic in that they are defined by aesthetic criteria so that those 
who participate in them can be rightly said to be engaged in aesthetic 
activities and to have aesthetic intentions, and we can say this without 
having to worry that their nature depends on fulfilling tightly defined 
rules already laid down and prescribed by others and which may leave little 
or no room for imaginative interpretation. 
This means that it is possible to argue that those engaging in certain 
sporting activities (i. e. those defined in part by aesthetic criteria) will 
necessarily gain aesthetic understanding. For, at the very least, as Meakin 
recognised, they will have to know which aesthetic criteria are to be fulfilled 
in learning how to move successfully. However, in making this claim it 
must be remembered that while it is true that certain sporting activities 
are defined by aesthetic criteria, these criteria only define a small part of 
the nature of these activities, the far greater part, as we have seen, being 
determined by criteria to do with physical skill carried out as an end in 
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itself (26). It is surely very relevant that while in certain sporting activities 
aesthetic values play their part, what matters a great deal more is the level 
of skill reached, where skill refers primarily to the ability to carry out 
difficult physical tasks, rather than the creation of aesthetic effects. After 
all a very simple movement idea which is physically very easy to execute 
may be highly effective aesthetically. Furthermore, the success of an 
activity, like some forms of modern dance, which are actually defined by 
aesthetic criteria, depends on seeing the aesthetic effects and not the 
mechanics which bring them about. But this is not the case in those 
activities, like diving, where the performance is appraised by technical and 
not just aesthetic criteria. 
It may be in some sporting activities, like figure skating and gymnastics, 
that we value a performance more highly if it is aesthetically exciting as 
well as being technically good, but I would argue that if we are still talking 
about sport the level of physical skill achieved remains the primary 
consideration. Aesthetic quality nust always be of secondary importance, 
in that however aesthetically pleasing a performance looks it must still be 
considered poor if the level of skill reached is low. In olympic gymnastics, 
for example, what is of the first importance in assessing a gymnast's 
performance is the level of difficulty of the physical tasks undertaken and 
achieved. 
In making this point I would, however, not deny that because aesthetic 
criteria are written into the nature of the tasks it may often be difficult, 
if not impossible, to distinguish between aesthetic criteria and functional 
ones. Interestingly, it is often the case that the aesthetic element can make 
the task more difficult, for example, landing simultaneously on two feet on 
completing a vault. Moreover, it is often for this reason we value the 
aesthetic - because the fulfilment of aesthetic criteria means greater skill 
is called for and not because it results in the movement having aesthetic 
quality which can be valued intrinsically (this can be well illustrated by 
the acrobat's performance at the circus which has the effect of making the 
audience gasp rather than muse, contemplate or be imaginatively inspired) 
and I would agree with Reid that when physical activities, like ice skating, 
do have this effect it is extremely debatable whether we are still watching 
sport. If we start to see and appreciate only the aesthetic quality and not 
the technique that brings it about we may well be on to something that has 
a closer affinity with dance. 
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Secondly, we have to remember that we are concerned with P. E. activities 
as participant ones. But as the relevant criteria are visual ones this must 
mean the aesthetic value of the performance is primarily intended for the 
spectator. Indeed the performer may be seen simply as a means to the 
end of the activity - the production of an object which has aesthetic value 
for others, but 'the performer as an educand must be seen as an end in 
himself and not simply a means to other people's aesthetic enjoyment. 
It has been frequently argued that sporting activities actually defined by 
aesthetic criteria must provide the best evidence for showing the importance 
of aesthetic values in physical education because, clearly, it is logically 
impossible to engage in these activities without gaining an understanding of 
the aesthetic criteria (the rules and principles which govern the activity) 
which have to be fulfilled to be successful at them. But what is so often 
ignored is that iNhile this is true, it is equally true that he could gain this 
knowledge by theoretical instruction. In short, while certain P. E. activities 
are designed to bring about aesthetic satisfaction this is primarily intended 
from the point of view of the audience, and while the participant does gain 
aesthetic knowledge and learns how to appraise his performance aesthetically 
this knowledge and ability is no different from that of the initiated 
spectator. 
What is different, however, is the performer's practical ability, his knowing 
how to execute movements that are aesthetically pleasing to look at. The 
satisfaction open to the performer is therefore very different from that of 
the spectator, for the value of what he is trying to do will come, not just 
from learning how to appraise his performance, but in learning how to get 
it right, and that means learning how to perform movements that have 
aesthetic value. This may just be a question of mastering a certain sequence 
of prescribed movements that fulfil aesthetic criteria laid down by others, 
but in a few activities, like gymnastics, the value for the performer can 
also lie in the opportunities he has for creating the aesthetic object himself. 
But even here, if we are still talking about sport, then, creativity and 
originality must be directed as much at discovery and learning how to 
execute difficult movement tasks requiring physical skin., as at the creation 
of an aesthetic object. 
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(b) Where Aesthetic Values Are To Be Found Incidentally in Sport 
1. The Kinaesthetic Sense. Since the claim was first made by Carlisle 
that the essential nature of physical education was to be found in the 
aesthetic, it has, after much debate and controversy, become generally 
recognised and accepted that in the majority of sporting activities any 
aesthetic value is largely incidental. However, it is strongly argued that 
where it is to be found it is not unimportant, being, for example, a positive 
and not just a negative value. It is therefore rather surprising considering 
the practical nature of ph ysical education, that while the possibility of 
gaining aesthetic satisfaction from athletic activities is still admitted, this 
is invariably seen as a bonus for the spectator, rather than participant. 
Perhaps, one of the reasons for this has been due to the way aesthetic has 
been defined in terms of attitude. This Is often understood at least in part 
by the idea of disinterested contemplation. Clearly this kind of attitude could 
be more realistically applied to the spectator rather than the participant. 
One would assume, for example, that the games player would be much too 
busy trying to score goals and keep up with a changing game to have the 
time to engage in any kind of aesthetic contemplation. But I would argue, in 
agreement with W. Charlton, (27) this kind of condition for an aesthetic 
experience is too restrictive, while it may be a sufficient one it is not a 
necessary condition, for there are other ways of enjoying an aesthetic object 
other than contemplating it. For example, I can see no reason why the 
aesthetic value of a poem could not be enjoyed by reciting it or a play by 
performing it. Similarly, with regard to the aesthetic potential of sporting 
activities, I think it can be argued that there Is the possibility of the 
performer as well as the spectator gaining aesthetic satisfaction from them. 
One of the main arguments against making such a case would be that if the 
aesthetic quality in sport is largely visual, then, the spectator must be in 
a better position if only because he is standing at a distance where he can 
see the entire sporting scene, and of course, the spectator does not have 
to concentrate on the mechanics and the current tactical state of the activity 
in order to watch (although he often does) as the player has to in order to 
play. But against this it may be possible to argue that the performer can 
appreciate his own movements aesthetically through different means only open 
to himself. 
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D. Best, for example, considers that aesthetic satisfaction can be experienced 
by the performer and not just the spectator. He describes the batsman's 
aesthetic experience where he plays a perfectly timed cover drive, as 
intrinsic to what he is doing, in that 'his experience is logically Inseparable, 
from the stroke he is playing(28). He suggests the experience can occur 
concurrently with the functional action which the player is carrying out 
which need not depend on a detached or retrospective contemplation. He 
concludes that: 1he sees no reason to deny, indeed he sees good reason to 
insist that one can have what are most appropriately called aesthetic feelings 
while actually performing the activity' (29). However, he hesitates to describe 
these as wholly kinaesthetic, he says, 'kinaesthetic' or 'tactile' would not 
tell the whole story by any means, since producing the same physical 
movement in a quite different context, for instance, in a laboratory, could 
not count as producing the same feeling. Best sees the relationship between 
the feeling and the overall purpose of the movement being particularly 
important in defining the aesthetic feeling of the performer. 
But, while I would not deny the importance of context in explaining the whole 
nature of the performers' aesthetic experience, nevertheless, I would argue 
that kinaesthetic satisfaction has to be examined on its own, because, unlike 
other kinds of satisfaction this sense is peculiar to physical action and 
activities. 
Indeed, in view of this, one might expect that considerable attention would 
have already been paid to it, at least by philosophers interested in physical 
education, yet, as P. Arnold has remarked, (30) despite the root meaning 
being contained within the term, (i. e. kinaesthetic), it is rarely, if ever, 
discussed in aesthetic literature as a form of perception that can provide 
aesthetic experience. 
It is also interesting that philosophers of physical education like Arnold, 
Best and Carlisle, while acknowledging that sporting activities can provide 
the opportunity for aesthetic experience through kinaesthetic sensations 
have not tried to use this dimension of physical education as a way of 
justifying it. For clearly, if it was thought, or if it could be shown, that 
children should gain aesthetic experience through'all their senses then it 
might be thought that physical education would be uniquely placed to unable 
children to find aesthetic satisfaction through their kinaesthetic sense. 
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One of the zeasons why this kind of specific kinaesthetic justification for 
physical education is never given is because of the assumption that it is 
only through sight and hearing that we can have enriching, meaningful and 
legitimate aesthetic experiences and not through, what are often called, the 
'lower' senses, like taste, touch and smell. Pole, for example, writes, 
'it is, I think, in accordance with established usage to treat only the two 
distinct senses, sight and hearing, as definitely aesthetic' (31). And Scruton 
argues that only the sense of sound and sight can be involved in aesthetic 
appreciation. He quotes Aquinas, who argues that we cannot speak of 
beautiful tastes and smells, since the perception of beauty being contemplative 
is only concerned with the more cognitive senses, namely, sight and hearing, 
he concludes that when the pleasures of the more cognitive senses approach 
the purely sensuous level characteristic of taste and smell, we tend to regard 
them as no longer aesthetic (32). 
However, while the opportunity for the expansion of aesthetic experience may 
be at its greatest through our visual and auditory senses (the fact that 
works of art are largely concerned only with these senses suggests this is 
indeed the case) there is no reason why this actually rules out the other 
senses as possible channels of aesthetic experience. The way to distinguish 
between the aesthetic and the sensual is to determine whether the satisfaction 
which is gained is of a detachable or of a non-detachable kind. If the 
experience is aesthetic its nature cannot be explained by reference to an 
inner state but only by pointing out and describing the perceptual features 
of the object of one' s satisfaction. Although many of the pleasurable 
responses which we gain through our senses will be of a sensual and not 
of an aesthetic nature there is no reason to suppose that these are restricted 
to the experience we gain from our lower senses or that it is only through 
the so called higher senses that aesthetic experiences are open to us. 
The importance of all the senses to our aesthetic experience is strongly argued 
for by H. Osborne. He says, 
I within the sensory range commonly excluded from aesthetic discussion 
sensibility can be cultivated and it would make little sense to deny that 
the sophisticated experience the Chinese connoisseur seeks and obtains 
from fingering a jade is aesthetic in character' (33). 
Now could it also be possible that the highly discriminating awareness the 
athlete has of the sensations of his own body also provide satisfaction of an 
aesthetic kind? it is to this kind of justification I now want to turn. 
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It has been frequently argued in P. E. literature that it is when movements 
become highly skilled that they take on an aesthetic dimension and that this 
is true of all P. E. activities and not only of those that are actually defined 
by aesthetic criteria. This point is usually argued for from the position of 
the observer, although, as we have seen, there are a few writerslike Best 
and Arnold,. who have argued that aesthetic satisfaction can come from 
performin skilfully. (Best gives the example of a well-executed drive in 
tennis, a finely timed stroke in squash. ) I think the connection posited here 
is correct: that very often aesthetic satisfaction becomes possible and increases 
as the movement becomes more skilful. But it is a further question why this 
is so. First of all it must be said that the connection is only a contingent 
one. There is no necessary connection between a skilful performance and 
the gaining of aesthetic satisfaction for the participant and this is just as 
true in the performance of those activities actually defined by aesthetic 
criteria. However, this is not the case with the aesthetic satisfaction the 
observer can gain from watching activities defined by aesthetic criteria, 
here there is a necessary connection between the two and this is because 
the aesthetic criteria which define them are visual ones (in other words, if 
he does not appreciate the activity aesthetically he has missed the point of 
it, or at least, as in the case of aesthetically defined sports, part of it), 
but it is not the case that what is aesthetically pleasing to look at - is 
necessaril aesthetically pleasing to perform. 
It may be, for example, like the person who learns to read braille, the 
athlete, while having considerable skill in what he is doing gains no aesthetic 
satisfaction from the activity. Perhaps the movements have become too 
familiar and automatic for this to happen, or perhaps the opposite is the 
case: the movements are new and unfamiliar, so the performer is consciously 
aware of the sensation of his own movement purely as a means of getting 
the movement right. Sometimes, even for the dancer, the movement may be 
too uncomfortable or even painful for him to get any kind of aesthetic 
pleasure, although that same movement may give the spectator a tremendous 
amount of pleasure. In the case of the games player he may be too anxious 
to win to gain much aesthetic enjoyment from his movements. Nevertheless, 
I would argue, the opportunity does exist for the performer to gain aesthetic 
satisfaction particularly where a high level of skill is reached, although it is 
not a necessary connection, it often does hold. 
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However, I would stress here that the central element of this enjoyment 
must be aesthetic. An athlete or gymnast could be gaining satisfaction just 
from moving skilfully. It is not the case that any physical activity which is 
skilfully performed and which gives intrinsic pleasure, necessarily gives us 
pleasure of an aesthetic kind, to think it does is the mistake Carlisle made, 
for he assumed that it was enough to show this, to be able to conclude the 
satisfaction gained was aesthetic. But, we come to value all kinds of things 
for the sake of the non-detachable satisfaction they can give us but this does 
not make them aesthetic. 
The criterion which refers to the actual content of our satisfaction remains 
crucial. Now it might be thought that this would refer to the kinaesthetic 
content, and it might be argued further that as P. E. activities have this 
content they are uniquely placed to enable the participant to find this kind 
of aesthetic satisfaction. But this line of argument would be quite mistaken. 
It would, I suggest, be quite possible for someone to claim that the physical 
sensations from moving were extremely pleasurable but we would not for 
that reason alone be able to describe his feelings as aesthetic ones. 
This is because, as I have already argued, for an experience to be properly 
called aesthetic, it can only be explained in terms of its object; it was for 
this reason I said earlier that I thought Scruton was right to talk of the 
tendency for the aesthetic to become normative, to at least invite the search 
for inter-subjective agreement, but how can there be agreement on what by 
their very nature are private states? 
If we try to justify the claim that the sensation of moving can bring aesthetic 
satisfaction to the performer we cannot do this just by pointing to the 
kinaesthetic experience he has while he is moving. For we would be faced 
with the same problem that others face when trying to maintain that we can 
ascribe experiences to others on the basis of the knowledge that we have of 
our own private mental life. Wittgenstein' s analogy of the beetle in the box 
being just as appropriate to our problem as it is to the underlying meta- 
physical one, regarding the existence of other persons. 
It is because aesthetic satisfaction is of a non-detachable kind it can only be 
explained in terms of the object that gives us that satisfaction, but it is 
also true that we can only rightly describe an experience as aesthetic if the 
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object is of a certain kind, that is if it is given a certain kind of description. 
It is not the case, as some seem to have thought, that anything can be 
described as aesthetic because, for example, it is 'contemplated for its own 
sake' or is I held still in attention' , for as I argued earlier this lets in too 
much, like the appreciation of a game of bridge or the interest a person 
might have in the working mechanisms of clocks(34), rather we are concerned 
with how an aesthetic object looks, feels, sounds or tastes. The reasons we 
give to explain our aesthetic judgments will therefore always refer to the 
perceptual qualities of the object(35). But how can we do this with regard 
to the aesthetic experience of movement? How can we give reasons for saying 
a movement is aesthetically good that are of a kinaesthetic kind in the way 
that we could give reasons of an auditory kind when explaining the aesthetic 
merit of a piece of music? 
How could kinaesthetic experiences, in themselves, ever, be described as 
normative? How, for example, could we search for agreement on what we 
considered to be kinaesthetically good? And, of course, the answer is we 
cannot do any of these things. 
To repeat the problem, it is simply this: the sensation of movement, unlike 
the sound of music is a private, not a public matter. We all hear the same 
piece of music, we do not all feel the same movement. And this inevitably 
means we certainly cannot explain the aesthetic value of movement 
kinaesthetically. Indeed, we can only do it one way and that, of course, 
is visually. It is only because the movements are seen that we are provided 
with public criteria, it is only because of what is visually presented that we 
can search and (in something like olympic gymnastics) find, agreement. 
If someone claimed that a movement was kinaesthetically pleasing to perform 
but visually it was aesthetically poor, we would not be presented with 
conflicting evidence on the aesthetic merit of his performance; no, the visual 
criteria would be sufficient and overriding, we would not even consider the 
performer's pr*lvate feelings as relevant in making our judgment. 
Are we then to conclude that any kinaesthetic satisfaction is purely sensuous 
and that while kinaesthetic experiences do bring us pleasure it would not be 
properly described as aesthetic pleasure? (This could mean the person who 
jumps off the board can find this as kinaesthetically satisfying as the person 
who jumps off doing a perfect triple somersault. ) 
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I think this conclusion is too strong, for I think it is possible to argue the 
case that the performer can gain aesthetic satisfaction through his performance, 
where the satisfaction is dependent on, and to some extent is derived from, 
the kinaesthetic experience of moving. 
What I wish to suggest is that the performer can also appreciate and enjoy 
the aesthetic object which is not a mysterious inner state but the movements 
which everyone (except himself) can fully observe. But the means by which 
he is able to do this will not be by watching them but by kinaesthetically 
feeling them. I have already suggested how this can come to be possible, 
that is, the performer can, through constant practice, instruction and experience 
of the correct movement, i. e. the movement which is aesthetically successful, 
(whether intentionally or otherwise) learn the fit between what the movement 
looks like aesthetically and what the movements feel like to perform. This 
means when the performer executes aesthetically successful patterns of 
movement he can know this and through the use of his imagination appreciate 
them and enjoy them. This is not to say that the performer cannot be 
mistaken*but then so can an uninitiated spectator. 
However, as my argument stands this would not make the case that there is 
a unique kind of aesthetic experience open to the performer, namely a 
kinaesthetic experience. This is because the appreciation on which the 
performeri s experience is still based is still appreciation of the visual object. 
It could therefore be said that it is no different in kind from what is gained 
by watching it, it is just that the performer's appreciation is based on know- 
ledge gained in a different way and where getting aesthetic satisfaction from 
what he is doing requires the power of his imagination. 
Now it might be thought here that what I mean is that there is one aesthetic 
object but two ways of experiencing it visually and kinaestheticany, but it 
is not as simple as that and as this stands it would not work. For it could 
be argued that put this way there are two aesthetic objects not one: the 
object which is seen and the object which is felt. In a similar way it would 
be wrong to say that because it is the same apple which is both appreciated 
for its colour and its taste that there is only one aesthetic object, namely, the 
apple. For if the apple was aesthetically pleasing to look at but tasted 
unpleasantly bitter, we would not be presented with conflicting evidence in 
trying to decide if the apple, as an aesthetic object, was a good one or not. 
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For clearly just because the apple looks good is no guarantee that it will 
taste good and vice versa. Rather the apple presents two aesthetic objects, 
the look of the apple and the taste of the apple. 
But in the case of the movement of the athlete or dancer there are not two 
aesthetic objects but one, namely the movement which is observed. It would 
be therefore more appropriate to compare the satisfaction which is available 
to the performer, not with the satisfaction which a person may get from tasting 
rather than from looking at an apple, but with the satisfaction a person gets 
from coming to appreciate through touch the visual quality of a vase. 
Now, of course, the vase may look smooth but feel rough so he may not be 
in the best position to appreciate the vase as a visual object. But that does 
not mean he is in no position at all, and he may be in quite a good position 
if, as in a similar way that we saw it could be the case with the performer 
of movement, his appreciation in the first instance is based on actually seeing 
the aesthetic object and then learning to some extent the fit between how -the 
vase looks and how it feels to the touch. This judgment would, of course, 
always be limited because he would never through this sense alone be able to 
know the colouring of the vasejbut clearly some degree of appreciation would 
be possible for him and in general this can be said to be the common experience 
of blind people. 
But there are other difficulties, the texture of the surface may in itself be 
aesthetically pleasing to him but this should not affect the judgment he makes, 
for he is appreciating it as a visual object., - in other words, touching the 
vase is therefore not significant in its own right but is simply a means for 
the person to work out what the object looks like, although this is not to say 
he will not find the process satisfying. 
However, it may be thought that it is difficult to see how someone would 
enjoy the aesthetic object as such when the whole experience is starting to 
look like an intellectual exercise. But I would argue if is possible to the 
extent that he can see and enjoy it in his mind' s eye. But this will only be 
because he has power of imagination and not just because of his detective and 
interpretative abilities (if this is thought unlikely, consider how at least some 
of us are able to enjoy a picture or piece of music through recalling it in 
our imagination). 
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If we now return to the experience available to the performer of movement, 
I think the case can be made that while it would be wrong to say that his 
kinaesthetic experience was in itself aesthetic, this would not mean that we 
could not correctly say that it is only through the use of his kinaesthetic 
sense (as well as through the power of his imagination) that he is able to 
appreciate and enjoy the visual qualities of his movements. 
While, then, for both spectator and performer the same aesthetic object is 
appraised and enjoyed, the process by which the performer is able to do this 
is entirely different and the importance of this should not be underestimated. 
For many,, it is a process which because it involves the kinaesthetic sense they 
would rather gain aesthetic enjoyment from performing the movements themselves 
than from watching the movements of others. (And of course, they may well 
prefer to perform for other reasons, for example, those to do with the non- 
detachable satisfaction that can only be gained from moving skilfully ) However, 
it must always be emphasised that this does not enable us to say that the 
aesthetic satisfaction he may get is of a kinaesthetic kind. 
We have to accept that whatever the word might suggest to the contrary, there 
is no justification for saying that the sensations we have of the movements of 
our own bodies are in themselves aesthetic, rather it is because of what they 
tell us about the visual object that at least there is the possibility that we can 
make aesthetic appraisals and have aesthetic experiences that can pEgerly be 
called aesthetic ones. 
2. The Enjoyment of Natural Beauty R. S. Hepburn in his article 
I Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty' (36) laments 
the fact that while in the eighteenth century there was substantial treatment 
of the beautiful in nature, today writing on aesthetics attends almost 
exclusively to the arts. He argues that while there are important differences 
between natural objects and artefacts, 'This should not be seen as entailing 
the aesthetic unimportance of the former that (on the contrary) several of 
these differences furnish grounds for distinctive and valuable types of 
aesthetic experience of nature' (37). He notes. for example, firstly how 
experiencing the beauty in nature is not simply done from the standpoint of 
a detached observer, rather we are in nature and a part of it, so that we can 
be both spectator and actor playing actively with nature. 
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With regard to education, he argues that to restrict a person, s aesthetic 
education to the appreciation of the arts would result in him having an 
inadequate aesthetic understanding for he would either pay little attention 
to the; beauty to be found in nature, or he will look, but look in vain, for 
what can be found and enjoyed only in art. The distinction between aesthetic 
enjoyment in the arts and in natural beauty have, he says, to be reckoned 
with otherwise 'one can neither intelligently pursue nor adequately comprehend 
experience of natural beauty save only in its most rudimentary forms' (38). 
Now clearly the best way of enabling children to appreciate the beauty in 
nature is to take them into situations where they can experience it first hand. 
This, however, could be a somewhat artificial exercise, unless the child comes 
to see himself as a part of this natural world. One way of doing this would 
be to get him to engage in outdoor sporting pursuits like sailing, rock 
climbing, surfing, hang-gliding, skiing, where learning to appreciate the 
beauty of one' s natural surroundings can be I caught' . 
It can be said, then, that incidentally there is in fact in many sporting 
activities the opportunity to enjoy natural beauty. Furthermore, it can be 
appreciated as part of a total experience, one could, for example, have the 
satisfaction from moving skilfully through one' s natural surroundings and at 
the same time gain aesthetic enjoyment from those surroundings themselves. 
The experience may be particularly heightened if one finds the natural world 
within which one moves awesome or sublime, (39). 
ii DANCE AND THE AESTHETIC 
Dance takes many forms and fulfils many different functions. Even if we 
restrict ourselves to what might be found going on in a school we would still 
have to acknowledge all of the following: national and folk dancing, historical 
dancing, classical and modern ballet, ballroom and stage dancing and modern 
educational dance. 
Although all of these are defined and judged at least in part by aesthetic 
criteria, in the context of justifying physical education most attention has 
been devoted to modern educational dance. This is because with the exception 
of classical and modern ballet, which is of less interest because it is usually 
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carried out only by a small minority of pupils, this kind of dancing is thought 
to come nearest to our understanding of dance as an art form, for it allows 
for creativity and is defined solely by artistic/or aesthetic criteria (and not 
for example by social or religious ones). 
However, I would argue there may be a danger in evaluating modern educational 
dance as an art form and it may be better to describe it as an aesthetic and 
creative activity. Indeed, if Dickiel s definition is taken seriously this will be 
true of all creative activities carried out in schools. Art education will be 
largely confined to getting children to appreciate great works of artýalthough 
this can include appreciation through performing them. This means, as far as 
dance is concerned, given the tremendous amount of technical ability required 
to perform dances recognised as works of art and given the nature of modern 
educational dance, with its focus on creativity rather than perfecting rigorous 
technique, it would be easier to understand I dance' as a part of art education 
from the point of view of the person watching dances recognised as works of 
art and not the person who is performing; and, of course, this would not 
help us to show that the appreciation of art was a part of physical education, 
because physical education is essentially concerned with participation in 
physical activities and not in knowing how to appreciate them by just being 
a spectator. 
However, this rather severe line needs to be balanced with the fact that modern 
educational dance,, may at its best aspire towards fulfilling the conditions of 
dance as an art form and can, in any case, even when it falls short of this, 
help initiate children into artistic values., in a way in which other sporting 
activities, which may also be legitimately called aesthetic activities, cannot. 
For example, children can learn, through creating their own dances, how to 
express not only movement ideas but social values and human emotions as well. 
There is, as I suggested earlier, an important distinction to be made when we 
are looking at so called 'creative activities' between those activities which are 
concerned with artistic values and those that are not. 
Olympic gymnastics would be an example of the former and modern educational 
dance of the latter. Indeed, if taught well there may be more chance that 
the child comes to appreciate artistic values through his own creativity than 
if he were a highly trained dancer, but a mere puppet in the hands of a 
choreographer. 
261 
It may be possible then to justify modern educational dance to a limited extent 
because of the contribution it might make to a child' s appreciation of art. 
However, it is as an aesthetic activity that it can be justified most strongly, 
although the same argument would still have to apply to modern educational 
dance as it did to the other physical aesthetic activities, namely, that because 
we are justifying dance as a participant activity we. have to show the knowledge 
and satisfaction to be gained from participating are in important respects quite 
different from what might be available to us from just watching. 
As engagement in modern educational dance demands creativity, this means the 
child has to be both choreographer and performer. In both these roles he 
will require theoretical knowledge and the ability to make aesthetic appraisals 
in a dance medium. But this knowledge and ability need be no different from 
that of the initiated observer. Furthermore, whether or not his performance 
as a dancer has aesthetic value will be decided by visual criteria. Although 
in dance there is perhaps more opportunity than in other P. E. activities to 
appraise and to enjoy the movements of others, while at the same time 
participating oneself (particularly during the stage of actually creating or 
working out a dance) , this would not normally be thought to 
be sufficient 
to justify on its own the value of the activity as a participant one. 
The satisfaction which must remain unique to the participant lies in his ability 
to create and to perform the dance and this is true not only of modern 
educational dance but many other forms of dance, for example, modern ballet. 
This will include exploring movement ideas, perfecting difficult sequences of 
movement, putting movement to music or rhythmical accompaniment, or 
conversely, letting the movements decide what the music or rhythm will be; 
using the imagination to convey dramatic ideas or social messages through 
gesture or letting the gestures contain their own message about the movements 
themselves; working with others where one can communicate and create in a 
joint enterprise through movement improvisation, and finally in achieving a 
dance performance that an audience can understand and enjoy. 
Now, given the emphasis on justiftying dance as a physical activity one may 
think it necessary to make the distinction in this list between the satisfaction 
to be gained as a performer and that to be gained as a choreographer. For 
it may be thought that the value of dance must be seen from the point of 
view of the former rather than the latter, but in practice this distinction may 
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not be easily made for in modern educational dance, the dance can 
come into being through movement improvisation, through the dancers' own 
exploration and not by a choreographer standing apart and telling the dancers 
exactly what movements to perform and what expressions to use. Very often 
even where a choreographer (usually the teacher) is set apart from the 
dancers (usually the pupils) there is interplay between them. The choreo- 
grapher/teacher does not necessarily just ask the dqncers/pupils to actualize 
a preconceived and previously notated dance (which he himself may not have 
created but only interpreted) , rather he puts forward ideas to the class and 
helps them produce and develop their own motifs out, of which the dance will 
emerge under the guidance of the teacher. If this kind of experience results 
in the development of the creativity and originality of the dancers (and this 
will be assessed by the quality of their dancing) we will consider him a 
successful teacher of modern educational dance. 
Where the distinction between choreographer and the dancers is a rigid one it 
may be thought that the experience of the choreographer win be more 
significant than the experience of those just following his instructions. But 
I would argue that in fact both parties would miss out, the choreographer on 
the satisfaction that can only be gained from performing and the dancer on the 
experience that only comes from being creative. I have suggested that, at its 
best, modern educational dance allows- for both kinds of experience. 
However, it may be thought from an aesthetic point of view that the experience 
to be gained from performing, particularly once the dance has been created 
(however it was arrived at) is of less value than the experience of a person 
watching (whether this is the choreographer or the member of an audience). 
This is because, as we saw with other P. E. activities defined by aesthetic 
criteria, it can be argued that even if a dancer does enjoy performing, 
aesthetically speaking he is not necessarily experiencing the object that matters 
the pattern of movements which can be observed from the standpoint of an 
audience. But, of course, the dancer, like the sportsman, can learn the fit 
between the movement which is visually good and what it feels like to perform 
it. This means, once the dancer has learnt to do this he can appraise his 
own performance aesthetically, he may not be in the best position or be the 
ultimate judge., but this does not stop him being in any position at all or being 
able to pass judgment with some degree of accuracy on his own performance. 
Indeed, it is quite possible for the experienced dancer, performing in front 
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of an ignorant audience to be a better judge of the aesthetic merit of his 
performance than those watching. (Similarly, with sporting activities which 
are in part aesthetic ones, it will be remembered the same argument can be 
applied to them. It is because, for example, that the competitive gymnast 
or ice skater, is also able to aesthetically appraise their own performances 
they often have a good idea of how well they have done before the marks 
go up. ) 
However, as we have seen, this knowledge and ability is not exclusive to 
the performer. So again, in giving an aesthetic justification we have to look 
to that enjoyment which dancers (and. as we saw earlier some athletes engaged A 
in aesthetic sporting activities) can have from engaging in the activity and 
from getting the movement aesthetically right: for that satisfaction is unique 
to them and it is a feeling which can often be correctly described as being at 
least in part an aesthetic one. This is particularly true for the dancer, 
because unlike most sportsmen, it will be a part of the overall experience 
of creating and producing something necessarily of aesthetic worth. 
This means, firstly, the chances of aesthetic enjoyment can be greater for the 
dancer because his attention throughout will be focused on the manner of his 
performance as an end in itself and not just as a means, for example, to 
scoring a goal. While it may benefit the games player for his movements to 
become automatic, this will not be true of the dancer, who has to keep the 
expression of the dance alive. It is a satisfaction which can be said to be 
appropriate and truly deserved if he is aesthetically and artistically successful, 
and this is open to public testing. There is also the opportunity for the 
dancer, unlike the sportsman, to be able to experience through his imagination 
what he is doing aesthetically and/or artistically at an emotional level. The 
importance of the imagination in experiencing a work of art is often neglected 
in contemporary aesthetics, and, as I said earlier, this has been largely due 
to the fact that expression theory, in which the role of the imagination is 
most at home, has been generally discredited. But I also argued at the 
beginning of this chapter that the use of the imagination is crucial if we are 
to fully experience the work of art, and that expression theory at least 
does 
justice to this, and a certain version of it-, may as Elliott argues (40) provide 
a better account of our experience of art than does objectivist aesthetic theory. 
For at least expressionists are not likely to forget the importance of what 
Elliott has described as the creative contribution of the subject (41) and would 
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not therefore deny of the dancer, that where his performance is the result 
of someone else's choreography, the dancer can 'live through' the feelings. 
of the choreographer in a similar way that someone reading a poem may try 
and identify himself with the poet; and also that through the power of his 
imagination the dancer can identify with the character he is dancing or with 
the emotion implicit in the movements he is performing. Of course, I am not 
saying, that the dancer is, for example, sad, rather as Elliott argues the 
sadness is in him but not predicable of him(42). 
Secondly, the dancer usually moves to and therefore has to attend to the 
musical accompaniment or to just rhythm. The opportunity is therefore open 
to him to enjoy the music by listening and responding to it, interpreting it 
in gesture and feeling the rhythm through the movements themselves. 
Thirdly, because very often for the dancer the creation and performance of 
the dance is the result of a group enterprise, 'he is usually able while 
dancing to observe the movements of other dancers. Indeed, the dancer on 
stage may be in a much more exciting position for enjoying a dance production 
than the person watching, and while an audience can certainly respond 
imaginatively, by identifying with the dancers, the dancers themselves can 
respond to each other with the full expression and force of their own 
movements; they can enjoy dramatic and beautiful moments of the dance 
because they are a part of them. 
Finally, it can be said that the same sort of points, with the possible exception 
of the last one can be made to a lesser extent about those other P. E. activities 
which are also defined by aesthetic criteria, particularly when they allow for 
creativity, like 'olympic gymnastic floorwork, synchronised swimming and ice 
skating. 
************** 
In the last two chapters I have examined the conceptual nature of those 
activities which fall under the title I physical education' .I have argued 
that these activities can be rightly seen as falling into one conceptual group 
I 
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because they have a sufficient amount in common for this to be done, namely, 
they are all: 
physically performative having standards of excellence built into them, 
so that it is: 
(a) necessary through learning and practice to reach a certain standard 
before one can engage in them at all, 
(b) open to a performer in any one activity to reach such a high standard 
the value of his performance would have universal recognition as a 
human achievement; 
2. where the point of these activities does not lie in effecting an instrumental 
end, but largely in the intrinsic satisfaction gained from participating in 
a physical activity as a physical activity. 
In particular there is the non-detachable satisfaction from experiencing the 
interplay of different powers working together (for example, physical skill, 
strength and endurance, creativity, imagination, practical judgment and 
courage). I have also argued that more specifically there are two main kinds 
of intrinsic satisfaction, which together, taken either singly or jointly, 
characterise to a large extent the nature. of all P. E. activities namely: 
(a) the satisfaction to be found from, moving skilfully which provided 
the subject matter for chapter nine, and 
(b) the satisfaction gained through moving aesthetically and sometimes 
in actually creating an aesthetic object which provided the subject 
matter for this last chapter. 
Now, in the final chapter I wish to look at how this common nature of 
physical education, just examined, can provide the content that will give us 
a theory of physical education and the considerable strength this will have 
in helping us to give a justification of physical education as physical education 
and for having it on the school curriculum. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE JUSTIFICATION OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
i INTRODUCTION 
In chapter nine it was suggested that physical education could be taken as 
just a name that we use to refer to a certain group of activities and that it 
was quite possible to consider whether these activities could be rightly seen 
as coming into one conceptual group independently of any question of 
justification. I argued that for this purpose we would put physical 
education in inverted commas or substitute it with another title altogether if 
necessary, and I hope I have shown in the last two chapters that it is quite 
in order to put all the different P. E. activities into one conceptual group 
because the criteria they share are sufficiently central to all of them. 
We are now therefore in a position to examine the quite separate question of 
justification, of considering whether the use of the actual title physical 
education which refers to these activities can also be justified. 
The case we have to prove is that the term I physical education' , unlike the 
names given to other subjects (for example, engineering, cookery, computer 
science) can be used to fulfil two roles: firstly that it gives a conceptual 
group of activities that make up our subject a name (which it clearly does) 
and secondly that it can, at the same time, assert that these activities 
are of educational value. 
To show that it can fulfil this second role we do not have to establish that 
all P. E. activities are educationally valuable for the same reasons. We 
would not, I think, expect this with any subject. Different areas are too 
diverse. We do not, for example, value German classical music for the same 
reasons that we value traditional jazz. There is no reason to think that 
there will have to be one peculiar P. E. ingredient, at the most., we may be 
able to show that the reason they are engaged in is for the non-detachable 
satisfaction they give the performer (for this, as we have seen, is the 
point of these activities) where this has a lot to do (although not everything) 
with their essentially physical character and where this refers to the 
performer's actual experience of bodily movements. 
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Now, in parts one and two I put forward and defended the meaning of 
education as: 'learning which promotes the development of the person qua 
person' , more specifically I explained what might be understood as the 
development of the person 
_qua 
person under three main headings - firstly, 
as a centre of experience, secondly, as a rational agent and thirdly, as a 
moraLagent. In so doing, I have done full justice to the way education 
has been contrasted to training, where education cannot be understood in 
relation to preparation for an occupation or the fulfilment of a role but where 
its value can only be seen to the extent that learning actually changes the 
person 
_qua 
person, for example, in terms of his conceptual understanding, 
his beliefs, attitudes, affective experience and dispositions to behave. I 
have also argued in part one, how important it is for a person to come to 
value certain things that he does, intrinsically, that is, because of the 
personal satisfaction they can bring him. 
So, finally, in order to justify physical education, what I have to show is 
that learning to engage in P. E. activities can contribute significantly to the 
Lua person. The contribution physical education development of the person c 
can make to the development of the person will therefore now be looked at 
under the following headings: 
ii Physical Education and the Development of the Person as a Centre 
of Experience; 
iii Physical Education and the Development of the Person as a Rational 
Agent; 
iv Physical Education and the Development of the Person as a Moral 
Agent. 
ii PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
AS A CENTRE OF EXPERIENCE 
In learning to master different P. E. activities the person will come to 
conceive of what he is doing under a particular description, his understanding 
of them will be based on how he sees the point of what he is doing. We do 
not, for example, teach a person how to become physically skilful in different 
activities, like we train dolphins or performing dogs, for the activities cannot 
become intrinsically worthwhile for them. No doubt it would be possible to 
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get children to carry out difficult physical tasks in the same way that we 
train circus animals to perform tricks, where they had no awareness of 
what they were doing, except perhaps as a sequence of movements which 
brought about some reward at the end, but then we would be merely 
training not educating them. 
Persons, unlike animals, conceive of physical activities in evaluative terms. 
They understand what they are doing in relation to a whole way of life, 
where the underlying distinction has already been made between what is 
instrumentally and what is intrinsically valued. Whether they engage in a 
P. E. activity or not, is not just dependent on the need for a reward but 
on their own judgment, where, how they evaluate it will depend on how they 
experience the activity affectively as well as conceptually. It is because of 
how a person experiences what we initiate him into, and not just because of 
what he comes to know that he is actually changed as a person, for the 
nature of his experience will inevitably affect his attitude towards different 
activities, the values he holds and how he determines his life. But, of course, 
this is still true even if everything a person learns, to do is judged by him 
to be a waste of time and to be given up at the first opportunity. It is 
because in education we are concerned with a person's quality of life, that 
we hope he comes to find life worth living, that the reason we teach him 
different activities is not only for instrumental purposes (e. g. so he can 
cope with his financial affairs) although this is not to deny the importance 
of these purposes, but because we hope, in time, that he will find some of 
them intrinsically worthwhile, and that by learning to engage in them the 
person will find personal fulfilment and harmony, freedom of being and of 
expression. 
It is with these kinds of considerations in mind, that one has to say that 
what finally counts in physical education is whether children come to gain 
any kind of personal satisfaction from learning to master and to engage in 
P. E. activities; although, of course, one is not saying that this has to 
happen straightaway, indeed it is highly unlikely until they gain a degree 
of proficiency in whatever activity they are learning. 
THE NATURE OF THE SATISFACTION TO BE GAINED FROM ENGAGING IN 
P. E. ACTIVITIES 
It is because the satisfaction gained from participating in P. E. activities is 
of non-detachable or intrinsic kind that an explanationof it can only be 
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given by referring to what characterises a particular activity - in other 
words as it is often said whatever any activity can offer will be unique to 
it. However, at the same time it would be wrong to think that the reasons 
why we value engaging in P. E. activities are as different as the activities 
themselves. 
Now., there are those, like many P. E. practioners, who are not philosophers, 
but who actively participate in sport and dance, who value the pursuit of 
P. E. activities and the initiation of children into these activities and who 
are extremely dissatisfied with the justifications which have been given for 
physical education in the past. They even feel at times that they have been 
betrayed, and this is because the values on which these justifications have 
been based are often no more than spin-off values. Furthermore, what 
completely perplexes the P. E. practioners is that the values which lie, to 
continue the metaphor, in the spinning top itself, are not even mentioned. 
And if he does not have to wonder what these might be, it is not because 
of anything he has read on the philosophy of physical education, but because 
through his own intuition and first hand experience he already knows what 
they are. 
The legitimacy of this kind of reaction from the active participant of sport 
and dance is reinforced by the fact that we have as our title: 'physical 
education' . For this suggests, at least to many of us, that 
the relevant 
educational values are P. E. ones, that is values which are inextricably caught 
up within physical education and not simply ones that can be realized in an 
incidental and fortuitous way through engaging in it. To illustrate this 
point consider what in a similar way., Js implied by terms like, 'music 
education' and 'history education' For, these too would suggest that 
educational values are those ones which are essentially to, do with music and 
history respectively. So that if someone tried to claim, for example, that 
we could justify talking about music education, only because, as a matter 
Of fact, certain educational values, but which had nothing essentially to do 
with music, could be realized through learning to appreciate music,. then, we 
would rightly object that while this might justify having music on the school 
curriculum,, it would not justify us talking about music education. And in a 
similar way, if someone claimed that the value of a person's history education 
lay in the fact that certain moral lessons could'be learnt through gaining 
historical knowledge and understanding, we would want to argue that this 
275 
in itself does not justify us talking about a person's history education at 
all, but rather about his moral education through learning history. Justifi- 
cations for physical education have often been of this nature. Consider the 
claim that is often made, for example, that moral lessons can be learnt 
through playing games and engaging in other kinds of P. E. activities. ( See, 
pp. 301-312for a critique of this. ) 
It is, as I have already argued at the beginning of part three (see pp. 190-198) 
possible and extremely necessary to explain the distinct, unique and, at 
the same time, universal nature of P. E. activities. But this cannot be done, 
as unfortunately it so often is by looking to those values which are at best 
secondary; and neither can it be done by focusing on those values which 
are primary, if this is done in a piecemeal way. Rather, what we need is 
a-theor that will explain the nature of physical education as we understand 
it, from the point of view of the person who engages in it, a theory, which 
in the past we have tried unsuccessfully to do without. Now, there is a 
theory which lends itself to doing just this, and that is the theory of 
formalism which is already to be found in the philosophy of art and aesthetics. 
There are several versions of this theory. For example, Kant argued that 
the object is beautiful not because of the sensations of representation but 
by virtue of its form. This, because it is contemplated disinterestedly can 
be distinguished from judgments of the pleasant and the good. Kant 
conceived aesthetic satisfaction as our consciousness of the harmony arising 
from the free play of imaginative powers. 
Then, for Clive Bell, as well, the aesthetic value, for example, of a 
picture, did not lie in what was represented, this was aesthetically irrelevant. 
What mattered was 'significant form' and it was this which he described as 
giving rise to the grand aesthetic thrill, the correct response to significant 
form and which Bell distinguished from everyday emotion. But there are 
degrees of this kind of response and not everyone will experience it to the 
same extent. Even the critic, indeed, especially the critic, must experience 
this emotion for his judgment on a work of art to be a valid one. Only then 
can he enable others to respond correctly, if to a lesser degree. And this 
he will do by pointing out the relevant abstract features, for examplein a 
painting the combination and arrangement of lines and colours, in music the 
pure musical form. 
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Formalism as a theory of art has not been universally accepted, on the 
contrary, it is criticised if not totally rejected, on the grounds, for example, 
generally that it does not do justice to the importance of emotion and the 
artist's intention of what he intends to communicate to an audience; and 
more specifically, that with regard to significant form, that it ignores those 
instances of art where form and subject matter are fused or a picture is 
blatantly representational and where it is only this which determines the form. 
But these, fortunately, are not problems that have to be faced when it is 
used as a theory of physical education. And this is the task I shall turn 
to now. 
First of all it can be said that P. E. activities have certain unique physical 
or kinaesthetic qualities (later just referred to as I KI qualities), which are 
inherent and are independent of all extra-kinaesthetic notions. 
Secondly, these qualities are only appreciated disinterestedly, by actually 
engaging in P. E. activities. What these qualities are will depend on such 
factors as the different kinds of skill required, the distinct aesthetic form 
of the movements themselves. 
Thirdly, engaging in P. E. activities brings about the free inter-play of many 
different powers belonging to the performer; for example, his physical 
strength, skill and endurance; his ingenuity, intellect and practical 
knowledge; his creativity and his imaginative powers; and not least, his 
courage. 
Fourthly, performing in different P. E. activities brings a unique kind of 
satisfaction, which arises from an awareness of the harmon which comes 
from the inter-play of these different powers. For many this harmony can be 
expressed in terms of the experiencing of physical well-being which only comes 
from the purposeful exercising of the human body, for others it may be 
understood as spiritual renewal, a special kind of freedom which comes from 
striving towards and reaching new standards of excellence. 
Fifthly, the degree of intensity to which this satisfaction is experienced will 
vary. Not all participants will experience to the same extent this kind of 
satisfaction which is unique to physical education. 
277 
Sixthly, although the nature of this satisfaction will be based on a unique 
combination of different powers and the sense of harmony that comes from 
the release of these powers working together, nevertheless there are, as 
we have seen from the previous chapters of this final section, two main 
features which need to be given special attention, because they are 
sufficiently general so it can be said that together they characterise to a 
very large extent the nature of all P. E. activities (either jointly or singly) 
and also explain why we value them. These are: 
the satisfaction which is gained from moving skilfully; 
the satisfaction which comes from moving aesthetically and sometimes 
in creating an aesthetic object. 
These will be looked at in turn. 
(a) The Satisfaction to be gained from Moving Skilfull 
First of all there is the satisfaction which is gained from moving skilfully. 
I have already argued in chapter nine that this is the point of sporting 
activities existing - that they are contrived to bring about an artificial end, 
for example, clearing the bar, because reaching this end demands physical 
skill, which is valued intrinsically and at its best is recognised as a human 
achievement. Although physical skill can be defined generally in terms of 
assessing how well a physical task is being carried out as a physical task, 
how we experience it will depend on the kinds of skill realized in any one 
activity and this means it will be dependent on the nature of the activity's 
physical objectives. What counts as skilful performance in one sport will 
be quite different from what counts as a skilful performance in another. 
In sport, not just because physical skill necessarily characterises it, but 
because it characterises it in such a central way, means that this kind of 
satisfaction will be predominant. 
But is this true of dance? Here one might expect that the experience of 
moving skilfully would be less satisfying than the experience of moving 
aesthetically. But it should,; be remembered that dance as a P. E. activity 
is a participant one and this means it may not be possible to make the 
distinction in any clear cut way. For in performing a dance, in creating 
aesthetic effects, one has to be able to carry out a great number of difficult 
movements, where being able to move rhythmically and to music are extremely 
important. Dance therefore demands that the participant becomes physically 
skilful, indeed one could say the dancer has to master the movement of 
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his body as an instrument, just as the flutist has to master his. The 
aesthetic experience for the dancer therefore cannot be divorced from the 
experiencing of mastering and performing difficult sequences of movement, 
for the aesthetic expression is the movement and cannot be separated from 
it. This means that while the satisfaction for the spectator can just be 
explained in aesthetic terms, the satisfaction for the dancer cannot, the 
dancer's experience is therefore in some ways more like the experience of 
the skilful sportsman than the experience of those who are watching him 
perform. 
There have been times when it hag, been argued that dance should not be 
found in a programme of physical education, and if it is, it should be 
removed and placed with the other performing arts or with other aesthetic 
activities. But there is no justification for this, while, of course, dance 
can be seen as a part of aesthetic education, and to some extent art education, 
(see the previous chapter ppZJ-6ýý) it also satisfies the conditions that enable 
it to count as physical education as well, for most forms of dance can be 
described as intrinsically worthwhile physical activities, requiring initiation 
before they can be mastered. In other words, dance can rightfully be said 
to belong in either category, and in practice this often turns out to be the 
case. 
It is because P. E. activities are characterised by criteria of excellence that, 
firstly, one cannot be said to be engaging in the activities at all unless one 
has reached a certain standard (although in some activities after reaching 
this standard the Participant may choose to go no further and simply value 
engaging in them as forms of play (see chapter nine, ppA06-JL07) and that, 
secondly, it is in the nature of all P. E. activities for the potential to exist 
for new standards to be reached by continually improving one' s performance. 
To say the participant finds an activity intrinsically worthwhile is to say 
that he values what characterises the activity. This means participants of 
sport will come to value improving their own performance, realizing the 
activity at its best, even when perhaps, due to a lack of ability they have 
difficulty in doing either of these things. It is because the satisfaction comes 
from moving skilfully and sometimes aesthetically as well that the more 
physically skilful and the more successful in aesthetic terms one becomes, the 
greater should be the satisfaction gained from participating. 
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One practical consequence that follows from this is that the conflict between 
those who see physical education as education for leisure and those who see 
it as the pursuit of excellence should be resolved. For even the person who 
supports the idea that we are only educating for leisure must acknowledge 
that these activities are necessarily characterised. by criteria of excellence, 
this means that if he is concerned (as he must be) that those who participate 
in P. E. activities come to find them intrinsically worthwhile, then he will 
want them to respect those standards, to improve their performance, so they 
can realize these activities as well as their ability allows. If the question of 
how well children perform does not matter to him (although obviously it 
would have to matter to; begin with otherwise he could not get them to engage 
in the activities in the first place) , one can only conclude that he is not 
concerned with the extent that children come to value them intrinsically 
after all, but only that they are provided with a form of amusement. If the 
activity is valued because of what characterises it one would expect there to 
be at least the desire to get better, and that those who have not got this desire 
have missed most of the point of the activity. 
But all this is not to say it does not often have a recreative function; 
although contrary to what is often thought, whether physical education fulfils 
this function is not dependent on whether P. E. activities are just played at 
rather than taken seriously, participated in with dedication and the desire 
to pursue physical excellence, rather, it is dependent on the effect that 
engaging in an activity has on a person. Where we find recreation we find 
ourselves in a state of well-being, of feeling relaxed, refreshed, ready to 
take on the demands of living again. What, then, has recreational value, 
is often called value by contrast (1). Some activities, and these include 
sport and dance, (as well as many other kinds of pastimes) fulfil, for many 
people, this function and this is because they can be engaged in voluntarily 
with no sense of obligation. They need not encroach on the business of 
everyday affairs, far from being burdensome, they provide a break, a means 
of recreation, existing as they often seem to do, outside the world of social 
pressure and moral demands, P. E. activities can be seen for some to be, 
at least in certain respects, self-contained; but for others, however, the 
recreative value of P. E. activities may seem inapplicable, for example, for 
the professional games player because for him too much depends upon whether 
he plays and how well he plays. 
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But the point remains whether they do in fact serve a recreative purpose 
or not, does not depend on motivebut the effect that they have on the 
participant. It is quite possible therefore for a professional player, or 
someone who is dedicated to sport and who is always training and improving 
his performance and for whom sport is not self-contained because it is his 
life, to find his sport extremely harmonious anda relaxing experience and 
for someone else who engages in sport for social reasons who has no 
overriding commitment, to find that for him this is a world of pressure which, 
in spite of himself, he cannot appreciate disinterestedly and which therefore 
makes him anxious and tense. 
There is then absolutely no reason why those who advocate the importance of 
physical education as recreation have to undermine the importance of pursuing 
standards, of teaching children to become as proficient as possible in dance 
or in a particular sport. Forif P. E. activities are valued for what they are 
it will be a main aim for the teacher to get the children to become as skilful 
as possible so they can get the greatest satisfaction from engaging in them. 
(b) Aesthetic Satisfaction to be Gained Through Engaging in P. E. Activities 
The other main kind of satisfaction that P. E. activities have to offer is 
aesthetic satisfaction, and as we have already seen from the previous chapter, 
it can be said that there are many physical activities which require initiation 
if they are to be mastered and which are also essentially aesthetic activities. 
It is because there are certain physical activities where the reason they are 
intrinsically valued is due to their aesthetic nature, that physical education 
can be justified because it contributes to a child' s aesthetic education. The 
case can be put as strongly as this: certain aspects of physical education 
are aspects of aesthetic education. This is largely because, firstly, dance 
fulfils both sets of criteria that allow it to be legitimately regarded as a part 
of physical education and also as a part of aesthetic education (as well as, in 
some instanceslas art education), and because, secondly, there are also other 
P. E. activities which are intrinsically worthwhile, which, because like dancing, 
they are defined by aesthetic criteria, these too may also help to contribute 
to a child' s aesthetic understanding. But the claims we can make with 
regard to these latter activities are limited by the fact they are only in part 
defined by aesthetic criteria, being more strongly defined as sporting activities. 
In other words, in these activities their main value is derived from the 
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realization of physical skill and the satisfaction that they can bring. Here, 
aesthetic values (with the notable exception of ice dancing, which can be 
legitimately regarded in many instances as both a sport and as a form of 
art), are always secondary. 
Then, with regard to all P. E. activities, whether these are necessarily or 
just incidentally aesthetic in character, we have to remember that we are 
trying to justify these activities as participant ones. This means, in making 
our case we have to rely on those values which are inherent in performing 
rather than just watching. So it is not enough to point to the aesthetic 
knowledge a performer can gain (for example of the principles or rules that 
govern the activity) or even to a person's ability to appraise and aesthetically 
enjoy dancing or different sporting activities. Although this knowledge and 
these abilities are important, it has to be recognised they could be gained 
just as well by theoretical instruction and observation only. 
The main reason. then, that a case can be made for saying that P. E. activities 
and especially dance can contribute to a child's aesthetic education is because 
participating in them can bring satisfaction of a non-detachable kind which 
is aesthetic in character. This satisfaction comes from creating the aesthetic 
object or at least bringing it into being (which may, or may not, be a 
necessary consequence of engaging in a particular P. E. activity) and from 
experiencing the aesthetic object in a way only open to the performer, that 
is, through his kinaesthetic sense and the power of his imagination. For 
these kinds of satisfaction (like the satisfaction that comes from reciting poetry, 
playing music, performing in a play) are, as I have argued, just as important 
in a child' s aesthetic and art education as studying or just contemplating 
different aesthetic forms and works of art. 
The enjoyment that can come from fulfilling aesthetic criteria or gaining 
aesthetic satisfaction through movement is for many an experience sufficiently 
worthwhile that they would prefer to perform than to watch the movements of 
others, which may well be aesthetically better than what they can produce 
themselves. It should therefore be an important aim of those concerned 
with both physical education and aesthetic education to enable children to 
find out if this is true for them. 
Finally, it can be said there is also in physical education the opportunity, 
through outdoor pursuits, for the enjoyment of natural beauty. This experience 
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may be enhanced by the satisfaction one may get from moving in one' s 
surroundings. For example, Y1. Fisher writes, somewhat poetically, in her 
article.. I Sport As An Aesthetic Experience' : 
I When it is said that the surfer becomes one with the wave, or that 
a skier becomes one with the mountain, it is implied that the athlete 
has perceived nature in a special way ....... That is he enters into 
relation with nature by surfing it, by skiing it, by sailing it' . (2) 
(c) The Value Attached to the Importance of Beingand Feeling Fi 
Now, there are, as I have already suggested, many other contingent reasons 
why P. E. activities are valued, in particular there is the value attached to 
being and feeling fit. Although this is not a necessary consequencep 
neverthelessý the connection between engagement and being physically fit is 
sufficiently strong empirically to say it is often an extremely important reason 
why people engage in sport and dance, and there are some physical activities 
like circuit training, jogging, weight training, keep-fit and aerobics, which 
are specifically designed for this purpose. 
Now it is often argued that fitness, even as a medical rather than an 
educational aim of Physical education, cannot be justified because fitness is 
a relative concept, it always makes sense to ask what it is a person is fit 
for. One can after all, it is argued, be fit enough to work in a shop but not 
fit enough to run 5,000 metres, (3). Those who put forward I fitness, as an 
aim of physical education are therefore said to be in fact advocating a high 
level of fitness and are often accused of assuming the value of an athletic 
way of life, but that if one had no intrinsic interest in pursuing physical 
activities in the first place then one would not see the point of becoming fit, 
where I fitness' means in effect being sufficiently fit to engage in athletic 
pursuits. However, recent empirical research (4) has shown that fitness 
can be defined in physiological terms and that a certain level of fitness 
which can only be achieved through regular and fairly Vigorous exercise 
may be necessary for the physical well-being of all of us, and particularly 
men, whatever our life styles, occupations and interests(5). H. B. Falls, 
for example, is, therefore able to distinguish between what he calls 'health 
related fitness' and I performance related fitness' (6) where the former refers 
to I those aspects of physiological and psychological functioning which are 
believed to offer the individual some protection against degenerative-type 
disease, obesity and various musculoskeletal disorders(7); and the latter 
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to Ithose qualities of function that provide the individual with the abilitY 
to participate in sport activities with greater power, endurance, skill, 
etc. 1 (8) . 
We value fitness, that is health related fitness, not only because it 
gives a feelin of physical well-being but also because it does actually 
contribute to our physical well-being where, because it can be physiologically 
measured, fitness can be defined in scientific terms in relation to the efficient 
functioning of the human organism and therefore escapes the criticism that 
fitness is only a relative concept. Increasingly, scientific research has 
shown, for example, that a person who is fit is less likely to get coronary 
heart disease (9) and more likely to remain active for a longer periodof his 
life, even into old age (10) . 
The value attached to engaging in P. E. activities and which necessarily brings 
about the interplay of so many different powers alsodhen, lies beyond what 
necessarily characterises them. Other important reasons why they are valued 
include the love man has for competition, and more specifically, physical 
contest, of meeting a challenge and testing himself to the limit, of mastering 
an activity to the extent that this might be recognised as a human achievement; 
the satisfaction that comes from a person facing physical danger and overcoming 
it, from pitting herself against the elements, of making the right decision 
where her life or honour may depend upon it; the excitement that comes 
from her being in the drama of a game with the outcome always uncertain, 
of trying to prove herself better than others, to achieve superhuman strength 
and endurance; the delight that comes from being part of a team or group 
engaged in a co-operative enterprise and from outwitting her opponent through 
fine play. where this may involve not only physical skill but cunning, intelli- 
gence, tactical judgment, precision and style. 
In part two, chapter eight, I argued that a person not only develops as a 
centre of experience but also as a rational and moral agent. I shall now 
look at both of these in relation to physical education. In the section below 
I shall deal with physical education and rational agency - and immediately 
after this (see pp. 301-3f5) I shall look at physical education in relation to 
moral agency. But I shall leave the question of what implications our theory 
has for a person's development as a rational and moral agent to the following 
section. 
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iii PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON 
AS A RATIONAL AGENT 
The importance of the contribution physical education might make to the 
development of the person as a rational agent is strongly argued for by 
D. Carr. In his article I Aims of Physical Education' (11) he puts forward 
the view of education as the development of rationality, knowledge and 
understanding and from this he argues a case for physical education in 
the following way: 
I Physical education activities have a definitive cognitive content, odd as 
it may seem, the practices commonly associated with the term I physical 
activity' are as mental as they are physical. For an education in 
athletics, gymnastics, or outdoor pursuits, invariab , 
ly involves instruction 
in rule-governed activities and initiation into modes of rational agency. 
Disciplined physical activity does indeed serve to promote the development 
of individual rationality, but the rationality it cultivates is practical, 
rather than theoretical or intellectual, and when a child has mastered 
a skill or some particular game, the knowledge he is then able to 
exercise is knowing how rather than knowing that, procedural rather 
than academic knowledge, but knowledge nonetheless' (12). 
And later he says: 
I Physical education then is something of a misnomer for an education 
in physical activities is a-sort of education in rational agency' (13). 
Carr argues that the reason why other philosophers like R. S. Peters, who 
at one stage conceived 'education' in the same way as himself, were unable 
to recognise the educational value of physical activities in these terms was 
because they had a limited view of rationality, they failed to see, what, he 
says, Ryle made much of that intentional action is just as much an expression 
of mind as the activity of theorising (14). Carr justifies P. E. activities 
because of what they necessarily bring about: mastery of skills and forms of 
practical knowledge. But Carr defines practical knowledge, 'knowing how, as 
practical reasoning (15), which seems curious when P. E. activities, that is 
at least those which are sporting activities, are essentially about the 
acquisition and the exercise of phyEsIcal skill, so before considering his case 
further, we need to have a closer look at the meaning of I knowing how' and 
what it might mean in relation to physical education. 
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(a) Physical Educatiop Knowing How and Knowing That 
1. Knowing how:. - Knowing how is usually contrasted with knowing that. 
The importance of making this distinction can largely be attributed to 
Professor Ryle (16). He argued that knowledge is not only exhibited in 
statements but in performance as well, providing that performance consistently 
comes up to certain standards or fulfils certain criteria (as such knowing how 
has a dispositional sense) . But, if knowing how is to be distinguished 
from 
having the ability, not any kind of successful performance will do. Ryle 
recognised this. He ruled out habitual actions, rote learning, the flawless 
performance of animals and put much emphasis On the ability to innovate, to 
make judgments, to decided from an understanding of general principles 
rather than from rule of thumb. In short, action had to exhibit intelligence 
as well as ability if it was to be identified as a case of knowing how. 
But while Ryle made the distinction between knowing how and mere ability, 
he has been criticised for not making the grounds for the distinction explicit 
enough and for not recognising that knowing how is open to many different 
interpretations. For example, behaviour which involves intelligence need not 
be done intelligently and there are ways of behaving which could not be 
described as intelligeniý'but which are not simply a question of habit either 
(like practising long jump) and there are some skills which may have become 
habitual but which involved intelligent behaviour in their acquisition (such 
as the movements used in driving a car). 
Now Ryle also argued that a person can be said to know how even if he 
cannot theorise or describe what he is doing. He gives the example of the 
chess player. He says: 
I his knowledge how is exercised primarily in the moves he makes or 
concedes and in the moves he avoids or vetoes. So long as he can 
observe the rules, we do not care if he 'cannot also formulate them' (17). 
Furthermore, different moves and indeed two entirely different performances 
can exhibit knowledge of the same rules and principles of chess. But the 
game exhibits more than these, it also shows that the players have the ability 
to put their knowledge into practice, to apply the principles of the game 
according to the positions of the pieces on the board, and this ability is 
crucial, otherwise the performance is only indicative of knowing that, not 
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of knowing how, and Ryle wanted to argue that knowing how cannot be 
reduced to knowing that and indeed preceded it. 
But it is difficult to see why this has to be the case why, for example, 
could the two not go together? In fact it is clear for Ryle that knowing that 
is just a certain kind of knowing how, namely the ability to state facts, 
recite propositions, explain principles and to answer questions, etc.. But 
there are those who take the completely opposite view to Ryle and who ask 
why knowing how is not simply a case of knowing that plus the ability to 
put this knowledge into practice. 
D. C. Brown, for example, in an article 'Knowing How and Knowing That, 
What' (18) criticises Ryle and suggests that what stands in need of explanation 
is how knowledge contributes to the ability and why this would justify 
calling the resultant whole itself knowledge. Brown' s answer is to maintain 
that Rylel s account is wrong, that in fact knowing how is knowing that. 
He argues his case by distinguishing between two uses of knowing how: 
the Standard use and English use. In both cases knowledge is propositional 
and is dependent on the performer having the answers to embedded questions. 
These lie behind the indicative statement which describes what a person is 
doing. For example, if he is mixing mortar he is able to answer the question 
how does one mix mortar? The questions in the Standard sense will relate 
to the manner of the performance, and in the English sense to the procedure 
or method used. Brown suggests that Ryle's achievement was not in 
realizing a different type of knowledge, but in showing that there is a kind 
of propositional content for knowledge, such that the knower need not be 
able to say what he knows, but exhibits his knowledge in performance. In 
other words, while there is one kind of knowledge there are two ways of 
ascribing it (19). 
Now while I do not think Brown' s position is defensible, (for it is not possible 
to discount all those cases where we use the term I knowing how' , where 
clearly what is being referred to is not propositional knowledge, for example, 
knowing how to ride a bicycle, knowing how to sing or play the piano - 
these are paradigms of knowing how, one cannot just ignore them or try to 
rule them out through linguistic stipulation) what can be accepted and which 
Brown' s article does at least draw our attention to, is that, firstly, there 
are times where knowing how is indeed of a propositional nature. For instance, 
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to say one knows how a combine harvester works is simply to know that 
certain things are true; and secondly, that there are different ways of 
establishing whether a person has propositional knowledge or not and that 
one of these ways can be -by observing and making a certain kind of judgment 
(see below) on a non-verbal performance. 
Consider for example what is involved in knowing how to tie knots. It could 
be argued that this knowledge could be exhibited in a variety of ways by 
actually tying the knot, by telling someone else how to tie the knot, by 
drawing diagrams to show how the knot is tied. In these three instances 
it could be argued the same propositional knowledge is being exhibited. 
However, and this is the point I am making, there is still a difference between 
the person who can only tell someone else how to tie knots or draw diagrams 
of the knots and the person who can actually tie them. In this example, and 
there are countless others, it would not help to add the word 'to' in order 
to distinguish between the two kinds of knowledge. For both the person who 
ties the knot and the person who tells someone else what to do know how to. 
Often knowing how has a demonstrative element, it is characterised by the 
fact that one has knowledge of particulars. For example, in driving one knows 
which button to push, when to de-clutch, where to indicate, etc.. A person 
may have this very particular kind of knowledge without being able to 
generalise it, he just knows, he does not have to work it out from general 
principles first. The point is illustrated well by an example A. D. Munrow 
gives in his book, I Physical Education: A Discussion of Principles, . In the 
chapter called I Intellectual Education Through Physical Education' , he writes: 
IA man who learned to sail in his forties employed in his learning 
processes a great deal of what the Americans call "skill sessions", 
reading books and studying diagrams. His young son meanwhile just 
messed about in boats and learned through "the pores of his skin". 
The father sailed as crew to his son in his first race and asked him 
whether he knew what manoeuvre he would have to execute to alter 
course as he rounded the first mark. The young boy, busy with 
immediate problems, replied, "No I don' t, but shut up, I'll know 
when I get there, " a reply which turned out to be perfectly truel 1 (20) 
Knowing how, then, is ambiguous. It can just be propositional knowledge, 
for example, he knows how the fire started; but not always. and when 
examining what we mean by knowing how, this is not primarily what we are 
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interested in, particularly in relation to physical education. A person may 
be able to tell someone else how to dive but we would not for this reason 
say Le knew how to dive. 
It is well known that learning many physical skills involves understanding 
and following instructions. The performer has to learn the right way of 
doing something, he has to be able to recognise mistakes, he has to know 
how he can put them right. So when a person does perform correctly, we 
can assume that he has all this sort of procedural knowledge which is of a 
propositional kind. But, of course, a person can have all this knowledge 
without also having to be able to perform. in vaulting for instance a person 
can know what the movement should look like, perhaps he can break the skill 
down into its component parts so he knows what his arms and legs should be 
doing at any moment in time, but he still cannot perform the vault. He may, 
of course, through giving instructions be quite capable of getting someone 
else to do it. Now, to say both the instructor and the performer knew how 
would be unfortunate because this is just the place where we would want to 
say, only the person who actually did the vault I successfully' or I correctly' 
knew how. 
It is clearly necessary to look at the difference between theoretical and 
practical knowledge in another way for there clearly is an important 
distinction between knowledge understood in a propositional sense and 
knowledge which is practical or is understood in an ability sense. Perhaps 
the distinction may be best described in terms of knowledge for which verbal 
evidence is crucial and knowledge for which it is not (21). The former being 
to do with knowing certain things to be true, the latter being concerned with 
performing correctl3; and it is to the latter I want to turn now. 
2. Practical knowledge where performance is all important' - If saying a 
person is able to do something means no more than I can do, then knowing 
how means more than having an ability. For a person can bring about a 
result as a causal agent but we would not for this reason wish to say he 
knew how to do it. For example, a person could, accidently, cause the 
bringing about of a series of events which resulted in a successful outcome 
(for example a player could inadvertently press the right button at the 
right time in a computer game enabling him to beat an opponent). 
What else then is required? 
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First of all knowing how implies success where I success' is being used in 
the sense of coming up to a mark, getting it right, being correct. (See 
chapter two pp. 37-38. ) Now being able to can also imply this as the example 
above illustrates, but not always; it depends on how what one is able to 
do is qualified. When it is qualified by an achievement verb it does imply 
success, but this does not always have to be the case. A person can be 
able, for example, to type, but show by the way he does it that he does 
not know how, because he does it so badly (22). 
Secondly, as Ryle draws our attention to knowing how implies having a 
disposition. For if a person was able to do something, even if that something 
was recognised as coming up to the mark, we would have to be convinced he 
was not simply lucky or that he did not just act as a causal agent in effecting 
a result. 
Thirdly, knowing how involves learning, it requires some kind of initiation, 
however simple, although this is not to say a person could not initiate 
himself (see below) . I. Scheffler argues that 
knowing how is arrived at 
only through training and that it is only appropriate to talk of knowing how 
to do something if one could have been trained to do it (23). But this is to 
go too far, for there are plenty of things, like skipping, which we know how 
to do but for which we may not have received any training, . Now there are 
many things we do successfully, and consistently successfully, which we 
would not wish to say we knew how to do. For example human beings are 
able to stand upright and move naturally in certain ways (e. g. walking 
and running); birds are able to migrate and to fly consistently well, but 
we would not want to say they knew how, unless we were prepared to use 
the term very loosely indeed, for we usually want to rule out instinctive and 
natural behaviour even when it can be said to fulfil I success' criteria. 
In the case of animals it is only when they start to carry out tasks which 
previously they were unable to do, where this is not the result of instinct 
or maturation, that some think it appropriate to say that what they are 
doing they know how to do, in a similar way that while some do not, many 
do, consider it appropriate to say that animals learn how to do certain 
things (24). Here, Scheffler's point that knowing how is the result of training 
may seem relevant. We would not, I think say that dolphins knew how to 
move through the water but some might wish to say they knew how to jump 
through the hoop. 
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If we do baulk at this - applying knowing how to animal behaviour, I think 
it is because, strictly speaking, we only consider it appropriate to say a 
person knows how because we only consider persons can be held responsible 
for what they are able to do (see chapter five pp. `111-113) After all, a robot 
could successfully perform a task and where this was not a question of luck, 
but where it would not be the result of initiation, although we could say that 
it was the result of it being programmed. Now, this is important, for it is 
because the robot cannot be said to learn how to perform a task (unless, 
that is, one is prepared to operate with an entirely mechanistic concept of 
learning, again see chapter two pp. 40-41, that we would never consider 
saying it knew how; and the same is true of animals where their performance 
is the result of strict conditioning. In these cases neither the robot nor the 
animal could be said to be responsible for what they have I done' . In fact 
we could argue this is because they have not done anything at all. Although 
the performances could be judged within a context of what counts as 
successful action, where there is the possibility of failure and where it is 
possible to judge if there is consistent success in the results that are brought 
about, we would not think it appropriate to congratulate them (or, at least, 
we would think it more appropriate to congratulate their trainer! ). In a 
similar way, if we contrived a jumping competition for frogs and as a result 
of the competition we could find the frog that could jump the furthest, we 
would not think it had done well, any more than the rat that is first to 
find its way through the maze, for neither the frog nor the rat could be 
held to be responsible for their I success' . 
Now I am using I responsible' here, as I explained in chapter five, to imply 
what is brought about is the result of intentional human action and not 
causal agency. Knowing how, I would argue, as indeed Carr has done on 
logical grounds (25) presupposes the idea of intentional human action. 
Although a person may not know why he is successful, or even what 
movements he is performing, he must know what he is doing, where this 
refers to recognisable actions or activities. We congratulate persons and, 
in spiteof what I have said to the contrary, sometimes animals as well, when 
we see them being consistently successful because of their mastery of a 
particular action or activity, providing we think they are acting intentionally. 
The fact that knowing how implies the learning and mastery of something does 
not, of course, mean that there is only one way of learning how to do it, 
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for example, being taught a procedure and then being shown how to put 
it into practice, it is quite possible for someone to learn how to perform 
sequences of movement just by watching and copying someone else doing 
them. Usually, however, coming to know how to do something does involve 
applying oneself to the task in hand, understanding what is required of 
one and practising it until one gets it right, but this does not have to be 
the case. Although a person does have to understand what is expected of 
him, there is no reason why a person has to find it difficult (although the 
nature of many practical activities is such that most people usually do), it 
is possible for a person to be successful the first time he does something 
without it being a question of luck. We usually describe this as'naturd 
ability, but if we do we should be careful to realize it Is still a learnt 
ability, it is not like natural abilities that are instinctive or the result of 
maturation, they are still the result of initiation, of what we do, rather than 
a question of what we undergo or what happens to us. Furthermore, it is 
assessed within a particular context, where there are particular reasons 
other than biological ones for assessing a person's performance, for 
acknowledging the degree of difficulty, the right way of doing something 
and the possibility of failure. 
Finally, it can be said that unlike evidence for a person knowing that, 
evidence for deciding whether a person knows how will not be based on 
reasons to do with truth, but with whether his performance fulf: Us certain 
criteria, where what those criteria are, will depend on the activity in question. 
For example, in sport generally, as we saw in the previous chapter, these 
criteria will be concerned with how well and how consistently a physical 
task is carried out as a physical task. For example, we decide whether a 
person knows how to do a backward somersault, by judging his performance 
according to the criteria of what constitutes such a somersault and where 
appropriate a good or excellent one. 
3. Summary,. *- To summarize it can be said that knowing how in its ability 
sense implies: 
(1) the performance comes up to a mark, in this sense it is I successful' 
or 'correct'; 
(2) the performance will not be successful or correct through chance or 
accident; 
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(3) the ability to perform will be the result in the first instance of some 
kind of initiation, however simple; 
(4) the performance can be described as being constitutive of intentional 
human action or actions; 
(5) the performance will be assessed on other criteria than those to do with 
truth and will depend on the activity or action in question (for example 
in relation to sport in general how well difficult physical tasks are 
carried out). 
4. Knowing how and physical education. #- If we now turn to physical 
education we can conclude that if knowing how is taken in its propositional 
sense (where verbal evidence is crucial) P. E. activities do involve a great 
deal of knowledge of this kind. The knowledge which is required being 
very often largely instrumental in enabling the person to know what to do 
in order to carry out difficult sequences of movement. It therefore tends to 
be of the particular and not demand an understanding of theoretical principles. 
A person may learn to swim faster because someone else, scientifically, is 
able to come up with a better technique, but of course the swimmer does 
not need to know why it works, and conversely the scientist does not have 
to test the theory himself to prove his theory is correct, Sometimes the 
development of a technique is the result of trial and error, like effective 
bowling in cricket, and then scientists may try and explain why a way of 
doing it is so successful, but the bowlers have not got this knowledge just 
by dint of being successful. 
Nevertheless, while the sportsman's knowledge is of the particular, rather 
than the general, the extent of his knowledge should not be underestimated. 
Physical education is often written about as if it involved no more than a few 
knacks and the learning of one or two rules. Nothing could be further from 
the truth; while some activities like running and skipping can be mastered 
with little understanding of what one's movements consist of, most P. E. 
activities demand an understanding of complicated procedures. As Carr has 
drawn our attention to coaching would be impossible without this (26). And, 
of course, Carr is also right in saying that learning to engage in these 
activities presupposes practical discourse, the possession of a common public 
language (27). 
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In learning to master a skill a performer has to understand what he has to 
do, when, where, how, etc., in short, what exactly is required of him 
(although he can still have this understanding and still not be able to do 
it, as anyone who has tried to learn a sport for which he has no natural 
ability knows only too well). But where a person is successful it is not 
impossible that once a technique has been learnt the skill remains while the 
procedures, the practical directives, are forgotten. But I would accept that 
in physical education which involves the continual business of teaching and 
learning, this is unlikely to occur; even when someone has mastered an 
activity to the extent that he is at last able to engage in it, it is still open 
to him to improve his performance and this is often done by learning new 
and better techniques as well as by improving old ones (although as I 
mentioned above, the athlete /performer does not need to know why these 
techniques work). 
Clearly physical performance does provide evidence that a person who performs 
correctly has a considerable body of knowledge. But this knowledge is 
propositional which means, for example, that the person who dances the 
galliard exhibits the same knowledge (where knowledge is being used in its 
propositional sense) as the one who notates it and which could in principle 
be described verbally. But of course what we are interested in when looking 
at practical knowledge or knowing how in relation to physical education, 
where our interest is in practical activities that are participated in, is that 
kind of knowledge where verbal evidence is not sufficient for us to say a 
persons knows how but where other criteria concerning the performance itself 
have to be fulfilled. Namely to summarize again: 
the performance has to be correct or successful; it must not be carried 
out by chance or accident; the ability to perform will be the result of 
some kind of intention, however simple; the performance can be 
described as being constitutive of intentional human action; the 
performance will be assessed on other criteria than those to do with 
truth, and these will depend on the action or activity in question. 
Judging whether a person knows how, then, can only be decided in relation 
to the particular activity in question. Now, in individual P. E. activities, 
Carr argues that there is a considerable demand for practical reasoning both 
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in the learning and pursuing of them, but I would maintain that it is not 
on this basis, at least, not on this basis alone, that we can say someone 
knows how in physical education. 
I have already argued (see chapter nine) that what is distinctive of P. E. 
activities is not the demand for practical reasoning but physical skill and 
the realization through movement, at least in some P. E. activities of aesthetic 
values as well. Now, with regard to the concept of physical skillI have 
already analysed it in some detail and argued that it can only be assessed 
in terms of how successfully and consistently a physical task is being carried 
out as a physical task, and where of overriding importance will be the degree 
of difficulty involved in carrying out the task which can be assessed in 
terms of (a) the standard of the opposition, (b) the physical techniques 
demanded by the sport, (c) our physical constitutional make-up. (See 
pp. 217-221. ) 
However, on Carr's account the meaning of knowing how seems to be 
restricted to what is implied by practical reasoning, so that it would not be 
on the basis that P. E. activities are characterised by the realization of 
physical skill by those engaging in them that one could say they demonstrated 
practical knowledge, but only on the basis that they could be said to exhibit 
the exercising of rationality. (He uses the terms practical reasoning and 
the exercise of rationality interchangeably. ) But I can, however, see no 
justification for limiting the meaning of knowing how in this way. There is, 
as I argued above, an important distinction to be made between propositional 
knowledge for which verbal evidence is sufficient and practical knowledge for 
which it is not. For although practical reasoning can be correctly described 
as practical knowledge (for example diagnosing an illness or judging where 
to place the ball or the best way to hold the racket) so can many other 
kinds of human abilities like singing, throwing a ball, diving, riding a 
bicycle not characterised by practical reasoning (although this is not to say 
it was not required in their acquisition). 
So while I would accept that P. E. activities are about knowing how it would 
not be for the reasons Carr gives. For on Carr' s account, although he 
puts physical skill at the centre of the meaning of physical education (he 
says, for example, instruction in physical skills is not the aim of physical 
education, it is physical education (28)) nevertheless, according to Carr 
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it is only because they require the exercise of rationality, particularly while 
they are being learnt, that physical education can be described as a form 
of practical knowledge. 
But my argument is if P. E. activities were essentially about practical reasoning 
then the coach described in the last Chapter who tells the players what to do 
is in an important sense playing the game; if cognitive skills rather than 
physical ones were all important to P. E. activities then games which involve 
no more than the pushing of buttons to make electronic men perform the 
right action should also be a valuable way of teaching physical education. 
Now, as I have already acknowledged, it is not that engaging in P. E. 
activities does not necessitate practical reasoning (the degree to which it is 
required varying according to the activity: middle distance running requires 
a little, playing tennis a fair amount and conducting an orienteering expedition 
a great deal) but that what is distinctive of P. E. activities, at least those 
which are sporting activities, is not the demand for intellectual but physical 
skill. 
Of course it would not be impossible for us to devise an activity like chess, 
but where in order to move the pieces, as well as keeping to the rules of 
chess, one also had to first execute difficult physical movements but this 
would just mean the activity could be described either way: as a sport or 
as an intellectual activity. In fact I think if one is misled into thinking 
Carr's thesis to be at all plausible it is because he does not distinguish 
sufficiently between cognitive and physical ability. The distinction is at 
least blurred because both are described as just I skill' (29). 
I am not. then, denying that engaging in P. E. activities does not depend on 
a great deal of cognitive ability for example practical reasoning in an 
orienteering expedition. But the point is that someone being pushed in a 
wheel chair could exhibit exactly the same ability as the person who is also 
running. It is not that practical reasoning is not a definitive part of 
orienteering as indeed it is of many, if not most sports, but rather if 
orienteering only involved practical reasoning it would no longer be a sport 
but an intellectual activity. I will have to conclude, therefore, that while 
P. E. activities are about knowing how, this does not enable us to say that 
they are essentially about practical reasoning. 
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However, I still consider that physical education can be shown to contribute 
to a person's development as a rational agent but not especially for the 
reasons Carr gives, rather I think a much stronger case can be made for 
physical education by looking at our development as rational agents in 
terms of being self- determining, capable of choice, making decisions and 
acting on them, in short, in terms of being evaluators. 
(b) Physical Education and the Development of the Person as an Evaluator 
It will be remembered from chapter two part one, that I used Taylor's 
argument that persons can be distinguished from the higher priniates not 
because they have first order desires but because they have second order 
ones(30). This means they can evaluate their desires, they can make 
qualitative evaluations, they can see the stronger desire is not necessarily 
the better one(31). As an evaluator, a person can be said to develop, not 
only because of his increased knowledge of the alternatives open to him, but 
also because of the extent to which he comes to value them, choose between 
them and turn them into action. Education, then, must be about giving the 
child a range of activities to choose from, in the hope that he will find some 
of them intrinsically worthwhile. Obviously what these are will be subject 
to practical considerations of what is suitable for him and what is already 
available and valued by the society in which he lives. 
Now, J. White in his first book I Towards A Compulsory Curriculum' (32) 
also argues a case for initiating children into a whole range of activities 
that they might want to choose for their own sake. In chapter two he says: 
I we do not know for any child on the threshold of education what the 
good will consist in for him. This follows from its subjectivity. But 
we do know, in formal terms, what his good will be. We know that 
only he can be in a position to determine this; and we know that he 
can determine this when he is in the "Ideal" situation, or making 
allowances for the unrealizability of this ideal, when he is as close as 
possible to this ideal situation' . (33) 
To do this he must satisfy as far as possible the following conditions: 
I he must know all the possible things he may want to choose for their 
own sake, and he must be ready to consider what to choose for their 
own sake, and he must be ready to consider what to choose from the 
point of view not only of the present moment but of his life as a 
whole' (34). 
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In considering on what grounds activities should be a compulsory part of 
the school curriculum - and those which should not, White makes an important 
distinction between 'those activities in which no understanding of what it is 
to want X is logically possible without engaging in X1 (category I) and those 
where some understanding of what it is to want X is logically possible without 
engaging in X (category 11) (35). It is only those activities that fall into 
category I that could be assured a place on a compulsory school curriculum, 
although those that come into category II may be allowed to figure in a 
voluntary one. 
In order to show that someone has an understanding of X it is sufficient 
that he can identify it, either by giving a correct verbal account sufficient 
to distinguish X from other things, or by giving a correct identification of 
cases of X (36). White gives several examples to illustrate these conditions; 
on the one hand, understanding what it is to communicate, engaging in pure 
mathematics and the physical sciences, appreciating works of art, 
philosophising; and on the other, climbing a mountain, speaking a foreign 
language, playing cricket, cooking, painting pictures. Only-the former would 
require getting the children to actually engage in them before they could have 
any understanding of them. He says, for example: 
Ia person incapable of speech lacks the concepts either to explain what 
communication is or be able to pick out examples of people engaging in 
the activity. But someone who has never climbed mountains can both 
give some kind of correct description of mountaineering and point out 
examples of it' (37). 
On White' s account, then, all P. E. activities would come into his second 
category for we can gain some understanding of them, at least to the extent 
of being able to identify when they are going on, without having to learn to 
engage in them. And one might add that as an informed spectator one could 
gain an, enormous amount of understanding. Now, White considers that this 
understanding is sufficient to enable the person to know if these are 
activities he would want to choose to do for their own sake. 
But how would this understanding be sufficient? Surely what is important is 
not just that we are able to identify the alternatives. What is at issue here 
is how children can be put in a position where they know what might be 
intrinsically worthwhile for them-, what might bring them personal satisfaction 
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of a non-detachable kind. But how can children possibly know if they are 
going to find an activity intrinsically worthwhile if they have never experienced 
the actual doing of it? If what matters is the satisfaction an activity might 
bring them then no amount of understanding will enable them to know what 
they will find and not find satisfying, if that understanding is limited to 
just being able to recognise the activity is going on. Indeed, even if like 
the informed observer, they understand a lot about what was going on, for 
example, in a game of cricket, this would not help, for no amount of 
theoretical understanding could replace the experience of playing. 
White in fact recognises that objections of this kind would be made about his 
account, that, for example, the cricket devotee will argue that one cannot 
understand what it is to play cricket until one has had plenty of experience 
of playing it. However, White argues this kind of discussion is beside the 
point. He says: 
I what should be at issue is not whether one can gain a full under- 
standing of cricket without playing it, but whether one can have some 
understanding of It, as measured by the two criteria laid down, that 
one can is surely indisputable' (38). 
But why should this be what is at issue? Why should we accept these kinds 
of criteria? For the only justification we have for doing so is whether this 
understanding is sufficient for a person to be in a position to choose between 
alternatives and my argument is that it is not. But this is not for the 
reason that White suggests others might put forward: that it is only by 
engaging in the activity like soccer that one can find out more of what it 
involves (for as I have already said, we can increase a child' s understanding 
of a game simply by turning him into a very knowledgeable spectator and 
not by having to get him to engage in it). Rather it is because it is only 
by the child experiencing what it is like to engage in different P. E. activities 
that he will be in a position to know if they could be intrinsically worthwhile 
for him. 
Children can be very impressionable, it is because, given the popular media 
and the commanding position sport has in our society that children can 
identify with ease, with the footballer, the mountaineer, the deep sea diver, 
the tennis player, the arctic explorer. Indeed they can come to idolise 
sportsmen, athletes and dancers, they often become extremely informed about 
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what these people can do, on the basis of this understanding they may well 
think that they would like to be a mountaineer or to engage in deep sea 
diving or to play tennis professionally. For it all looks exciting when it is 
done well and children usually have plenty of opportunity to watch sport 
carried out at its best; if this was all they had to go on how quickly they 
would become disillusioned. For it is only by experiencing these activities 
first hand that one will discover, firstly if one is any good at them: it is 
difficult to find an activity intrinsically worthwhile if one is unable to master 
it or if one is only ever able to do it badly; and secondly, if one will find 
them satisfying and this depends on all kinds of affective considerations. 
To state the somewhat obvious, identifying with the mountaineer on the 
television in the warmth of one' s own sitting room is quite different from how 
one would feel if one was actually climbing the mountain. Skiing, parachute 
jumping, diving can all look exhilarating until one actually tries to engage 
in them. 
And, of course, it can work the other way., children may on seeing a game 
of cricket going on consider it is an extremely boring game, but if they 
learnt to play they may find it extremely demanding and personally 
satisfying; or they may think canoeing is a very dangerous sport and that 
they would be much too frightened to enjoy it, but once they had learnt 
how to do it and become highly proficient they could find it becomes for 
them a lifelong pastime. 
All teachers know (and not only P. E. teachers) that children can have strong 
ideas about whether they are going to like an activity long before they learn 
to engage in it and this can be the case even if these ideas are based on a 
great deal of correct information they have about the activity. But after 
they start actually engaging in it and gain some expertise they can change 
their minds, they can decide the activity is for them after all, or conversely, 
that it should be given up at the first opportunity. 
At this stage it might be felt that there is a serious practical problem with 
my account, in that even if one agreed that all activities have to be engaged 
in before one can possibly be in a position to know what one might find 
intrinsically worthwhile, one might question how this could help us decide 
what should be on the school curriculum and what should not. For surely 
not all activities that a person might conceivably find intrinsically worthwhile 
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could appear on the curriculum, even if that was extended to include a 
non-compulsory one. 
In answer to this one, I would make the following points: 
Firstly, in suggesting physical education can be justified because it can 
contribute to learning which promotes the development of the person 
_qua 
person, I am presupposing that it will require initiation. There are plenty 
of activities, and this includes physical ones, that are trivial or very 
simple and can be picked up without there being any necessity for them 
to be engaged in in an educational institution. These would be clearly ruled 
out. 
Secondly, one has to accept, I think, that in giving the kind of educational 
justification I have, that when it comes down to the practical questions of 
what should actually feature on the curriculum that socially relative 
considerations are decisive (39). It depends, in the case of physical 
education on what sporting activities and forms of dance are already popular 
and generally valued, the reasons for which may well be historical and 
international. It also depends on what facilities are available in school and 
in society at large and this may depend on other kinds of factors, for 
example, financial and geographical ones. 
Thirdly, there are considerations of a moral kind; there are, for example, 
activities which could be discounted on grounds of cruelty. We would not 
initiate children into gladiator fighting and we might think twice about some 
forms of boxing, American football, ice hockey and blood sports. We would 
certainly make some distinctions on the grounds of sex when deciding what 
sports children should engage in. 
Iviore specifically, it may be possible to show that certain P. E. activities 
actually make a positive contribution to the development of the person as a 
moral agent. And this now needs to be looked at. 
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iv PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE PERSON AS A MORAL AGENT 
Whether physical education can contribute to a child' s moral development 
can be argued for in one of two ways, that is either intrinsic or extrinsic 
reasons can be given. Although by far the most numerous ones have been 
of the latter kind, an interesting attempt at a justification using intrinsic 
reasons is made by D. Aspin. 
In his article I Ethical Aspects of Sport and Games and Physical Education' (40), 
he argues the case: 
I it is possible for one to treat the whole topic of games and sports, 
not as means to promote the ends of moral education, but as being, 
in certain respects, activities necessarily underpinned by and shot 
through with presuppositions that are of an irreducibly ethical 
character? . (41) 
He continues: 
I They may therefore, to some extent, be regarded as moral enterprises, 
engagement in which is actually part of moral value and thus capable of 
being included in the educational programmes of those who seek to get 
young people started on the business of acting according to moral 
principles "off their own bats" so to speak' (42). 
(a) Are Games and Sports Necessarily Moral Enterprises 
Now can games and certain sports be correctly described as moral enterprises? 
And enterprises that are necessarily moral because of the presuppositions on 
which they are based? One has only to recall the kind of evidence we now 
witness on the football field (as well as on the terraces) and the rudeness 
that has become an increasingly common occurrence on the tennis court, 
the ruthlessness which more often than not characterises motor racing, to 
wonder how Aspin could make such bold a claim. 
Can, as he suggests, I authority, freedom, equality, fairness and justice, 
tolerance, dignity and magnanimity' really be said to be I implicit' in and to 
lie at the root I of all major games' (43) ? And if they are to be found there, 
why is it possible for the players to so wilfully disregard them and yet still 
be able (and this is the point that counts) to play the game. 
0 
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Now, of course, it is logically true that in order for someone to be said to 
be playing he must be playing according to the rules and not, for example, 
be deliberately breaking them. But this does not necessitate the player has 
to have a particular attitude towards his opponent (for example a magnanimous 
one) or that he has to have honourable motives for playing. It is unfortunately 
quite possible for someone who plays fairly, in that he keeps the rules 
impeccably, to have no regard for his opponent where his main intention may 
be to humiliate him. 
It is also true that in spite of the moral ideals that inspired and have since 
been associated with the Olympic Games, there is no reason why games, 
because they are games, should realize these ideals. Indeed, it is because 
their realization is dependent on the motives of men that much which has 
been written on the moral worth of the games should by now be the source 
of some embarrassment; for they have not only been used to bring about 
moral ends such as promoting friendship between athletes, strengthening 
international ties, they have also been instrumental in bringing about ignoble 
ones. for example, the demonstration of superiority of one nation over another. 
And it is the recollection of those Olympic Games which have been used to 
secure political ends, for example, the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin and 
the 1956 Melbourne Games, which has led writers like Alex Natan to talk 
of nationalism being sport' s deadliest enemy (44). The events of the last 
two Olympic Games would not have altered their opinion. 
One has only to consider examples such as these to wonder how one could 
possibly defend the view that there is something necessaril moral about 
engaging in sport. 
However, Aspin might wish to argue that he would not deny games can be 
misused, but this does not affect his argument - that they are in themselves 
moral enterprises; because, he says, in agreeing to play, the players have 
to be willing 'to be bound by the sorts of ethical considerations upon which 
the game fundamentally rests and that they understand what it is, so to 
do"(45). Indeed, he tries to use the fact that players (and his point could 
also be applied to others, for example, those who sponsor them) do disregard 
the moral nature of the games to prove his argument. For, he also says, 
I it is because this happens (players deliberately try to break the rules 
while remaining undetected), that we are so morally outraged, forexample 
at the behaviour of a Pereira or a colin IVII-eads' . (46) 
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Aspin argues that what happens in cases like these is that: 
I all the normal principles that underpin inter-personal transactions 
, 
of 
any sor - equality of consideration, fairness, consideration of interests, 
personal respect - have been unilaterally disregarded, suspended or 
just overturned. Sports and games activities, like any other activities 
seem to me to come under the same sort of moral umbrella; what applies 
to personal conduct in general applies afortiori (since voluntarily 
entered into under the overt declaration of acceptance of and adherence 
to the rules) to our conduct in sports and games' (47). 
But of course it is always (as Aspin himself admits) possible to apply moral 
criteria in any inter-personal situation. For any inter-personal transaction, 
indeed, any human action is open to moral judgment. This is because as I 
argued in chapter five, persons, as rational agents, living in society are 
always morally accountable for what they do. But this does not mean we 
are justified in describing every human action or inter-personal activity as 
moral. Very often the question of whether what a person is doing is moral 
or not (whether in terms of his motive, the consequences of his action or in 
terms of social justice) just does not arise. And even when it does, this may 
not mean we are justified in describing the actual activity as a moral one. 
Scientists engaged in research may be morally accountable for what they are 
doing but this does not make their activity necessarily moral. Although they 
may well be asked to answer moral questions about their methods and their 
findings, and rightly so, still, as far as the scientific research is concerned, 
the questions they will be answering will be scientific ones. 
Similarly, members of an orchestra have to co-operate with one another, agree 
to abide by certain rules of procedure and to accept the commanding authority 
of the conductor (the musician who plays out of tune in order to wreck a 
concert will inevitably have to face the moral wrath of his fellow musicians). 
But there is still no reason why, just because playing in an orchestra is an 
inter-personal affair, where, because of this, moral problems and questions 
will inevitably arise, that it has to be necessarily understood as a 'moral 
activity' or that it must be seen to come under I the moral umbrella' or be 
put into Ia moral category' and this is true even though it is often the 
case that we applaud musicians not only for the performance they have given 
but because of what we know about them as persons, for example, we may 
applaud their dedication, their industry and courage-, as well as their 
musical skill, imagination and sensitivity. 
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The same is often true in athletics and sport. As I have already acknow- 
ledged (48) our admiration for the great athlete or sportsman is often moral 
admiration; we know the personal qualities that were necessary for an athlete 
to achieve the degree of physical excellence that is being exhibited in an 
athletic competition or in a game, but this does not mean the athletic 
competition, any more than scientific research or playing in an orchestra, 
is itself a moral enterprise. 
Crucial to Aspin' s argument is the fact that games are activities mutually 
enjoyed and which can only be engaged in with the co-operation of those one 
is competing against (as well as, where this is applicable, one's own team 
members), and where engagement is dependent on keeping to rules which 
enshrine general principles which, Aspin argues, are moral ones. He says: 
'Sport and games are not so much paradigm cases of moral habits in action, 
but, rather that moral principles of one sort or another are actually part 
and parcel of their make up' ., (4 , 
9) And he also comments, I if one plays 
games or takes part in any form of sporting or athletic activity, of necessity, 
one must stick to certain moral principles' . (50-) 
Now of course one cannot disagree that playing games is dependent on 
everyone playing according to the rules but one can question whether doing 
so implies the acceptance on the part of the players of moral principles. 
What I suspect is that Aspin has taken the formal principles on which our 
understanding of the meaning of a rule c gua rule rests and turned them into 
substantial moral principles. Take for example the principle of fairness. 
This in itself is a purely formal principle, one described by R. S. Peters in 
'Ethics and Education' 'that no distinctions should be made unless there 
are relevant differences' (5,1). Now, it is only because we can reason in this 
way that we can operate with rules at all. We could not abide by a set of 
rules or engage in rule governed activities unless we had a prior understanding 
of this principle. But while it is a necessary condition of other principles 
being described as moral'ones, this does not mean the condition is in itself 
a moral one, rather it only becomes morally significant when what it is being 
applied to is, in the first instance, of moral value or importance. 
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spm says: 
I the athlete gains his position of pre-eminence as a result of his own 
spirit of dedication and sacrifice and, crucially under a system of 
rules which rest upon the acceptance of human worth and dignity, on 
the concepts of fairness and equality' (52). 
But I would say the system of rules only rests on the idea of making the 
activity possible. Rules do not exist to make possible or to regulate moral 
conduct but to define the game. To say of someone that he is playing a 
game is necessarily to say that he is abiding by the principle of fairness, 
but this is to say no more than that he is playing according to the rules, 
for adhering to the rules at least in part is just to understand and accept 
this principle. 
It is interesting that Aspin himself admits that to be morally relevant an 
action will spring from a free choice on the part of their agent and will 
be based on his ability to give reasons for them that are'relevant and 
appropriate, capable in principle at all events of being judged as such by 
people generally' (53). But actions within the game carried out because of 
what the rules dictate are not freely chosen. And this is why it is just 
inappropriate to see the rules of the game, and therefore the principles by 
which we are able to operate with them, as moral ones. For we recognise 
moral rules as such, not only because they belong to a particular moral 
system in which rational agents have a mutual interest, but where those who 
act according to,. the rules have some degree of choice. If we describe an 
action as moral it is not just because it is in accordance with a moral rule 
but because we believe the person should have acted otherwise. Where we 
understand moral autonomy as an important characteristic in the development 
of the person as a moral agent then we would expect him to act from moral 
rules only when they reflect higher order principles that he has freely 
accepted, and to be able to change the rules when they fail to do this. 
Moral rules, as J. Rawls has argued in his article 'Two Concepts of Rules, 
are therefore more likemaxims or rules of thumb than rules that define a 
practice' (54). 
Rawls, in this article, compares rules as guides where one has in principle 
full option to use the guides or to discard them as the situation warrants 
without one's moral office being altered in any way and rules which define 
306 
a practice. With rules of this second kind one holds an office defined by 
a practice then questions regarding one' s actions in this office are settled 
by reference to the rules which define the practice and where the practice 
is logically prior to the forms of action it specifies (55). To engage in a 
practice is to perform those actions specified by a practice. It therefore 
does not make sense for a person to raise the question whether or not a 
rule of a practice correctly applies to his case as it would in the case of a 
moral rule. Rawls says: 
I we would take it as some kind of joke if in a game of basketball a 
batter were to ask can I have four strikes. But was not asking for 
a specification of the rules but was wondering if on this occasion it 
would be best on the whole for him to have four strikes instead 
of three' (56). 
In a moral situation to ask about the desirability of a rule is to expect an 
answer in terms of the well-being of the person or persons concerned or in 
terms of the common good. But in a game to ask about the desirability of 
a rule is to expect an answer in terms of how it might contribute to the 
technical goodness of the game, how, for example, it might be changed in 
order that it might produce a better game. It is knowing what the rules 
make possible that enables us to decide what kind of rules they are and 
whether or not they are moral rules. 
There are some rules in a game however which are of a moral nature, this 
is because as well as determining the logical character of the game they 
safeguard the interests of the players as human beings capable, at least, 
of suffering physical pain. There are therefore many rules, particularly in 
dangerous sports (like combat sports) that ensure the safety of the lives 
of the players and as far as it is possible to do this, freedom from injury. 
In boxing and fencing, for example, the rules do not allow the players to 
fight to the death or that serious injury is inflicted (at least they try to 
prevent it happening) . However, it is still conceivable, as it was at the 
time of ancient Rome, that a game could be devised where the rules allowed, 
indeed even necessitated, that this happened. In a human blood sport such 
as this, in spite of a total disregard for the most basic moral values of human 
life, it would be no less a game because of it. Another example which 
illustrates the same point is the one Peters givesin 'Ethics and Education' 
during his analysis of justice, of the torturer who, in spite of his wicked 
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practices could be described as just in that he could exercise his art on 
his victims with fine distinction and impartiality (57). Cruel sports, 
unfortunately are still sports. 
Usually, however, as I have said, rules that define a game or sport do not 
allow the practice of cruelty but this does not mean that what they do allow 
is a moral enterprise rather they make possible an activity that is morally 
neutral. 
With regard to making any kind of justification because of the kinds of 
activities games and sports by their competitive and rule governed nature 
necessarily are, I think the most that can be said is that children will through 
playing games come to understand the principles of fairness which is also a 
necessary principle in moral reasoning. Mlore specifically, one can say learning 
to adhere to a set of rules may be necessary before one can understand what 
it means to live according to moral rules. But this would be a very limited 
kind of justification indeed, because at best it could only be seen as a pre- 
condition before a particular stage of moral development could be reached 
(for example, Kohlberg's good boy stage (58)), but which in itself would 
be an aspect of a child' s cognitive rather than moral development. 
(b) Inter-Personal Agreement 
It may be felt at this stage that I have not done full justice to Aspin' s account 
in that I have ignored the fact that playing a game is not just a question of 
the players adhering to the rules, it also necessitates that there is inter- 
personal agreement to abide by them in the first place. 
J. H. Green in his article I Competitive Sport, Morality and Education, (59) 
suggests that agreeing to play the game according to the rules is analogous 
to making a promise, so that someone breaking the rules deliberately to 
secure an unfair advantage is like a person failing to keep his word. This 
is why it is always morally appropriate to condemn the cheat. 
The function of the rules is, as I have argued, to define the activity, but 
this is not their only function, in sports and games they also ensure that 
both players or teams have an equal opportunity to win. If the rules are 
deliberately broken and where this remains undetected, not only can the 
activity be said to be no longer going on, but, also, that the condition of 
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equal opportunity is no longer being met. Now Green argues that if players 
set themselves above these rules and create an unfair situation so that their 
winning can be disputed they do not appreciate the full entailment of their 
moral decision to play the game. However, this does not lead him to believe, 
as it did Aspin, that games are moral enterprises, rather he says I any 
connections which exist between competitive sport and morality are contingent 
not logical or conceptual ones' (60). Although he views the players' original 
decision to take part in a game as an analogue to making a promise he 
concludes that, 'once 
, 
this promise is made no further moral issues ought, 
and this implies can, arise' . (61) For when a player cheats while 
he is held 
morally responsible for his actions, this is not in relation to what rule he 
has broken or, as Green says, 'in terms of the specific incidence, but in 
relation to the players' original moral decision to play the game' (62). We 
disapprove of the cheat because he puts the whole activity in jeopardy. 
While I believe Aspin is wrong to say that games are necessarily moral 
enterprises, I believe that equally wrong are those who see games as somehow 
being immune from ethical considerations or moral judgments, whether 
regarding the conduct of the individual players or the game as a whole. 
bluch of what Aspin says I could have accepted if he had not gone so far 
and had limited himself to making the point that playing a game is an inter- 
personal activity and therefore open to moral comment. 
Certainly it is wrong to argue, as some have done, that because games are 
self-contained, separate from the serious business of living that we can 
behave just as we like on the games field because ethically it does not matter. 
Cheating in playing games is just as morally deplorable as cheating a friend 
out of some money or breaking someone's confidence. Playing games is just 
as much a part of life as any other inter-personal activity and we are 
therefore just as morally accountable on the playing field or athletic track 
as off them. 
It is because of this that Green is quite right to say cheating in a game is 
comparable to breaking a promise, but he is also right, for the reasons I 
have already given, to say that any connection between sport and morality 
is only contingent. If Aspin' s arguments that games are necessarily moral 
enterprises seem at all plausible it is only because he takes very broad 
criteria of what would enable an activity to be described as coming into 
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the moral category, so, in effect, all actions and activities (at least inter- 
personal ones) end up coming into it. 
Now, it will be remembered from part one, chapter five, that one of the 
difficulties in examining the nature of morality is that it can be given so 
many different meanings (see pp'. 120-122). We only had to consider, for 
example, the difference between positive morality and individual morality (63) 
and the importance of both rational and social criteria in deciding what 
counts as moral action. Also with regard to moral agency it was found there 
was the problem that one can only say a person is necessarily a moral agent, in 
the very weak sense that as a rational agent and as a member of society, 
he will be held morally accountable for his behaviour, and there are as we 
saw, many other importantly different reasons why we should wish to describe 
persons as moral agents. For, in spite of the use of the one term I moral 
agent' which might be used to describe all of the following, I argued that 
we still needed to distinguish betweeD: Iihe person who has through reflection 
arrived at his own moral principles which may go beyond what is socially 
required of him and the one who unthinkingly accepts the moral norms of 
his time; the man who acts ýýnorallyll but always prudentially and the one 
who is motivated by selfless ideals; and between the person who always acts 
on his moral beliefs, without thinking too much about them and the one who 
never gets past the stage of deliberating' . (64) 
Now it seems to me that Aspin fails to take these kinds of differences into 
account esPecially when looked at in relation to moral education. Where our 
interest is in what moral values we wish children to come to hold, where we 
are concerned whether they will have the strength of character to live by 
them and whether they will be motivated for reasons of altruism, self-interest 
or moral duty, then a broad definition of morality is no good to us. 
In chapter eight, when considering what criteria would have to be fulfilled 
for a person' s development to count as his development 
_qua 
person it had 
to be accepted that it was impossible to say anything very helpful with 
regard to how a person might necessarily develop as a moral agent, in that 
to say a person will necessarily become morally accountable for what he does, 
tells us nothing about his moral development per . Whether we 
like it or 
not to talk about moral education and more specifically aims of moral education, 
we have to enter the prescriptive stage where what we put forward will be 
highly contestable and this will inevitably be true of what I have to say next. 
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Now I would hold the view that in moral education we should give a lot of 
consideration to what motivates us in our conduct towards each other, the 
importance of which Aspin seems to neglect. To get children just to 
understand that life is I beset with obligations of one sort and anotherl t (65) 
even to get them in the position of being able to adapt, justify, analyse 
or apply principles 'in inter-personal affairs in the world, that they can 
seem to be universalizeable, overriding, other-regarding, significantly 
related to human welfare and harm' (66) does not do justice to their 
development as individuals who care for each other, it is too much like an 
intellectual exercise comprising largely of deliberate reflection on what they 
ought to do while fulfilling all these different criteria. 
In reality we do not very often have to make difficult moral decisions that 
involve all this deliberation, and when we do have to, we do not always 
know which principle is the most important to us, so that when we have made 
a decision and acted upon it we may always wonder if we did the right thing. 
In any case most of the time we just act, because of the kind of people we 
have become, because of the way we feel towards each other and how we see 
the situation at that moment in time. 
of course the development of moral autonomy is important, it is obviously an 
ideal that can be justified as an aim of moral education, but the only or even 
the main ideal? 
Suppose a child had progressed sufficiently in his moral thinking so he could 
be said to have reached Kohlberg's sixth and final stage of his moral 
development, (67), but suppose he was unable to relate to his fellow human 
beings and suppose he always behaved for reasons of prudence and never, 
for example, out of love, would this be enough? Would it be sufficient that 
he had become morally autonomous. 
Imagine another child not very good at stating, let alone deliberating, what 
moral principles he should hold, but who invariably acted only out of 
kindness towards his fellow beings whose moral education was not so much 
the result of anything he had learnt formally at school (whether from the 
attitude of his teacher, the school acting as a community or discussion of the 
relevant moral issues of the day) but what he had learnt from the living 
example of his mother and his own natural inclincation that other people matter. 
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Suppose we could get children to the stage of deliberating over their moral 
principles, but suppose, although these principles were other-regarding, 
they always acted out of self-interest because being rational they could see 
that living in a society was dependent on upholding a moral code or codes 
which they all adhered to for reasons of reciprocal advantage, would we 
believe they were now,, morally educated because they behaved correctly 
and could justify their behaviour rationally as autonomous agents? Would 
this even make any sense when we compared it against our experience of 
moral life which is intimately caught up with our feelings towards one 
another? Does it really not matter how we feel in our moral conduct as 
long as we do the right thing? 
Mary Midgley in an article, I The Objection to Systematic Humbug, (68) argues 
to my mind convincingly that it does matter (69). She says, I if a rational 
creature has to be a social creature it also has to be a creature with 
affections to suppose otherwise is an illicit abstraction' (70) - She says, Ito 
praise will without feelings makes little sense. Every thought about values 
has to have its passive contemplative element we cannot really think injustice 
is bad if it does not at some point sicken us' (71). But equally, she says, 
I however highly we may value feeling we do not actually praise Feeling which 
is divorced from Will (72) 
0' 
Feeling is both active and deliberate, both are 
resolved in action. I Thought, feeling and action are conceptionally not 
contingently connected, they are aspects of the one thing - conduct' (73). 
She emphasises the development of our attitudes through active thinking and 
imagining: 
I Goodwill is not the power to do the right thing suddenly while still 
wallowing in habitual ill-will, envy, self-pity or the fear of life. It 
is the power to change such emotional habits over time through 
vigorous attending and imagining into better ones' (74). 
Now my problem is that given these kinds of considerations are_, as I see 
it, important to our understanding of what constitutes moral conduct, one 
of our main aims of moral education must be to foster the development of 
particular emotional attitudes, namely those characterised by 'caring' motives, 
for example, tolerance, benevolence, sympathy and compassion. But 
how 
can we possibly defend the view that playing games and enjoying sports can 
help develop these kinds of attitudes? Now, of course, it is possible that 
engaging in P. E. activities could help children to become generous and 
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tolerant even magnanimous, but to labour the point, this does not follow 
simply from playing games. For playing games does not necessitate what 
particular kind of motive a player should have. Even if a person behaves 
impeccably while playing a game, he would never, for example, dream of 
cheating, this need not be out of any respect or concern he has for his 
opponent or even because he does not like to go back on his original 
commitment to play the game (analagous to wanting to keep his promise) but 
because he can see keeping to the rules is necessary if the activity is to 
go on (to put it more strongly he can -see that to keep the rules Is to 
engage in the activity) . He does not have to see 
his opponent as a person 
at all (once he is engaging in the activity) but simply as another player 
instrumental in enabling him to play. It is significant perhaps that moral 
judgments do not arise until someone intentionally breaks the rules while 
trying to remain undetected. We do not pass moral judgment where eveyone 
is playing according to the rules, we do not say I look at everyone behaving 
morally' , which we should be able to do if games were necessarily moral 
enterprises. It is also significant that when it does become appropriate to 
pass judgment it is invariably passed not so much on what has actually 
happened (e. g. a deliberate infringement of a rule which may in itself be 
trivial) but on what this tells us about a player's character. 
(c) A Justification Which Looks To Non-Intrinsic Reasons 
If we have any hope of showing that physical education can contribute to a 
child' s moral development we will have to look to a justification that is based 
on non-intrinsic reasons. This kind of justification acknowledges that games 
and sports as well as dance are not necessarily moral enterprises and that 
any moral lessons which may be learnt from engaging in them is a contingent 
not a necessary consequence of playing. It therefore has the advantage of 
being honest, of making certain claims without at the same time having to 
distort the nature of games in doing so. If we can accept these limitations 
I think some kind of case can be made. 
The main reason why I think at least it is possible that physical education 
could have a part to play in contributing to a child' s moral development is 
because during the P. E. lesson and in P. E. activities generally there is 
necessarily, unlike in many classroom lessons and activities, a considerable 
degree of interaction between children engaged in a shared enterprise. 
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In engaging in games, dance and gymnastics children could, for example, 
learn to become tolerant of one another, to be patient and to be co-operative. 
But these kinds of attitudes do not come, as I have just argued, as a 
logically necessary consequence of taking part in P. E. activities, neither do 
I think has it been shown empirically that these attitudes will just develop 
by dint of engaging, whether it be in sport or in any other aspect of 
physical education. I think what has to be accepted is that any moral 
education which comes about through physical education will only be the 
result of the deliberate efforts of the teacher. If the teacher is prepared to 
see his role as a moral educator, as well as a teacher of P. E., then, he could 
help to encourage attitudes of friendship and respect between members of 
the group and to discourage negative ones like meanness, hostility and 
spitefulness. 
Clearly, the P. E. teacher's greatest opportunity would come in outdoor 
pursuits. In such activities as camping, orienteering, mountaineering, 
canoeing and sailing one is dependent, even in order to participate in them, 
on the co-operation of every member of the group, where, and this is the 
point that counts, one' s life may depend upon it. in something like 
mountaineering without such qualities as perseverance, patience, courage, 
mutual understanding and tolerance the whole enterprise is doomed to failure 
and in all outdoor pursuits there is the need to share, to act jointly and to 
trust one another. 
M. C. Meakin in an article,, ' Physical Education: An Agency of Moral 
Education? ' (75) also emphasises the potential moral significance of these 
kinds of activities. In camping, for example, he says: 
I the conditions under which one is forced to live are relatively spartan 
and that one has to live in close proximity with one's fellows. The 
aim being group survival plus a tolerable quality of life, high levels 
of mutual co-operation, tolerance and self-control are demanded-' (76) 
While a fairly strong case can be made for these activities where there is 
the potential problem if even mt1imally, of physical survival I think it has 
to be accepted that other aspects of physical education, particularly in games 
and sports, where there is not this element of life and death, the manner, 
approach and where necessary the intervention of the teacher, will be much 
more contrived, and unfortunately one has to say that-, however committed 
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the teacher might be to his role as a moral educator, indeed even to the 
point where trying to foster attitudes which will lead to the development of 
children's moral character might actually be his main aim, he may well be 
disappointed. For he is much more unlikely to be successful now than he 
would have been in the days when qualities of sportsmanship were recognised 
and valued on a universal scale. Inevitably the replacement in many 
instances of amateur with professional sport has played its part in the 
gradual erosion of the old values associated with gamesmanship. Phrases 
like I that' s not cricket' .I be a sport', now seem to 
have little meaning in 
relation to their original context and at best sound rather quaint. 
There is also the problem of transfer. If moral lessons are learnt, for 
example, through dancing with other people, can these lessons be applied 
elsewhere? If moral qualities are observed in a games player are they also 
to be found in his behaviour when he is not playing? D. Meakin in the 
article already referred to raises the same problem. He says that: 
I even if it might be granted that pupils would develop moral qualities 
in different aspects of physical education it will still be doubted whether 
these qualities will be transferred to other areas of a pupil' s life' . (76) 
However in spite of this doubt he still believes there can be transfer in 
that the principles of action they learn in P. E. activities will be relevantly 
similar in other situations (77). 
Personally I do not think that this kind of claim amounts to very much, 
largely for the reasons Meakin himself raises, that what is of most interest 
to us is whether motivation is likely to be transferred (although this seems 
an odd way of putting it). Meakin tries to argue that because there are 
numerous similarities as well as differences in sport and other activities 
in life then Iff a pupil can be motivated to behave in morally praiseworthy 
ways in certain situations arising in competitive sport and the rest there 
would appear to be no reason in principle why he cannot be motivated to 
behave in these ways in a relevantly similar situation in other activities 
too' (78). But I do not find his argument convincing. 
However, what I would endorse is that, firstly, if moral qualities are to be 
found in P. E. activities, like sport, dance and outdoor pursuits, as a result 
of engaging in them (which in the latter, as I have argued, is very likely 
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to be the case) , then this is of positive educational value because these 
activities do, in themselves, constitute a part of life. But secondly, that 
any transfer is not going to be automatic, and that generally speaking where 
we do think it is possible that moral development can occur through engage- 
ment in physical education, particularly in outdoor pursuits, we have to 
accept this will largely be the result of the deliberate and conscious efforts 
of the teacher. 
CONCLUSION 
In part one I suggested that the concept of education, if it is to be of any 
use to philosophers, has to be seen as an essentially contestable concept, 
where there is only at a very basic level unanimous agreement on what 
the preconditions of education must be, namely that it is about learning 
within a social context, learning which presupposes the agency of the person 
L and which has a transforming effect- in that it changes the person Cua 
person by the difference it makes to him in terms of what he comes to know, 
his conceptual awareness, the evaluations he makes and the attitudes he 
holds. It is from this level of agreement that definitions of education can 
be constructed at a higher level which are logically based on these pre- 
conditions but which will nevertheless be contestable and will conflict with 
one another. Furthermore their validity at this level depends on those who 
put them forward being able to defend them by showing their advantages 
over other definitions, for example, how well they realize those values 
presupposed in the preconditions and how strongly grounded they are in 
those preconditions (used to replace Galliel s example) about which we must 
necessarily agree. 
I have argued that education is best understood as: I learning which promotes 
the development of the person qua person' , for the reason that this does 
justice to the fact that education presupposes learning, the agency of the 
person and the fact that what he learns actually changes him; and I have 
defended this definition against other definitions, for example, that education 
is only concerned with the development of knowledge and understanding, or 
on just becoming a person ancjý the development of autonomy. It is on the 
basis of the definition I have given and defended in parts one and two that 
I have been able in part three to justify physical education. 
316 
I would suggest the reason why justifications of physical education have 
failed in the past was for two main reasons. Firstly, we have lacked a 
theory of physical education whichomeant our subject area had no principle 
of unity, no underlying rationale, this has not only meant physical education 
could not easily be defined (which as we have seen has even led some to 
suggest we should dispense with the term altogether and write our obituary 
(see p.,. 191) . 
but also that where there have been disputes. arising 
from competing claims over what physical education is essentially about, 
there has been no way of resolving them. Secondly, the definitions of 
education from which philosophers worked, in effect made it logically 
impossible to justify physical education. For example, if one understands 
education to be the development only of knowledge and understanding, it is 
hard to justify the educational value of those activities where the main values 
are to do with the realization of physical skill and aesthetic quality in human 
movement and where cognitive values are at best secondary. 
But by taking a formalist theory usually to be found only in the philosophy 
of art and aesthetics and by applying it to P. E. activities, physical education 
can be seen to have a coherent rationale and recognisable IRI values which 
are unique and apply universally; and by defining education as I learning 
which promotes the development of the person 
_qua 
person' , it is possible 
to justify physical education because of the considerable contribution it 
makes to the development of the person. 
FirstIV, as a centre of experience by learning to engage in P. E. activities 
the person will find satisfaction of a non-detachable kind: 
(a) Generally, there will be the interplay of different powers (for example, 
fitness, physical skill, strength. and endurance, creativity, imagination, 
practical judgment., courage) and the harmony that comes from the 
release of these powers working together. Physical education can 
therefore provide for many what they may well want to describe as 
spiritual renewal as well as personal fulfilment. 
(b) More specifically, there is the intrinsic satisfaction which comes from 
moving skilfully. This after all is the point of sporting activities 
existing. They are contrived to bring about an artificial end because 
realizing this end demands physical skill which is intrinsically valued. 
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(c) Also, and again quite specifically, there is aesthetic satisfaction to be 
found, particularly in dance but also to some extent in those sports 
like gymnastics which are defined. at least in part., by aesthetic criteria. 
Learning to engage in dance and these kinds of sports necessitate the 
understanding of aesthetic rules and principles and the appreciation 
of the aesthetic quality of movements which are defined, if only partially, 
by aesthetic criteria. There is also, and this is *. more important 
because it is unique to engaging 
' 
in certain P. E. activities, the experience 
of gaining aesthetic satisfaction in a way only available to the performer, 
that is through his kinaesthetic sense. 
Critiques given on physical education must, I would suggest, to be valid come 
from the inside, and not, as so often happens, from the point of view of a 
critical spectator. For however considerable the spectator's knowledge of 
particular P. E. activities might be and however much he enjoys and 
appreciates watching them being performed, it is only the participant who 
can, for example, by-- struggling to make his limbs go in unaccustomed ways, by 
continually repeating movements until they become second nature; by under- 
taking tests of endurance and physical strength, 6jbecoming sensitive to the 
movements of others, ly learning the fit between what the movement looks like 
to perform and what counts as successful technique or aesthetic excellence, 
come to appreciate those values that are discovered only through finally 
gaining mastery and the experience and sense of freedom this brings. 
Then, incidentally, there will be other kinds of satisfaction. For example 
for a few there will be the satisfaction to be gained from proving oneself 
to be good in a way that could get world-wide recognition, and for all of 
us there will often be the opportunity to enjoy visually the aesthetic form 
of other participants' movements, to appreciate natural beauty and to 
experience the feeling of physical well-being that comes from the purposeful 
exercising of the human body. 
Secondly, as a rational agent it can be said that physical education can 
contribute to the development of the person qua person because being 
initiated into a particular group of intrinsically worthwhile activities increases 
the range of alternatives open to him that he might want to choose for their 
own sake. If he does, learning to engage in them may have provided him 
with life-long interests. In a society in which unemployment is commonplace 
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and which advances in modern technology is likely to continue to be so and 
where also a great amount of leisure time is available to many of us, it would 
not be to go too far to say that for some engagement in physical activities 
will help them to find life worth living. 
Thirdl , as a moral agent it can 
be said that, incidentally and to a limited 
extent, physical education may make a positive contribution to a person's 
development, especially in outdoor pursuits. But it has to be emphasised 
that if engagement in P. H. activities does contribute to the development of 
the person as a moral agent this is not a necessary consequence of engaging 
in P. E. activities (for they are not, as Aspin argued in some sense 
essentially moral enterprises), rather it is dependent on whether the teacher 
is prepared to take advantage of interactive and co-operative situations most 
P. E. activities involve in order to get over moral lessons to his pupils. 
Fourthly, and also incidentally, it can be said that because engagement in 
many P. E. activities is likely to enable a person to reach a level of physical 
fitnessCwhich can be measured in physiological terms) this will enable him to 
cope with the stresses and strains of everyday living and to help him remain 
active throughout his life. It will therefore help in an indirect way towards 
the development of the person qua person and the subsequent quality of his 
life. 
However, in the end we must all acknowledge that it is only because there 
are values in physical education which are not to be found anywhere else, 
namely unique IKI qualities and the appreciation of which requires initiation 
into different participatory activities, that the educational value, of P. E. 
activities can be most strongly justified and subsequently the place of 
physical education on the school curriculum. For example some may want 
to talk of physical education as one kind of a unique form of experience, 
others may see the necessity of having physical education on the curriculum, 
if education is to be of the I whole man' - There is no need to look 
further; 
although physical education may contribute to developing a child' s capacity 
for rational thinking, his moral behaviour and attitudes; and while there 
may be the opportunity for the appreciation of natural beauty and the 
aesthetic aspects of a particular game like football, not actually defined 
by 
aesthetic criteria, these are incidental I spin-offs' and should never 
detract 
from those unique IKI qualities which, unlike these other values, can only 
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be discovered by actually engaging in physical education. And we do a 
disservice to what as practioners (i. e. as sportsmen and women, athletes 
and dancers) we value most if we forget this. 
Finally, something needs to be said about a certain dimension that P. E. 
activities have, which other activities, although they may be physical and 
carried out for the kinds of non-extrinsic reasons described above, are not. 
In a sedentary society like our own we cannot usually look to everyday action 
to find examples of physical prowess or aesthetic forms of physical expression. 
Activities have to be contrived for this purpose (although, of course, they 
always were when living was more primitive, and survival demanded physical 
action; this was no more true than it was at the time of Ancient Greece) . 
Without sport and dance there would be the risk that we could forget, at 
least in movement terms, the physical aspect of our being. We desire in 
western society to make ourselves comfortable, to kill pain, to move as little 
as possible. But whatever our capacity for thought we are subject to the 
same natural laws as any other species. In the end it is our physical 
condition that has the last word but at least while it allows us we have the 
chance to let our bodies speak! ý 
One can, when they are done well, see activities like cricket, basketball, 
fencing, ice skating, Russian dancing, marathon running, ski jumping as 
forms of human greatness or excellence, worthy of universal acclaims, even, 
as in the case of the round-the-world yachtsmen, moral acclaim. This says 
something about the nature or 'mentality' of these activities that they are 
up to this, that they can inspire us to think in this way. It would not be 
true of all physical activities even if they were carried out for intrinsic 
reasons and carried out well. One could never have the same sorts of 
feelings towards someone who could spit a long way, knit quickly or spin 
a plate for hours on end; and there are some activities like those in I It's 
A Knockout' which are designed to be funny, rather than to exhibit skill 
(although they do), to be laughed at rather than to be applauded (although 
they are). P. E. activities have a certain dimension that makes it possible 
for us to talk in terms of human achievement and makes them worthy of 
learning, dedication, in short of being called physical education. 
What I am suggestin g, then, is that the full nature of sport and dance can 
only be understood against a certain background. This background is one 
320 
where we see man as a physical being with severe limitations, for example, 
of being subject to the laws of nature, of being physically vulnerable, of 
ultimately being finite, it is against this conception of man that we see his" 
attempts to overcome these limitations as heroic. We recognise a certain 
magnificence in the movements of the great athletes or dancers because they 
give us a glimpse of what we might have been, had we been more god-like 
and had not the awkwardness of our human frame. 
Now it does not matter that it is only a minority that gives us this ideal; 
we should not, as some have done, devalue the potential of P. E. activities 
because the vast majority are not able to realize it (indeed by comparison 
do rather badly) . It is not as if the existence of these persons, past or 
present, who have given us this ideal, prevent others from aspiring towards 
it by performing as well as they are able to. 
For it is only through engaging in physical education that we can become 
fully aware of unique IKI qualities which we are able to appreciate 
disinterestedly; and it is only through the release and interplay of many 
different powers, including the power of our imagination, that we can 
experience spiritual renewal, a special kind of freedom in the rhythm and 
harmony of our total physical and personal being. 
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